The Greeks sent the following land forces, under the command of the Spartan King Leonidas, to occupy the pass at Thermopylae: 4,000 Peloponnesians, consisting of 300 Spartiates, 2,120 Arcadians, 400 Corinthians, 200 from Phleious, 80 from Mycenae and probably 900 ‘Helots’ or ‘Perioeci’ (see Glossary), who were joined there by 1,000 Phocians, 1,000 Locrians, 700 Thespians and 400 Thebans – a grand total of 7,100 soldiers. The Greek fleet, under the command of the Spartan Eurybiades but ably helped by the Athenian Themistocles, was composed of 271 triremes and nine penteconters, later reinforced by 53 triremes, and was sent to occupy the position of Artemisium. This disparity between the comparatively small size of the army and the large naval forces, together with other factors, has led some modern historians to doubt that the Spartans genuinely supported the above strategy of mounting a full and effective defence of Thermopylae and central Greece, preferring privately to make the decisive stand at the Isthmus of Corinth.
Support for this view comes from this quotation –‘The proposal that won the day’ (7.175.1): clearly the decision of the Hellenic League to defend Thermopylae was not unanimous. The main opposition presumably came from the Peloponnesian delegates who did not wish to send their military contingents so far north, preferring to make the Isthmus at Corinth the main line of defence. It is believed that the Spartans, although sharing this opinion, did not openly oppose this strategy, since a refusal to defend Central Greece could have led to the medism of Athens and its navy, and the fatal weakening of the Greek forces and of Sparta’s claim to leadership. Furthermore, it is argued, there are three pieces of evidence which show that the Spartans knew that the army was too small to hold Thermopylae and were unwilling to send reinforcements there; but, to stop their allies in central Greece from medizing, sent the minimum possible force with no intention of reinforcing this army.
First, there was the invitation to the Locrians and the Phocians to join the Greeks at Thermopylae:
For the Greeks themselves invited them, telling them through messengers that they themselves had come as an advance guard of the rest, and that the rest of the allies were expected to arrive any day.
(Herodotus 7.203.1)
It is reasonable to believe that ‘the Greeks’ in the above quotation are Leonidas and the commanders of the other Peloponnesian contingents. This is clear evidence that the 4,000 Peloponnesians were only an advance guard and therefore were insufficient for the task of holding Thermopylae. Second, the Spartan claim that they could not come at once with their full force owing to their celebration of the religious feast of the Carneia, repeated by the Peloponnesians in their celebration of the Olympic festival, was a convenient excuse to delay the sending of troops until the fall of Thermopylae (7.206). The insincerity of the Spartans and Peloponnesians is laid bare by the fact that their religious scruples did not stop them from sending some forces. Third, when the Greek army at Thermopylae lost its nerve at the arrival of Xerxes’ army and the Peloponnesians wished to retreat:
Leonidas voted to remain there and to send messengers to the cities, ordering them to send help on the grounds that they were too few in number to withstand the Persian army.
(Herodotus 7.207)
All this evidence reveals the Spartans believed that the fall of Thermopylae was inevitable and therefore its defence was unwise, but political considerations dictated that they had to make some effort and give the appearance of taking the defence of Thermopylae seriously.
On the other hand, Herodotus’ account of the fighting at Thermopylae and the alternative interpretation of the above evidence strongly suggest that the Greek army could have held Thermopylae indefinitely and that the Spartans were fully committed to the Thermopylae–Artemisium line of defence. The comprehensive defeat of the Persian forces on the first two days of the fighting, with only a few Greek casualties, highlights the clear superiority of the heavily armed hoplites fighting in a narrow space and contradicts the view that the Greeks had insufficient troops to hold the pass (7.210–12). The discovery of the Anopaea, the path over the mountain that could turn Thermopylae, and the need to station some of his forces there must have been a disappointment to Leonidas, but the failure of the 1,000 Phocians to defend the Anopaea was due to their incompetence, not to a lack of manpower – a more vigilant and braver force of well-armed soldiers could have successfully prevented the Persians from climbing the narrow and difficult path (7.218).
Furthermore, at the meeting of the Hellenic League, the Spartans were more likely to have supported the chosen policy of defending Thermopylae, since to give up the whole of central Greece and the island of Euboea without a struggle would have gravely damaged the Greek will to resist and increased the mood of defeatism that was felt by some of the allies. The decision of the Spartans and the Peloponnesians to delay the despatch of their main forces during the festivals of the Carneia and the Olympics was based on their confidence that an adequate number of troops had been sent to Thermopylae:
Therefore, they sent their advance guard, not thinking that the campaign at Thermopylae would be decided so soon.
(Herodotus 7.206.2)
Thus the Spartans had every intention of defending Thermopylae and, as for the festival of the Carneia, the Spartans only claimed that it was ‘in the way’ (7.206.1), not an insurmountable obstacle. Finally, the story of Leonidas contemplating withdrawal and his request for more troops is probably fictitious, derived from an anti-Peloponnesian source. Leonidas knew that the forces at Thermopylae and Artemisium were inextricably linked, and consequently his withdrawal would expose the Greek fleet to enormous risk (see above). Moreover, with the Persian army in front of the very pass of Thermopylae, there was no time for extra troops to be summoned and put in position before Xerxes attacked.
On the basis of the evidence and the preceding arguments, it is reasonable to believe that Thermopylae was designated as the main position for the land defence. There was no doubt among scholars that the main bulk of the Greek navy, on the basis of Herodotus’ evidence, had been sent to Artemisium until the discovery of an inscription at Troezen in 1959, reproducing allegedly a ‘decree of Themistocles’ (ML 23). This decree is in conflict with Herodotus’ account on two very important points: first, it authorizes the mass evacuation of Attica before the battle at Thermopylae; second, it orders only one hundred Athenian ships to sail to Artemisium, instructing the other hundred to remain around Salamis and the rest of Attica. In Herodotus, the evacuation of Attica was an emergency measure after the fall of Thermopylae and a matter of improvisation by individuals, not organized by the state (8.40–42); and the whole of the Athenian fleet was sent to Artemisium, with the exception of 53 triremes that joined during the three days of fighting. If the decree is authentic, then it is clear that the Athenians also had no confidence in the commitment and the ability of the Spartans to hold Thermopylae, and that the retention of a hundred triremes was designed to protect Attica from an attack by a detachment of the Persian fleet, sailing around the east coast of Euboea, while the main Persian fleet fought at Artemisium. The inscription was carved in the late fourth or early third century, and is one of a number of Persian War documents that are believed to have been forged for fourth-century political purposes. No agreement between scholars has been reached on the issue of its authenticity and therefore, for the purposes of this chapter, the account of Herodotus has been preferred.
Although it is not clear in Herodotus, the three days of fighting at Thermopylae coincided with the naval action at Artemisium. The breakthrough for the Persians at Thermopylae came on the third day, after a certain Ephialtes from Malis revealed the existence of the Anopaean path, which the Persian troops under Hydarnes exploited to turn the Greek position, after the 1,000 Phocians who had been stationed there to protect the Greek rear, had fled. Upon receipt of the news that their position was about to be turned, Leonidas held a council of war which revealed a split in the allies’ opinions between retreat and resistance. Leonidas ordered the allies to retreat
, with the exception of the 700 Thespians and 400 Thebans, because, according to Herodotus, he perceived that there was a lack of will to fight, and he did not want such a potentially damaging and divisive split to be made public (7.220). His decision to stay with his 300 Spartans was motivated, according to Herodotus, by the oracle which stated that Sparta’s survival depended upon the death in battle of one of its kings, and by Leonidas’ desire that the Spartans should gain the maximum glory from this noble sacrifice (7.220). However true this may be, there was a much more prosaic reason for Leonidas staying and engaging the Persians on the third day: the need to buy time for the other Greeks to escape. If the whole Greek force had retreated, the Persian cavalry would have soon overtaken and destroyed them. After the most dogged and the bravest resistance, the Spartans and the Thespians were annihilated, but not the Thebans who surrendered before the final Persian onslaught (7.223–25; 233). Now the whole of central Greece lay open, since the next line of land defence was the Isthmus at Corinth.
The overtaking of two and the capture of all three lookout triremes by the speedier Persian ships confirmed the Persian tactical advantage, if fighting took place in open water. However, Herodotus’ account that this loss led to panic and the withdrawal of the Greek fleet to Chalcis in the Euripus strait seems unhistorical (7.183), since this would have left the Greek position at Thermopylae exposed. But there may be a kernel of truth, namely that the Greek fleet did retreat temporarily into the Malian Gulf, presumably from the terrible storm that soon arose; and the mention of the Euripus may refer to the need of the Greeks to guard against a flanking movement by the Persian fleet around the eastern side of Euboea which would cut off the Greek line of retreat down the Euripus strait. It may well be that the 53 Athenian triremes, which later joined the main fleet at Artemisium, had been given this task. The Persian fleet arrived and moored on the Magnesian coast, close to Cape Sepias, but due to their large numbers, most had to ride at anchor off the shore. A terrible storm arose that blew for three days, and inflicted major damage upon the exposed Persian fleet, but the stated losses of 400 ships (according to Herodotus) must be scaled down substantially (7.188–92). However, the reduction in Persian fighting ships did help to lessen the inequality in numbers.
After the storm, the Persians stationed their ships at Aphetae and in the safe waters of the Gulf of Pagasae. They also at some point despatched a squadron of 200 ships to sail around Euboea and attack the Greek fleet in the rear (8.7), but were destroyed by another storm, or perhaps by the three-day storm if sent earlier than in Herodotus’ account (8.13–14). Although the loss of 200 is certainly an exaggeration by Herodotus, there seems no good reason to doubt that this attempt to circumnavigate Euboea took place. The Greeks launched their first attack on the same day as Xerxes first sent his army against Leonidas, but they waited until late in the day. Their tactics were presumably to catch the Persians with their ships dispersed, there being no single harbour for so large a force, defeat one division of ships, and then retreat at nightfall before the Persians could concentrate their fleet for a major battle. On the first day, the Greeks captured 30 ships (8.9–11) and on the second almost destroyed the Cilician squadron (8.14). On the third day, the Persians took the initiative and at midday went into a battle in which both sides inflicted and received heavy casualties (8.14–16). However, the news of the fall of Thermopylae meant that the Greek fleet’s position was untenable; it withdrew under the cover of night to Salamis.
Salamis
There are many difficulties in Herodotus’ chronology of the events leading up to the battle of Salamis, and there are serious doubts about the number of meetings of the Greeks’ council of war, and about the reliability of the details and the portrayal of individuals’ behaviour in these meetings. In particular, the first meeting of the Greek generals at Salamis (8.49), which was debating the possibility of retiring to the Isthmus before the Persians had even reached Athens, is still in session when it receives the news of the fall of the Acropolis – a success that took the Persians days, possibly weeks, to accomplish. In the same way, the portrayal of the Corinthians and their general Adeimantos as cowards, both in the debates in the councils of war and in the actual battle, is evidently the product of a hostile Athenian tradition that reflected the virulent anti-Corinthian feelings in Athens from 460 onwards. In fact, the Corinthians fought very bravely at Salamis, as the rest of the Greeks attested (8.94.4). However, although the greatest caution must be exercised in the use of Herodotus, what does emerge clearly from his account is the debate about the Greeks’ naval strategy – whether to stay at Salamis or retire to the Isthmus where the army was hastily building a defensive wall (8.40.2).
After the battle of Artemisium, the Greek fleet put in at Salamis at the request of the Athenians so that they might evacuate their women and children to Salamis, Aegina and Troezen (8.40–41). When this was done, the Greek reserve ships joined the main fleet at Salamis. It was in Herodotus’ first council of war that the arguments were put for making the Isthmus the base for the fleet:
Eurybiades put the matter before them, allowing anyone who wished to speak to state where they thought was the most suitable place to fight a sea-battle in the territory still under their control [for Attica was already lost, but he was discussing the remaining places]. The opinions of most of the speakers were to sail to the Isthmus and fight a sea-battle for the safety of the Peloponnese – their reasons were that, if they were defeated in a sea-battle at Salamis, they would be blocked up in the island where no help could be brought to them; whereas, at the Isthmus, they could escape to their own people.
(Herodotus 8.49.1–2)
The identities and the arguments of the opponents of this strategy (i.e. retreat from Salamis to the Isthmus of Corinth) are not given by Herodotus at this point, but the opposition presumably came from the Athenians, Aeginetans and Megarians (8.74.2).
After Herodotus’ second (or extended first) council of war had allegedly voted to retire to the Isthmus (8.56), Themistocles persuaded Eurybiades to convene another meeting of the generals, where he put the arguments against the Isthmus and for Salamis for the sea-battle with the Persians:
‘If you take on the enemy at the Isthmus, you will fight a sea-battle in open waters which is to our least advantage, since our ships are heavier and fewer in number. In addition, you will lose Salamis, Megara and Aegina, even if we are successful. At the same time their land army will follow their navy, and thus you yourselves will lead them to the Peloponnese and put the whole of Greece at risk. But if you will do things that I say, you will find so many advantages. First, by fighting in narrow waters with our few ships against their many, we will win a great victory, if things in war turn out as expected. Second, we will keep hold of Salamis where we have sent our children and wives. Third, the thing which you most desire, you will be fighting in defence of the Peloponnese equally by remaining here as at the Isthmus, and you will not lead the enemy to the Peloponnese, if you are wise.’
(Herodotus 8.60.1–2)
To add force to his argument, Themistocles threatened Eurybiades that, if the decision went against fighting at Salamis, the Athenians would leave Greece for good and settle in Siris in Italy (8.62.2). It may have been Themistocles’ blackmail that led Eurybiades, the naval commander-in-chief, to decide to fight at Salamis, as Herodotus believed (8.63), but it is just as likely that he, a battle-hardened commander and drawing on his knowledge gained from the fighting at Artemisium, fully recognized the superior quality of Themistocles’ strategy.
Themistocles had devised the right strategy for dealing with the Persians. He knew that the Persian strategy was very rigid, based almost totally on the joint operation of the army and navy. The campaigns of Darius in Thrace (4.89ff.) and of Mardonius in Thrace and Macedon (6.43–45) had relied upon the same strategy, which also had been most forcefully recommended to Xerxes by Achaemenes, his brother and admiral (7.236.2), and accepted by him. The Persian army, having devastated
Attica, would not dare advance to the Isthmus without the fleet, which would be needed to turn the Greek land position. But the Persian fleet dare not bypass the Greek navy, since it would expose itself either to a flank attack or, if allowed to sail past unmolested, it would risk having its line of communication and supplies, especially water supplies, cut off by the Greek navy – a situation very similar to Artemisium. Therefore two options presented themselves to the Persians: either destroy the Greek fleet by attacking with the whole of the Persian navy or divide up the navy, leaving behind one large detachment to neutralize the Greek navy and sailing with the other to the Isthmus. The storms had substantially reduced the number of Persian ships, as Herodotus pointed out after the second storm:
Everything was being done by the god in order to make the Persian navy equal to the Greek or not much larger.
(Herodotus 8.13)
Their numbers had been further reduced by their losses in the fighting at Artemisium. Thus the option of dividing the fleet was a non-starter: the Persians had to fight.
Although Herodotus allows only one or two days between the arrival of the Persian fleet, the conference of Xerxes’ admirals and their decision to fight, and the actual battle, most scholars believed that he has telescoped these events, and that the time-scale of these events may have been as much as three weeks. Certainly the Persians would not have been eager to fight in the narrows of Salamis, and the intervening time between the Persians’ arrival and the battle may well be accounted for by their hopes of either tempting the Greeks out into the open waters to do battle or of a Greek withdrawal to the Isthmus. According to Herodotus (8.75) and Aeschylus (Persai 355–60), it was the message from Themistocles of dissension among the Greeks and their desire to flee that induced Xerxes to launch his attack. Many scholars have doubted the authenticity of this story, particularly as flight by the Greeks to the Isthmus would have suited Persian strategy perfectly. Whether the story about Themistocles’ message is true or not, there were sound strategic reasons why the Persians had to attack. The sailing season was coming to an end and, if the issue was not resolved, the Persian fleet and army would be forced to retire to Thessaly for winter-quarters in order to have an adequate supply of grain. In this situation, Xerxes would have little to show for the year’s campaign: the defeat of a small portion of the Greek army at Thermopylae and an indecisive outcome at Artemisium, while the bulk of the Greek forces remained intact and dangerous. Furthermore, he would have to surrender his control of central Greece, possibly having to face a repeat of Thermopylae and Artemisium, but against bigger and better prepared Greek forces. Victory at Salamis before the onset of the winter gales would lay the perfect foundation for the land campaign of 479.
Aspects of Greek History (750–323BC) Page 25
