Aspects of Greek History (750–323BC)
Page 31
The size of the indemnity that the Samians had to repay to Athens for the cost of the war poses some problems. According to our literary sources – Isocrates, Diodorus and Nepos – the total sum was 1,200 talents. There is also a fragmentary inscription (ML 55; AE90 p. 48) that records the expenditure from the Treasury of Athena for the year 440–39: three sums are recorded with ‘against the Samians’ placed between the first and second sums, and ‘Total’ placed before a fourth sum which records a total of 1,400–1,500 talents. Some scholars believe that the first sum (128–130 talents) refers to the expenditure of subduing Byzantium, and that the second and third sums (1,276–1,280 talents) refers to the Samos. This is more than the costs stated in the literary sources but is at least closer than the 1,400+ talents. However, others have argued that there is no evidence that an expedition was ever launched to subdue Byzantium and therefore all three sums and the total should refer solely to Samos. Whatever the answer, it is interesting to note that the expenditure came from the Treasury of Athena, i.e. sacred money, and not from the Hellenotamiae, i.e. secular money. This may be the first recorded instance of wars being funded by public borrowing from temple funds.
Mytilene
Lesbos was one of the original ship-suppliers of the Delian League and by 428 was one of the two remaining independent allies who still supplied ships. There were two major cities on Lesbos, Mytilene and Methymna, and three smaller ones. Mytilene, under the control of an oligarchy, had already considered revolt before 431 but their appeal for help had been refused by the Spartans (3.13.1). In 428, Mytilene and the rest of Lesbos, apart from democratic Methymna, were secretly preparing to revolt from Athens but their plans were betrayed, thus forcing them to revolt earlier than they planned. The Athenians, after recovering from the initial shock, hurriedly sent out 40 ships, which fleet managed to blockade both harbours. However, the Mytileneans still had control of the land (3.3–6). Meanwhile the Mytileneans had sent an embassy to the Spartans, who redirected them to Olympia so that the other allies there could hear their appeal. The Mytileneans, according to Thucydides’ version of their speech, explained almost apologetically that their reasons for revolt and pleas for help were not based on ill treatment by the Athenians, who had treated them with respect, but on their fears for the future and their desire for total freedom (3.9–14). The Spartans and their allies agreed to help them and allowed them to join their alliance. Unfortunately, the words of the Spartan allies were stronger than their actions: the planned second invasion of Attica failed to materialize owing to the non-appearance of the Peloponnesian allies and no help was sent to Mytilene in 428. However, the Spartans did commission a fleet of 40 ships to be sent out the following year.
The Athenians realized that the time had come for serious action: in the autumn they sent out Paches with 1,000 ‘hoplites’, who quickly built a wall around Mytilene, thus completing the blockade of the Mytileneans by land and sea (3.18). In 427, the Spartan Alcidas and a Peloponnesian fleet of 40 ships set out, but his tardiness, lack of ambition and fear resulted in the surrender of Mytilene before his arrival (3.26; 29–33). In Mytilene the supplies of food were exhausted, and it was decided that the only hope of maintaining the revolt was to take on the Athenian hoplites in battle and thus relieve the land blockade. The oligarchs therefore gave out heavy armour to the ordinary people (used previously as light-armed troops). However, once armed, the people refused to obey the oligarchs and threatened to make an agreement with the Athenians and surrender the city, unless the oligarchs produced all the remaining food and shared it out. At this point, the oligarchs, realizing the danger to themselves if this agreement was made without their own participation, promptly came to terms with Paches: first, Athens had the right to do as she wished with the Mytileneans; second, the Athenian army could enter the city; third, the Mytileneans could send an embassy to Athens to put their case; fourth, until the return of this embassy, no Mytilenean was to be imprisoned, enslaved or killed by Paches (3.27–28). Finally, Paches sent to Athens all those Mytileneans (about 1,000 in number) who he suspected had been most involved in organizing the revolt (3.35).
Thucydides’ account of the revolt of Mytilene is considerably longer (about ten times) than his account of the revolt of Samos. Yet the main purpose of this account of the military action and the speech of the Mytileneans at Olympia is to set the scene for the main event: the speeches of Cleon and Diodotus in the Athenian Assembly. The revolt of a major ally and its ramifications, if successful, at the time of Athenian distress – the Peloponnesian invasions of Attica, the plague and the death of Pericles – is an event worthy of significant treatment in its own right. However, for Thucydides there are two more important main issues: first, the Athenians’ decision, in the first meeting of the Assembly, to execute the entire population of adult males of Mytilene and to enslave all the women and children (3.36.2) was the harshest punishment to date for a revolting ally; second, in the subsequent Assembly on the next day, a debate on the issue of what was the most effective means of treating dissident allies in order to maintain the security of the empire.
Thucydides tells us that Cleon had been responsible for proposing the original motion in the first Assembly and that a ship had been dispatched that very day ordering Paches to carry out the executions at once. However, many Athenians had second thoughts. Their decision had been mainly motivated by anger: first, the Mytileneans had revolted even though the Athenians had allowed them to remain independent; second, the appearance for the first time of a Peloponnesian fleet in Ionia to support the revolt clearly implied that the revolt had been planned for a long time (3.36.2). Now, after a night of reflection:
On the next day they were immediately filled with repentance and reckoned that the decision that they had taken was savage and unprecedented, to destroy a whole city instead of those who were guilty.
(Thucydides 3.36.4)
Thus an extraordinary meeting of the Assembly was held so that the punishment of the Mytileneans could be discussed again. Thucydides tells us that various opinions were expressed, both for and against the original decision. It is almost certain, bearing in mind the sentiment above that initiated the second debate, that arguments involving humanity, pity and mercy were expressed, but Thucydides has not included them. Instead he condenses the whole debate down to two basic opposing points of view: whether the best way to control the subjects of the empire was through fear (Cleon) or through moderation (Diodotus).
Cleon wastes no time in explaining the nature of the Athenian empire:
‘You do not realise that the empire you possess is a tyranny, exercised over those who plot against you and who are ruled against their will.’
(Thucydides 3.37.2)
Cleon then stresses that Mytilene had harmed Athens more than any other city. He could understand a city driven to revolt as a result of harsh imperialism, but the Mytileneans had all the advantages of an independent city and were treated by the Athenians with the greatest honour. To talk of a revolt is a misnomer, since people revolt only when they have been mistreated. Instead it is right to talk of aggression, since they had sided with Athens’ bitterest enemies and had desired Athens’ destruction (3.39.2; AE129 p. 62). Furthermore, the Athenians should consider the effect of leniency on their other allies:
‘Consider your allies if you impose the same punishment both on those who have been forced to revolt by your enemies and on those who have willingly revolted; who do you think will not revolt on the slightest pretext when there is freedom if successful but nothing serious, if they fail?’
(Thucydides 3.39.7)
Cleon, in the same section, highlights the financial and human costs to the Athenian state, whether successful or not in putting down revolts: apart from the campaign costs and the loss of men, even if they were successful, the city of the crushed ally would be in ruins and unable in the future to pay the phoros upon which Athenian strength depends; if they fail, the Athenians will have to face even mor
e enemies (3.39.8; AE130 p. 62). Finally, he comes to the crux of his argument:
‘Punish these men as they deserve and give a clear example to the other allies that whoever revolts will be punished with death. For if they know this, you will give more time to fighting your enemies than making war on your allies’.
(Thucydides 3.40.8)
In Cleon’s opinion, the Athenian Empire was hated by the subject-allies and therefore the only secure way to maintain the empire was to instil fear: the death penalty was the most effective way to deter revolt.
The main thrust of Diodotus’ argument in answer to Cleon is that expediency (i.e. that which is most useful to Athens) should underpin all decisions: he was not against the death penalty per se and would support it if it was in the Athenians’ best interests (3.44.1–2). However, he strongly believed that Cleon’s solution would not be useful for the Athenians when they had to deal with revolts in the future which, because of human nature, would invariably happen no matter how harsh the punishment:
‘You must not make unwise decisions because of the misplaced trust in the effectiveness of the death penalty, and you must not deprive those who have revolted of the hope that they can change their minds and make up for their mistake in a very short time. [46.2] You should reflect that, as it is, if a city that has revolted decides that it is not going to succeed, it can come to terms while it is still able to pay the expenses [incurred by Athens] and pay tribute in the future.’
(Thucydides 3.46.1–2 AE131 p. 62)
This was a very effective counter to Cleon’s argument about the double loss of income for Athens when a subject-ally revolted (i.e. the cost of the campaign and the crushed ally’s inability to pay phoros in future). Diodotus continued by arguing that, if Cleon’s method were to be adopted, every city before revolting would prepare even more carefully for it and, having revolted, would fight to the bitter end, since a short or long siege would lead to the same punishment. This would cost the Athenians even more money – a longer, costlier siege and a ruined city – because of the impossibility of reaching a settlement (3.46.2).
Diodotus then offers an allied view of the empire that directly opposes Cleon’s opinion that it was a tyranny:
At the moment in all the cities the people are your friends; either they do not join the few [i.e. oligarchs] in revolting, or, if they are forced to revolt, they become at once the enemy of those who have revolted, and when you go to war with the hostile city, you have the people, who are the majority, on your side.
(Thucydides 3.47.2; AE132 p. 62)
Certainly it was the oligarchs who planned Mytilene’s revolt, but Diodotus then brushes over the fact that the Mytilenean people, when armed, were more interested in obtaining food than surrendering the city to the Athenians (see above). However, he stresses that indiscriminate punishment of all, as proposed by Cleon, would in the future drive the people into the arms of the oligarchs. Diodotus concluded his argument by proposing that those suspected of stirring up the revolt should be tried in Athens but to allow all the others to keep their lives and live in Mytilene (3.48.1–2). Diodotus won the day, but not by many votes – a clear sign that the war was having a hardening effect upon the Athenians. When Scione in Chalcidice revolted in 423, the Athenians, on the motion of Cleon, again passed the death sentence and carried it out in 421 – this punishment was recorded in one sentence by Thucydides (5.32.1).
A ship was sent out immediately to stop Paches from carrying out the executions and arrived just in time owing to the first ship being in no hurry to deliver the harsh orders. As for the Mytileneans most suspected of stirring up the revolt, these (about 1,000) were put to death on the motion of Cleon. The Athenians then destroyed the fortifications of Mytilene, deprived them of their fleet and took possession of all the towns on the mainland that Mytilene had controlled. Finally, instead of imposing phoros, they divided all the land of Lesbos, with the exception of loyal Methymna, into 3,000 allotments: 300 were put aside as sacred to the gods and the remaining 2,700 were distributed by lot to Athenian cleruchs. However, the people of Lesbos agreed to rent these allotments, paying the Athenian allotment-holders 200 drachmas a year, and cultivated the land themselves (3.49.3–50; AE133 p. 63). The Chians alone remained as the only independent ship-supplying state. Their attempt to build new fortifications in the winter of 425/4 came to a swift end – on the orders of the Athenians, they promptly demolished them (4.51). However, their chance to revolt would come after the Athenian defeat in Sicily.
Melos
Melos, a Spartan colony (allegedly), was an island in the south Aegean and by 416 was the only one outside the Athenian Empire. At the beginning of the Peloponnesian War it had neutral status (2.9.4 – along with Thera), but in 426 the Athenians launched an attack on the Melians presumably to complete their domination and control of the Aegean. Owing to financial and military pressures elsewhere in the war, the Athenians were unable to do more than ravage the Melian territory and soon departed (3.91). Another possible cause of the Athenian attack was the contribution of money by Melos to the Spartan war effort in the early 420s, but this depends upon the dating of an inscription, recording contributions to the Spartan war-fund (ML 67). A possible date is about 427 at the time when Alcidas was leading the Peloponnesian fleet into the eastern Aegean to bring help to the Mytileneans in revolt (see above). However, it could equally be dated to about 405 near the end of the war as a grateful thanks offering from the surviving Melians for being restored to their state by Lysander, the Spartan commander, as he closed in on Athens (Xenophon, Hellenica 2.2.9). Melos also makes an appearance on the list of phoros-payers in the extraordinary re-assessment of 425/4, as recorded in the Thoudippos Decree (ML 69; AE138 pp. 66–68) – but this seems to be a wish-list on the part of the Athenians, as it also includes many other states who had never contributed phoros or had not paid for many years. However, in 416, the Athenians returned and this time they were determined to resolve the Melian issue once and for all.
The force sent against Melos included 30 Athenian ships and 1,200 hoplites, and from the allies and islanders 8 ships and roughly 1,500 hoplites, under the command of Cleomedes and Teisias (5.84.1–2) – Thucydides does not state the reason for this campaign but it is significant that allied forces are also campaigning against Melos. The generals encamped in the territory of Melos but, instead of laying waste the land immediately, they sent representatives to negotiate with the Melians:
The Melians did not bring these men before the people but told them to tell to the magistrates and to the few what they had come for.
(Thucydides 5.84.3)
Thucydides now records, uniquely in his history, a continuous point and counter-point debate between the Athenian representatives and the oligarchs who governed Melos – hence its modern name, ‘The Melian Dialogue’ (5.85–113). The authenticity and the purpose of the dialogue are a matter of serious scholarly disagreement. As regards its authenticity, some scholars believe that this dialogue is mainly a product of Thucydides’ imagination. First, it was a private discussion, conducted behind closed doors; second, the Melians who conducted the debate were killed soon after, and Thucydides would have had no recourse to the Athenian negotiators until after 404 when he returned from exile; third, the constant use of generalizations, e.g. the custom of the powerful always ruling the weak (5.89), would be inappropriate in this particular instance of diplomatic negotiation as well as the fact that these generalizations have constant echoes in other Thucydidean speeches, e.g. the Athenians’ speech to the Spartan Assembly in 432 about the same issue (1.76.2); finally, the tough, blunt, uncompromising language and sentiments expressed by the Athenians are very untypical of standard diplomacy. However, those who accept its authenticity make the following points: first, although no one can be totally sure what Thucydides meant by ‘what was the most appropriate (‘ta deonta’) for each speaker to give in each situation’ (see Chapter 1), he does claim to stick to the general gist of hi
s recorded speeches –‘keeping as close as possible to the general sense of what was actually said’; second, not all the Melians were killed, and he could have been given a very brief summary of the main points raised, e.g. the Melians’ reliance on justice, hope and Spartan aid; third, this was not a typical public speech where diplomatic niceties were to be observed, but private negotiations where the key issues and choices – incorporation into the Athenian Empire or destruction – could be bluntly spelled out so that there was no possibility of misunderstanding.
In the same way, there is scholarly disagreement as to Thucydides’ purpose in highlighting the Melos affair. On the one hand, it is believed that Thucydides wished to show the moral decline of the Athenians as the war progressed – the punishment of execution of all men of military age and the selling into slavery of all women and children was rescinded in the case of the Mytileneans in 427, but was carried out on the Melians in 415; furthermore, this progressive decline is reflected in three key speeches – from the high moral tone of Pericles’ Funeral Speech at the beginning of the war (2.35–46) to the emphasis on expediency in Diodotus’ speech in the Mytilenean debate in 427 (3.42–48) to the crude cynicism of the Athenian representatives in 416 (e.g. Finley). Some (e.g. Cornford) see a deliberate juxtaposition of Melos and the Sicilian disaster where the Athenians’ destruction of Melos is viewed as an act of overweening arrogance (hubris) leading to their downfall (ate) in Sicily in the manner of a Greek tragedy. However, recent scholarship has moved away from this opinion, particularly pointing out that Thucydides’ account is concentrated on the actual dialogue and not on the punishment which is mentioned almost incidentally, in the same brief manner as the Athenian destruction of Scione in 421 (5.32) and the Spartan slaughter of all the men at Hysiae near Argos in 417 (5.83.2). Thucydides displays no pity or revulsion over the treatment of Melos (nor Scione or Hysiae), yet the brutal, senseless slaughter of the people of Mycalessus in Boeotia, especially the killing of the boys at school, by Thracian mercenaries in 413 moved him deeply (7.2–5), suggesting that Thucydides’ pity in this instance was moved by the unexpected and unplanned fate of the people of Mycalessus, but not for the Melians who were given a choice and could have avoided their fate, if they had been prudent. Very soon after, in the spring of 414, Aristophanes in the Birds makes a casual, passing reference to the ‘Melian famine’ (l.186) which seems to suggest that the fate of Melos also did little to trouble Athenian consciences.