Aspects of Greek History (750–323BC)

by Terry Buckley

  If the dikasteria decided that the decree was constitutional, then the decree was presumed to be passed, giving the dikasteria constitutional power. It is revealing that in the oligarchic revolutions of 411 and 404 the graphe paranomon was suspended, as it was seen to be synonymous with democracy.

  Eisangelia (impeachment) was the process by which a citizen could make a denunciation against another individual or a public official(s). The eisangelia process was used against those accused of either committing treason (subversion of the democracy, betrayal, accepting bribes to speak against the best interests of the people); or deceiving the people by not keeping their promise; or (probably) any crime that was not specifically covered in the existing law-code, for example, the Mutilation of the Hermae in 415 (see Chapter 21). Any citizen, wishing to make an eisangelia, could either wait for the Principal Assembly in each prytany, where it was a fixed item on the agenda, or could take it to the Boule, which would then put it on the agenda in the form of a probouleuma. Whoever made the denunciation was expected to deal with the whole issue from start to finish. The denouncer would put his proposal in the Ecclesia, in which he would name the denounced, the crime committed, the relevant section of the law broken (if it existed) and the punishment proposed, which was usually the death penalty. He would probably also include a recommendation as to whether the case should be tried in the Ecclesia or the dikasteria. The denouncer would then be the main prosecutor in the subsequent trial.

  From the sources it is clear that this was used as a political weapon for the most part against the generals, who as elected officials exercised great power in the democracy. If a general lost a battle or failed to succeed in some enterprise and/or was a political opponent, he could be and often was denounced, not on the grounds of incompetence, because eisangelia did not recognize that as grounds for prosecution, but for treason. Cimon, in 463, was charged by his democratic opponents of having been bribed by King Alexander of Macedon not to invade and seize part of his kingdom (Plutarch, Cimon 14) – since Cimon’s incorruptibility was so well known and documented in Plutarch, this was clearly a politically motivated charge. If a denouncer abandoned his case, then he was liable to a fine of 1,000 talents but, owing to the importance that the Athenians placed on this area of public life, he was not forbidden to bring other ‘eisangeliai’ in the future unlike in other criminal cases.

  The final area of political involvement of the dikasteria was in the control of the public officials. Every official had to undergo a dokimasia (investigation) before he could undertake his office, to ensure that he was eligible to take up his post. With the exception of being a councillor in the Boule, the dokimasiai took place in the dikasteria, where any citizen could make an accusation against the incoming official who would have to make a defence against the charges. Whether or not an accusation was made, there was a ballot in the dikasteria which would decide if the man chosen could take up office. This was a lengthy business, as Aristotle (Ath. Pol. 24.3) states that there were 700 officials at home; but clearly it was viewed with great seriousness by the Athenians. Then, during an official’s year of office he could be accused of maladministration and, if the punishment required a more severe penalty than 500 drachmas, once again the dikasteria would exert their control over the public officials. Finally every public official would undergo his euthuna at the end of his year of office, in which his performance in office and his accounts would be checked by the ten euthunoi and the thirty logistai (see above and Chapter 13); if there was a case to answer, the dikasteria would again be the final arbiters of the public officials. Thus it can be seen that the dikasteria played a significant political role in the fifth century, which was to increase in the next century.

  Bibliography

  Hansen, M. H. The Athenian Assembly, chs 2 and 4.

  ——The Athenian Democracy in the Age of Demosthenes, chs 6, 8 and 10.

  Macdowell, D. M. The Law in Classical Athens, chs 11 and 16.

  Ostwald, M. From Popular Sovereignty to the Sovereignty of Law, pt 1, ch. 1.

  Rhodes, P. J. The Athenian Boule, chs 2 and 5.

  Roberts, J. W. City of Socrates. An Introduction to Classical Athens, ch. 3.

  Sinclair, R. K. Democracy and Participation in Athens, chs 3.5–6, 4 and 5.1.

  15

  ATHENIAN FOREIGN POLICY IN THE FIRST PELOPONNESIAN WAR, 462/1– 446/5

  The sources

  The two main sources for this period of Greek history are Thucydides (1.102–15.1; AE39 pp. 25–28, AE64 p. 39 – all references in this chapter are to Thucydides unless otherwise stated) and Diodorus (11.71–12.7). Thucydides’ narrative is very sketchy due to the fact that it is part of his digression on the so-called ‘Pentecontaetia’ (‘The Fifty-Years’), which is in itself a brief and highly selective account of Athens’ rise to power between the Persian War (480–479) and the Peloponnesian War (431–404). Although it can be reasonably assumed that most of the events are recorded in chronological sequence, Thucydides gives no specific dates; instead he makes use of phrases such as ‘after this’, ‘soon after’, ‘about the same time’ and ‘in the third year’. Furthermore, he makes no attempt to explain the foreign policy options available to the Athenians and the reasons for their choice at different times in the war. Instead, Thucydides has given us an account of Athenian military campaigns – recording some very important ones briefly (e.g. the battle of Oenophyta) but other less important ones in detail (e.g. the defeat of the Corinthians at Megara) – and thus leaving it to the modern historian to attempt to deduce Athenian foreign policy from these campaigns. The other major weakness is the omission of important events, such as the transfer of the Delian League treasury to Athens; the pro-Persian allied revolts in the eastern Aegean during the 450s and 440s; the (formal or informal) peace with Persia in 449; and the intensification of Athenian control over their allies, all of which had an important bearing upon or reflected Athenian foreign policy.

  Diodorus’ account is more detailed than Thucydides, but is mainly derived from Thucydides because Diodorus, writing in the first century BC, almost certainly based his work on the history of Ephorus, who wrote in the fourth century and used Thucydides as his main source for the period 478–411. The greater amount of detail in Diodorus may be due either to Ephorus using another source, such as Hellanicus whose history of this period was criticized by Thucydides (1.97.2), or to the tendency of Ephorus to enlarge and embroider his account of events for dramatic and pro-Athenian purposes. It is for that reason that events recorded in Diodorus but not in Thucydides, such as Athenian victories and two-day battles, should be treated with great caution, especially since Diodorus can even contradict Thucydides about events that both historians recorded: for example, the Athenian defeat at the battle of Halieis (1.105.1; AE39 p. 26) is portrayed as an Athenian victory (Diodorus 11.78.1–2); and Cimon’s death before the great battle of Cyprus in c.450 against the Persians (1.112.4; AE39 p. 28) is postponed until after the Athenian victory in order to glorify Cimon’s achievements (Diodorus 12.3–4).

  462/1–454

  When the Athenians were snubbed at Ithome by the Spartans in 462/1, upon their return they left the Hellenic League, in which Sparta and Athens had been equal allies (see Chapter 12). This was tantamount to a declaration of war, which was confirmed by their alliances with Argos and Thessaly (1.102.4; AE39 p. 25). Athens’ alliance with Argos, Sparta’s traditional enemy, was a calculated risk, as it might have provoked the Spartans into open warfare. However, the fact that Argos was well placed geographically to cause problems for Sparta in the Peloponnese and that it had an abundant supply of ‘hoplites’, which the Athenians needed to strengthen their own weaker land forces, outweighed any doubts among the Athenians who had been disturbed and worried by the open display of Spartan hostility at Ithome. In the same way the Thessalian cavalry would be an excellent addition to Athens’ fighting capability, if war broke out, and it would act as a counter-weight to the power of Boeotia with its pro-Spartan sympa
thies.

  For the next few months a cold war existed between the two super-powers, but this changed in c.460:

  The Megarians also revolted from the Spartans and went over to an alliance with the Athenians, prompted by the fact that the Corinthians were winning a war over border territory. The Athenians came to hold Megara and Pegae.

  (Thucydides 1.103.4; AE39 p. 25)

  Corinth was the leading ally of Sparta, and thus the Athenians’ military support to the Megarians meant that open conflict between the two states over Megara would lead to a major war between Athens and Sparta. This momentous decision would have been taken after much discussion in the Ecclesia, and clearly possession of the Megarid – the narrow strip of land, immediately east of the Isthmus of Corinth, connecting central Greece to the Peloponnese – provided the strongest argument for the alliance with Megara and its military consequences. The cornerstone of the Spartans’ strategy was always likely to be an invasion of Attica by land with their superior hoplites, but now their main offensive weapon had been blunted by Athens’ control and occupation of the Megarid. The Spartans made only one attempt in this war to intervene in central Greece, while the Athenians possessed the Megarid (the Sacred War took place during the Five Year Truce), and they learned a valuable lesson from this experience (see below). However, the Athenians now had the problem of war on two fronts.

  It is a fundamental tenet of war strategy that war on two fronts should be avoided. Even allowing for the confidence arising from the new, ‘radical’ democracy, some attempt by the Athenians to eliminate one of the two war fronts would have been expected. The obvious one was Persia, as it was further away than Sparta and, after the Delian League’s crushing double victory at Eurymedon in c.469 (1.100.1; AE29 p. 21), there seems to have been less military activity against Persia in the 460s, since the Athenians were concentrating on asserting their authority over their allies (1.99; AE29 p. 21). There is a hint in Herodotus (7.151) that the Athenians may have made an attempt to negotiate a peace with the Persians at this time. Herodotus, while describing a delegation from the Argives who wanted to confirm with Artaxerxes, Xerxes’ successor in 465 as King of Persia, that their mutual friendship still existed, states that at the same time an Athenian embassy including Callias was present at the Persian court ‘on some business’. The problem for the historian is that no date is given and the nature of the ‘business’ is not stated. It could have been in 449, when many historians believe that a peace was made by the Athenians with Persia, either informally or formally, known as the Peace of Callias. If that was the ‘business’, it seems strange that Herodotus does not state that fact explicitly. However, there is a distinct possibility that this was an earlier attempt (c.460) at peace-making by the Athenians, which presumably failed as it was in the Persians’ interest for Athens to fight on two fronts. Therefore, where diplomacy fails, military force is often used to persuade an opponent to return to the negotiating table.

  In 460 or 459, the Athenians were involved in a major expedition against the Persians on Cyprus with a huge force of 200 ships (1.104.2). This campaign may have been an attempt to put pressure on the Persians to resume peace negotiations by highlighting the Athenian ability to inflict serious damage on the Persian Empire; if this was not their primary aim, then the Athenians were acting unwisely. While campaigning:

  Inaros … led the revolt of most of Egypt from king Artaxerxes. Having made himself ruler, he called in the Athenians.

  (Thucydides 1.104.1; AE39 p. 26)

  The Athenians accepted and consequently were now fully committed on two fronts. There were some good, sound reasons for getting involved initially. Egypt was much more important to the Persians than Cyprus, and this far greater threat might have led the Persians to negotiate with the Athenians in order to remove them from this theatre of war; also, Inaros had already done most of the hard work, and it seemed that the Athenians would only be involved in a ‘mopping-up’ operation; and finally, even if peace with Persia did not come about, conquest of Egypt with its abundance of corn would meet Athens’ needs for the future. Ultimately, however, the Athenians were drawn into an unsuccessful six-year campaign, which proved to be a very costly error of judgement in foreign policy.

  For the next five to six years (460–454) the bulk of the fighting took place in mainland Greece. The Athenians lost the battle of Halieis in the Argolid, but defeated the Peloponnesians at the sea-battle of Cecryphaleia in the Saronic Gulf (1.105.1; AE39 p. 26). Then came the first major conflict of the war:

  After this, war broke out between the Athenians and the Aeginetans and a great sea-battle took place at Aegina between the Athenians and the Aeginetans, with the allies of each taking part, and the Athenians … won, captured 70 ships, landed, and laid siege to Aegina.

  (Thucydides 1.105.2; AE39 p. 26)

  It is worth noting that 70 ships were ‘captured’, which does not include those that were sunk in the battle. This sea battle deserves Thucydides’ description ‘great’ and the Athenians must have had a very large navy, in excess of 100 ships, to gain such a notable victory over such an opponent. The Athenians now had considerable forces committed in Aegina and in Egypt, and garrisons in Megara and Pegae. The Peloponnesians, especially the Corinthians, now saw their chance to exploit the fact that the Athenian armed forces were very stretched. Three hundred hoplites were sent to the aid of Aegina, and at the same time the Corinthians and their allies made an attack on the Megarid, calculating that the Athenians would either shift troops to Megara and lose Aegina or stay put in Aegina and lose Megara owing to a shortage of troops (1.105.3; AE39 p. 26). The Athenians, although desperately short of manpower, sent out a force of the oldest (50 to 59 years of age) and the youngest (18 to 20 years of age) of the troops left in Attica, which after two battles defeated the Corinthians and kept Megara safely in Athenian hands (1.105.4–106.2; AE39 p. 26). Also at this time, clearly inspired by the success of the long walls by which they had joined the city of Megara to its nearby port of Nisaea, the Athenians commenced the building of their Long Walls from the city of Athens to the sea, one to the Piraeus and the other to Phaleron – thus making the Athenians virtually impregnable to a siege, provided they retained mastery of the sea (1.107.1; AE39 p. 26).

  The events described above took place between the years 460 and 458 and, although there was active warfare between the Athenians and the Peloponnesians, Thucydides makes no mention of the Spartans. The explanation for this probably lies with the ongoing ‘Helot’ revolt in Messenia, which paralysed the Spartans and prevented them from carrying out their responsibilities as ‘hegemon’ (leader) of the Peloponnesian League and leading the campaigns against the Athenians. This changed in c.457:

  The Phocians launched an expedition against the people of Doris, who are the mother people of the Spartans, … The Spartans sent a force of 1,500 of their own men and 10,000 allies … to help the people of Doris.

  (Thucydides 1.107.2; AE39 p. 26)

  The conquest of Doris, Sparta’s mythical mother-country, was a source of great humiliation to the Spartans and thus they felt impelled to intervene, even though the regular route through the Megarid was impossible owing to the Athenian occupation. They therefore crossed the Gulf of Crisa by sea, forced the Phocians to come to terms and restored liberty to Doris. However the return journey was now fraught with difficulty, as the Athenians had no intention of allowing them an unhindered passage. The Athenians had already blocked the gulf with their fleet and intended to sink anything that tried to sail across; they also had permanent garrisons at Megara and Pegae, and had occupied the passes over Geraneia to prevent access by this route to the Peloponnese (1.107.2–4; AE39 pp. 26–27). Here was the clearest proof to the Spartans, if they needed it, that control of and safe passage through the Megarid were essential for any military intervention in central Greece. Now they were cut off from the Peloponnese and the longer they delayed the greater the encouragement for the Helots to strive harder with their revolt. However, th
e Athenians had no intention of playing a waiting game:

  The Athenians marched out against them in full force, with a thousand Argives and contingents from the other allies to give a total force of 14,000.

  (Thucydides 1.107.5; AE39 p. 27)

  The battle of Tanagra (c.457) proved to be a very bloody battle with much slaughter on both sides but ended in victory for the Spartans, who then made their way back to the Peloponnese via the Megarid. Diodorus claims that a four-month truce was agreed in the aftermath of this battle, which would help to explain the Spartans’ unhindered march through the Megarid (11.80.6).

  It might have been expected that this bloody defeat would have crushed the Athenians’ morale and enthusiasm for any immediate armed conflict but:

  Sixty-two days after the battle, the Athenians marched out under Myronides and in a battle at Oenophyta defeated the Boeotians, became masters of Boeotia and Phocis.

  (Thucydides 1.108.2–3; AE39 p. 27)

  The Opuntian Locrians also handed over 100 of their richest men as hostages (1.108.3; AE39 p. 27). The Athenians had thus gained a ‘Land Empire’, consisting of Boeotia, Phocis and Opuntian Locris, i.e. virtually the whole of central Greece. After this (c.457) Aegina, one of Athens’ major naval rivals, capitulated, surrendered its navy and became a ‘phoros’-payer (1.108.4; AE39 p. 27); (c.456) the Spartans’ dockyard at Gytheum was burned, Chalcis (a Corinthian foundation in Aetolia) was captured, and Sicyon, an important polis in the Peloponnese, was defeated in battle by the Athenians (1.108.5; AE39 p. 27). This phase of the war in Greece came to an end in c.455/4 with a failed attempt to restore Orestes, the exiled son of the King of Thessaly, another defeat of Sicyon under the command of Pericles and an unsuccessful siege of Oeniadae in Acarnania (1.111.1–3; AE39 p. 28). It is possible that the Athenians’ conquest of Troezen and alliance with Achaea, both in the Peloponnese, should be dated to this period.