Not so forgetful have I been of the majesty of the Roman people and of this authority of mine, conscript fathers, that if it were a question of a charge brought against me, I would have pleaded my case with Greeks as my accusers. But it is not what I have done that is to be inquired into – for whatever I did in the case of enemies is defended by the law of war – but what they deserved to suffer. If they have not been enemies, it makes no difference whether it was recently or in the time of Hiero that I desolated Syracuse. But if they rebelled against the Roman people, if they attacked our ambassadors with sword and arms, closed their city and walls, defended them against us with an army of Carthaginians, who is indignant because they suffered hostile acts, when they have committed them? When leading men among the Syracusans tried to surrender the city, I rejected them; I preferred [the mercenaries] Sosis and Moericus the Spaniard as the men to whom I would entrust so important a matter. You are not Syracusans of the lowest rank, inasmuch as you reproach others with their humble station. Who is there among you who promised that he would open the gates to me, that he would admit my soldiers under arms into the city? You hate and curse those who did so, and even here you do not refrain from uttering insults against them. So far is it from the truth that you also would have done anything of the sort. [Sosis and Moericus’] humble rank, conscript fathers, of which those men make a reproach, is itself the strongest proof that I did not turn my back on any man who wished to serve our state. Before I laid siege to Syracuse, I endeavored, now by sending embassies, now by going to a conference, to secure peace; again, it was not until after they showed no shame in injuring ambassadors, and no answer was given even to myself when I met with their leading men at the gates, that, having endured many hardships on land and sea, I at last captured Syracuse by force of arms. Of what befell the captured it is more reasonable for them to complain in the presence of Hannibal and the defeated Carthaginians than in the senate of a victorious nation. For myself, conscript fathers, if I had been intending to deny the despoiling of Syracuse, I should never be using its spoils to adorn the city of Rome. But in what I as victor either took from individuals or gave to them, I am quite sure that I acted both according to the law of war and according to each man’s desert. Whether you confirm these acts, conscript fathers, or not, concerns the state more than myself. For my duty has been fully discharged; it is to the interest of the state that you do not make other commanders less energetic for the future by annulling my acts. And seeing that you have heard face to face the words of the Sicilians as well as mine, conscript fathers, we shall leave the temple at the same time, so that in my absence the senate can deliberate with greater freedom.46
The themes of service to the Republic and the justness of humbling Rome’s enemies are certainly consistent with the rhetoric of the time, and it is difficult to imagine Marcellus taking a different tack in his formal defence. Plutarch captures the speech much more briefly:
Marcellus made answer that in return for many injuries which [the Syracusans] had done to the Romans, they had suffered nothing except what men whose city has been taken by storm in war cannot possibly be prevented from suffering; and that their city had been so taken was their own fault, because they had refused to listen to his many exhortations and persuasions. For it was not by their tyrants that they had been forced into war, nay, they had elected those very tyrants for the purpose of going to war.47
While Plutarch leaves out the focus on service to the Republic, he corroborates Livy on what must have been the core complaint of the Syracusans, that they had been mistreated. Both sources agree that Marcellus’s defence essentially was that the Syracusans had been enemies in a time of war and thus a Roman commander could legitimately treat them however he saw fit.
When his rebuttal was complete, both parties left the senate chambers, the consul to conduct the necessary levies of soldiers for the year, the ambassadors to await the decision of the senate. Laevinus, as the presiding consul, opened the debate on the Syracusans claims. Livy suggests that the senate was divided on the issues. No doubt this was the case since the Syracusans had had the support of some influential senators since at least their arrival in Rome. He names Titus Manlius Torquatus in particular as the leader for the ‘great part of the senate’ that found fault with Marcellus. The substance of their argument, apparently, was that the war should have been against the tyrants of Syracuse not the Syracusan people, who had been oppressed by the tyrants. Accordingly, Marcellus should have liberated the city as a recovered ally, not conquered and sacked it.
It was ultimately the propriety of Marcellus’ behaviour that was questioned by Torquatus and those who were like-minded. Torquatus noted rhetorically, according to Livy, that:
If Hiero, that loyal supporter of the power of Rome, could rise from the dead, with what face would any one dare to show him either Rome or Syracuse? In the one – his own city – he would see universal spoliation and a large part of it burnt, and as he approached the other he would see just outside its walls, almost within its gates, the spoils of his country.48
While Torquatus’ exact words are irrecoverably lost, the substance of this critique likely came directly from his speech that day. Marcellus had used a great deal of the spoils from Syracuse to construct and adorn his temple to Honour and Virtue outside the Capena Gate of Rome. That made the temple an easy target for anyone critiquing the general’s handling of Syracuse.
As with the earlier debate at the Temple of Bellona, various levels and motives for opposition can be identified. Certainly, some senators must have believed that Marcellus had treated the Syracusans poorly. It was a debatable point whether they were properly considered enemies or victims of the rebel government’s policies. This can hardly have been the main sticking point for most senators however. Shortly after this debate, the senate heard the complaints of the Capuans, whose city had been sacked by Fulvius Flaccus. Arguments similar to those of the Syracusans were made and the senate did return possessions and land to a number of the citizens, even though the city had revolted from Rome.49 Clearly then, even though our sources sometimes hint otherwise, the Romans were not limited to simple binary categorizations of people as either enemies or friends. The Capua parallel, however, also illustrates that Romans had no qualms about treating enemies harshly. A number of Capuans were ordered sold into slavery after their petitions, some were kept in chains awaiting future decisions on their fates, and possessions were not restored to those deemed undeserving. In this case, however, no debate was recorded in the senate when it ordered that some Capuans to be sold into slavery and others clapped in irons. Even if there were some debate that escaped the sources’ notice, the senate apparently did not think the Capuan protests warranted calling the commander Quintus Fulvius Flaccus back from Capua to account for his actions as Marcellus had. It is difficult to suppose, then, that there was universal agreement in the senate that the Syracusans had been treated too harshly, that, categorically, rebellious cities should be treated better than Marcellus had Syracuse.50
In Livy’s version Marcellus’ opponents took advantage of the opportunity presented by the Syracusan protest to generate envy (invidia) against the consul. They were certainly successful insofar as they managed to orchestrate the hearing at all. That the senate even received the Syracusan deputation and required Marcellus to respond formally called into question the consul’s actions in Sicily and could easily have been seen as a slight to his dignity.51 Certainly, Livy says as much in his recreation of Marcellus’ speech: Flaccus had not been required to answer his accusers, but Marcellus stood on trial.52
Why did the sacking of Syracuse provide an opportunity for Marcellus’ opponents in a way that the taking of Capua did not? As seen earlier, Livy indicates, with considerable exaggeration, that the sacking of Syracuse marked a transition in the Republic, ushering in the Roman penchant for Greek art – but of course Livy was fixated on trying to track the decline in Roman morals from the founding of the Republic to his own day.53 Plutarch
provides an interesting relevant detail: the older citizens in Rome were offended by Marcellus’ excessive use of Syracusan loot to adorn the city, particularly the use of gods – statues of gods, it should be noted – seized from that city. They grumbled that his introduction of so much Greek art would corrupt the Roman people, making them soft and unwarlike.54 While there certainly may have been those who felt so, as with Livy, one must be on guard for the tendency of Plutarch, and his sources, to introduce an anachronistic moralizing that was not clearly present in the third century.
The important kernel of truth in the statements Livy and Plutarch report is their testimony to the copious amount of wealth that Marcellus had seized from Syracuse, the beauty of the spoils, and the uses to which he put it, adorning temples and public spots. The Romans were not unfamiliar with Greek art, but still, Marcellus had apparently imported this art on a previously unknown scale, so much from one city at one time. These works were bound to spark the curiosity of the city dwellers, high and low status alike. When they saw the works, they would know that Marcellus had seized them from the enemy and brought them to enrich Rome. It was an example of the most permanent and powerful kind of advertising a Roman aristocrat could have. Marcellus was neither the first nor last to use the spoils from a captured city this way, but the scale of his conquest meant the scale of the spoils he had at his disposal were extraordinary for the time.
This context helps explain why Torquatus may have opposed Marcellus so adamantly. Certainly, he may have honestly felt that the Syracusans had been illtreated. But there was likely also a more personal element in play. Torquatus was one of the great aristocrats of the time, a man who had had a highly distinguished career and enjoyed great influence in the senate. Marcellus was an active or potential rival whose prestige and successes were far beyond those of a normal aristocratic career. He had been central to the Roman war effort for the past six years in a way Torquatus had not. He had certainly eclipsed him in the offices, honours, and scales of victories he had earned. An untarnished political victory in the Syracusan debate would only enhance Marcellus’ reputation further and potentially undermine Torquatus’ own position. It was not even a stretch for an envious senator in a society that paid such homage to tradition and character to proclaim that Marcellus’ display of Syracusan wealth was immodest, immoral.
Furthermore, Torquatus had a special reputation for being a staunch traditionalist. After the defeat at Cannae, he had delivered a scathing speech, persuading the senate to refuse ransom for those legionaries captured by Hannibal. In the Livian account, he raised issues of traditional military virtue. Later that year, when Spurius Carvilius proposed the possibility of enrolling Latins in the senate to fill the gaps, Torquatus’ speech was recorded for the opposition. He began by alluding to his famous ancestor who had fought the Latins in the fourth century. At the end of the speech against letting Latins fill the holes in the senate, Torquatus threatened that there was ‘still one man of the stock to which that consul belonged who once in the Capitol threatened that he would kill with his own hand any Latin whom he saw sitting in the senate.’ Clearly, Torquatus was both a man of prestige and influence at Rome, and one who was quite vocal in promoting traditional values.55 If he continued to operate from the stance of a traditionalist, he could have had many reasons to object to Marcellus’ behaviour. Marcellus had claimed the spolia opima; what he framed as the warranted revival of ancient glory, Torquatus could have just as easily seen as a spurious invention. From the patrician Torquatus’ view, it would take no stretch at all to disapprove of the fact that Marcellus sought and won election as the second of two plebeian consuls and sparked a warning from the gods. Just in the past few months Marcellus had challenged the will of the senate and celebrated an antiquarian triumph on the Alban Mount. Now he brought wealth into the city perhaps on a scale never before seen. Perhaps Torquatus was even aware that, back in Sicily, the Syracusans had originally offered to make themselves clients of Marcellus, something unprecedented for a Roman.56 In short, there are many reasons why Torquatus might have felt Marcellus flouted custom and propriety.
In any event, none of these concerns was sufficient for the senate to reprimand Marcellus or countermand his decisions in Sicily. The senate formally approved by decree his conduct and arrangements. And while Marcellus’ opponents had scored a limited victory in that they had managed to cast doubt on the commander and question the propriety of his actions, the end result could not be considered anything but a confirmation of Marcellus’ standing. When the Syracusan envoys heard the senate’s ruling, they took the stance of supplicants, begging Marcellus to protect them and their city. Marcellus readily agreed, reassured them that he would not seek vengeance, and sent them on their way.57
The magnitude of what the Syracusans actually offered to Marcellus that day should not be underestimated. They essentially promised to place their city under the permanent patronage of Marcellus and his descendants. What’s more, they voted honours to him and his descendants worthy of a god-king. When he or any of his descendants set foot on the island, the Syracusans pledged they would wear garlands and offer sacrifices to the gods.58 A festival and games were established to celebrate the divine glory of Marcellus, an honour that was common enough for rulers in the Greek world but, so far as can be determined, had never yet been bestowed on a Roman. It’s worth repeating: the Syracusans established yearly games called the Marcellia to celebrate their patron. These games continued to be held in Cicero’s day well over a century later. In short, the city of Syracuse at least and, according to Cicero, who certainly would have known, the entire island were fully associated with the Marcelli from that day forward.59 Though he had faced a number of substantial political challenges from the moment he had returned to Rome, Marcellus had essentially overcome them all and reached a pinnacle of success, now capped with patronage over a city and island, that had not been matched by any Roman in the past.
Chapter 5
The Final Italian Campaigns
While Marcellus had been away in Sicily, the war against Hannibal had continued much the same as it had since Cannae. Hannibal continued to wander southern Italy testing the loyalties of various towns, and Roman armies continued to monitor his movements and attempted to counter any damage he inflicted on their alliance system. This had been going on for years, and war weariness lay particularly heavy upon the Romans when Marcellus and Laevinus were inaugurated as consuls for 210.
Certainly, the Roman strategic situation in Italy had improved dramatically since the dark days after Cannae: Syracuse had been recaptured; Capua and Campania with it secured; and the Romans were no longer in any immediate danger of losing the war. These improvements in the Roman strategic position, however, had come at a heavy cost. Tens of thousands of Romans had lost their lives serving in the legions and fleets, cities and towns had been destroyed, farmlands devastated, and peasants displaced from their homes. So it was that the levies for 210 were bitterly received by citizens at Rome. After the infantry soldiers were conscripted, it came time to select rowers for the fleet. In response to a shortage of both manpower and state money, the consuls decreed that citizens themselves should supply rowers along with their pay and rations rather than funding this through the state treasury. This was not a completely novel suggestion; in the Greco-Roman world it generally fell to citizens to supply these kinds of military services, though not necessarily the accompanying pay and supplies. The demand agitated the populace, however, which had been subjected to extra financial and personal burdens for the better part of a decade. Complaints arose openly in the forum and reached the point where the consuls were unable to quell them. The senate met to discuss the issue but seemed unable to come up with a solution; the state treasuries were empty and it simply had to fall upon the citizen body to supply the necessary funds. A much needed solution soon came from Laevinus and Marcellus, who discussed the matter at great length. They, as befitting their station as consuls, would take the lead in giving vir
tually all of their personal holdings of precious metals, in whatever form they might be, to the state so that rowers could be properly furnished. The senators in return would follow the example of the consuls. The senate agreed without making any formal declaration, and each man brought his liquid assets to the state treasury. As usual, there was a competition to be seen serving the Republic, but this time it was by donating wealth rather than providing military and political service. In response to the show of dedication on the part of the senators, the wealthy cavalry class followed suit, as did the rest of the population.1
As for Hannibal, his strategic situation in Italy had certainly deteriorated. He had captured the important southern port of Tarentum but failed to secure the citadel, which remained in the control of a Roman garrison. Capua, the capital city that was critical to controlling Campania and fueling the flames of resistance against Rome, had fallen. After the Roman success at Capua, other Italians believed the tide had shifted and switched their allegiance to Rome. Unable to garrison effectively all the remaining loyalist regions, Hannibal adopted a policy of devastating disloyal areas in central and southern Italy in order to deny them to the Romans.2
Since Marcellus had traded his province of Sicily to Laevinus, it fell to him to prosecute the war against Hannibal. He had been in this situation six years earlier. The enemy was still loose in Southern Italy, engaging Marcellus in a military and diplomatic struggle for the loyalties of the various Italian city states in the region. An important victory for Marcellus came from Salapia, a city in Apulia near the Adriatic that had served as an important logistical post for Hannibal.3 The leaders of the city, after some internal wrangling, decided to surrender Salapia to Marcellus, who had been in communication with Roman partisans there throughout the process.4 The city was important in and of itself, but also because a detachment of Numidian cavalry were stationed there. The loss of these skilled horsemen was a serious blow for Hannibal. After securing the city, Marcellus turned his attention to other regional nodes in Hannibal’s system of supply depots and fortified towns. First among these were the towns of Marmoreae and Meles in nearby Samnite territory. They contained considerable supplies of grain and were defended by a Carthaginian garrison several thousand strong. Marcellus’ forces seized these towns and confiscated 240,000 modii of wheat and 10,000 of barley, a large haul corresponding to perhaps 3,600,000 pounds of wheat and 150,000 of barley. Other loot from the towns Marcellus distributed to his soldiers.5 The gains made by Marcellus’ forces were followed shortly by a Roman defeat at Herdonea, perhaps twenty miles distant from Marmoreae and Meles. Tradition blamed the proconsul in command, Gnaeus Fulvius Centumalus. Centumalus hoped to pressure Herdonea to return to the Roman alliance, especially after Marcellus had recovered Salapia. Supporters of Hannibal’s cause in the city sent word to the Carthaginian, however, and Hannibal’s army dropped its baggage and conducted forced marches until it reached Herdonea. Centumalus, Livy reports, was surprised and somewhat hastily drew up his forces. His plan was to send the fifth legion and the left wing of allied soldiers and cavalry first, with the sixth legion and right wing in reserve. He had apparently not chosen a particularly secure spot for his camp, however, and Hannibal’s cavalry, as their commander instructed, flanked the Romans quickly after the fifth legion and left wing engaged in close combat. The cavalry attacked both the Roman camp and the reserve forces, throwing them into disarray. They then turned their attention to the front line and routed the Roman forces. Thousands of Roman soldiers – how many exactly is unknown – died that day, Centumalus and a number of officers along with them.6 The remnants of the army made their way to Marcellus.
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