Pakistan- the Balochistan Conundrum

by Tilak Devasher

  The Baloch do not want to live in Punjabi-dominated Pakistan and want separation to form their nation state;

  Military and paramilitary forces must be removed from the province as a demonstration of a genuine commitment to end ‘occupation’ of the province;

  All ‘settlers’ must be evicted from the province, especially the Punjabis and Afghan refugees who had settled in the province, since this would change the demography of the province;

  The traditional Baloch territories, like Jacobabad and DG Khan, should be restored to Balochistan;

  Organizations that want to help the Baloch people should raise the issue of human rights violations at the international level, especially in the United Nations; and

  International support for independence of Balochistan is welcome irrespective of who offers that, be it the United States or India.20

  A separatist, in an interview, unambiguously expressed the gravity of the current situation: ‘We’re an oppressed nation. There is no other choice but to fight … No matter how hard they try to turn Gwadar into Dubai, it won’t work. There will be resistance. The pipelines going to China will not be safe. They will have to cross through Baloch territory, and if our rights are violated, nothing will be secure.’21

  As Brahamdagh Bugti, Akbar Bugti’s grandson, told journalist Carlotta Gall: ‘The people are angry and they will go to the side of those using violence, because if you close all the peaceful ways of struggle, and you kidnap the peaceful, political activists, and torture them to death and throw their bodies on roadsides, then definitely they will go and join the armed resistance groups.’ He saw little hope of change from within Pakistan and sought intervention by the United Nations and Western nations. ‘We have to struggle hard, maybe for one year, two years, twenty years,’ he said, ‘We have to hope.’ ‘Ninety-nine per cent of the Baloch now want liberation,’ he said.22

  Separatist Groups

  Like the moderate Baloch groups and parties, the separatists, too, are divided into several factions. However, given the shadowy nature of these organizations, it is very difficult to determine their leadership and structure. Due to necessity, their structure is fluid and it is their mobility that helps them evade detection and gives them the element of surprise.23 As Human Rights Watch notes, the extent to which Baloch political leaders maintain control of militant groups remains unclear.24

  According to media reports, more than fourteen major and minor militant Baloch separatist groups operate in the province. The main groups are the Balochistan Liberation Army, Baloch Republican Army, Baloch Liberation Front, and Lashkar-e-Balochistan.25

  Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA): The precursors of the BLA were two militant groups that were active in the 1960s and 1970s—the Balochistan People’s Liberation Front (BPLF) and the Balochistan Liberation Front (BLF). At that time, the Marri, Mengal and Bugti tribes carried out armed resistance activities under the umbrella of these groups. However, as the BPLF dissipated during the exile years in Afghanistan, the armed supporters of the Marri tribe were organized under a new organization—the BLA. According to Naseer Dashti, during the initial years of the current insurgency it provided logistic support and training to the other armed resistance groups.26 Reportedly, Marri as well as Bugti tribesmen form the bulk of the BLA’s cadre, some of whom participated in the 1970s’ insurgency, and others have taken up arms for the first time. The BLA also reportedly draws its strength from underemployed, alienated and politicized Baloch youth in Quetta and other towns.27 It started its militant activities in 2002.

  On 9 April 2006 the Musharraf government banned the BLA as a terror organization, threatening to arrest anyone with links to it, a move that was seen by many as the first step in a systematic campaign to clamp down on Baloch dissent.28 Since then, scores of Baloch nationalist leaders and activists have been charged with links to the BLA.29

  In the initial years of the insurgency the BLA claimed credit for most attacks on government installations and personnel and on communication links and energy grids province-wide.30 Despite this, very little is known about its leadership, command structures or manpower. No Baloch nationalist political party or tribal group publicly admits knowledge of or links to the militant group, and with good reason. Nawab Bugti described the BLA, the BLF and the BPLF as ‘different groups or organizations’. Denying any links to them, he said: ‘Whatever name you give to these groups, they are not under our control. They are not beholden to anyone. Whatever they do, they do on their own. They don’t ask anyone.’31 The leader of the opposition in the Balochistan Assembly, Kachkool Ali Baloch, concurred that there were multiple militant groups with different tactics but an identical goal—to protect the Baloch people from an oppressive and exploitative Centre.32

  According to Baloch journalist Malik Siraj Akbar, the BLA ‘is not owned by any one sardar. No nationalist leader, including Bugti, Marri, and Mengal, accepts responsibility for leading the Baloch Liberation Army even though all of them admit to backing the outfit’s activities.33 And neither the assassination of Balach Marri nor of Akbar Bugti, the two main leaders of the initial phase of the current insurgency, ended the conflict between Balochistan and the Centre.34

  Among its high-profile attacks were the 15 June 2013 attack on the Ziarat Residency where Mohammad Ali Jinnah had spent his last days. The BLA mainly operates in the Marri area although like the other insurgent groups, its area of operations is not rigidly defined.35

  Balochistan Liberation Front (BLF). The BLF, reputed to be the most organized of the resistance groups, represents a new phenomenon in Balochistan in that it is the only militant organization led by educated middle-class segments of the Baloch society. Till the present fifth phase of Baloch insurgency, the national struggle was led by tribal sardars. This is no longer true. The volunteers of the BLF are mostly educated and come from the BSO (Azad). According to Naseer Dashti, young nationalist activists under the leadership of Ghulam Mohammad Baloch, Dr Allah Nazar and Wahid Kamber formed the BLF in 2003. Initially, it allied itself with the BLA and its volunteers reportedly received militant training from BLA instructors. The BLF is the only resistance group in Balochistan that is overt. Dr Allah Nazar, who belongs to a middle-class family from Mashkay in district Awaran, is the declared leader of the organization. The security forces, including the Pakistan Air Force, have targeted him on several occasions.36 He is the only prominent leader among the various insurgent groups who is engaged in actual fighting on the ground in Balochistan. This accounts for his popularity among the younger Baloch.37 The BLF’s area of operations includes Awaran, Panjgur, Washuk, Turbat and Gwadar districts in southern Balochistan. Here, the sardari system does not exist. BLF’s cadres include a large number of Zikris who are concentrated in the Makran belt.38

  The Baloch Republican Army (BRA): After the killing of Akbar Bugti in 2006, his Jamhoori Watan Party splintered and his grandson Brahamdagh Bugti set up the Baloch Republican Party (BRP). The security agencies claim that BRA is the militant wing of BRP and Brahamdagh is running it. This has been vehemently and repeatedly denied by him and he has accused the agencies of finding an excuse for the crackdown on the activities of BRP inside Balochistan. The BRP has also denied any link with militancy and claimed to believe in a peaceful struggle for the liberation of Balochistan.39 The BRA advocates the independence of a ‘greater Balochistan’ and opposes any sort of political dialogue, calling upon the international community to intervene to halt a ‘genocide’.

  The BRA is composed mainly of Bugti tribesmen who were followers of Akbar Bugti. In recent years its membership has expanded with volunteers from other parts of Balochistan joining it. The group has been successful in disrupting gas supplies from Sui to other parts of the country on many occasions and is believed to be one of the most potent resistance groups in the contemporary conflict.40 Among its high-profile attacks was the one on 24 January 2015, when it bombed two electricity transmission lines in Naseerabad district, plunging much of the country into darkness.41<
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  United Baloch Army (UBA): After the death of Balach Marri in 2007, differences were reported to have arisen between his successors. These differences caused divisions in the rank and file of the BLA. Resultantly, in 2012, the BLA split and according to Naseer Dashti, with the blessings of Khair Bakhsh Marri a new organization called the UBA was announced. Like the BLA, the UBA too is mostly composed of fighters from the Marri tribe but there are also people in its ranks from other tribes in Sarawan and Bolan regions. The security agencies have frequently accused Mehran Marri as leading the group but this has been strongly denied by him. Mehran Marri, who spends his time between London and UAE has, in fact, been articulating the Baloch case effectively in the UN Human Rights Commission in Geneva. Among UBA’s deadly attacks was the bombing of a Rawalpindi-bound train at Sibi station in April 2014, which killed at least seventeen people.42

  Lashkar-e-Balochistan (LeB): Formed in 2008 the LeB recruits volunteers from the Mengal tribe though today its volunteers come from more than just the Mengal area. Its main area of operations is in the Jhalawan and Makran regions. The security agencies have frequently accused Javed Mengal, the elder brother of Akhtar Mengal, the head of the BNP, as leading this militant group. The BNP has, however, denied any link with the LeB and has asserted that it is has no role in the armed struggle. It has made clear that its declared objective is to achieve the rights of the Baloch through political means. Javed Mengal who lives in exile in London and UAE has also denied any links with the LeB. Like Mehran Marri, Javed Mengal and his son Noordin Mengal have been active in pleading the Baloch case and highlighting the human rights situation in Balochistan in different international forums. Noordin has been active in the Unrepresented People’s Organisation (UNPO) and been instrumental in organizing some events in the US on the Balochistan issue.43

  Curiously, the Balochistan home department had announced bounties for ninety-nine members of banned militant organizations ranging between Rs 500,000 and Rs 15 million. These included militants belonging to the Baloch Liberation Army, Baloch Republican Army, Baloch Liberation Front, United Baloch Army and Lashkar-e-Balochistan. However, names of their alleged leaders like Brahamdagh Bugti, Hairbyar Marri, Mehran Marri and Javed Mengal, who are accused of instigating terrorist activities in Balochistan, were not included in the list.44 This says something about all the allegations against such leaders.

  Nature of the Conflict

  Since its forced accession to Pakistan and till the 1970s the Baloch conflict with the state was limited largely to tribal pockets. It lacked mass national participation. Things started changed during 1970s when due to the brutal suppression of the insurgency, a Baloch national consciousness started taking firmer roots. As a result, today the nature of the Baloch resistance is qualitatively different from the earlier periods. According to Naseer Dashti, ‘Now it has acquired many dimensions that are necessary for a national resistance movement to flourish and survive.’ According to him, ‘The perception of running out of time among the Baloch intellectuals and opinion makers is fuelling the sentiments of “national salvation in our life time”’ among the politically conscious elements. The Baloch universally share the belief that as a nation they are at the verge of becoming extinct.45

  Frederic Grare makes an important point: ‘It was the state’s repressive response that radicalized most elements of the “nationalist movement”’ and ‘as soon as it became clear that the military regime was seeking the elimination of the nationalist leadership’, the possibility of political compromise greatly diminished.46 The impact of this has been that the position of the nationalist political parties who hoped for a constitutional and political solution has been undermined. It is not only the militants who don’t believe that a political solution is possible any longer but the ordinary Baloch are also becoming convinced that there is no political solution and the gun is the only way.

  Unlike the past resistance movements, the ongoing Baloch insurgency has created serious challenges for Pakistan for several reasons. First, as of 2019 the insurgency is now in its fourteenth year. It has lasted longer than any of the past resistance movements and is continuing at the time of writing. It shows no signs of dissipating despite everything that the army has thrown against it. Even though low-key and not yet a threat to the state, it has a momentum of its own.

  Second, geographically the insurgency extends far beyond the tribal areas and has reached the length and breadth of Balochistan. Today, it is no longer confined to the domain of one or two tribes. Instead, it has spread into non-tribal regions such as the southern Makran belt, cutting across society and age groups, from the rural, mountainous regions to the city centres. As Grare puts it, the insurgency has shifted ‘… from rural to urban areas and from the north-east of the province to the south-west. Sometimes it spills over to cities like Karachi.’ As evidence he cites the fact that ‘… many leaders now come from the urbanized districts of Kech, Panjgur and Gwadar (and to a lesser extent from Quetta, Khuzdar, Turbat, Kharan and Lasbela). They are well-connected to Karachi and Gulf cities, where tribal structures are nonexistent.’47 In fact, the insurgency seems to concentrate mainly in the hilly terrain of Turbat, Panjgur, Gwadar and Awaran districts.

  Third, Baloch women and children have become involved in the insurgency. They have supported the armed groups through regular protest rallies. This indicates that the insurgency has permeated the ordinary people who are fighting not for the sake of a sardar but for the cause of Balochistan. As Declan Walsh noted: ‘… this insurgency seems to have spread deeper into Baloch society than ever before. Anti-Pakistani fervour has gripped the province. Baloch schoolchildren refuse to sing the national anthem or fly its flag; women, traditionally secluded, have joined the struggle. Universities have become hotbeds of nationalist sentiment.’48

  The impact was felt even in Islamabad. In April 2009 a Baloch senator dropped a bombshell in the Senate stating that the Pakistan national anthem was no longer sung in schools of Balochistan.49 By 2010 in most of Balochistan, books on ‘Pakistan Studies’ had been banned, the national flag could no longer be flown in any school or any other building, and singing the national anthem had been prohibited by the militants.50

  Fourth, for a considerable time, especially under Musharraf, the international community did not understand the threat posed by the army’s Islamist allies, domestically and externally. Though belatedly, the insurgency seems to have caught the attention of the international community. For example, in February 2012 US Congressman Dana Rohrabacher convened a hearing on Balochistan and supported the demand for a free Baloch land. He moved a resolution that was co-sponsored by House Representatives Louie Gohmert and Steve King. It asserted that the people of Balochistan that were ‘… currently divided between Pakistan, Iran and Afghanistan, have the right to self-determination and to their own sovereign country’, adding that they ‘should be afforded the opportunity to choose their own status among the community of nations’.51 The European Parliament has held several debates on the issue of Balochistan, while the matter is frequently raised in the sessions of the Human Rights Council in Geneva. In 2018 there were poster campaigns in Geneva, London and New York creating greater awareness about the situation in Balochistan.

  Fifth, Marri, Bugti and Mengal tribes had dominated the insurgency in the initial phases, but today the ranks of the insurgency include a large numbers of educated, middle-class Baloch. The bulk of them is said to be under the age of thirty. An observer has noted: ‘Previous insurgencies were led by sardars but today’s insurgency is spearheaded by ordinary, middle-class Baloch.’52 Nationalist fervour, he said, is driving it; factors such as poverty, unemployment and underdevelopment are of secondary importance. ‘The insurgents,’ he said, ‘include doctors, lawyers, traders and teachers. They can all make a living but they have chosen to fight because they see their rights violated and [Balochistan’s] resources plundered.’53 According to Baloch politician Abdul Rauf Mengal, ‘It is not just the three tribes but all B
aloch people are fighting [for their rights], and most of them are ordinary Baloch.’54

  The educated middle class that is leading the movement is underrepresented in the higher echelons of the Pakistan state structure—both military and civil, as noted in an earlier chapter, and it provides a substantial cadre to the Baloch nationalist movement.55 The middle class is also a unifying factor due to its opposition to separate agreements, individual or collective, between Islamabad and the tribal chiefs. Not surprisingly, the Pakistan Army has targeted the middle class to dent the growing consolidation of Baloch nationalism.56

  Dr Allah Nazar, leader of the BLF, best represents the change in the epicentre of the insurgency. According to author Mahvish Ahmad, Nazar’s rise represented a fundamental shift within the hierarchy of the movement. ‘From one led by sardars, or tribal leaders, it is becoming one spearheaded and populated by a non-tribal cohort of middle-class Baloch. Nazar’s leadership exemplifies the shift of the movement’s epicentre from Balochistan’s north-east—home to the Marris and Bugtis, and known for its longstanding separatist sentiments—to the remittance-rich, urbanizing south, which is home to a burgeoning educated and professional class, which has historically remained on the sidelines of the province’s politics.’57

  Sixth, while it is true that tribal unity in Balochistan has been a chimera and one of the banes for the nationalists, several events provide a glimmer of hope. The first was the 2003 four-party alliance called the Baloch Ittehad of Abdul Hayee Baloch’s NP, Sardar Akhtar Mengal’s BNP, Nawab Akbar Bugti’s JWP and Nawab Khair Bakhsh Marri’s Baloch Haq Talwar. The alliance stayed together for a while but later disintegrated. The second was provided in the wake of the killing of Akbar Bugti when the former Khan of Kalat called a grand Baloch Jirga on 21 September 2006 and again on 2 October 2006 in which about 380 leaders, including eighty-five sardars, participated. This put paid to Musharraf’s boast that all except three sardars supported him.58 For a while at least, there was a semblance of unity. The Baloch sardars even called upon the Pakistan government to vacate Baloch areas. In 2013 the Khan of Kalat and Hyrbyair Marri joined forces and announced that a united the Balochistan ‘charter’ would be launched. This, however, did not materialize. Key exiled figures such as the Baloch representative at the United Nations Human Rights Council (UNHRC) Mehran Marri, Brahamdagh Bugti and Javed Mengal refused to endorse the document.