Plutarch offers the most complete moral indictment, suggesting that the Romans had known nothing other than crude art and the rough decorations of war before Marcellus imported Syracusan art collections. He places the beginning of the Roman exposure to the luxuries of Greek art and decoration with Marcellus’ importation of spoils from Syracuse. He also suggests that these finer objects of art softened the Romans. In bringing such great and, by implication, morally corrupting art to the city, Marcellus allegedly gained favour with the average citizen while receiving the disapproval of the city elders. Again, though, it must be stressed that these sermons fundamentally misrepresent the familiarity Romans had with Greek culture at this time. There simply is no certain and compelling third century evidence suggesting contemporary Romans felt corrupted by the Syracusan art.
Later preaching aside, Marcellus’ calculations for his victory celebrations had been highly effective. Some senators at least were likely disgruntled that he effectively circumvented the senate’s denial of a triumph by his extraordinary celebrations. Clearly, whatever animosity he might have aroused was insufficient to prevent his election to yet another consulship sometime soon after the celebration of his triumph – not that anything as mercurial as the moods of a voting assembly could be predicted with any certainty. Indeed, the centuria praerogativa, the century chosen by lot to cast its public vote for consul first, did not select Marcellus at all. Instead, it voted for the old and distinguished Roman noble, Titus Manlius Torquatus and for Titus Otacilius, at that time commanding the Roman fleet in Sicily. Torquatus’ eyesight was failing, however, and when the initial vote was cast, he addressed the assembly and demanded that it vote again for a different candidate.39 This episode suggests again that at least during the war years, one did not have to declare one’s candidacy in order to be elected consul, for it is difficult to see why Torquatus would have petitioned to be consul and then challenged the vote when it went his way. Further, it reinforces the reality that despite any efforts to believe otherwise, these elections were not pre-determined or predictable, not even necessarily rational. Livy’s assessment of what happened next, some two centuries after the fact was likely little better than ours. In his account, the prerogative century, on this day the juniors of the Voturian tribe, requested time to confer with the senior century of their tribe. Livy says they were granted space for a secret meeting and in the next breath, without any sense of irony, reports the discussion in that meeting: the elders suggested that there were three choices, Marcellus and Fabius among the established nobles and Marcus Valerius Laevinus, who had been conducting the war against Philip of Maecedon, if they desired a less established but capable candidate. Leaving aside the implausibility that Livy would know the three names discussed in an ad hoc secret meeting conducted on the day of elections, these were hardly the only men that could have been elected consul, particularly when the customary restrictions on intervals between successive consulships were largely ignored in this period. More likely, Livy simply noted that when the junior century voted again, Marcellus and Laevinus were chosen and all the remaining centuries concurred. He inferred then that these men were named in the secret discussion and considered it reasonable that the elder statesman Fabius would also be in the running as a matter of course. Ultimately, Livy was most interested in using the episode to illustrate the superior morality of the Romans of old, compared to those in his own day, noting with the affected air of a curmudgeon, ‘that a century of the younger men wished to confer with their elders on the question to which persons they should, by their vote, entrust a high command, should seem to us scarcely credible – this is due to the cheapened and diminished authority even of parents over their children in our day.’40
Despite his victory at the polls, political trouble was brewing for Marcellus. Sicilians who had grievances against Marcellus had traveled to Rome and were staying in the various villas of his rivals in the suburbs of the city. By the time the Ides of March had come and Marcellus was inaugurated consul, according to Livy, he claimed to know that these Sicilian envoys were making the rounds of the city and that they wished to levy an accusation against him. Here it is worth reading Livy’s account in full:
[Marcellus] knew ... that a large number of Sicilians were near the city at the country-places of his detractors; that so far was it from being true that these men were not permitted by him to noise abroad openly at Rome the charges emanating from his personal foes, that he would himself immediately have given them a hearing in the senate but for their pretending no little fear to speak of the consul in the absence of his colleague. When indeed his colleague should arrive, [Marcellus] said, he would not allow any business to be taken up prior to the question of bringing the Sicilians before the senate. It was almost a levy that Marcus Cornelius [Cethegus] had conducted all over Sicily in order that as many as possible might come to Rome to complain of himself. [Marcellus] added that Cornelius had also filled the city with letters falsely stating there was a war in Sicily, in order to detract from the praise of the speaker. After winning a reputation for moderation on that day, the consul [Marcellus] dismissed the senate.41
Livy uses the vocabulary of political conflict when describing Marcellus’ statement: Marcellus said that his inimici (‘formal enemies’) had accusations to make against him and that he was ready to receive those charges, but felt it improper to do so until the other consul Laevinus, who was still abroad and recovering from an illness, had returned and taken up his consulship.
Livy’s account is plausible enough, as was Marcellus’ claim that his personal enemies were behind the suit, hosting the envoys and encouraging them to plead their case to the senate. Without such patronage the Sicilian envoys would have made very little headway, and those senators who entertained the Sicilian claims were opposing Marcellus by that very act if they had not done so before. That Marcellus had formal political opponents of this level is practically certain. It was the nature of the Roman political system, if not of politics in all times and places, to produce such formal rivalries. More precisely, though, there had to have been substantial opposition to Marcellus on the day his claim for a triumph was rejected, substantial enough to block the claim. Surely not everyone who opposed Marcellus was simply a categorical enemy, but for some there was a clear connection to be made between the debate over Marcellus’ triumph and the encouragement of the Sicilian envoys. Marcellus’ actions in Sicily were controversial enough that they inspired opposition from those who wished to see him humbled or their own careers promoted.
This time, though, instead of some general reference to enemies in the sources, one of Marcellus’ rivals is named: Marcus Cornelius Cethegus. He had succeeded Marcellus as commander in Sicily. During his time there, Cethegus had apparently persuaded – actively encouraged, claimed Marcellus – Sicilians with grievances against the sacker of Syracuse that they would find supporters at Rome. Again, this is plausible enough. Cethegus had also apparently sent letters – a flood, Marcellus noted – reporting that Sicily was far from pacified. There is no question that encouraging the Sicilian envoys and writing such letters would actively undermine Marcellus’ accomplishments on the island. Cethegus cannot have been unaware of this; the alternative would be simply incredible, that such a complete political naïf had played the game of politics successfully enough to make it to the praetorship.
None of this requires supposing, however, that Cethegus sought to discredit Marcellus simply for the sake of doing so. The letters about Sicilian affairs may have been no more than status reports based on Cethegus’s assessments, and he would hardly have kept quiet about the realities in the field simply to spare another commander’s feelings. Perhaps, too, Cethegus did nothing more than suggest to any complaining Sicilians he encountered that their grievances should be properly received by the senate in Rome. The embassy dispatched to complain about Marcellus and the publicity it received, however, were both substantial. They lend credibility to Marcellus’ accusation that Cethegus had ac
tively stirred up trouble.
Why? Some possibilities suggest themselves. First, the debate over Marcellus’ triumph and over the end of the war in his province was still quite fresh. It can hardly have been more than a few months since he celebrated his ovation and triumph on the Alban Mount, perhaps six at the most. Those who seriously resented Marcellus then would have found Cethegus to be a useful instrument or ally for continuing the debate on Sicily. Perhaps they collaborated with Cethegus. Certainly, Cethegus, in general terms, had things to gain. His own command in Sicily and his own deeds would become more important if the general consensus was that Marcellus had not finished the job. Since senators were already divided about the completion of the war there, Cethegus had an opening to increase his own prestige at Marcellus’ expense. It is worth noting that in the Roman political system, people of lower rank could and often did attempt to increase their own stature simply by promoting their inimicitia (‘enemy status’) with a more famous and distinguished politician.42 The greater the fame of the enemy, the more status could be gained, particularly if the lower-status rival checked his enemy. This is a logic still at work today when junior legislators denounce established politicians or new prosecutors tackle cases against high-profile defendants – regardless of their motives – and gain media exposure. Certainly, Marcellus would be an excellent target for an ambitious rising aristocrat. He was unsurpassed by his contemporaries, matched only by Fabius Maximus, yet he was not unassailable. Perhaps a combination of these factors moved Cethegus.
However much Marcellus may have claimed Cethegus’ reports were mere lies, the reality was more complicated. Sicily’s strategic importance to both Carthage and Rome ensured that the Carthaginians would not surrender it easily. The relatively short distance between the western half of the island and Carthage itself meant that new forces could be dispatched to continue the struggle there with relative ease. Roman senators at the time must have been fully aware of this. Did Marcellus really claim that there was no fighting on the island? It seems more likely that he would have argued, instead, the more defensible and, for him, relevant point: there was no war in his former province. To a certain extent, he had a point. Cethegus had quickly pacified the revolt of the Sicilian cities, and since he would have been a primary source of information about affairs on the island, it might have appeared to Marcellus that Cethegus’ reports were lies. Ultimately, since Marcellus had already celebrated his ovation, triumphed on the Alban Mount, and won the consulship, Cethegus’ letters posed the lesser problem. The greater political challenge was the accusation that Marcellus had conducted himself improperly as the agent of Rome in Sicily. The perceived conduct of an aristocrat on campaign played a critical role in his reputation for virtus and honour or a lack thereof. Marcellus had cultivated an exceptional reputation for superior conduct and superior virtus on the battlefield. The accusations of the Sicilians threatened to undermine his great source of political strength, and a humiliation now could end his ascendancy.
Whether he would be condemned or vindicated would soon be seen. Laevinus recovered from his illness and returned to Rome. Soon after, the senate determined that the two consular provinces for the year would be ‘Sicily and the fleet’ and ‘Italy with the war against Hannibal’. When the lots were cast to determine which province each consul would have, Marcellus received Sicily. Apparently, the Sicilian envoys, who had not yet had the chance to put their case before the senate, were present when the lots were drawn or at least received the news quickly. Seeing that Marcellus would again hold imperium in Sicily, they protested elaborately, donning the clothes of mourners and making the rounds to the houses of senators. Such a dramatic course of action suggests that Marcellus had a point when he charged that the Sicilians were being supported by his enemies. Perhaps by some stretch of imagination foreign embassies were regularly allowed to wander on their own between senators’ houses publicly lamenting and petitioning, but it is far more likely that such tactics would only be permitted, let alone successful, if the delegates had powerful friends within the senate. According to Livy, ‘these complaints of the Sicilians, at first circulated in the homes of the nobles and repeated in conversations inspired partly by pity for the Sicilians, partly by envy against Marcellus, even reached the senate.’43 If Livy chose his words precisely and based them on a valid source, his reference to the nobles suggests that those who encouraged the Sicilians were among the highest ranking of Roman senators.
The campaign was successful; the senate convened and asked Marcellus and Laevinus to discuss the appropriateness of the year’s provincial assignments. In particular, the consuls were asked by some to exchange their provinces so that Marcellus no longer would hold imperium in Sicily. Marcellus could have treated the request as a grave insult, but simply agreed that since the Sicilians had not yet presented their grievances to the senate it would be appropriate to discuss an exchange of provinces. He was surely well aware that failing to swap provinces would spur speculation that the Sicilians had feared to raise legitimate complaints because they feared reprisals from the consul. The consuls asserted, however, that they could discuss the matter themselves; there was no need for a formal senatorial decree exchanging provinces, and indeed, any such official action would be highly, publicly insulting to Marcellus. The senate concurred, Marcellus and Laevinus conferred, and the consular provinces were transferred for the year.44 Really, it was a win-win situation for Marcellus. Though command over Sicily and the fleet was strategically important, the opportunities for glory were greater in Italy, where Hannibal, now having spent almost a decade in the peninsula, was still the primary threat and was certainly the symbolic heart of the enemy.
With the provinces reassigned, the Sicilian envoys could present their grievances to the senate without any hint of coercion. The substance of their complaint seems to have been these points. Hiero had been a steadfast ally of the Roman people. Therefore, the defection to Hannibal under the short-lived king Hieronymus and the tyrants Epicydes and Hippocrates was no more than a policy aberration and one hated by the Syracusans at that. Marcellus himself was partially responsible for this change in policy. The tyrants were able to seize power because of Syracusan resentment at the way Marcellus had brutally sacked Leontini – though it was never clear that this was more than a rumour. Furthermore, when the Syracusans plotted to assassinate the tyrants and made arrangements with Marcellus to put pressure on the walls of Syracuse, he had delayed in positioning his army. That delay caused the assassination plot to be exposed and the assassins executed. After this, secret emissaries from leading citizens at Syracuse repeatedly tried to surrender the city to Marcellus, but he was set on taking the city by force and insisted on working with the mercenaries in the city rather than the leading citizens. Finally, came what was likely the core of the complaint: Marcellus’ troops had despoiled the city, stripping temples and private houses, looting the city of all its riches. Furthermore, much of the land owned by the wealthiest Syracusans had been seized by the Romans and given away. The envoys requested that, insofar as it was possible, the Syracusans have all possessions returned to their verifiable owners.45
Once they had finished their complaints, the Syracusan envoys were asked to leave the senate chambers by Laevinus. Marcellus, however, countered the order, wishing to make his response in front of both the senators and the envoys. It is impossible to determine the extent to which Marcellus was enraged, astounded, defensive, or simply calculating when he responded to the charges. What can be said is that he acted yet again in a politically savvy way by rhetorically emphasizing his role as a loyal servant of the Republic. Responding to the charges in front of the envoys was as good a way as any to show that he believed he had done nothing dishonourable.
Though the sources agree that Marcellus was a model of restraint that day, it strains credulity to think he felt sanguine during the Syracusan charges. There is no reason to doubt that from his point of view, the Syracusans had been mercurial, treacherous, and dishon
ourable. On several occasions Marcellus had negotiated a peaceful end to the conflict in Syracuse only to have political disorder in the city smash all arrangements. When all was said and done, no professed good intentions on the part of these leading citizens had changed the fact that Syracuse resisted surrendering to the Romans until the very end. From his point of view, their claims must essentially have amounted to: ‘We do not think we should have lost all our possessions just for defying and resisting the Romans.’ That these envoys could now come before the senate at all and make these claims must have been galling. What right did Rome’s enemies, once vanquished, have to complain about the terms of their defeat?
When Livy constructed Marcellus’ response from the available evidence, he clearly was thinking along similar lines. Though Livy assuredly fabricated the exact wording of Marcellus’ response, he just as likely preserved the substance of the response passed on by earlier sources. It is a good speech and worth reading:
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