The Melian punishment gains notoriety as the leading example of the atrocities committed under the Athenian Empire only after the end of the war and later, and this has misguidedly influenced the discussion about Thucydides’ purpose in highlighting the affair of Melos. Thucydides’ purpose should be searched for in the dialogue (not in the punishment) and in the context of the campaign against Melos. Unlike the Mytilenean debate, which was conducted by Athenians alone in the Athenian Assembly about the punishment of Mytilene, this was a genuine dialogue between the Athenian generals and the Melian oligarchs about whether Melos was to accept incorporation into the Athenian Empire or destruction. The fact that the Melians were neutrals (although they had given some financial help to the Spartans some years earlier (ML 67)), that they were allowed a choice in deciding their fate, that there was a point and counter-point dialogue between the combatants on this issue (unique in Thucydides rather than his typical set-piece speeches) suggest strongly that these were the main reasons for his full treatment of the Melian Dialogue. At the same time it cannot be denied that the juxtaposition of a successful attack on a small island followed immediately by a failed attack on a large one would have been another factor in Thucydides’ selection. In addition, Hornblower has pointed out how the Melos affair fits in with the context of Book 5 – although the transition from the Peloponnese to an island and from complex diplomacy to open imperialism (see Chapter 20 for these events) may appear a big change of theme, in fact much of Book 5 is about bigger and more powerful states asserting their power over smaller and weaker states, e.g. the Mantineans, exploiting Sparta’s weakness, had brought most of Arcadia under their control (5.29.1), and Argos was constantly attacking Epidaurus (5.53ff). Thus the Athenians’ decision to impose their will upon Melos should be seen as part of this same theme, especially as Melos was a Spartan colony and the Athenians, as part of the quadruple alliance, had been recently defeated by the Spartans at the decisive battle of Mantinea (5.70–73).
The discussion takes place in private at the request of the Melian oligarchs, presumably because they feared that, if the issue was put before all of the people, they would be sympathetic to the Athenian arguments.
Map 5 The Athenian Empire
(5.84.3; AE156 p. 72). It was probably for this reason that the Athenians’ tone was harsh and their arguments blunt – it was in the interests of the ruling oligarchs to remain independent, and thus they were the least likely of the Melians to respond to gentle persuasion. Hence the need to spell out in the bluntest terms to the oligarchs the fate awaiting Melos if they chose resistance. The Athenians laid down the ground rules for the dialogue: first there would be no set speeches but a discussion of each detail, point-by-point (5.85); and second, the discussion was to be limited solely to the immediate situation, i.e. how to save the city from destruction, and therefore only relevant facts were admissible (5.87). Within these set guidelines, therefore, the Athenians would have no opportunity to justify their empire (as they usually did), and the Melians no opportunity to mention their neutrality or doing no harm to Athens in the past (5.89):
‘We should both be aware of the other party’s true position and try to get what is possible, each party knowing full well that just settlements are reached in discussions between men only when each side is equally under compulsion, and that those who have power do what that power enables them to do, and the weaker part agrees.’
(Thucydides 5.89; AE157 p. 72)
By this statement the Athenians were excluding all arguments about justice because it was inappropriate to this situation. ‘Just settlements’ (i.e. justice) take place only when there is an equal compulsion for both sides to settle. In 421, both Athens and Sparta were desperate to make peace and thus equal compulsion led to the Peace of Nicias. However, in the present case, the compulsion was one-sided, i.e. the Melians, with a population of about 3,000 (probably 500 adult males) and their land occupied, were desperate to negotiate, whereas the Athenians with 38 ships and 2,700 hoplites, and the resources of an empire behind them, had none, apart from the desire for a quick, painless campaign. Therefore the Melians should stick to the point: the choice of incorporation within the empire or destruction.
The Melians, however, in the early part of the dialogue still try to make justice, disguised as expediency, the basis of their argument (5.90–98). The Athenians dismiss these arguments, and when the Melians reply that they, as free men, would be cowards if they submitted to slavery (5.100), they again spell out the key issue:
‘This is not for you a contest on equal terms about honour and avoiding shame, but rather a discussion about saving yourselves and not opposing those who are much stronger than you.
(Thucydides 5.100)
The Melians then offer the viewpoint that, while there is resistance, there is hope (5.102). The Athenians’ response could be that of Thucydides himself – that hope for the future is a dangerous commodity in the face of present reality and often leads to irrational decisions, culminating in disaster (5.103). For the rest of the dialogue the Melians focus on two points: first, their belief that the gods will favour them because of their stand against injustice (5.104); and second, their confidence that their kinsmen, the Spartans, will come to their aid (5.104, 106, 108, 110). The Athenians attempt to disabuse them of both: first, they state that gods and men accept that it is the law of nature that men rule wherever they can, just as the Melians would if they had the same opportunity (5.105.2); second, they claim that the Spartans’ foreign policy, more than that of any other state, is rooted firmly in self-interest and it is the height of folly for the Melians in their current predicament to trust in Spartan military aid (5.105.3). The Athenians’ final words amount almost to a plea to the Melian oligarchs to ignore spurious ideals of honour, and to concentrate on the realities of power and the enormity of their decision for the fate of Melos (5.111).
The Athenians must have felt nothing but frustration, irritation and exasperation when the Melian oligarchs, upon reconvening after their private consultation about the Athenian proposals, restated briefly the same points as before – in fact, 5.112 is a perfect synopsis of their arguments in the Melian Dialogue. The Melians managed to hold out for some months and even had a few minor military successes, but finally surrendered in 415, and were punished as described above. Later an Athenian colony of 500 men was sent to occupy Melos (5.116). Whatever Thucydides’ personal views may have been about the Athenian decision to incorporate Melos into the Empire or the severity of the punishment, one of his main concerns as a historian was to highlight the weakness of Melos and its irrational determination to resist the overwhelming might of the Athenian Empire, as portrayed in the Melian Dialogue.
Bibliography
Davies, J. K. Democracy and Classical Greece 2nd edn, ch. 5.
de Ste Croix, G. E. M. The Origins of the Peloponnesian War, Appendix 5.
Hornblower, S. The Greek World 479–323 BC, chs 2 and 3.
——Lactor 1, The Athenian Empire, pp. 17–21.
Kagan, D. The Outbreak of the Peloponnesian War, chs 5, 6 and 7.
Lewis, D. M. CAH vol. 5, 2nd edn, ch. 5, sect. II; ch. 6, sects I–III.
McGregor, M. F. The Athenians and their Empire, chs 4–9.
Meiggs, R. The Athenian Empire, chs 3–5, 6–10.
Meritt, B. D., Wade-Gery, H. T. and McGregor, M. F. The Athenian Tribute Lists, vol. 3, pt 2, ch. XI and pt 3, chs VI, VIII and IX.
Powell, A. Athens and Sparta, chs 1 and 2.
Rhodes, P. J. The Athenian Empire, Greece and Rome New Survey in the Classics 17, chs II and IV.
——CAH vol. 5, 2nd edn, ch. 3, sects I–IV.
Westlake, H. D. Essays on Greek Historians and Greek History.
Bibliography for second edition
Andrewes, A. CAH vol.5, 2nd edn, ch. 10.
——‘The Mytilene Debate’, Phoenix 16 (1962).
French, A. ‘Athenian ambitions and the Delian Alliance’, Phoenix 33 (1979).
Gomme, A. W., Andrewes, A. and Dover, K. J. A Historical Commentary on Thucy-dides, vol. 5, pp. 182–88.
Hammond, N.G.L. ‘The origins and the nature of the Athenian Alliance of 478/7 B. C.’, JHS 87 (1967).
Hornblower, S. A Commentary on Thucydides. Vol. 3, Books 5.25–8.109, pp. 218–25.
Jacobsen, H. ‘The oath of the Delian League’, Philologus 119 (1975).
Kagan, D. The Outbreak of the Peloponnesian War, ch. 10.
Low, P. The Athenian Empire, chs 1, 4.
Powell, A. Athens and Sparta, 2nd edn, ch 5.
Rawlings, H. R. ‘Thucydides on the purpose of the Delian League’, Phoenix 31 (1977).
Rhodes, P. A History of the Classical Greek World: 478–323 BC, chs 2, 5.
de Romilly, J., Thucydides and Athenian Imperialism, ch. 2.
de Ste Croix, G. E. M. The Origins of the Peloponnesian War, ch. 1 (ii).
Walker, P. K. ‘Purpose and method of the Pentekontaetia’, CQ5 (1955).
11
ATHENIAN POLITICS, 478– 462/1
The sources
The major source for this period is Plutarch’s Lives of Cimon and Themistocles, since Thucydides deals with these events only in a brief, cursory fashion (1.89–102.4) as part of his short digression on the ‘Pentecontaetia’ (‘The Fifty-Years’–see Chapter 1), and in his digression on the fall of Themistocles (1.135–38), the reliability of which has rightly been called into question (for example, how did Thucydides gain access to Themistocles’ letter to the Persian king?). Diodorus gives some extra information, but his probable source was the fourth-century historian Ephorus who in turn generally relied upon Thucydides. The weaknesses of Plutarch as a historical source are discussed fully in Chapter 1, but it is worth mentioning that his main aim in the Lives was to portray the moral worth (or lack of it) in his subjects so as to inspire later generations (Life of Pericles 1–2).
As a consequence, his belief in the heroic qualities of Cimon led him to write a Life which is fulsome in its praise and permeated with virtually uncritical respect, especially for his conservative political ideology and his gentleness towards Athens’ naval allies. It seems likely that Ion of Chios, a fifth-century playwright, poet and prose writer, and apparently an admirer of Cimon, was a major influence on Plutarch when composing the Life of Cimon. By contrast, Themistocles is portrayed as the clever, devious and unscrupulous politician and general, as characterized in Herodotus in the Persian War; and also as the demagogic champion of the navy and its rowers, the lower-class ‘thetes’, who supported his policies of ‘radical’ democracy and of imperialism over their naval allies, as characterized by later anti-democratic writers. It is clear that these biased stereotypes must lead to a cautious use of Plutarch, whose Lives must be checked where possible with the evidence of Thucydides. However, it is still possible to discern from Plutarch the underlying issues of foreign and domestic policy that divided the factions of Themistocles and Cimon in this period.
Foreign policy, 470s
The Athenian ‘hawks’
In 478 there were two options available to the Athenians in foreign policy. They could use their new military power and prestige either to dominate Greece or to wage war against Persia. This was the key issue that split the political factions in Athens. In modern politics it is customary to refer to those who contend for influence over or control of foreign policy as ‘hawks’ and ‘doves’, and these terms will be used for the two Athenian factions. The hawks believed that the Persians had been beaten and, once removed from Greek territory, would no longer offer any serious threat to mainland Greece and Athens. The main danger to Athens in the future would come from Sparta and the Peloponnese. Recent history had revealed Sparta’s feelings towards the Athenians. Cleomenes, King of Sparta, had intervened or attempted to intervene four times in Athenian internal affairs in the last decade of the sixth century (see end of Chapter 4). There had been a constant underlying friction between the Spartans and the Athenians in the Persian War. Far more ominous was the attempt in 479, immediately after the Persian defeat, by the Spartans to stop the Athenians from rebuilding their defensive walls, which was thwarted only by the cleverness of Themistocles (Thucydides 1.90.1–91.7; AE4 pp. 10–11). The Spartans’ hostile attitude to the Athenians was motivated by fear of Athens’ military strength. The majority of Spartans could never accept the existence of Athens as a new, equal and independent power and thus, the Athenian hawks believed, Sparta was bound to attack Athens to try to regain the hegemony of Greece by force. Therefore the policy of the hawks was, after removing the Persians from Greek territory, to end hostilities with them and prepare for the inevitable conflict with Sparta.
There is little doubt that Themistocles was the leader of the Athenian hawks. In 478, the Delian League was founded, which was destined to bring great glory to its commander-in-chief as he pursued a glamorous and successful naval offensive against the Persians. The obvious choice for this position was Themistocles. In 493/2, as chief ‘archon’, he had authorized the fortification of the Piraeus, the port of Athens, and had organized its completion immediately after the Persian Wars (Thuc. 1.93; AE4 pp. 11– 12). He had been the most successful and influential politician in the 480s; in 482, he had persuaded the Athenians, against the forceful opposition of Aristides, to use the recently discovered vein of silver at Laureion to finance the construction of 100 ‘triremes’, increased to 200 by 480, which transformed Athens into a naval super-power; and he had been the architect of the naval victory at the battle of Salamis. Yet little is heard of Themistocles until his ostracism c.471. The obvious conclusion to be drawn is that Themistocles was not interested in being commander of the Delian League. His energies in the 470s were directed towards pursuing his anti-Spartan policies.
Themistocles very probably believed that the Athenians’ naval supremacy, that he had recently created, should be further strengthened at the expense of the Greeks:
He told them … that through the strength of their fleet they had the power not only to drive off the barbarians, but also to become the leaders of Greece.
(Plutarch, Themistocles 4)
Even allowing for anachronism on the part of Plutarch, it is clear that Themistocles’ policy meant that the Spartans, who feared Athens’ sudden rise to super-power status, had to be opposed whenever and wherever they tried to increase their own power or limit that of Athens. This open opposition commenced with his deception over the issue of the rebuilding of the Athenian walls in 479 and his blunt statement to the Spartan Assembly that the Athenians would make their own decisions in their own interests and would deal with the Spartans henceforth on a basis of equality (Thuc. 1.91.4–7; AE4 p. 11). The Spartans, although taken aback, showed no open anger at this ruse:
When they heard this, the Spartans did not display anger openly to the Athenians. … But they concealed their annoyance at the Athenians for ignoring their advice.
(Thucydides 1.92; AE4 p. 11)
Themistocles did not have to wait long for his next opportunity. The Spartans planned to gain control of the Amphictyonic Congress (a religious league for the running of the sanctuary of Delphi but possessing political influence) by attempting to expel all those states, who had not joined in the resistance to the Persians. Themistocles, seeing the ulterior motives of the Spartans, spoke against the Spartan motion and won the day:
His stand on this occasion especially upset the Spartans.
(Plutarch, Themistocles 20)
Throughout the 470s, Themistocles continued to pursue his anti-Spartan policies by stirring up trouble for Sparta in the Peloponnese. The Spartans’ fear of and hostility towards him led them to back his political enemy:
Cimon’s position was strengthened by the support of the Spa
rtans, as they now became bitter enemies of Themistocles.
(Plutarch, Cimon 16)
However, the 470s saw a decline in Themistocles’ political fortunes. There was still a very strong pan-Hellenic feeling in Athens after the Persian War and most of the Athenians could not be convinced of the Spartan danger. In addition, the promise of wealth accruing from the Delian League was far more attractive than a difficult and dangerous war against Sparta. Finally, c.471, the Athenians decided to ostracize Themistocles as his hawkish foreign policy and activities in the Peloponnese were becoming an embarrassment and a threat to peaceful relations between the two states. Themistocles promptly went to Argos, Sparta’s deadly enemy, and brought about a coalition of anti-Spartan states in the north Peloponnese (see Chapter 12).
Aspects of Greek History (750–323BC) Page 32
