The Sword of Rome

by Jeremiah McCall

  The accounts of this second battle provide a terrific tale of an army and its commander bouncing back from defeat and winning back on the second day what it had lost on the first. This has caused some historians to doubt seriously whether it ever happened. It has the suspicious marks of a glorified fable constructed both to show Roman determination in the face of defeat and to minimize the harm to Marcellus’ reputation. Livy’s version even includes two outstanding moral examples: the first of Marcellus personally leading the troops, fighting in harm’s way, and the second of the brave tribune saving the day. Two critical pieces of evidence, however, suggest that the second battle was either wholly invented or, equally as likely, not such a victory, and that the defeat in the first battle was the critical event for Marcellus’ army that year.

  First, Livy later in his history states that Marcellus suffered two defeats this year to Hannibal,31 but only mentions these two battles during his account for the year. It is hard to imagine where and when Marcellus would have had the opportunity to lose another battle that year. Equally as important, it is difficult to see why, if the Roman army had indeed inflicted almost three times as many casualties on the Carthaginians as it had received, Marcellus was forced to enter winter quarters immediately but Hannibal was able to march off without harm. Finally, the number of Roman casualties on the alleged second-day victory is very large, more consistent with a defeat than a victory. If, though, the defeat on the first day was decisive, perhaps even the Roman casualties listed for the second day were actually from the first. Then Marcellus’ need to seek winter quarters early would make more sense. Whatever the truth of the matter, what is clear is that Marcellus did cease his efforts to engage Hannibal that year. The early end of the campaign season must have been forced by the sheer number of wounded Roman soldiers. Marcellus had shown no hesitation in pursuing Hannibal in the past and would not have ended the campaign season months early unless he judged the fighting condition of his army to be poor indeed.

  The defeat of Marcellus’ legions was not a complete strategic loss for the Romans by any means. Hannibal’s preoccupation with Marcellus had given Fabius the time he needed to besiege Tarentum. As was so often necessary in sieges of great cities, Tarentum ultimately fell through treachery. A Roman infiltrator worked his way into the confidence of the garrison commander in Tarentum and persuaded him to betray the city to the Romans. When the army gained access to the city, they engaged in the usual initial slaughter intended to break any resistance, followed by the formal plundering of the city.32 The accounts of the haul from the city include hints of the continued political friction between Marcellus and Fabius or, at the very least, between those sources who preferred Fabius and those who preferred Marcellus. According to Livy, Fabius authorized the plundering of 30,000 slaves, a massive weight of silver, over 3,000 pounds of gold, and works of art that ‘almost rivaled the adornments of Syracuse.’ Still, Fabius ‘showed more magnanimity in refraining from plunder of that kind than did Marcellus. When a clerk asked what he wished to have done with statues of colossal size – they are gods in the form of warriors, but each in his own attitude – Fabius ordered that their angry gods be left to the Tarentines.’33 Plutarch offers the same comparison – where Marcellus did not even hesitate to capture gods at Syracuse, Fabius showed moderation at Tarentum.34

  Was this really the case? Other evidence suggests Fabius too was not above seizing gods from the Tarentines. Plutarch himself, in his biography of Fabius, says that Fabius did take the colossus of Hercules from Tarentum and not only installed it on the Capitoline hill, but also built an equestrian statue of himself to set near it, showing in this way less restraint than Marcellus.35 Pliny, that compiler of encyclopedic information in the early Empire, also preserves a tradition that Fabius wished to take the colossus of Jupiter from Tarentum but was unable to move so massive a statue.36 Once again, as with the descriptions of Marcellus’ haul from Syracuse, we cannot escape the conclusions that the ancient historians of Rome in general openly embraced history-writing as an exercise in exemplifying moral behaviour, rather than an attempt at providing reasonably objective interpretations. In this case, the truth seems to be that both Marcellus and Fabius fully exercised their rights as victorious generals by plundering whatever possessions of the defeated they wished. It was left to the later recorders to wage a new battle over which commander had been more virtuous.

  With Tarentum retaken, Fabius’ proposed strategy for the year was successful. Still, Marcellus’ decision to billet his troops for a substantial part of the fighting season exposed him to political attack at Rome. Gaius Publicius Bibulus, a tribune of the plebs for 209 and, according to Livy and Plutarch, an enemy of Marcellus, began a campaign indicting the general’s decisions and conduct for the year, especially the decision to enter winter quarters early. Regardless of the military necessities that may have dictated such a choice, it simply looked bad to the citizens at Rome, far removed from the realities in the field, to have their army resting while Hannibal’s army was intact and on the move.37 Bibulus capitalized on these perceptions and proposed that Marcellus be stripped of his command. Livy says Marcellus’ relatives persuaded whoever it was that needed persuading – the senate presumably – that the commander was entitled to return to Rome to defend himself against Bibulus’ charges.38 Though he is not explicitly named, Marcellus’ son, who had served as aedile and was, presumably, already enrolled in the senate would likely have taken the lead in defending his father and his family’s reputation – unless he was serving as an officer, as he did in the subsequent year. In any event, the family’s appeal was successful, word was sent to Venusia, and Marcellus left the army under the command of subordinates, returning to Rome around the time that the elections for 208 were to be held.39

  The debate over Marcellus’ command took the form of a great trial held in the open air of the Flaminian Circus. The level of curiosity, if not outright excitement, in the city must have been very high. Here was arguably the greatest of Rome’s living generals – for Scipio Africanus had not yet achieved the glory of decisively defeating Hannibal – on trial for failing as a commander. A much younger man of much lower rank, the tribune Bibulus, would attempt to strip the commander of his office and strike a blow of dishonour that would be difficult to overcome. Bibulus, apparently, did not fail to put on a show for interested observers. He did not limit his criticisms to Marcellus, but found fault with the governing class for failing to bring the war to a successful conclusion after almost ten years. This was certainly a tactic that would resonate with many, judging by the signs of war strain from the previous few years. After indicting the ruling class, he shifted his attack to Marcellus. For Bibulus, Marcellus’ defeat and decision to stay encamped at Venusia exemplified the failure of the aristocracy to win the war swiftly and decisively.

  The particulars of Marcellus’ defence are lost. Livy says only that he gave a statement of his achievements. This could mean that he simply assessed the campaigns of recent years and justified his decisions in them. More likely though, given the habits of the Roman aristocracy, his defence focused more on his moral qualities, his virtus, than on any of the technical details of his campaigns. Perhaps he even went so far as to indulge in the time-honoured tradition of displaying the battle scars he had acquired over the years. There is a fair amount of evidence that Roman aristocrats, when their virtus and honour were challenged publicly and politically, would not infrequently engage in this spectacle, recounting each of their campaigns and noting the various scars from wounds received in those battles. The purpose of these displays was to illustrate one’s superior courage, valour, and toughness – one’s virtus. In doing so the accused showed that he had served the Republic with his spirit and body and that any moral challenges levied against him were unwarranted.40

  This sort of defence may seem illogical when the precipitating event of Marcellus’ trial may well have been the result of a tactical error, a failure in exercising command decisions. In r
eality, it was wholly consistent with the Romans’ view that the victory or defeat of their armies was not primarily an issue of the commanders’ tactical competence. Rather, conventional wisdom held that military success depended upon three crucial factors: the favour of the gods, obedient and brave soldiers, and commanders that displayed the proper courage on the battlefield. Though it may seem counterintuitive that the tactical decisions of the general were rarely called into question, it made great sense to elite Romans within the system of aristocratic competition. The Roman political system essentially made it highly likely that those who were elected consul, those who would generally be entrusted with the weighty task of commanding a citizen army in the field, had no prior command experience. True, they would have, in the early and middle Republic at least, years of military service, but not experience commanding armies, unless the candidates had happened to do so as praetors during those infrequent occasions when praetors commanded field armies. The Roman army of the middle Republic was an army of citizen soldiers, not professionals, and the commanders of the army were amateurs. There were no military academies for young aristocrats to attend, and indeed, if they were involving themselves in a political career they had no time to attend them anyway.

  With this in mind, consider that if military defeats were routinely blamed on the general’s tactical failures, and indeed, exceptional skill as a commander became a primary criterion for election, access to the prized consulship, and even praetorships, would be closed off for all those who were not gifted with that skill. In short, competition was already hot enough for these offices when the main claim to office was one’s pedigree and character; adding the factor of command skill would disrupt the competitive balance. And so it was very much within the interests of the aristocracy collectively to promote the idea that any aristocrat was technically fit to command armies, any possessed sufficient skill to do so. In rare cases, when a defeat was blamed on the commander rather than on the virtus of the soldiers or the will of the gods, that blame was based not on whether he had made any technical errors in command, but how he comported himself during battle. A true aristocrat, one worthy of the position of commander and worthy of continued respect, would, the Romans generally agreed, show valour on the field of battle and after, refusing to give up and never despairing, even in the face of defeat. He would make the proper sacrifices to the gods, serve as the font of morale for the troops and in all other ways be a moral exemplar.41 Indeed, this was the sum of Bibulus’ charge. Marcellus, along with the other leaders of Rome had dissembled and delayed. To top it off, here he was cringing in winter quarters rather than fighting. He lacked the moral competence to command, Bibulus harangued.

  By recounting his achievements, and perhaps showing his battle scars, Marcellus certainly could make the claim that he did. All that he needed to do to defend himself was emphasize that he had an unparalleled record of bravery in the face of the enemy, all in the service of the Republic. He was no delayer or dissembler. Whether it was through the details or delivery of his defence, or both, Marcellus was elected consul the very next day by a large number of voting centuries. Titus Quinctius Crispinus won the other consulship.42 Pressing matters, however, delayed Marcellus’ return to Venusia. A letter had arrived in the senate from the propraetor Gaius Calpurnius warning that the citizens of Arretium in Etruria were considering a break with Rome. The senate tasked Marcellus to travel to Arretium and investigate the matter; should the situation warrant it, he could request an army be sent to Etruria. Apparently, the presence of the venerable warrior was enough to quell any eagerness for revolt, however, and the sources mention no more of the matter.43

  When Livy says the new consuls Marcellus and Crispinus took office in 208, he cannot help but note that Marcellus – if one counted the inauguration that had been invalidated in 215 – had entered the consulship for the fifth time.44 Rightly so. Only Fabius of Romans in living memory had held five consulships, his fifth only the year before; only Gaius Marius in the late second century would ever hold more. Both consuls were assigned to Italy, but a series of pressing religious matters delayed their campaign. The gods again had reportedly sent many signs indicating their displeasure. It was the duty of the consuls, as the chief magistrates of the Republic, to oversee the rituals necessary to restore the proper relationship with the gods. This took several days, however, for the initial sacrifices of animals to the gods did not produce favourable omens and needed to be repeated until it was clear that the gods had accepted the offerings of the Republic.45

  Once the sacrifices were deemed favourable, Crispinus travelled with new recruits to the army in Lucania. Marcellus, however, still had more business to settle. The college of Roman priests, the pontifices, was blocking the formal dedication of the temple to Honos and Virtus that Marcellus had vowed back at Clastidium, nearly fifteen years ago. The priests declared that one temple could not be dedicated to two gods. To do so would confuse the signs the gods sent. For example, the priests argued, if lightning struck the temple to Honos and Virtus, it would not be clear which god was offended and, thus, which god needed to be placated through sacrifices. Why this objection was noted at this particular point is hard to determine. Surely, if this were a well-established concern, it could have been raised years ago. Why now?

  When pondering this question, one cannot help but note that Fabius was not only an augur but a pontifex, one of that college of priests that objected to Marcellus’ dedication. That may help with establishing the motive; Fabius can hardly have wanted the rival temple to be built. It does nothing to explain the timing. Surely, Fabius should, could, and would have raised this objection years earlier, perhaps when plans for the temple were initially made? Perhaps the decisive factor was that construction of the temple had not, it seems, actually begun until after Marcellus had taken Syracuse. If Fabius was the primary opponent, perhaps he saw no reason to obstruct the temple so long as it was not actually under construction. Now that it was nearing completion and ready to be dedicated, it was the opportune time for Fabius or some others among the pontifices to object. However this may have come about, the only practical solution for the consul, no doubt eager to continue his stalking of Hannibal, was to order the swift construction of a temple of Virtus alongside the temple of Honos.46 But the delay was enough to insure that he would not live to see the dedication of his memorial to Clastidium and Syracuse.

  Finished satisfying the religious obligations that were no doubt very important to his public image – possibly to his private scruples too, though we shall never know – Marcellus gathered his new recruits at Rome and returned to his army at Venusia.47 Crispinus, meanwhile, had initiated large-scale operations against the city of Locri in Bruttium, on the southern coast near the toe of the Italian peninsula. Hannibal’s occupation of Lacinium, however, a promontory east along the coast from Locri, caused Crispinus to abandon his plans. It is difficult to see why that would have been. One might argue that Hannibal’s movement threatened Crispinus’ lines to Rome, but clearly the Romans had been communicating with and supplying armies in nearby Sicily successfully for years by ship. Even more puzzling, Crispinus abandoned Locri and marched his army to join Marcellus in Apulia, marching past, in other words, Hannibal’s position in Lacinium. Perhaps the change of plan, therefore, came not because Crispinus had been outmaneuvered, but because Marcellus had finally reached Venusia, and there was an opportunity for the two consular armies to defeat Hannibal decisively.48

  Certainly, that seems to have been the plan. The consular armies met between the towns of Venusia and Bantia, maintaining separate camps but combining operations. Once the camps were established, the consuls began what was now practically a ritual: leading the armies out in battle formation daily to tempt Hannibal to fight. Hannibal, for his part, had no desire to face such a large force. And so the cat-and-mouse game began for another season. Hannibal kept his eyes open to opportunities for ambushes, skirmishers engaged here and there, and the main armies kept their distan
ce. The Apulian theatre looked likely to be locked down for the year. Seeing this, the consuls sent instructions to the Sicilian fleet commander, Lucius Cincius, to take advantage of Hannibal’s immobility and carry on the siege of Locri by sea. Meanwhile, Roman garrison troops from Tarentum would attack the landward side. Hannibal received reports of these movements, however, and sent a force to ambush the Roman detachment. The Roman garrison troops were soundly defeated and the broken remnants returned to Tarentum.49