The Sword of Rome
Page 11
But the threads continued to unravel. When Hippocrates and Epicydes, the primary diplomatic links between Hannibal and Hieronymus, heard of the Syracusan king’s death, they followed the conspirators to Syracuse. Once there, Epicydes held open the possibility of maintaining the alliance with Hannibal, even finding that there was a significant level of anti-Roman sentiment in the city. Though we cannot uncritically accept Livy’s assertion that Epicydes started to entertain the idea of seizing control of Syracuse at this point, it certainly is plausible.7 Livy also suggests, however, that Adranadorus entertained his own coup at this point. Apparently, reports of Adranadorus’ plans reached the Syracusan city council, whose members brought Adranadorus to their meeting chambers and murdered him.8
The city council quickly held elections for a magistrate to replace Adranodorus. It came as something of a surprise, however, when some in the electoral assembly called for both Epicydes and Hippocrates, neither Syracusans by birth, to be named as magistrates. The disruption caused the council to dissolve the assembly. The two had sufficient support, however, that the council feared further revolution if some concession were not made. Accordingly, Epicydes and Hippocrates were named magistrates.9 At about the same time, the council sent envoys to Appius Claudius seeking a truce that would lead to a reaffirmation of the Roman-Syracusan alliance. It would hardly have been surprising if Appius Claudius was a bit stunned by these rapid changes in the political alignments at Syracuse.
By this time, no later than the end of 214,10 Marcellus arrived to take over Roman negotiations. While consul (214), Marcellus had returned to Nola after capturing Casilinum. He had become ill, however, and was incapacitated for a period of time.11 Once he had regained his health, the senate assigned Marcellus the command in Sicily to deal with the growing problem at Syracuse.12 Marcellus arrived on the island after the Syracusan envoys had reached Appius Claudius, and the latter dutifully sent them on to the consul. Marcellus spoke with the envoys, believed peace to be possible, and sent his own legates to speak directly to the magistrates of Syracuse.13 Not surprisingly, Epicydes and Hippocrates, both of whom were deeply connected to Hannibal and thus unlikely to find anything favourable in a Roman-Syracusan alliance, agitated against siding with the Romans. The fact that Appius Claudius had stationed warships at the mouth of the Syracusan harbour as a precautionary measure had also proved a useful propaganda tool against the Romans. Nevertheless, the Syracusans held an assembly and voted to renew their relationship with the Romans rather than risk an immediate Roman invasion.14
To the dismay of the Romans – perhaps even to the exasperation of some readers at this point – the government of Syracuse reversed course yet again. Soon after the Syracusans voted to join Rome, Leontini requested a force of Syracusan soldiers to defend its border. The Syracusan council sent Hippocrates with a force of Roman deserters in order to both meet the demands of Leontini and drain Syracuse of dissidents at the same time. Hindsight, of course, is 20/20, and it is unreasonable to condemn those in the past for not seeing the future. Still, what were the leaders of Syracuse thinking, sending off Hippocrates with an army? If one hopes to attribute any sort of sensibility to the city council, it seems necessary to assume that Hippocrates and Epicydes were exceptionally talented politicians who managed to persuade the council that, despite their Carthaginian origins and their reintroduction to Syracuse as ambassadors for Hannibal, they were, nevertheless partisans of Syracuse firmly committed to supporting the pro-Roman decisions of the assembly. Or perhaps, as one might suspect from Livy’s account, the city council was at its limits and simply picked the lesser evil by removing Hippocrates from the city in a way that did not involve murder and the potential for even further factional strife. Perhaps they reasoned that there was little Hippocrates and 4,000 soldiers could do that could not be checked by the combined might of Syracuse and Rome.
In any event, Hippocrates quickly took advantage of his new freedom of action and used the troops to raid Roman territory near Leontini. In response, Appius Claudius sent additional troops to guard the farms in the area; a number were killed by one of Hippocrates’ raids. When Marcellus heard of the attacks on Roman territory and Roman soldiers, he sent a message to Syracuse. The peace was broken, he noted, and there was no remedy except to remove Hippocrates and Epicydes from Sicily entirely. Marcellus also queried whether attacking Leontini, ostensibly under Syracuse’s authority, would further disintegrate the treaty between Rome and Syracuse. Epicydes, probably realizing that he would soon be in an untenable position at Syracuse due to his brother’s predations on the Roman province, swiftly left Syracuse and joined Hippocrates in Leontini.15 The Syracusan city council, now with both of the brothers out of the picture, declared to Marcellus that Leontini was in rebellion and Syracuse could not be held accountable for that town’s actions. Marcellus could attack Leontini, and Syracuse itself would provide support troops so long as the town, once conquered, was returned to Syracusan authority.16
Having reached a diplomatic agreement with Syracuse, Marcellus led his forces to Leontini while instructing Appius Claudius to approach the opposite side of the city. The forces of Leontini offered no significant resistance to the Roman soldiers, who Livy asserts sought revenge for the attacks on their comrades. Still, according to Livy, other than those slain in the initial assault, the soldiers in the town were spared and the property seized during the attack was restored to its rightful owners. Epicydes and Hippocrates, however, managed to escape the city. Meanwhile, the auxiliary troops promised by Syracuse were on the march to Leontini, unaware that the Roman forces had already seized the city. Rumours reached the force that the Romans had massacred the adults of Leontini and plundered the city itself. This news stunned the Syracusan commanders, who were unsure of how to proceed. The complexities of actions taken within the Syracusan army next need not detain us here.17 What is critical is that during this time of confusion, Epicydes and Hippocrates made contact with a contingent of Cretan archers in the Syracusan force. By continuing to manipulate the rumour of Marcellus’ cruelty at Leontini, they took command of the whole force. Then, supported by this army and taking advantage of inflamed anti-Roman sentiments in Syracuse, Hippocrates and Epicydes engineered a coup in the great city itself, seizing control and winning election to be generals of the city.18
The speed with which Hippocrates and Epicydes carried out this stratagem must have amazed Marcellus, who was still encamped at Leontini. When he received the reports, however, he moved his forces to Syracuse. The Roman army encamped less than two miles away from Syracuse at Olympium, a site that overlooked both the city itself and the harbour. At about the same time as the Roman army was arriving, apparently, Appius Claudius had sent legates to the city by ship, but the ship was captured and the legates were hard pressed to escape. Though this hostile treatment of diplomats probably did not bode well for peace, Marcellus made a last effort at diplomacy. He sent legates to the city, but rather than allow them into the city, Epicydes and Hippocrates met them at the gate. Since one of the Roman terms was that the leaders of the coup be surrendered, intercepting the Roman envoys essentially guaranteed the failure of further diplomacy. The legates were rebuffed, and Marcellus’ forces set about the business of taking Syracuse, probably in early 213.19
The siege of Syracuse is one of the striking episodes of Roman military history in the Republic, one that imprinted itself on the minds of many later authors. In part, this is due to the scale of the deed. Syracuse was one of the great cities of the third century Mediterranean, and it would not yield easily to any attempts to take it. When dealing with the siege itself, the historian is very fortunate in that Polybius, whose account of events after Cannae vanished sometime between its authoring and today, has left us an intact account of the operations. As one who had commanded soldiers and had experience of war, his assessments, though not to be taken at face value, are invaluable. Polybius gave this assessment of the city defences: ‘The strength of Syracuse lies in the fact that th
e wall extends in a circle along a chain of hills with overhanging brows, which are, except in a limited number of places, by no means easy of approach even with no one to hinder it.’20
This requires some elaboration. The mainland portion of the city itself consisted of three distinct sections. The oldest part of the city was in the southeast section. This contained the citadel of Syracuse and was called alternately Nasos (‘the Island’ in Greek) or Ortygia; it guarded the harbour of Syracuse and was defended by its own wall. Achradina was next, the heavily populated mainland section of the city, located north of the island and on the coast. Finally, to the west of Achradina, the large plateau of Epipolae was included in the main defensive wall of Syracuse. Though both districts were encompassed by the defensive wall, the fourth-century wall of Dionysius, they were also separated from one another by internal walls and thus able to be defended independently. The Epipolae quarter itself may have been largely uninhabited, but including the plateau in the defensive circuit made Syracuse that much more formidable as a defensive position since many segments of the wall were built on heights and difficult to approach directly. At the western tip of the triangle created by the walls of Epipolae stood the formidable Euryalus fortress, as solid a defensive position as could be desired.21
The obdurate walls themselves were formidable enough, but at that particular time the defences of the great city were supervised by none other than the famous mathematician and engineer Archimedes. This Greek engineer was said to have claimed he could move the very earth with a lever if he had the right fulcrum; his feats of calculation and formulation are still important in modern mathematics. Archimedes had designed a daunting series of missile engines and other machines to defend the landward and seaward walls of the city.22 Still, the Romans, according to Polybius and Livy, were confident they would take the city quickly by assault.23 Polybius would have it that the Romans gave the consul Marcellus command only over the naval forces, while Appius Claudius was appointed as the independent commander of the land forces.24 This is assuredly either a mistake on Polybius’ part, or yet another effort to lessen Marcellus’ prestige, in this case by making his command seem less powerful than it was. Appius Claudius’ praetorship in Sicily was for the year 215, and he must have been granted an extension, presumably as a propraetor, for the year 214, since he continued on in an official capacity, attempting to negotiate with the Syracusans when Marcellus arrived. As the consul, and thus by far the ranking commander, Marcellus had authority over the province of Syracuse and all Roman forces in it. This province was re-established when the senate extended his command and made him proconsul for 213, with a province delimited by the boundaries of Hiero’s former kingdom. In short, Appius Claudius was Marcellus’ subordinate in this attack, regardless of Polybius’ effort to mask it.
What forces did Marcellus have at his disposal for the attack on Syracuse? This is a bit of a thorny issue. Since 215, the regular Roman garrison force for Sicily – two legions – consisted of the so-called legiones Cannenses (‘Cannae legions’). These soldiers were the survivors who had fled the battlefield at Cannae. As punishment for their failure to die holding their ground against the enemy, the senate sentenced them to a punitive form of service as a mark of disgrace. As Livy, Plutarch, and the first century AD recorder of military stratagems, Frontinus, recorded it, the Cannae legions were to serve in Sicily for as long as the enemy was in Italy.25 Generally, it has been understood by historians that, as part of this punishment, the soldiers of the Cannae legions were barred from active duty in field armies, required to serve only as garrison troops. This is because Livy suggests that in the winter of 213/2, a year after the attack on Syracuse had begun, the soldiers of the Cannae legions received permission from their commander in Sicily, Publius Lentulus, to send their most distinguished centurions and cavalrymen to petition Marcellus, a petition that Marcellus forwarded in a letter to the senate.26 Livy attributes a particularly lengthy and elaborate speech to the delegates that seems wholly out of place for soldiers addressing their general; he even seems to forget the location of the speech when he has the soldiers address the ‘conscript fathers’ – the title for the senators – though they were far away at Rome. After a recount of relevant ancient and recent history, the petitioners end with the request, ‘Let us engage the enemy and by fighting earn freedom... We demand all the worst hardship and danger, in order that what should have been done at Cannae be done as soon as possible, since every day that we have lived since has been marked for disgrace.’27
While the speech itself is surely a fabrication, the core request is believable enough; the Cannae legions wished to serve under Marcellus in his attack on Syracuse. Marcellus was apparently not unsympathetic to their cause but was no renegade; he followed a reasonable protocol under the circumstances, promising nothing, but writing to the senate for a decision on the matter. The response from the senate repeated the general principle that the men of these legions could not be trusted; however, Marcellus might employ the soldiers as he saw fit. The prohibitions nevertheless remained in place: none could be decorated for service in battle, exempted from duty, or allowed to return to Italy until the war was over.28 Plutarch adds the detail that Marcellus chafed at the restrictions placed upon him and several years later reprimanded the senate for not allowing him to reward these soldiers for their service. It seems, then, that Marcellus did in fact incorporate these legions into his army.
Livy’s timing of this episode poses a problem for historians. Were the Cannae legions actually prohibited from serving as active field troops until they had petitioned Marcellus? Did they only petition him at the end of 213? If so, Marcellus and Appius Claudius had to attack Syracuse without the aid of these legions, a prospect considered unlikely by some. After all, why would Marcellus fail to use every soldier available on the island when attacking so mighty a city?
Livy’s chronology of events in Sicily as a whole has long been considered problematic by historians.29 He seems to have conflated the events in his account from 214 to 213 and presented them as if everything from the death of Hieronymous to the attempt to assault Syracuse occurred in 214 and nothing at all happened in Sicily in 213, a highly implausible scenario. It is certainly possible that he or his source dated the petition of the Cannae legions to Marcellus incorrectly or perhaps even passed on a fabulous account of the petition. The question is, what other evidence can be found that suggests a more plausible reconstruction of the relationship between Marcellus and Cannae legions?
When historical problems like this present themselves, it is necessary to see if other sources can corroborate the events. As it happens, Plutarch also refers to the petition of the Cannae legions. According to the Greek biographer:
As Marcellus took over [Appius Claudius’] force [in Sicily], he was beset by many Romans who were involved in a calamity now to be described. Of those who had been drawn up against Hannibal at Cannae, some had fled, and others had been taken alive, and in such numbers that it was thought the Romans had not even men enough left to defend the walls of their city. And yet so much of their high spirit and haughtiness remained that, although Hannibal offered to restore his prisoners of war for a slight ransom, they voted not to receive them, but suffered some of them to be put to death and others to be sold out of Italy; and as for the multitude who had saved themselves by flight, they sent them to Sicily, ordering them not to set foot in Italy as long as the war against Hannibal lasted. These were the men who, now that Marcellus was come, beset him in throngs, and throwing themselves on the ground before him, begged with many cries and tears for an assignment to honourable military service, promising to show by their actions that their former defeat had been due to some great misfortune rather than to cowardice. Marcellus, therefore, taking pity on them, wrote to the senate asking permission to fill up the deficiencies in his army from time to time with these men. But after much discussion the senate declared its opinion that the Roman commonwealth had no need of men who were cowards; if,
however, as it appeared, Marcellus wished to use them, they were to receive from their commander none of the customary crowns or prizes for valour. This decree vexed Marcellus, and when he came back to Rome after the war in Sicily, he upbraided the senate for not permitting him, in return for his many great services, to redeem so many citizens from misfortune.30
Plutarch’s version differs from Livy’s in several important ways. Most importantly, he suggests the soldiers approached Marcellus when he arrived in Sicily, which would have been late in 214 and a year before Livy’s dating.
To make matters more confusing, Frontinus, a writer in the late first century AD, the period of the Empire, seems to split the difference between the two authors. In a book of military stratagems that happened to include the encounter between Marcellus and the Cannae legions, Frontinus explicitly places the event in the consulship of Quintus Fulvius Flaccus and Appius Claudius, 212. In the same sentence, however, he says that the soldiers petitioned the ‘consul Marcellus’, which would have referred to the year 214. What are we to make of this? Did Frontinus mean 212 and simply mistakenly indicate Marcellus was consul, or was Marcellus actually consul when he was petitioned and the actual year was 214 (or early 213), and the dating to 212 a mistake? It would seem that mistakenly labeling Marcellus consul, particularly by a writer from the Empire, when consuls were far less powerful, would be a far easier slip to make than writing out the phrase, ‘In the consulship of Quintus Fulvius and Appius Claudius’ (Q. Fulvio Appio Claudio consulibus). This is hardly decisive proof, however.