The Athenian ‘doves’
The Athenian doves rejected this analysis of Greek super-power politics. They believed in the policy of ‘dual hegemony’ (joint leadership) of Greece. They argued that the Athenians and the Spartans had different spheres of influence – Athens, a sea-power, operating in the Aegean, and the Spartans, a land-power, operating in the Peloponnese – and therefore there was no need for a clash. The Persian Wars had shown that the two super-powers in general could work together and they believed that the pan-Hellenic spirit could be continued in peacetime. The goodwill that had been engendered in the Persian War would ensure that any future problems could be resolved amicably. The real enemy had to be the Persians, who had inflicted such suffering and casualties upon the Greeks. Therefore the policy of the Athenians doves was to maintain peaceful relations with the Spartans and make war on the Persians.
Cimon, the son of Miltiades, was the leader of the dove faction. He fully supported the aims of the Delian League and was probably its commander-in-chief continuously from 478/7 to 462/1. However, his commitment to peaceful relations with Sparta was based on more than expediency for Athens. He had tremendous admiration and respect for the Spartans:
From the beginning of his career he was a great supporter of the Spartans. He actually named one of his sons Lacedaimonius [‘the Spartan’].
(Plutarch, Cimon 16)
Almost certainly he was their ‘proxenos’ (see Glossary), which meant that he was Sparta’s main representative in Athens. Athens’ friendship with Sparta was the cornerstone of his foreign policy, as this allowed the Athenians to direct their full military might against the Persians. This policy also was of great benefit in promoting Cimon’s career. His greatest asset was his generalship, and the campaigns against the Persians in the 470s were the perfect arena for him to display his talents. It was said of him:
Indeed no man did more than Cimon to humble and insult the pride of the Great King himself. He did not relax his pursuit of the Persians from Greece but pressed hard on their heels … until Asia, from Ionia to Pamphylia, was totally emptied of all Persian soldiers.
(Plutarch, Cimon 12)
The culmination of his military success was his leadership of the Delian League forces at the battle of Eurymedon in c.469:
Cimon, like a top class athlete, won two victories in a single day.
(Plutarch, Cimon 13)
Although Plutarch exaggerates the success of Eurymedon by saying that it surpassed that of both Salamis and Plataea, this victory, on land and at sea, decisively ended the Persian menace to the Aegean. It is hardly surprising that nearly a decade of continuous military glory for Cimon gave Themistocles and his anti-Spartan policies little chance of success in the 470s.
Domestic policy, 478–462/1
There was one other issue that divided the two factions and this concerned political ideology. It is too much to say that Themistocles planned the reforms, which were introduced by Ephialtes and Pericles in 462/1; but there is strong evidence, especially if the development of Athenian democratic thinking from the time of the reforms of Cleisthenes was evolutionary (as argued by Forrest – see Chapter 13) and not sudden, that Themistocles, perceiving this political maturing of the lower class thetes, wished to advance their political power. Thucydides (1.138) especially praises his foresight, and to someone of Themistocles’ (and Aristides’) intelligence it was clear that the decision to make Athens a great naval power would have a direct bearing on the future of the Athenian constitution. Greek history had shown that political power lay with the class best able to defend the state. In the eighth and first part of the seventh centuries the aristocrats had held sway because of the state’s dependence on cavalry, which only the aristocrats could afford. Then in the rest of the seventh and in the sixth century the middle-class ‘hoplites’ replaced the aristocrats as the defenders of the state and they, with the aid of the tyrants, gained a share in political power (Aristotle, Politics 1297b). Themistocles’ enthusiastic support for, and Aristides’ opposition to, the ship-building programme in 482 strongly suggest that both men saw the implications of making Athens a great naval power dependent on the thetes. That these two men, both committed anti-Persians, on the eve of the Persian invasion of Greece should disagree so strongly that the issue could only be resolved by Aristides’ ostracism, is clear evidence that the essence of their conflict was about political ideology. Plutarch informs us of the political effects of Themistocles’ naval policy:
The result of this was that he increased the standing of the people at the upper class’s expense and filled them full of confidence, with power now passing into the hands of sailors, boatswains and pilots.
(Plutarch, Themistocles 19)
Plutarch has once again exaggerated and is describing the political situation in Athens in the second half of the fifth-century, but there is an element of truth in the growing awareness of the thetes with regard to their increasing importance to the state.
The main opposition in the 470s and 460s came from Cimon and his faction, who strongly supported the 508 constitution of Cleisthenes that had created a moderate democracy, in which political power was mainly shared between the middle-class hoplites and the upper classes. Therefore Cimon, who was a staunch supporter of the aristocratic council, the ‘Areopagus’, was determined to oppose Themistocles’ plans for the people:
He together with Aristides opposed Themistocles, when that man began to advance the democracy beyond its prescribed limits.
(Plutarch, Cimon 10)
In the 470s, constitutional issues were of much less importance than foreign policy in Athenian politics, and thus Themistocles’ unpopularity in foreign affairs gave him little scope to be successful in domestic policy. However, constitutional change became a major issue in the late 460s and forced Cimon into the role of the champion of moderate democracy:
During the rest of his political career, while present, he checked and even reduced the challenges of the people on the power of the upper classes.
(Plutarch, Cimon 15)
However, there was a fatal flaw in Cimon’s domestic policy. His dynamic foreign policy led to success against the Persians (478 to 469) and to Athens’ growing imperialism over the Delian League allies (469 to 462/1). This success was achieved through the naval fighting abilities of the thetes, who just like the middle-class hoplites in 508 were bound to demand recognition of this by a substantial increase in their political power. This desire for ‘radical’ democratic reform was anathema to Cimon and yet his foreign policy led directly to its introduction. Cimon either lacked the vital quality of foresight or hoped that a combination of personal generosity (Plutarch, Cimon 10) and a successful foreign policy would dissuade the people from seeking a change in the constitution.
The fall of Themistocles
Themistocles’ final disgrace came at the hands of his political enemies in Athens and the Spartans. From 471 he had been travelling around the Peloponnese, helping to create an anti-Spartan coalition, which challenged the Spartans’ dominance of the Peloponnese at the battle of Tegea in c.469 (see Chapter 12). The Spartans undoubtedly had the motive to get rid of Themistocles and the ‘evidence’ was at hand. Pausanias, the victor of Plataea, had allegedly spent the 470s in treacherous intrigues with the Persians and had plotted the overthrow of Sparta by promising freedom to the ‘Helots’ (Thuc. 1.128–35). His medism (see Glossary) was discovered and he met his death in Sparta. No exact date can be given for his death but at some time in the late 470s (or even as early as 474/3, according to Forrest) seems reasonable. According to the Spartans, when they were investigating Pausanias’ case:
certain letters and documents concerning this issue were found, which cast suspicion on Themistocles.
(Plutarch, Themistocles 23)
The Spartans raised an outcry, claiming that this ‘evidence’ proved that Themistocles had shared in Pausanias’ medizing intrigues and that he should be punished in a similar way. It is the time lapse betw
een the death of Pausanias (late 470s) and the presentation of the evidence (early 460s), which creates the suspicions that this ‘evidence’ was manufactured, especially as the Spartans were so desperate to remove Themistocles and his troublesome influence from Peloponnesian politics. The Spartans knew, however, that it would be hard to convince the Athenians that their great war hero, although out of favour at the time, had indulged in medism. For such a charge to be successful it would need the right opportunity and support from the highest quarters in Athens.
The great victory at Eurymedon c.469 was the peak of Cimon’s career and was the clearest vindication of the dove faction’s foreign policy. It was now that Sparta had the opportunity to present their evidence, knowing full well that Cimon, their proxenos and political enemy of Themistocles, could and would use his dominant influence to back the charge of medism. We know that Cimon, either now or earlier, was willing to destroy his rival’s career:
When Alcmaeon and Cimon and many others were attacking and prosecuting him (Themistocles), Aristides was the only one who neither did nor said anything despicable.
(Plutarch, Aristides 25)
The Athenians were persuaded and officers were sent out to arrest him and bring him back for trial. Themistocles (like Alcibiades in 415) knew that his political enemies would ensure that a verdict of guilty was passed and thus was forced, like Alcibiades, to seek protection with the enemy – in this case, ironically, with Persia as there was nowhere else in Greece that could offer sanctuary from Athenian and Spartan agents. This act naturally appeared to confirm his enemies’ accusations and Themistocles’ career in Greek politics was over, although he left a powerful legacy to his successors, Ephialtes and Pericles.
Athenian foreign policy, 460s
The year of 469 marked a major change in foreign policy for Cimon and the dove faction. The success at Eurymedon had virtually destroyed any chance of a Persian counter-offensive in the Aegean and many of the Delian League allies felt that the liberation of the Greeks from Persia – the chief aim of the League, for which they had joined – had been achieved. They looked forward to a rest from their labours and probably expected the League to go the way of the Hellenic League, i.e. it would still exist in name but would involve very few commitments to active service. Thucydides records their failure to understand Athenian attitudes to and intentions for the League (1.99; AE29 p. 21 – see Chapter 10). Cimon realized that the Athenians now had the opportunity to exploit the League for their own benefit and advancement, and thus began the conversion of the League into the Athenian Empire. As the ship-supplying allies became more unwilling to serve on campaigns, which Athens still insisted on conducting, Cimon (according to Plutarch) encouraged the allies to take their ease and allowed them to supply either phoros or empty ships. While the allies grew soft from easy living, Cimon filled the empty ships with Athenian sailors and made them battle-hardened. This policy soon brought results:
The Greeks who did not take part in military campaigns became accustomed to fear and to flatter men, who were continuously at sea, who always had weapons at hand and who were thriving on constant training, and so, without realising it, they became tributaries and slaves instead of allies.
(Plutarch, Cimon 11)
Cimon’s role in this was crucial and his successful pursuit of Athenian imperial interests at the expense of the allies reflects highly on his ability to perceive and act upon policies that were advantageous to Athens.
However, there was once again a fatal flaw in this policy. The cornerstone of his foreign policy was peace with Sparta, but he failed to appreciate the fear and resentment that existed among the Spartans towards the Athenians. They had wanted to keep Athens defenceless in 479 and had only with great reluctance allowed Athens to take over the hegemony of Greece against Persia in the 470s (see Chapter 12). Now that the Persian threat to Greece appeared to be over and the Athenians’ power was growing through the suppression of their allies, so the Spartans’ fear continued to grow. Sparta, being a military state, usually responded to all threats, real or imaginary, by aggression. The more eagerly that Cimon pursued his policy of crushing the allies and making them subject to Athens, so the likelihood of Spartan aggression increased. Cimon, blinded by his admiration of and trust in Sparta, lacked the foresight to appreciate this. In 465, the revolt of Thasos, instigated by Athens’ commercial greed, was the incident that provoked Sparta:
The Thasians … appealed to the Spartans and asked them to aid them by invading Attica. Unknown to the Athenians, the Spartans promised and intended to do so.
(Thucydides 1.101.1; AE29 p. 21)
Even though the Spartans were still allies of Athens and officially at peace, they were prepared to launch an invasion against Athens and were only prevented by the occurrence of an earthquake and the subsequent Helot revolt (see Chapter 12). Athens, even under the influence of their pro-Spartan proxenos Cimon, was still an object of profound fear.
The year of 465 marked a turning point in Cimon’s career, when his popularity began to slip. After defeating the Thasians in battle, Cimon was involved in a long and unglamorous siege, which kept him out of the public eye from 465 to 463 (Plutarch, Cimon 14). In addition 10,000 settlers were sent out in 465 to found the colony of the Nine Ways near the river Strymon (Thuc. 1.100.3; AE29 p. 21). This new colony almost certainly played its part in provoking the neighbouring Thasians into revolt, as it was clear that Athens had designs on controlling that part of the North Aegean, which was strategically important and rich in natural resources. The destruction of this colony, so close to Cimon’s forces, probably added to Cimon’s slip in popularity. The rise of the hawks, under Ephialtes and Pericles, can probably be dated from now. Cimon’s success had previously made it extremely difficult for the Athenian hawks to make headway against his faction. However, once Cimon had proved fallible, the window of opportunity opened for them to challenge his authority and to win over the Athenians to their policies – hostility to Sparta and the advancement of democracy. In 463, Cimon, upon his return from Thasos, was charged with corruption (Plutarch, Cimon 14). The fact that Cimon’s incorruptibility was renowned and that one of the leading prosecutors was Pericles proves conclusively that this was a politically motivated trial, initiated by the hawks to test Cimon’s current popularity. Cimon was acquitted but the trial showed the growing confidence of the hawks.
The overthrow of Cimon’s policies came in 462/1, and the Spartans must take the major responsibility for this. The Spartans’ siege of the Helots on Mount Ithome had been dragging on from 465 due to their lack of skill in conducting sieges, and they appealed to their allies, including Athens, to come to their aid (Thuc. 1.102.1; AE39 p. 25). This request caused a political storm in Athens. Ephialtes was totally opposed to the Athenians helping their rival and had hoped that the Spartans’ efforts would end in failure. Cimon, however, pleaded with the Athenians to send a large force of hoplites:
he urged them ‘not to allow Greece to go lame, nor to allow their city to lose its yoke-fellow.’
(Plutarch, Cimon 16)
Cimon won the day and was despatched with 4,000 hoplites to Ithome. However, the Spartans soon became fearful of the Athenians’ presence and sent them away, alone of the allies, claiming that they had no further need of them (Thuc. 1.102.3; AE39 p. 25 – see Chapter 12). This snub at Ithome provoked a powerful backlash at Athens. The Athenians were angry at this degrading treatment and rightly held Cimon responsible for this disgrace. The hawks saw this as their moment to strike. They took advantage of the Athenians’ angry mood and persuaded them to renounce their alliance with the Spartans – virtually a declaration of war – and to make a military alliance with Sparta’s enemy, Argos (Thuc. 1.102.4; AE39 p. 25). The hawks also brought about the passing of the second part of their policy. While Cimon and the Athenian hoplites were still away:
under the leadership of Ephialtes they [i.e. the people of Athens] took away from the Council of the Areopagus all its powers of jurisdiction, a
part from a few, and giving themselves total authority over the law courts they turned the city into a full radical democracy, with the help of Pericles.
(Plutarch, Cimon 15)
Cimon’s foreign and domestic policies were in ruins due to the Spartan snub at Ithome. His final humiliation, ostracism in 462/1, came about as a result of his desperate attempt to restore political power to the Areopagus and the constitution of Cleisthenes (Plutarch, Cimon 15). The Athenians now possessed a new more democratic constitution and were set on a path of confrontation with the Spartans.
Bibliography
Bury, J. B. and Meiggs, R. A History of Greece, ch. 8.
Davies, J. K. Democracy and Classical Greece, 2nd edn, ch. 3.
Forrest, W. G. The Emergence of Greek Democracy, ch. 9.
——‘Themistocles and Argos’, CQ 10.
Hornblower, S. The Greek World 479–323 BC, ch. 2.
Kagan, D. Pericles of Athens and the Birth of Democracy, ch. 2.
Meiggs, A. The Athenian Empire, ch. 5.
Powell, A. Athens and Sparta, chs 1 and 4.
Sealey, R. A History of Greek City States 700–338 BC, ch. 9.
de Ste. Croix, G. E. M. The Origins of the Peloponnesian War, ch. 5 (ii).
12
SPARTAN FOREIGN POLICY AND PROBLEMS IN THE PELOPONNESE, 478– 446/5
The evolution of the Peloponnesian League
In the sixth century it had been the intention of the Spartans, building upon their success in Messenia, to attempt the conquest of the rest of the Peloponnese. However, defeat by Tegea in the middle of the century (c.550) led to a radical rethink of their policy in the Peloponnese: instead of conquest, the Spartans embarked on a policy of forming with individual states a series of military alliances, in which they would hold the ‘hegemony’ (leadership). These allies would swear the oath ‘to have the same friends and enemies as the Spartans, and to follow the Spartans wheresoever they may lead’. The Spartans for their part would protect their Peloponnesian allies from outside attack; in return they could call upon their allies if they needed help and could summon them to participate in any military campaign in which they were engaged. This military organization, together with control of the Messenian ‘Helots’, was the vital element in maintaining the Spartans’ supremacy in the Peloponnese. In the first place, the cultivation of Messenia by the Helots for their masters ensured that the Spartans had the necessary time and opportunity to become a first-class military state, excelling in the art of ‘hoplite’ warfare. This military superiority had two interrelated consequences: first, it ensured their hegemony over the other states in the Peloponnese; and second, this hegemony ensured that these allies supplied the necessary military help to suppress any revolt of the Helots, upon whom the Spartan system ultimately depended. While this virtuous (in the Spartans’ eyes) circle worked successfully, the Spartans had no fears about their supremacy in the Peloponnese and therefore their status as a Greek super-power. However, if they were to lose the Helots, they would quickly lose their military superiority (having then to cultivate their own lands) and with it their hegemony over their Peloponnesian allies, as happened in the fourth century following their loss of Messenia in 370/69 (Diodorus 15.66.6) and the break-up of the Peloponnesian League in 366/5 (Xenophon, Hellenica 7.4.6–11 – see Chapter 25).
Aspects of Greek History (750–323BC) Page 33
