Aspects of Greek History (750–323BC)

by Terry Buckley

  Cleon seems to have inherited his wealth from his father, who had taken advantage of the wealth-making opportunities offered by the Empire and had made his money from the tanning business. This gave him the leisure to involve himself full time in the affairs of state and to acquire that mastery of detail, especially financial, that appealed to the demos. He is rightly seen as the force behind Thoudippos’ Decree of 425 (ML 69; AE138 pp. 66–67), which trebled the contributions of the allies to pay for the increasing costs of waging war. He also proved later in his career to be a competent military commander by his defeat of the Spartans on Sphacteria in 425 (Thuc. 4.29–40). If he had chosen to pursue his career in the traditional manner of the kaloikagathoi (as Nicias did, although coming from a non-aristocratic background), the literary sources may well have given him the praise that his ability warranted; but he firmly rejected, even despised, that approach to politics with its inbuilt hierarchy, conventions and its constant compromises. Plutarch (Rules for Politicians 806f) states that he repudiated his friends on the grounds that they could compromise his integrity in his pursuit of the right and just policy for Athens. By doing this, Cleon was turning his back on traditional philia (political friendship) to advance his political career, was giving his devotion and friendship to the demos, and aimed to become their spokesman, their protector (‘prostates’). Cleon and his successors saw that it was possible to gain political power by appealing directly to the demos in the Ecclesia without the need to cultivate old-style ‘friendships’, form coalitions or hold public office. The allegiance of the demos became far more important for political success than the support of a narrow circle of influential men.

  The development of language in a political context is useful in understanding this new approach to politics. The main source is Aristophanes, and, because he was a comic playwright and probably a personal enemy of Cleon, it is necessary to use his evidence with caution. However, even in his caricature of Cleon, who is clearly the model for Paphlagon, the servant of the old man Demos in the Knights, there has to be a modicum of truth to make the caricature effective. There is a recurring theme, which runs through the whole play, of Paphlagon continually expressing his loyalty and devotion to Demos in very exaggerated language:

  Demos: ‘Who, Paphlagon, is harming you?’

  Paphlagon: ‘I am being beaten by this man and these young men because of you.’

  Demos: ‘Why?’

  Paphlagon: ‘Because I love you, Demos, and I am your lover.’

  (Aristophanes, Knights 730–32)

  This imagery is reinforced by the statement of the Sausage-Seller, who is Paphlagon’s rival for Demos’ affections:

  Whenever someone said in the Ecclesia ‘I am your lover, Demos, and I love you, and I cherish you and I alone deliberate for you.’

  (Aristophanes, Knights 1340–41)

  The language and ideas of aristocratic philia (friendship) have been adapted to describe the relationship with the demos, stressing that in a politician such loyalty and affection is only acceptable when directed towards the city and not to one’s friends. In the same play, performed in 424, there is also in line 787 the first recorded use of the word ‘philodemos’ (demos-lover). Older than this word, but parallel in its adaptation to political usage is ‘philopolis’ (city-lover):

  Pericles: ‘And yet you are angry with a man such as me, who I think am inferior to no one in my knowledge of what is necessary and in explaining it, being a lover of the city (philopolis) and above money.’

  (Thucydides 2.60.5)

  Loyalty to and love of the city (‘polis’) and the demos, and not one’s circle of friends, becomes the most admirable trait in a politician and brings success in politics. As these words became common currency in the language of politics, so did their antonyms –‘misodemos’ (demos-hater) and ‘misopolis’ (city-hater). Thus it can be deduced that politics had become far more divisive, confrontational and vicious – political opponents were now enemies of the state, constantly suspected of treason, conspiracy and tyranny.

  It was probably this tough and aggressive approach to politics that led many of the kaloikagathoi to withdraw from public life who might have limited the effectiveness of these new politicians and the success of their policies, which in turn provoked Thucydides and Aristophanes to portray Cleon and the demagogues in such a lurid and derogatory manner. Thucydides had the greatest admiration for Pericles and viewed him as a politician of the old school:

  Pericles held power because through his reputation, intelligence and incorruptibility he could restrain the people while respecting their liberties.

  (Thucydides 2.65.8)

  His description of Cleon before his speech, advocating the retention of the death penalty for all the Mytileneans in 427, could not be in starker contrast:

  He was the most violent of the citizens in every respect and at that time was the most influential among the people.

  (Thucydides 3.36.6)

  These two politicians, epitomizing the old and the new, could not be more different in the eyes of Thucydides. It is a measure of the prejudice against and distortion of Cleon ‘the demagogue’ in the literary sources that when his policies, and not his style, are considered – belief in the necessity of Empire, a firm policy towards the allies, a refusal to accede to the demands of the Spartans, and genuine concern for the welfare of the demos, reflected in pay for public service and improving their standard of living – they bear a remarkable similarity to those of Pericles. In this respect at least, the Old Oligarch was not fooled by Pericles’ aristocratic background or bearing – he knew a ‘demagogue’ when he saw one:

  But anyone who is not one of the common people and yet chooses to live in a city governed by a democracy rather than one governed by an oligarchy, must be preparing to do wrong and have decided that a bad man can escape detection far more easily in a democratic than in an oligarchic city. (Old Oligarch 2.20; OO p. 25)

  Thus there was a change in the nature of politics in the last third of the fifth century. The dominance of the old style of politics, based on a complex web of friendships, was being superseded by a new style, which was based upon direct appeals to the demos and the forging of them into the most powerful political force in Athens. The new politician’s statements of devotion to the city and the demos stressed that the clear-cut, moral duty of all politicians should be to the state and not to one’s circle of friends. They also believed that all the incompetence of the upper class involved in public service should be ruthlessly exposed and punished. The kaloikagathoi intensely disliked this new style of politics and reacted in one of two ways. Some withdrew from public life, but others decided to make their philia tougher in its methods and far more political. As a result these ‘friend-ships’, which previously had been open to view and also performed social functions, became ‘hetaireiai’ (political clubs) that met in secret and plotted the overthrow of the democracy. Thus the stage was set for the constitutional upheavals at the end of the century (see Chapter 23).

  Bibliography

  Andrewes, A. ‘The opposition to Pericles’, JHS 98 (1978).

  Connor, W. R. The New Politicians of Fifth-Century Athens.

  Finley, M. I. ‘The Athenian demagogues’, Past and Present (1962), reprinted in Democracy Ancient and Modern, 2nd edn.

  Frost, F. J. ‘Pericles and Dracontides’, JHS 84 (1964).

  ——‘Pericles, Thucydides, son of Melesias, and Athenian politics before the war’, Historia 13 (1964).

  Gomme, A. W., Andrewes, A. and Dover, K. J. A Historical Commentary on Thucydides, vol. 5, sections 89–98.

  Kagan, D. The Outbreak of the Peloponnesian War, chs 6 and 8.

  Meiggs, R. The Athenian Empire, ch. 9.

  Rhodes, P. J. A Commentary on the Aristotelian ‘Athenaion Politeia’.

  Sinclair, R. K. Democracy and Participation in Athens, chs 2.3 and 6.1–7.

  Wade-Gery, H. T. ‘Thucydides the son of Melesias’, Essays in Greek History.

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9

  ATHENIAN AND SPARTAN STRATEGY IN THE ARCHIDAMIAN WAR, 431– 421

  There are three possible outcomes in war: victory, defeat or stalemate, but even a stalemate can be construed as a moral victory or defeat, depending upon the war aims of the combatants. Pericles realized that the Athenians had little chance of winning a decisive war in the conventional manner, i.e. an invasion of the Peloponnese and the destruction of Sparta, since the Athenian army would be destroyed by the superior forces of the Peloponnesian League:

  The Peloponnesians and their allies have the power to stand up to all the Greeks in a single battle.

  (Thucydides 1.141.6)

  Therefore Pericles’ war aim was shaped by this knowledge, which he expressed in his final speech before the outbreak of war:

  ‘I have many other reasons for believing that we will win through (periesesthai).’

  (Thucydides 1.144.1)

  The Greek word ‘periesesthai’ is used in two other places by Thucydides to describe Pericles’ war aim (2.13.9; 2.65.7 – all references in this chapter are to Thucydides, unless otherwise stated), but there is an ambiguity about its meaning. It can be translated as ‘to be superior to’ or ‘to survive’, and for that reason ‘to win through’ is an effective translation. Sparta’s war aim was to destroy the Athenian Empire and thus, if the Athenians could survive their attacks and retain possession of their Empire, a stalemate would ensue. However, Pericles would view this as a victory for the Athenians, whereas the failure and the consequent loss of face by the Spartans would be judged as a defeat, especially if the Spartans could be made to seem the aggressors (7.18).

  Athenian strategy

  With these considerations in mind, Pericles devised a defensive strategy to ensure Athens’ survival:

  Pericles gave the same advice as before that they should prepare for the war and bring in their property from the fields; that they should avoid battle with the enemy but come inside the city and guard it; that they should ensure the efficiency of the fleet, on which their strength depended, and should keep a firm control of the allies, saying that their power was derived from the allies’ contributions of money.

  (Thucydides 2.13.2)

  Thucydides repeats with approval, in his obituary of Pericles and his summary of the course of the Peloponnesian War (2.65), the key elements of Pericles’ defensive strategy:

  For Pericles said that they would win through (periesesthai), if they pursued a defensive policy, took care of the fleet, did not extend their empire during the war and did not expose the city to danger.

  (Thucydides 2.65.7)

  However, there were also some important offensive elements in his strategy – attacks on the Peloponnesian fleets, whenever an opportunity presented itself; retaliatory raids against enemy territory by sea-borne forces, provided that no excessive risk was involved and that there was an easy means of escape by sea; and an annual devastation of the Megarid with large land forces, after the Peloponnesians had returned home from their invasion of Attica. This offensive part of Pericles’ strategy reflected Spartan strategy, and presumably, apart from boosting Athenian morale after the destruction of Attica, was designed to emphasize Athens’ lack of provocative aggression by merely responding in kind to Sparta’s actions. It is not clear whether Pericles’ strategy also included the building and occupation of forts in enemy territory (‘epiteichismos’). Pericles does refer to this as a possible course of action, but only if the Peloponnesians should attempt it first (1.142.2–5).

  This policy of epiteichismos was first put into operation in 427 (two years after Pericles’ death) at Minoa opposite Megara and even more effectively at Pylos in 425, and it appears from the evidence that the years 427–424 marked a departure from the strategy advocated by Pericles. In these years Demosthenes, Cleon and other influential Athenians carried out a more ambitious offensive strategy, aiming to win the war decisively by campaigning more widely and aggressively against the Spartans and their allies, rather than waiting for the gradual evolution of a stalemate by sticking rigidly to Periclean strategy. Thucydides, in fact, is very critical of the strategy adopted by the democratic leaders who succeeded Pericles, accusing them of doing the exact opposite (2.65.7). There were undoubtedly some changes to Pericles’ defensive strategy in the Archidamian War, but to speak of a complete reversal of policy is not supported by his own account of these years – it is very likely that his view in this passage was shaped by the disastrous Sicilian expedition of 415 (see Chapter 21). If Thucydides had reported (in the same extensive manner as his treatment of Pericles’ strategy) the debates in the ‘Ecclesia’ wherein decisions about Athenian strategy would have been thrashed out, the issues of whether the strategy was changed and by whom would now be much easier to resolve. However, in the final years of the Archidamian War (424–421), there was a return to Pericles’ defensive strategy owing to the Athenian failure to capture Megara, a major defeat in a ‘hoplite’ battle at Delium in Boeotia and the successes of the Spartan Brasidas among Athens’ subjects in Thrace.

  Pericles also stressed the vital importance of finance as a means of success in the coming war (2.13.2–5). This was directly linked with his strategy of keeping a firm hold upon the allies, who in 431 were providing an annual income of about 600 talents; there was also a reserve of over 6,000 talents. The Athenians also put aside 1,000 talents as a special reserve fund, which was only to be used if the city needed defending from an enemy attack by sea; in addition, the hundred best ‘triremes’ of each year were to be put aside for the same purpose (2.24). It is in the area of finance that Pericles can be criticized for his failure to foresee that Athens’ income would be insufficient for fighting a long drawn-out defensive war. The campaign against Samos in 440/39 had cost in the region of 1,200 talents (Diodorus 28.3), and the eventual cost of the siege of Potidaea was 2,000 talents (2.70.2). Expenditure at this level would quickly drain the Athenian reserve. It was left to his successors to attempt to resolve this problem: the Thoudippos Decree, passed in 425/4, raised the allied ‘phoros’ payments to 1,460–1,500 talents (ML 69; AE138 pp. 66–67).

  Spartan strategy

  The Spartans’ war aim was simply expressed and allegedly won great popularity in the Greek world:

  The good-will of men was for the most part directed towards the Spartans, especially because they declared that they would free Greece.

  (Thucydides 2.8.4)

  The liberation of Greece could only be achieved by the destruction of the Athenian Empire (1.118.2), and this required total victory. In this way the Spartans would also remedy some of their allies’ specific grievances, and protect their hegemony of the Peloponnesian League by persuading such states as Corinth to stay loyal to the League. Therefore the Spartans’ strategy had to be primarily offensive in order to achieve their war aims. The cornerstone of Spartan strategy was a land invasion of Attica, which they carried out most years from 431 to 425 – there was no invasion in 429, probably through fear of the plague (2.57.1), nor in 426 when frequent earthquakes were taken as bad omens (3.89.1). These invasions would either provoke the Athenians to fight a hoplite battle in order to protect their crops, which would lead to their inevitable defeat, or destroy the crops of the Athenians, who would be starved into submission.

  This ‘conventional’ strategy of invading an enemy’s homeland with a hoplite army had been very effective in the past 250 years, and had been spectacularly successful in 446/5 when the Spartans forced the Athenians into making substantial concessions (see end of Chapter 15). Thus the Spartans believed that they could easily destroy Athenian power within a few years by ravaging their land (5.14); and this view was shared by the rest of the Greeks who believed that the Athenians might hold out for one or two years, but certainly not more than three (7.28). Even King Archidamus (see Chapter 17), who was very critical of this strategy and doubted its effectiveness to defeat the Athenians, was apparently won over to its possible success by his decision in the 431 inv
asion to encamp in and devastate Acharnae, the biggest ‘deme’ (see Glossary) seven miles from Athens. He felt confident that the combination of the young men’s anger at the destruction of Attica and the pressure from the influential Acharnians who supplied 3,000 hoplites would force Pericles to risk a pitched battle (2.20). Archidamus’ analysis of Athenian public opinion was correct, but he seriously underestimated Pericles’ determination to maintain his strategy (2.21– 22). The Spartans’ biggest misjudgement in this war was their failure to realize the Athenians’ ability to cause extensive damage to the Peloponnesian coastal cities by sea-borne raids.

  There was also an alternative ‘adventurous’ strategy that was outlined by the Corinthians in 432:

  ‘There exist for us other ways of waging war – by encouraging their allies to revolt, especially as this would deprive them of their income on which their strength depends, and the planting of forts in their territory.’