Aspects of Greek History (750–323BC)
Page 53
The challenge to Sparta’s hegemony of the Peloponnese
With regard to the threat to Sparta’s leadership of the Peloponnese in the years 421–418, there were many, often fruitless, diplomatic manoeuvrings between the Peloponnesian cities as they attempted to protect themselves and to avoid isolation in the aftermath of the peace treaty. Space prevents a full description of this complex diplomacy, so only the key alliances will be included. It was the Corinthians, fearing that the Spartans along with the Athenians were planning to enslave the Peloponnese, who initiated the move against the Spartans by encouraging Argive ambitions to lead this challenge (5.27). The Argives proclaimed their willingness to receive into their alliance any city, apart from Sparta or Athens, that wished to join. The first to join were the Mantineans and their allies, who seceded from the Peloponnesian League – the first since Megara in about 460. The Mantineans had brought a large part of southern Arcadia under their control during the Archidamian War and feared that the Spartans, with the coming of the peace, would force them to give up their gains (5.29.1). The Mantinean secession acted as a spur to other states. The next to join were the Eleans, who were in dispute with the Spartans over possession of Lepreum and its territory (5.31.1–5). Then the Corinthians and the Chalcidians in Thrace joined the Argive alliance. However, the Boeotians and the Megarians, although in sympathy with their views about Sparta, did not join owing to their dislike of the Argives’ democratic constitution (5.31.6). A bigger blow to the fledgling alliance was the refusal of Tegea, one of the most powerful cities, in the Peloponnese to join (5.32.3–4) – hardly surprising, since they were first in line for any future Spartan reprisals and had fought a bloody battle with the Mantineans in 423/2 (4.134). At this rebuff the Corinthians became downhearted, and throughout these three years Corinthian behaviour is notable for its timidity and vacillation.
The election of a new board of Spartan ‘Ephors’ in October 421 marked the beginning of the end of peaceful relations between Sparta and Athens, especially the election of Cleoboulos and Xenares, who both wanted an annulment of the Peace of Nicias (5.36.1). In the winter of 421/20 the Spartans, desperate to recover Pylos, sent an embassy to the Boeotians, begging them to hand over Panactum and the Athenian prisoners to themselves. The Boeotians agreed to this but only on condition that the Spartans made a separate alliance with them, just as they had done with the Athenians. The Spartans knew that they would be breaking the terms of their alliance with the Athenians, but so desperate were they to obtain Panactum in order to exchange it for Pylos, they readily agreed, especially those in favour of ending the treaty with Athens. (5.39.3). Once again the growing confidence of the Boeotians should be noted – no more so than their decision, without informing the Spartans, to demolish Panactum so that it could be of no military use to the Athenians. The festering problems between Sparta and Athens came to a head in spring 420. The Spartans sent an embassy to Athens to secure the return of the Athenian prisoners held by the Boeotians and to return Panactum, brazenly claiming the demolition of Panactum was really a restoration, since no hostile force could now occupy it to threaten Athens. The Athenians reacted indignantly to this sophistry and, being also very angry with the Spartans’ alliance with the Boeotians and with the other unresolved treaty matters, sent them away (5.42).
This Athenian anger was exploited by the faction in Athens who had opposed the 50-year defensive alliance with Sparta, and it is here that Alcibiades makes his first appearance in Thucydides. Once again Thucydides ascribes personal motives to Alcibiades’ opposition to the Spartans – his pride had been hurt because the Spartans had failed to pay him due respect but had chosen in his place to negotiate with Nicias about the peace treaty of 421 (5.43). Whether true or not, Alcibiades certainly considered an alliance with Argos to be more advantageous to the Athenians, bearing in mind Sparta’s current difficulties in the Peloponnese and the opportunity to help break up the Peloponnesian League with minimal risk to Athens. Seizing the initiative, Alcibiades encouraged the Argives, Mantineans and Eleans to send envoys to the Athenians to invite them to join the Argive alliance (5.43). The Spartans, having discovered Alcibiades’ plans, immediately sent a second embassy out of fear that the Athenians in their anger might agree to become a member of the Argive alliance. In addition, this embassy was to demand the restoration of Pylos as they had returned Panactum – not a wise move with the mood in Athens being so febrile.
The Spartan embassy spoke first to the Boule of 500, stating that they had come with full powers to settle all the outstanding problems between themselves and the Athenians. Alcibiades, fearing that the Athenians in the Assembly might be won over by these arguments and reject the Argive alliance, conceived a plan to discredit the Spartan ambassadors. He promised to use his influence to persuade the Athenians to return Pylos and to resolve the other matters, provided they did not admit in the Assembly that they had come with full powers to negotiate. They foolishly agreed and on the next day, having been asked in the Assembly whether they had come with full powers and having denied it, they were promptly castigated for their duplicity by Alcibiades. Only an earthquake prevented the Athenians from voting to join the Argives (5.44.2–45). This gave Nicias his last chance to avoid a split with the Spartans by persuading the Athenians to send him and others to Sparta in order to demand the restoration of Amphipolis and of an intact Panactum, and the end of their separate alliance with Boeotia. The Spartans, however, urged on by Xenares the Ephor, refused to give up their alliance with Boeotia and offered nothing new about Amphipolis and Panactum (5.46). This rebuff allowed Alcibiades’ policy to prevail and a 100-year alliance was agreed between the Athenians, Argives, Mantineans and the Eleans. The alliance was mainly a defensive alliance (5.47), although it had the potential to be an offensive alliance (5.47.7). Although not formally revoked by either Athens or Sparta, the Peace of Nicias and the 50-year defensive alliance now existed only in name (5.48.1). The Corinthians, who probably had never intended to break fully with the Spartans but desired to change their foreign policy, did not join this new alliance and now began to harbour thoughts of returning to the Spartans (5.48.2–3).
The first operations of this new quadruple alliance in the summer of 419 were against Epidaurus which was pro-Spartan but probably a member of the Peloponnesian League. Its conquest would encourage Corinth’s neutrality, as the territory of these two cities bordered each other, and would also greatly improve communications and the sending of troops between Athens and Argos (5.53) – at present, the Athenians had to sail around the Argolid peninsula, whereas Epidaurus was immediately opposite the island of Aegina, occupied by the Athenians (see Map 9). During this summer the Argives launched two invasions of Epidaurus in order to ravage its territory and, although the Spartans sent out two expeditions to bring aid to the Epidaurians, both were aborted on the northern frontiers of Laconia owing to unfavourable omens (5.54–55). However, in the winter of 419/8, the Spartans managed to elude the Athenian ships and sent a garrison of 300 into Epidaurus. Argive annoyance at the Athenians’ negligence was allayed only by the Athenians agreeing to return to Pylos the original garrison of Messenians and Helots, who had been removed in 421 to the island of Cephallenia at the request of Sparta (5.35.7) – these could once again renew their guerrilla warfare and ravage the surrounding territory, causing great problems for the Spartans.
At the end of the winter of 419/8, the Argives launched a third invasion of Epidaurus, but failed in their attempt to capture the city. Finally, the Spartans decided to assert their power in the Peloponnese:
The Lacedaimonians, seeing that their allies in Epidaurus were suffering greatly and that furthermore in the Peloponnese some of the states were in revolt, while others were turning against them, and thinking that, unless they swiftly took precautions, their problems would become even greater, they themselves and their helots made an expedition against Argos with their full force under the leadership of King Agis, son of Archidamus.
(Thucydides
5.57.1)
The Spartans were joined by troops from Tegea and the rest of their allies in Arcadia. Furthermore, troops from their other allies in the Peloponnese (including the Corinthians) and the Boeotians also gathered at Phlius, north of Argos. The Argives were joined by the Mantineans with their allies and 3,000 hoplites from Elis, but the Athenians with their cavalry had not yet arrived. The stage was set for the greatest land battle of the Peloponnesian War, but that proved to be an anti-climax – two Argives, including Thrasyllus the general, seeing that the Argives were in a perilous situation, prevailed upon King Agis to avoid battle in return for a fair and impartial arbitration of the grievances held by Sparta against Argos and to make a treaty with a view to keeping the peace (5.49.3–4). Agis, without consultation, concluded a four-month truce with the Argives, and withdrew all his forces. Thrasyllus and Agis paid a heavy price for their diplomacy – the former was nearly stoned to death by the angry Argives who were convinced that they could have defeated the Spartans and their allies (5.60.6); the latter faced the possible destruction of his house and a large fine, having been blamed for wasting such an excellent opportunity with so many allies to crush Argos (5.63.1–4).
Alcibiades and the Athenian forces arrived soon after the departure of the Spartans, and persuaded the Argives with difficulty to resume the war on the grounds that their truce with Sparta was invalid because the Athenians had not been part of the discussions, as required by their alliance (5.61.2–3). The forces of the quadruple alliance now attacked and besieged Orchomenus in Arcadia, a Spartan ally – the citizens, fearing that they would perish before the arrival of help, surrendered and joined the alliance. However, it was now that a split opened up among the anti-Spartan allies about the next target: the Eleans wished to go against Lepreum, over which they had lost control; the Mantineans wished to go against Tegea, Sparta’s most powerful ally and their most powerful rival in Arcadia. The Mantineans won the day but the Eleans angrily returned home with their 3,000 hoplites – possibly a fatal decision for the alliance in the coming battle (5.62). Desperate calls for help came to the Spartans from their supporters in Tegea, warning them that Tegea was on the point of joining the Argive alliance unless the Spartans came at once. The Spartans needed no second bidding, as the loss of Tegea could be fatal to Sparta’s leadership of the Peloponnese – it also gave King Agis an opportunity to redeem himself and avoid the punishment proposed after his withdrawal from Argos. There followed the battle of Mantinea in the summer of 418 in which the Spartans achieved a brilliant victory, even though they made some potentially disastrous tactical mistakes in the battle (5.70–73), and restored their battered reputation as the foremost infantry in Greece:
By this one action they had removed the charge, previously brought against them by the Greeks, of cowardice on account of the disaster on the island [i.e. of Sphacteria] and of a lack of judgement and of slowness in other matters; they were thought to have suffered disgrace through bad luck, but they themselves still possessed that spirit as in the past.
(Thucydides 5.75.3)
It was now time for the Spartans to reap the fruits of the victory at Mantinea. The Argives withdrew from the quadruple alliance with the Mantineans, the Eleans and the Athenians, and concluded a 50-year alliance with Sparta. Furthermore the Argives agreed to have no diplomatic dealings with the Athenians until they evacuated Pylos, Cythera and Epidaurus (5.78– 80.1). The Mantineans lost their confidence with the withdrawal of Argos from their alliance, and they also made a separate 30-year treaty with the Spartans in which they gave up control of the cities in Arcadia that they had conquered in the Archidamian War. It seems likely that the Eleans, now isolated, soon returned to the Peloponnesian League. Thus emboldened and exercising their restored power, the Spartans set about strengthening their grip in the Peloponnese: they established pro-Spartan oligarchies in Sicyon and Argos itself in 418 (7.81.2), and in Achaea in 417. The success of the Argive oligarchy did not last long, and the Argive democrats soon regained power and set about restoring their alliance with the Athenians (5.82.2–5). But it is doubtful whether this caused much consternation in Sparta – to all intents and purposes Argos was no longer a serious challenger for the hegemony of the Peloponnese. To rub this in, the Spartans in the winter of 417/6 invaded the Argolid; demolished the defensive long walls that the Argives were building down to the sea; conquered Hysiae, a city in Argive territory, slaughtering all the men; and returned home without any problems (5.83.1–2). The only thorn in Sparta’s side was the continued occupation of Pylos by the Athenians who were still seizing large quantities of booty from the Lacedaimonians. However, in 416 the time was not yet ripe for the Spartans to react to this provocation and renounce the Peace of Nicias. That was soon to change as the politically ambitious Alcibiades, whose desire to defeat Sparta, based on an Athenian alliance with Argos, Mantinea and Elis, had been thwarted by the battle of Mantinea, sought a new foreign policy objective to exercise his talents.
Outbreak of the Decelean War
Alcibiades’ opportunity came in 415: Segesta, a non-Greek Sicilian ally of the Athenians, being hard pressed by Greek Syracuse and Selinus, sent a delegation to Athens in 416 begging for military assistance. Athens had recently concluded an alliance with Segesta, and a majority of the Athenians saw this as a perfect pretext for the conquest of the whole of Sicily (6.6.1 – see Chapter 21 for a full treatment of the Sicilian expedition). In 415, when the debate about sending help was held in the Ecclesia, Alcibiades was the foremost supporter of the expedition. Both Nicias in open debate (6.12.2) and Thucydides in his commentary (6.15.2) believed that Alcibiades’ eagerness was motivated mainly by a desire to gain wealth and glory. Alcibiades was chosen as one of the three generals but, shortly before the expedition set sail, a religious scandal broke out (the mutilation of the Hermae and the profanation of the Mysteries) in which Alcibiades was allegedly implicated. He was instructed to set sail, even though he had this charge hanging over his head. While on campaign in Sicily, he was ordered to return to face trial: a likely guilty verdict and death penalty were enough to persuade him to escape into exile, finally arriving in Sparta at the Spartans’ invitation (6.61).
In the winter of 415/4, the Syracusans, having suffered their first defeat in battle, sent envoys to Corinth and then to Sparta: their request was for the Spartans to be more active in open warfare in mainland Greece against Athens and to send help to Sicily (6.88.8). The Spartans, although sympathetic, were still very unwilling to break their peace treaty and alliance with Athens because of their responsibility for the outbreak of the Archidamian War:
For in the former war (they felt) that their wrongdoing was greater because the Thebans had gone into Plataea in peacetime and, although it was stated in the previous treaty not to take up arms, if the other wished to go to arbitration, they themselves had not submitted to arbitration, although the Athenians were offering it. And because of this they believed that they deserved their misfortune and took it to heart about the disaster at Sphacteria and the other misfortunes that had befallen them.
(Thucydides 7.18.2)
It was now that Alcibiades used his oratorical skills to deadly effect to the benefit of the Spartans and to the detriment of the Athenians. His intervention in the debate proved to be the catalyst that stirred the Spartans into action. First, he painted a picture of Athenian imperial aims and ambitions, deliberately exaggerated to strike fear into the Spartans: Sicily was only the first stage of conquest; this was to be followed by the conquest of the Italian Greeks, then Carthage and the Carthaginian Empire; finally, supported by these forces, a full-blown attack upon the Peloponnese to rule over the entire Hellenic world (6.90.2–3). Second, he gave them the perfect strategy for weakening and debilitating the Athenian war effort: to establish a permanent garrison at Decelea in Attica, which was equidistant from Athens and Boeotia and which easily controlled the whole of Attica, thereby denying the Athenians access to their land and forcing them to import everything by sea;
to send hoplites to Syracuse; and, even more important than these, to send out a first-class Spartan general to command the forces at Syracuse (6.91.4–7). This speech removed the Spartans’ previous hesitation about attacking Athens and establishing a garrisoned fort (‘epiteichismos’) at Decelea; they also appointed Gylippus and ordered him to proceed at once to Sicily to organize the war effort against the Athenians there (6.93.2).
Early in the summer of 414, the Athenians removed any lingering doubts among the Spartans about the legality of attacking Athens. The Spartans had invaded the territory of Argos and had laid waste most of it. The Athenians sent 30 ships to aid Argos but, in a marked departure from the past, attacked cities on the coast of Laconia:
The Athenians brought help to the Argives with thirty ships which most clearly of all violated the treaty with the Spartans …; after landing at Epidaurus Limera, Prasiai and other places, they laid waste the land, and as a result they gave the Lacedaimonians the more plausible reason of self-defence against the Athenians.
(Thucydides 6.105. 1–2)
This was a clear breach of the terms of the Peace of Nicias (see term 2 above) – a foolish and provocative act by the Athenians, although they may have felt emboldened by the ongoing success at Syracuse. However, by the end of summer of 414, the news from Sicily was not good – Gylippus had dramatically improved the fighting mettle of the Syracusans and had prevented the Athenians from completing the circumvallation of Syracuse. Nicias’ letter to the Athenians advised either a recall of the whole expedition or the despatch of substantial reinforcements (see Chapter 21 for a full treatment of these events). The Athenians’ decision in late 414 to send a second expedition in spring 413 was the final galvanizing moment for the Spartans. Although they were influenced by the Syracusans’ and Corinthians’ urging them to invade Attica to prevent the sending of the second expedition, and by Alcibiades’ constant telling them to fortify Decelea and to prosecute the war more forcefully: