Shortly after dawn the Greek fleet put out from its base to meet the Persian attack in the narrows of Salamis and, although the exact location is a matter of scholarly dispute, the bravery of the Greek fleet flatly contradicts Herodotus’ frequent statements that most of the Greeks were desperate to flee on the eve of the battle. The result was a decisive victory for the Greeks, although this was not at first realized, since the Greeks made preparations to renew the sea-battle (8.96). Although Xerxes pretended that he was ready to continue fighting (8.97), he had already decided that his chance of defeating the Greek fleet had gone. He was far more worried that the news of his defeat would encourage the revolt of the newly conquered cities in Macedon and Thrace, and especially the Asiatic Greeks. Thus Xerxes and the Persian navy first sailed to the Hellespont to secure the line of retreat, and then he made his way to Sardis which he made his headquarters in order to keep a close surveillance on Ionia. Mardonius was left in charge of the Persian army which now retired and wintered in Thessaly, where there were abundant supplies, and prepared for a renewal of the land campaign in 479. The refusal of the Peloponnesian naval commanders to pursue the Persian fleet to the Hellespont, although much desired by the Athenians (8.108–9), revealed the split between the cautious strategy of the Spartans and the adventurous one of the Athenians that came to the fore in 479.
Greek strategy and Spartan leadership in 479
Mardonius’ strategy in 479 for the conquest of Greece was devised with the main aim of defeating the Greek army, which was still on the defensive in an impregnable position behind the Isthmus wall, while the Greek fleet controlled the seas. To achieve this, he formulated a primary and a reserve strategy. Mardonius knew that a fleet was essential if he was going to turn the Isthmus wall by landing troops in the Peloponnese (9.9.2). Therefore his primary strategy was to win over the Athenians to the Persian side by offering them very generous and attractive inducements on two occasions (8.136.2–3). If the Athenians had succumbed to these blandishments, the whole course of the war would have changed and Greece would have fallen: a fact that Herodotus recognized and stated in the clearest and most unequivocal terms, even though it was bound to be an unpopular opinion in the third quarter of the fifth century (7.139).
When this strategy had to be abandoned due to Athenian patriotism, his reserve strategy was to tempt the Greek forces to come out from behind their defensive wall and fight a land-battle on terrain that he had chosen, which would allow his cavalry to deliver the decisive blow against the Greek hoplites. His major problem with the reserve strategy was the potential operations of the Greek fleet in Ionia. He, like Xerxes, knew the extent of the demoralization of the Persian fleet and its inability to fight an effective sea-battle after Salamis. If the Greek fleet discovered this fact, either by military action or by information from Ionia, then a naval offensive could well lead to a second Ionian Revolt. In this situation, Mardonius would have to retire with his army to protect his lines of communication and to suppress the revolt. Therefore Mardonius knew that he could not wait indefinitely to bring the Greek army to battle on his chosen terrain, but might be forced to concede this desired advantage.
Greek strategy for 479 is difficult to deduce with certainty owing to two factors: first, Herodotus describes the land campaign at Plataea in Boeotia and the sea campaign at Mycale in Ionia as two separate and independent theatres of war, and thus makes no attempt to explain their interdependent relationship in a coordinated Greek strategy; second, the tension between Athens and Sparta, reflecting their different strategic priorities, did not produce a clear-cut, definitive strategy upon which both agreed wholeheartedly. The Athenians wanted the Greek land army to forsake the Isthmus and go on the offensive, which is expressed precisely in the words of the Athenians to the Spartan ambassadors in the spring of 479:
‘But now, as things stand thus, send out the army as soon as possible. For we reckon that the Persian army will soon be here and invading our land when it learns very quickly from our message that we will do none of the things that he wants from us. Therefore, before the Persian army comes into Attica, it is the right time for us to march first into Boeotia.’
(Herodotus 8.144.5)
The Athenians had already evacuated their population and had seen their land and city devastated in 480, and consequently did not wish to undergo the same trauma in 479: hence their desire for the Greek army to advance and hold the line north of Attica in Boeotia. This Athenian emphasis on a land strategy in 479 may explain the very low profile of Themistocles, who had favoured a vigorous sea offensive at the Hellespont in the immediate aftermath of Salamis and, when thwarted, supported a naval campaign against Ionia in 479 (8.109), since the dominant Athenian politicians of 479 were Aristides and Xanthippus, in command respectively of the Athenian army and navy.
The Spartans, as Herodotus reveals in his account (derived for the most part from Athenian sources), were reluctant to pursue this offensive land strategy. The overwhelming advantage of defence behind the Isthmus wall, thus ensuring the safety of the Peloponnese, would be put in jeopardy by risking an offensive land battle in Boeotia in order to protect Attica. This of course could not be stated bluntly to the Athenians, since their fleet and their goodwill were essential to maintain the impregnability of the Isthmus wall. It is possible that the Spartans’ extravagant praise of and honours to Themistocles (8.124) reflect their support for his strategy of concentrating on a naval campaign against Ionia in order to force the withdrawal of Mardonius’ army from Greece without the need to fight a land battle. If this was their preferred strategy, then the gathering of only 110 Greek ships at Aegina in the spring of 479 (8.131), compared with the 310 at Salamis in 480, could reflect the dissatisfaction of the Athenians, who may have held back their contingent from the fleet of the Hellenic League or sent only a nominal force. However, the more likely reason for the comparatively small gathering of ships at Aegina was the shortage of Greek manpower: there were insufficient troops to maintain a large army and a large navy, and therefore the strengthening of one branch of the armed forces had to be offset by the weakening of the other. In 480, Greek strategy had dictated that the main emphasis should be on the fleet, in which many hoplites had served as marines and possibly as rowers. But the Greek strategy of 479 had switched to the land which entailed the allocation of more men to the army at the expense of the navy.
It would seem, therefore, that Greek strategy for 479 was to concentrate on the defeat of Mardonius by land, but this decision did not make the Spartans enthusiastic supporters of this policy. If Demaratus, the exiled Spartan king accompanying Xerxes, is correct in his statement that the citizen-body of Sparta numbered only 8,000 in 480 (7.234.2), it is understandable, though not praiseworthy, that the Spartans, whose military super-power status depended upon the ruthless suppression of a much greater number of Helots (see Chapter 4), were reluctant to commit the bulk of their forces to such a hazardous expedition. This characteristic caution of the Spartans was noted by Thucydides who described them as:
being traditionally slow to go to war, unless they were compelled.
(Thucydides 1.118.2)
Many reasons have been put forward to explain away their failure to march out and save Attica from a second Persian invasion: the speed of the Persian advance, the need to wait for the harvest, or danger in the Peloponnese from medizing states such as Argos. Although these reasons have some plausibility, the real answer, confirmed in Herodotus’ account, lies in Thucydides’ astute comment above: the decision of the Spartans to advance into Boeotia was a direct result of Athenian compulsion.
Plataea
Mardonius set about implementing his primary strategy by sending the Macedonian king, Alexander, to Athens with an offer that, if the Athenians would join the Persian side they would receive very favourable terms: forgiveness for all Athenian hostile acts against Persia; the return of Attica and the gift of more territory of their choosing; internal autonomy in the conduct of their affai
rs; and the rebuilding of all their destroyed temples (8.140. 1–2). The report of Alexander’s mission caused great disquiet to the Spartans who immediately sent an embassy to Athens. The Athenians at this stage had no intention of medizing, but deliberately delayed their rejection of Mardonius’ offer in order to pressurize Sparta into a land-campaign in Boeotia (8.144.5 – see quotation above). However, Athenian hopes of the Greek army advancing beyond the Isthmus wall and holding a defensive line north of Attica proved to be futile.
Upon hearing of Alexander’s failure to win over the Athenians, Mardonius brought his army from Thessaly into Boeotia and then into Attica, leading to a second evacuation by the Athenians when they realized that the Spartans had no intention of protecting them. Herodotus alleges that Mardonius’ motives for invading Attica were arrogance and a desire to inform Xerxes of his current success (9.2). However, he does admit that Mardonius reckoned the Athenians would be more willing to accept his repeated earlier offer, since they had been let down by the Spartans and their territory was again directly threatened with devastation (9.4). When they refused for a second time, he turned to his reserve strategy of provoking the Greeks into a land battle. Mardonius knew that his continued occupation of Attica was bound to rouse intense Athenian pressure on the Spartans to resolve the stalemate.
The Athenians, as soon as the Persians entered Boeotia and while they themselves were evacuating their families to Salamis, sent ambassadors to Sparta:
in order to reproach the Spartans for allowing the Persians to invade Attica by not opposing them in Boeotia along with themselves, and at the same time to remind them of all the Persian promises if they would change sides. They were also to warn the Spartans that, if they did not bring help, the Athenians would find some means of helping themselves.
(Herodotus 9.6)
The Spartans’ excuse for their delay in protecting Attica was the celebration of the religious festival of the Hyacinthia, but Herodotus also points out significantly that the Isthmus wall was now almost complete (9.7). Even when the Spartans had received this veiled threat, the Ephors (see Glossary) were still reluctant to give a definite assurance that they would go on the offensive. However, Chileos, who was the foreigner with the most influence at Sparta but also spoke for the powerful and strategically vital Tegeans, stressed the deadly danger to the Greek cause and the futility of the Isthmus wall if the Athenians medized (9.9). The combination of Athenian blackmail and Peloponnesian pressure finally compelled the Spartans to mobilize the army of the Hellenic League and advance into Boeotia.
Upon hearing of the Greeks’ mobilization, Mardonius devastated Attica for a second time and withdrew to Boeotia, for Attica was unsuitable terrain for his cavalry and he did not wish to be cut off from his main line of supplies. With Thebes as his base, he deployed his forces on the north side of the river Asopus, close to Plataea, and awaited the arrival of the Greek army under the command of Pausanias, who was acting as Spartan regent for the under-age son of Leonidas. Herodotus’ account of the battle of Plataea (9.12–89) reveals that both armies, by their constant skirmishing and movements, were trying to entice the opposing side to fight on terrain that favoured their own forces: the Greeks on the south side of the Asopus and protected by the rough countryside in the foothills of Mount Cithaeron; the Persians on the north side of the Asopus in an open plain. Soothsayers on both sides had recommended remaining on the defensive (9.36–37), which led to a lengthy stalemate. Finally, Pausanias’ move to the less protected Asopus ridge and a complex night manoeuvre that went wrong, combined with Mardonius’ fear of revolt in Ionia, induced the Persian general to cross the Asopus and attack. Pausanias held back until the Persian infantry was fully committed on the south side of the Asopus, and won a stunning victory with the Greek hoplites. Mardonius was killed and the Persians fled across the Asopus; those who took refuge in their fortified camp were slaughtered, while the rest under Artabazus escaped northwards and found safety back in Asia.
Mycale
Herodotus’ account of Greek naval operations in 479 is given in two sections, separated by his lengthy description of the events leading up to the battle of Plataea. His concentration on the land campaign at Plataea, coming after his full treatment of the naval campaign at Salamis, resulted in a less detailed account of this campaign, possibly on the grounds that it was an anti-climax after the two previous great battles. In the first section (8.131–32), Herodotus begins with the gathering of 110 ships at Aegina under the command of the Spartan King Leotychidas who, urged by conspirators from Chios to sail to Ionia, led the fleet only as far as Delos:
For the Greeks were terribly afraid to go further, having no experience of those lands and thinking that everywhere was filled with armed men; also because they reckoned that Samos was as far away as the Pillars of Hercules.
(Herodotus 8.132.3)
These reasons for stopping the naval advance at Delos, apart from the mention of ‘armed men’, cannot be taken seriously. However, although Greek strategy had put the emphasis on a land campaign in 479, it made sense to threaten Ionia by a forward advance, and thus put pressure on Mardonius. But it would be risky to sail closer to the enemy fleet which was still larger, even after its defeat at Salamis, than the 110 Greek ships and which could choose to fight in open waters where its speed and manoeuvrability would be to its advantage.
Map 4 Persian Wars
The second section (9.90–107) covers the advance of the Greek fleet across the Aegean to Samos where the Persian fleet was based and then to Mycale on the coast of Asia Minor. The key factor in the Greeks’ decision to go on the offensive was the news from three Samian ambassadors that the Ionians were ready to revolt and that the Persian fleet was too demoralized to offer serious resistance (9.90.2). This was confirmed by the refusal of the Persian fleet to fight a sea-battle and its withdrawal to Mycale to be under the protection of the army (9.96). The Greeks landed and, with the help of the Ionians who deserted in the battle, won a hard-fought battle:
In this way Ionia revolted for a second time from the Persians.
(Herodotus 9.104)
The victories at Plataea and Mycale marked the liberation of Greece and the end of the defensive war. However, the revolt of the Ionians and their desire to join the Hellenic League would entail a radical change of military policy, if they were admitted: an offensive war against Persia in order to ensure their continued freedom. The reluctance of the Spartans and the willingness of the Athenians to take responsibility for the defence of the Asiatic Greeks laid the foundations for super-power rivalry and conflict throughout the fifth century.
Bibliography
Barron, J. P. CAH vol. 4, 2nd edn, ch. 11.
Brunt, P. A. ‘The Hellenic League against Persia’, Historia 2, reprinted in Studies in Greek History and Thought.
Burn, A. R. Persia and the Greeks, 2nd edn, pt 3.
Cartledge, P. Sparta and Lakonia, ch. 11.
Ehrenberg, V. From Solon to Socrates, 2nd edn, ch. 5.
Hammond, N. G. L. CAH vol. 4, 2nd edn, ch. 10.
Hignett, C. Xerxes’ Invasion of Greece.
How, W. W. and Wells, J. A Commentary on Herodotus vol. 2, Appendices XX–XXIII.
Sealey, R. A History of the Greek City States 700–338 BC, ch. 8.
10
THE DELIAN LEAGUE AND ATHENIAN EMPIRE
The establishment of the Delian League
In 478, the Hellenic League, under the command of the Spartan regent Pausanias, set about consolidating its victories of 479 and ensuring the safety of Greece by making expeditions against Cyprus and then against Byzantium (Thucydides 1.94.1–2; AE7p.13– all references in this chapter are to Thucydides, unless otherwise stated). Cyprus, which was controlled by Persia and which would be a powerful base for a Persian naval counterattack in the southern Aegean, was for the most part conquered by the League forces. For similar reasons Byzantium, the gateway to the nor
th Aegean, was besieged and captured. It was at this moment that the seeds of the Delian League (as it is called by modern historians) were sown. Pausanias, like many a Spartan removed from the strict constraints of Sparta, began to behave in an arrogant and overbearing manner towards the League’s allies, resulting in their discontent with his leadership and consequently that of Sparta. The Ionians and those recently liberated from Persia approached the Athenians and, emphasizing their common Ionian kinship (see Chapter 2), asked them to become their leader (1.95.1; AE7 p. 13). Pausanias was recalled and Dorcis was sent out by Sparta as a replacement commander, but by this time the allies were committed to Athenian leadership and would not accept Dorcis’ command. His return to Sparta marked the end of Sparta’sofficial active involvement in the offensive war against Persia (1.95.2–7; AE7 p. 13).
Aspects of Greek History (750–323BC) Page 26
