Aspects of Greek History (750–323BC)

by Terry Buckley

  The modern school believes that land ownership and inheritance in archaic and classical Sparta was similar to that of other Greek states, i.e. the land was privately owned and the usual rules of inheritance whereby a father bequeathed his land to his children were in force. It is also argued that land was inherited not only by the sons but also by the daughters, who may have received as much as a half portion of her brother or each of her brothers. However, their portion would probably be given not on the death of the father but as a dowry when the daughter married. It is this different system of private ownership and inheritance that explains more convincingly the continual decline of Spartan citizens from the fifth century onwards. The key source for this view is Book 2 of Aristotle’s Politics. On the issue of the weakness of Lycurgus’ legislation concerning the inequality of property ownership, Aristotle says:

  For he [i.e. the lawgiver] quite rightly made it dishonourable to buy or sell land in someone’s possession but allowed those who wished to give and bequeath it … moreover nearly two-fifths of all land is possessed by women.

  (Aristotle, Politics 1270a)

  Later on in the same passage Aristotle criticizes the laws that were introduced to encourage an increase in the Spartans population:

  For the lawgiver, intending that the Spartiates should be as numerous as possible, encourages the citizens to beget many children … But it is obvious that, if many are born and the land distributed accordingly, many must inevitably become poor.

  (Aristotle, Politics 1270b)

  On the basis of Aristotle’s evidence, it was possible as a typical private landowner to transfer land as a gift during one’s lifetime or to bequeath it to whomever one liked. Even the sale and purchase of land is a matter of dishonour but not of illegality. Furthermore, those families of the Spartiates who followed the lawgiver’s encouragement for larger families inevitably fell into poverty, as their land was divided up at their death among their sons and daughters into increasingly smaller parcels of land. However, the wealthy Spartiates, whose number is well attested throughout the classical period (Herodotus 6.61.3; Thucydides 1.6.4; Xenophon, Lac. Pol. 5.3), like the rich in other states, carefully planned their marriages, procreation and bequests, using these laws to consolidate their wealth and, where possible, to increase their landholdings. Thus wealthy families ensured that their children married into wealth. Families were kept small to prevent the diminution of the estate owing to too many heirs – hence the practice of one wife being shared between two men to keep the number of inheriting children small in both families. Furthermore, if the evidence of Philo, a first century AD Jewish scholar, who states that in Sparta uterine siblings (i.e. children from the same mother but different fathers) could marry (On Special Laws 3.4.22), is accepted, a marriage between the half-brother and the half-sister of the shared mother mentioned above would result in the inheritance and concentration of even more land. A childless Spartiate could adopt a kinsmen as his heir, thus keeping the land within the kinship group – also further evidence of the right of a Spartiate to dispose of his land as he wished.

  One final quotation about land tenure must be mentioned which has caused great difficulty amongst all scholars and resists a consensus of opinion. It comes from Heracleides Lembos (fr. 373.12 Dilts), a second-century statesman and scholar, and is considered to be derived from Aristotle’s lost Constitution of the Lacedaimonians:

  To sell land is considered shameful by the Lacedaimonians, but from the ancient portion (archaias moiras) it is not allowed.

  Some scholars view this source as evidence of two categories of land: private land that can be sold (although socially unacceptable) and state-controlled land –‘the ancient portion’–which it was expressly forbidden to sell. Some scholars equate this ‘archaia moira’ with the cleroi of Lycurgus; others that this refers to landholdings in Messenia which were given to poorer Spartans after the Second Messenian War so that they could meet the obligations of citizenship; others believe that it refers to land that has been in the possession of a Spartiate’s family for many decades to differentiate it from any newly acquired land. The latest view, i.e. Hodkinson, is that this ‘ancient portion’ has nothing to do with land but refers to the Helots’ rent, his agricultural payment in kind.

  As regards the ‘Lycurgan’ economic and social reforms in archaic Sparta, with all the problems of the sources and the constant reinvention of the Spartan myth, it is difficult to give a definitive answer, as Plutarch does in the Life of Lycurgus. It seems very unlikely, however, that there was a ‘Big Bang’ moment when a new ‘Lycurgan’ system suddenly appeared ready-formed, like an Athene springing forth from Zeus’ head. The fact that there was no revolution and no tyranny in Sparta strongly suggests that a consensus was reached among the Spartiates as a whole and that a collective decision was taken to adapt their economic and social (and political) institutions to meet the new demands of the seventh and sixth centuries. First, it must have been agreed at some time that every Spartan would be a hoplite citizen (usually one-third of the population in other states), whose legal duties would include daily attendance at one of the dining clubs (syssitia), where all the Homoioi (Similars/Peers) dined. Second, there must have been a distribution of some land, probably in Messenia, together with allocated Helots to the poorer citizens so that they had the means to provide their compulsory quota of food to their syssition (dining club) upon which their citizenship depended, and the opportunity to carry out their full-time civic and military duties. Finally, a social system, a common way of living (including education) was agreed upon that stretched from birth to death and in which all citizens must participate. It was this third element that was subject to change, modification and refinement over the decades of the late seventh and the sixth centuries.

  Part of the social reform involved the agoge or the state military education system, which is described in detail by Xenophon (Con. of the Lac. 1–4) and Plutarch (Life of Lycurgus 14–25). Again it is not possible to give a definitive answer as to when all the different and distinctive elements of the agoge were introduced (even the term agoge may be of third century origin), although it too must have undergone changes over the decades, even centuries. Its objective was to develop the ideal qualities of a first-class soldier-citizen: patriotism, obedience, loyalty, comradeship, community spirit and uniformity. From the age of six every male child, apart from the royal heirs-apparent, was removed from his family, and joined groups of other boys in a communal life where over the next fourteen years they acquired through harsh, even brutal, training the physical strength, the discipline and the fighting skills that made the Spartans the most feared of all soldiers. Once they had served their apprenticeship in the agoge, they became ‘eirenes’ at the age of 20 and were then eligible to join a syssition (dining club). Each syssition would consist of roughly fifteen members (Plutarch, Life of Lycurgus 12) of different ages, who were expected to attend every night for the rest of their lives and share a common meal. The young Spartan man (‘eiren’), once admitted, would live in the syssition for the whole of his twenties, even if married, where his older companions would complete his education by helping him to integrate into the adult Spartan life of training, fighting and dining. At a certain age, possibly 30, he became a full citizen, and was entitled to attend the Ecclesia (Assembly) and to reside with his wife. Thus the syssition and not the family, thus communal rather than private life, became the main focal point of a Spartan’s existence. The result was the first full-time, professional army in Greece which not only kept the Helots subdued, but enabled the Spartans to spread their power throughout the Peloponnese in the sixth century.

  The rise of Sparta in the sixth century

  By the end of the sixth century (599–500) the Spartans had made throughout the Peloponnese a series of military alliances, in which they were acknowledged as the ‘hegemon’ (leader) of a military league, called the Peloponnesian League by modern scholars. However, due to the paucity and unreli
ability of the sources, it is very difficult to trace accurately the stages of the League’s development. Herodotus provides the briefest of information about Sparta’s expansion in the first half of the sixth century:

  In the kingship of Leon and Agasicles at Sparta, the Lacedaimonians were successful in their other wars, but kept on failing only against the Tegeates.

  (Herodotus 1.65)

  Leon and Agasicles ruled from c.580 to c.560 but, with the exception of the conflict between Sparta and Tegea (see below), little is known about these successful ‘other wars’. The only ‘other’ war that can be assigned with any confidence to this period is Sparta’s intervention on the side of the Eleans, who defeated the Pisatans in c.572 and regained control over Olympia. This military alliance with Elis was intended to deter the Pisatans, who occupied the territory that bordered on north Messenia, from offering help to the Helots. The Spartans also gained a reputation as the expellers of tyrants in the sixth century (Thucydides 1.18), and it is possible that the Spartans played a part in the overthrow of the Cypselid tyranny in Corinth (c.583) and the Orthagorid tyranny of Sicyon (c.556). However, the list of Spartanaided expulsion of tyrants from such late sources as Plutarch, Moralia 859c–d does not inspire confidence; and it would make more sense strategically to subdue Tegea and Argos on their northern borders before embarking on such campaigns further north.

  Two powers stood in the way of the Spartans establishing their supremacy in the Peloponnese: Tegea and Argos. The Tegeates had helped the Messenian Helots in the Second Messenian War, and would always offer them in the future either encouragement to revolt or a refuge for escape, unless stopped. The Argives had severely defeated the Spartans at Hysiai in 669 and had established themselves as one of the major powers, if not the foremost, in the Peloponnese. The Spartans chose as their first target the city-state of Tegea, the strongest and most influential of the Arcadians. This was essential due to the constant menace of an Arcadian-inspired Helot revolt, and because it would be too dangerous to launch an attack against Argos without previously ensuring that their left flank would not be left exposed to an attack by unconquered Arcadians. Therefore, in the first half of the sixth century, the Spartans set about the conquest of Tegea which, if successful, would bring the rest of Arcadia under their control.

  It is clear from Herodotus’ quotation above that the Spartans experienced the greatest difficulty in their attempt to subdue Tegea. According to Diodorus (Book 7 fr. 13.2) the Spartans’ first campaign ended in failure when the Tegeates, aided by the Argive forces of King Meltas (grandson of Pheidon), even regained some lost territory. Far more serious was their defeat at the ‘Battle of the Fetters’. So confident were the Spartans of gaining total victory, sanctioned by the Delphic oracle, that they even brought fetters with them to put on the defeated Tegeates; ironically it was the Tegeates who made use of the fetters by putting the Spartans in chains and making them farm the fields of Tegea (Herodotus 1.66). The intention of the Spartans is revealed by the fact that they brought fetters and measuringrods on this campaign – to turn the Tegeates into Helots and to divide up their territory into more cleroi (plots of land).

  The discovery at Tegea of the bones of Orestes, son of Agamemnon, and their return to their ‘home’ in Sparta was followed by a Spartan victory in c.550 (Herodotus 1.67–68). However, the Spartans had learned a valuable lesson from their previous defeats at the hands of the Tegeates, and now embarked on a policy of diplomacy. In place of conquest and helotization, the Spartans decided to make a military alliance with Tegea in which Sparta was the hegemon (leader). The Spartans would come to the defence of Tegea, if attacked by another state; and the Tegeates, for their part, were to supply troops for any Spartan campaign and, as can be seen from a fragment of a treaty between the two states, were to refuse any help to the Helots. It was this treaty that set a precedent for Spartan foreign policy, and led to the growth of similar military alliances with other Peloponnesian states culminating in the Peloponnesian League (see Chapter 12). The adoption of the Achaean (i.e. pre-Dorian) Orestes as a Spartan hero was a clever use of propaganda by the Spartans (presenting themselves as Achaeans rather than Dorians) to make their military leadership of the Peloponnese more politically acceptable.

  This sensible diplomatic policy was put into operation during the reigns of Anaxandridas and Ariston (from c.560 onwards), and probably bears the stamp of Chilon, Ephor in c.556 and one of the ‘Seven Wise Men’ of Greece: ‘nothing too much’ was allegedly one of his famous sayings (Aristotle, Rhetoric 1389b). However, Herodotus again baldly states that, at the time (c.547/6) of the request for an alliance against Persia by Croesus, king of Lydia in Asia Minor:

  Most of the Peloponnese had been made subject to the Spartans.

  (Herodotus 1.68.6)

  This could be another example of Herodotus’ tendency to exaggerate; but the defeat of Tegea c.550 and the probable submission of the other Arcadian cities along with Tegea to a military alliance, in which they accepted the military superiority and leadership of the Spartans, gave Sparta control of three-fifths of the Peloponnese. Thus such a position of military strength, together with the alliance with Elis, is enough to confirm Herodotus’ statement about the extent of Spartan power by the middle of the sixth century.

  Argos, the old enemy, was the next target, and once again the Thyreatis, the fertile plain on the Argive side of the border with Sparta, was the chosen battleground. According to Herodotus (1.82), the Spartans had seized the land but, instead of a full-scale battle, it was agreed that 300 champions from each side would fight it out, with the disputed territory going to the winners. Both armies would retire home until the contest was concluded. When nightfall brought an end to the ‘Battle of the Champions’, fought c.544, two Argives and one Spartan remained alive. The two Argives, claiming victory by virtue of their superior number, returned to Argos with the news. The wily Spartan, however, stripped the arms and the armour from the dead, set up a battlefield trophy, and stayed in possession of the battleground – a symbol of victory. As both sides claimed the victory, it was left to a full-scale conflict to decide the issue conclusively: victory for Sparta. The Spartans were now undisputed masters of the Thyreatis and, if Herodotus is to be believed, also annexed the former Argive possessions along the east coast of the Peloponnese down to Cape Malea and the island of Cythera, and turned them into ‘perioikic’ communities.

  King Cleomenes

  It may have been this victory that encouraged the independent city-states of Epidaurus, Troezen and Hermione, all in the Argolid, to make military alliances with Sparta. This success against Arcadia and Argos also brought the Spartans directly into contact with the Isthmus states, and it is more likely that Corinth, Sicyon and Megara (and possibly Aegina) became part of the network of Spartan alliances in the years following the defeat of Argos rather than in the first half of the sixth century. The Corinthians had certainly become a Spartan ally by c.525, since they joined in the Spartan campaign to depose Polycrates as tyrant of Samos (Herodotus 3.39.1, 48.1). The last twenty years of the sixth century are dominated by the dynamic personality of King Cleomenes of Sparta, but the account of his reign (c.520–490) is distorted by the hostile sources used by Herodotus. It was under Cleomenes that the Spartans not only firmly established their supremacy in the Peloponnese but also, by intervening in the affairs of other states outside the Peloponnese, came to be recognized as the leaders of Greece in defence of the homeland against the Persian invasions.

  Athens was to play a leading part in Cleomenes’ plans for extending Spartan influence outside the Peloponnese. The assassination of Hipparchus in 514 had persuaded his brother, the tyrant Hippias, that his hopes of survival as tyrant of Athens depended upon a policy of harsh repression. One of the leading aristocratic families, the Alcmaeonids, tried to engineer Hippias’ overthrow, but this was only achieved in 510 when Cleomenes used his Spartan army to support their aims (Herodotus 5.64 – see Chapter 7 for a fuller discussion).
The Spartan expedition went by land which confirms that Corinth and Megara were allies of Sparta by this time, thus providing them with easy access to Attica. There is doubt as to whether Athens now formed a military alliance on the same terms as Sparta’s alliances in the Peloponnese, but, at the very least, Cleomenes would have expected a pro-Spartan, oligarchic regime to be installed to maintain Sparta’s growing influence. The proposal of democratic reforms by Cleisthenes was viewed with concern by Cleomenes who intervened in 508 with a small Spartan army, resulting in the exile of Cleisthenes and 700 families and in the installation of Isagoras as the leader of a narrow oligarchy.

  The revolt of the Athenian demos against such an unwelcome constitution forced Cleomenes to retire in disgrace (Herodotus 5.72). Cleomenes’ desire for revenge revealed Sparta’s current status as the leading power of Greece:

  Cleomenes … summoned an army from the whole of the Peloponnese, not stating the reason for its gathering, but desiring to take vengeance on the people of Athens and to establish Isagoras as tyrant.

  (Herodotus 5.74)

  This army also included the Boeotians and the Chalcidians of Euboea, both of whom were allies of Sparta. This quotation is interesting on two accounts: first, the Spartan armed forces were so powerful that the allies felt obliged to comply with their orders, even though the objective of the campaign was not stated; second, the Spartans’ claim that they expelled tyrants as a matter of principle is exposed as empty rhetoric. However, this invasion of Attica in c.506 had to be aborted at Eleusis on the Athenian borders, when the Corinthians withdrew on the grounds that they were acting unjustly by attacking Athens, to be followed by Damaratus, the other Spartan king, and the other allies (Herodotus 5.75–76).