Operation Valuable Fiend

by Albert Lulushi

  After this, the team missed five consecutive contacts, not reappearing until August 13 when they said that they had distributed the arms and were awaiting the return of Shehi. Athens replied that unforeseen circumstances were complicating Zenel’s return at that time. Then, on September 1, Athens asked if the team was able to exfiltrate to Greece. On September 14, Apple parried the base’s request: “We are waiting for Shehi and you tell us to return to Greece. This, and no answer on the information promised about Shehi has us greatly worried. We await information tomorrow.”

  The base informed Apple on September 15 that Shehi could not return that season and that the team must make plans to come out. Apple replied on September 17 that it could not stay without Shehi and agreed to exfiltrate after a supply drop, specifically requesting food and clothing for their return trip and gold to pay off their local contacts. The supplies were dropped on September 19. The Sigurimi sent a message on September 22 acknowledging receipt of the two containers and thanked the crew for the drop.

  On September 26, Apple reported on the preparations they were making for their departure. Athens advised them to get started before the onset of winter weather. On September 29, Apple announced they planned to begin the trek to Greece on October 15, after making appropriate explanations to their friends and contacts. On the October 4 transmission, the team announced that its departure was causing despair among friends but that all was under control. They said they were bringing out some friends who would guide them and asked for another drop of food and clothing for these friends. On the 17th of October, base asked Apple to await a drop during the period of October 21–25.

  At the next scheduled communication, on October 22, Apple confirmed the resupply plan and reported that it had been waiting at the drop zone since October 19. Athens told them to await the drop that same night of October 22–23. A radio communication control challenge was issued with the message. Later that same day, Apple made an unscheduled contact stating that they had not arrived at the DZ yet and would not be able to receive the drop that night, but would be ready the following night. Kabashi provided a negative control response to the latest challenge, as he had done throughout his exchanges with Athens.

  On October 23 Athens received this message from the team: “In 212. Tonight we will await the drop at DZ I-1531 between the hours of 21 until 23 local time. The zone is quiet.”

  The response that went out was: “Out 140. Await drop tonight 23 October.”61

  * * *

  Red flags should have been raised in Athens by the fact that Apple had chosen the DZ and had reported on October 22 that they had been on location since October 19, only to contradict themselves later that same day by indicating that they had not arrived at the DZ and were unable to receive the drop that night. Even though Athens suspected the team to be controlled, it went along with the sudden change in plans.

  On the night of October 23–24, the C-47 covert aircraft approached the designated DZ at three hundred feet altitude with an airspeed of 105 mph. While the plane was crossing the illuminated “T,” which was the ground signal pointing at the precise location of the drop point, two anti-aircraft batteries opened fire. The pilot applied take-off power immediately and began a right turn. A few instants after starting the turn, the aircraft was hit by one 20 mm shell and oil pressure on the left engine dropped to zero. The pilot cut off power to the engine to prevent fire, feathered the propeller to reduce drag to a minimum, and flew the aircraft on one engine. As the plane escaped from the valley, another five anti-aircraft positions opened fire. The plane was forced to make an emergency landing at Brindisi, Italy. According to the flight navigator, only the pilot’s exceptional skill made escape possible.62

  The firing on the aircraft left no doubts that Sigurimi had been controlling the Apple team. The Athens Fiend staff and headquarters began dissecting the operational records to determine how big the damage was, how long the team had been under control, and what were the possible sources of compromise. E. Howard Hunt, based in Rome at the time as head of covert operations for the CIA’s Southeast European Branch, began to search for a possible double agent in the midst of the Albanians who had knowledge of the operations. Doubts first fell on Colonel Selmani, who had escorted the four agents parachuted on June 5 and on his way back to Cairo had talked about them to Abas Kupi in Rome. Then Hunt scrutinized sympathizers of Zog in the Albanian Labor Services Company 4000 in Germany. Hunt would later say that he asked the head of a branch within the CIA in charge of “wet jobs” whether they had the capability to liquidate the double agent if found, but because his query had not been specific enough it had been brushed aside.63

  CIA map indicating the area of operations of Apple team and the spot where the covert plane was hit by antiaircraft fire on October 24, 1953

  In November and December, information began to trickle in from sources in Yugoslavia that Zenel Shehi and several of his comrades had been captured by the Sigurimi. Reports indicated that Shehi had been separated from the other prisoners and Mehmet Shehu, the minister of interior, was personally conducting his interrogation.

  Then, on December 29, Radio Tirana announced the capture of six members of the group, Zenel Shehi, Halil Branica, Hamit Matiani, Ahmet Kabashi, Gani Malushi, and Naum Sula. Three men were reported killed, Nuri Plaka, Zenun Gjolena, and Haxhi Gjyla. No mention was made of Tahir Premçi and Pal Nikolla.

  The news caused a great deal of distress and sorrow in the Albanian émigré circles. There was disbelief particularly with Matiani’s capture. All of those who knew or had worked with Matiani believed he must have been drugged or so surprised that he could neither fight nor take his own life to avoid capture. Operational teams spending the winter in the Athens area indicated that this whole incident had given them even more motivation for activity against the regime. However, the morale of Albanians at large, in refugee camps in Greece, in Italy, and at the Labor Service Company in Germany, suffered deeply.64

  * * *

  The show trial of the six captured Apple agents and two of their internal contacts began on April 5, 1954, in Tirana. The trial was aimed at the United States in a propaganda attempt to show that it was the main organizer of all clandestine activities against the Communist government in Albania. The trial disclosed the close collaboration between the United States and King Zog in the recruitment of agents and mounting of agent teams into Albania. The close working relationship between Greece and the United States was discussed at length, with special emphasis on the subordinate position held by Greece and other Western nations to the United States and the relative ease with which undocumented American agents were able to cross borders and operate in these countries.65

  During their testimony, the defendants gave the true names of over forty men with whom they had worked in the past as fellow agents or with whom they had had some operational contact within the country during earlier missions. With regard to CIA staff personnel, no true full names were disclosed during the trial except that of a contract agent who had left service in the fall of 1951. The true first names of only two staff personnel were disclosed. Some information was disclosed concerning the methods of training and physical location of holding and training areas for agents in Greece. The CIA moved swiftly to abandon the locations that were still in use at the time of the trials. All of Apple’s supplies and equipment, including weapons, clothing, documentation, poisons, radio equipment, gold coins, and dollar bills that were captured had been subjected to detailed examination and were exhibited and reported on at the trial.66

  Though during the trial the prosecutor mentioned that Tahir Premçi and Pal Nikolla had been arrested, he provided no indication of their disposition. Haxhi Gjyla, Zenun Gjolena, and Nuri Plaka were also mentioned as having been arrested, although the Radio Tirana broadcast of December 29 had reported them killed upon landing. The true fate of these men was never learned, although the Sigurimi later displayed pictures of their bloodied corpses for propaganda purposes. If they had indeed
been arrested, they could have died during interrogations or been summarily executed for refusing to cooperate at the proceedings.

  The trial ended on April 12 with the conviction of all defendants. The prosecution asked for the death sentence for all but one of the defendants in the trial. These sentences were harsh even by Tirana’s standards. Captured agents tried and convicted in similar trials in the past had received sentences ranging from ten years to life in prison but very rarely had been sentenced to death.

  Many years later, after the fall of Communism, reports surfaced that Kadri Hazbiu had advocated for sparing the life of some of the agents, especially Zenel Shehi, in light of their cooperation during the playback operation against the CIA and their testimonies during the trials. At a meeting of the Albanian leaders, Mehmet Shehu strongly opposed any pardon and was very critical of Hazbiu for considering only the operational aspects of the matter and not its political and ideological implications. Shehu forcefully argued that handing out tough sentences would serve as a lesson to the Americans, King Zog, and any Albanians abroad who might still consider coming in the country with the intent to disrupt the regime. Enver Hoxha agreed and added that if Shehi and others had cooperated it was because they had been afraid and not because they had wanted to help. Mehmet Shehu was also the main proponent for hanging Matiani at a public execution and keeping his body on public display for several hours. Hoxha himself favored execution by firing squad for fear that a public display of the hanged man might cause unrest and backfire.67

  In the end, Shehu’s argument prevailed. Hamit Matiani was sentenced to die by hanging. The following were sentenced to death by shooting: Zenel Shehi, Halil Branica, Naum Sula, Ahmet Kabashi, Gani Malushi, and Rrapush Agolli, a principal agent recruited by Apple inside Albania. Ibrahim Lamçe, a minor contact of the team, was sentenced to ten years’ imprisonment.68 Radio Tirana announced the sentences on the evening of April 13. That very night, over two hundred thousand leaflets were dropped over Tirana in a single pass by the covert aircraft flying at top speed. The leaflets had the following message in front:

  Albanian People,

  A group of nationalist heroes have been condemned by the Communist masters for fighting to liberate Albania. They are the true heroes of the Albanian people and they deserve revenge. Honor them as our legendary heroes and as valiant offspring of the Albanian hearth.

  Long Live Free Albania!

  Long Live the Martyrs of the Resistance!

  They Will Never Be Forgotten!69

  The back the leaflet read:

  Despite the evil tricks and bloody methods of the Communist clique, the heroic will for the liberation of Albania will never be extinguished. Other patriots will take the places of the fallen and together will continue to act until the puppets of the Kremlin are driven once and forever from the blessed soil of Albania.

  Long Live Free Albania!

  Long Live Albanian Martyrs!70

  The CIA considered countering the Communist propaganda coup of the Apple trial with additional leaflets but in the end decided not to pursue the idea. By that time printing leaflets regularly and dropping them at pre-agreed times had become difficult due to limitation of resources available for the operation. In addition, the CIA staff in Athens felt that the Apple agents, including Matiani, had offered weak testimonies at the trial, mostly repeating scripted lines that the Sigurimi had wanted them to say. Furthermore, the circumstances surrounding the control of Apple by the Communists were still unclear, and there was a general feeling that letting the story be forgotten might be the best thing to do after all.71

  The last episode in the Apple agents’ tragedy occurred almost one year after their demise. Three staff officers in Athens conducted a thorough examination of the possessions that the deceased agents had left behind. These were generally items the agents were wearing or carrying at the time the CIA staff picked them up for staging. The practice then was that each agent left any worthwhile possessions with friends or relatives prior to undertaking a mission, so the bulk of the effects were clothes. Items issued by the case officers while the agents resided at the safehouse were returned to the Supply Section of the Athens station for proper disposal; the rest were sent to refugee camps for distribution. In addition to the clothing, there were personal possessions, including small change, papers, letters, photos, pocketknives, and sunglasses. The examining officers found that none of these items had any significant monetary value or sufficient sentimental importance to warrant forwarding to headquarters. They segregated them into separate envelopes for each former owner and held them for distribution to former friends or relatives who might request them.72 There is no record of anyone ever coming forward to claim them or when they were finally disposed of.

  CHAPTER 15

  King Zog Overstays His Time in Egypt

  The news of the demise of all the agents he had sent to Albania could not have come at a worse time for King Zog. His situation in Egypt had become extremely precarious after the overthrow of his host and protector, King Farouk, who had recognized Zog as an exiled monarch and granted him and his entourage diplomatic immunities. On July 1952, a coup d’état by a group of Egyptian officers led by Muhammad Naguib and Gamal Abdel Nasser toppled the king from power and forced him to abdicate in favor of his infant son, then flee into exile. Less than a year later, on June 18, 1953, the revolutionaries abolished the monarchy and declared Egypt a republic. For Zog, this meant the loss of an important supporter and the beginning of a period of tribulation and harassment.

  On August 5, 1953, the Egyptian government informed Zog that it considered the Royal Albanian Legation closed and that it would stop recognizing Albanian diplomatic passports. However, they would issue Zog Egyptian laissez-passer and would be glad to have him and his family remain in Egypt as honored guests as long as they wished to stay. Press reports at the same time stated that Zog was to be arrested any day and tried for “arms trafficking during the Palestine war” of 1948. On September 5, Al Ahram ran a story accusing Albanian Legation officials of helping Farouk smuggle money out of Egypt and stating that an investigation of Zog’s entourage showed activities “contrary to the interests of Egypt.” This article was the first salvo in a press campaign against Zog that would be conducted over the next several months with the full blessing of the Egyptian authorities.

  At this time, the CIA had accelerated its efforts to bring Zog and his entourage to the United States. Since he purchased his estate in Long Island, Zog had expressed the desire to live in the United States. Working arrangements established initially by Yatsevitch had been fruitful and Zog had become a good asset for the agency in Egypt. In September 1952, he presented an unsolicited offer through his case officer in Cairo to help the CIA penetrate the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt by leveraging the connections that Zog had formed with its leaders. A review of the proposal in Washington concluded that this was an opportunity to be capitalized upon and that the agency should make every effort to do so.1

  Throughout 1952 and until fall 1953, when the fiasco of Zog’s emissaries in Albania became known, the king had been the main source of infiltration agents for the Albanian operations. The agency hoped that his continued cooperation in clandestine activity would increase in value if Zog resettled to the United States, which would also resolve difficulties the agency had in communicating with him on sensitive matters over long distances. However, Zog did not wish to enter the US under a refugee or immigrant visa. Doing so, he felt, would impair his prestige, prejudice his political status in Albania, and detract from his claim to the throne of Albania. The agency’s general counsel worked with the Department of Justice to waive normal entry requirements in the interest of national security. In a letter to the attorney general of the United States on July 24, 1953, the director of Central Intelligence Allen Dulles wrote:

  The entry of King Zog and his family through the exercise of discretionary powers pertaining to the Office of the Attorney General would be substantially less likely to
arouse speculation regarding the nature of the interest of this Government in his entry.

  It is requested, therefore, that you review the question of entry of King Zog and his family and, in so doing, that you consider the national interests in continuing the cooperation of King Zog on important clandestine activities of this Agency.2

  The attorney general waived the statutory requirements for Zog and nine members of his immediate family. On September 22, 1953, the State Department notified the Alexandria consulate that Zog and his party would be allowed into the US even though no visas were to be issued. Zog then booked passage on a French ship to leave Egypt for France on October 18.

  * * *

  Apparently alerted of Zog’s imminent departure, the Egyptian police under the direction of the lieutenant governor and prosecutor of Alexandria raided his villa on September 26. They seized certain of his personal papers, but Zog resisted a body search of himself and Queen Geraldine. On September 30, Zog notified his CIA contact in Egypt that his bank accounts were frozen and that although the Ministry of Foreign Affairs had granted exit permits to him and his entourage, he was not allowed to carry with him the gold and jewels in his possession, and, therefore, he had refused the exit permits. On October 3, the Foreign Ministry informed Jefferson Caffery, the US ambassador in Cairo, that Egypt would not confiscate Zog’s gold but they would not allow the gold to be exported either. On the same day, the Department of State, at the request of the CIA, asked that Ambassador Caffery communicate informally to appropriate Egyptian officials that: “The US Government feels Zog represents a real asset in the struggle against Communism and hoped the Egyptian Government, acting in the general interest, will be able to permit Zog to leave Egypt with such property as remains to him and without exposing him to further actions which will tend to diminish his prestige as a top Albanian leader and important figure in the anti-Communist struggle.”3