Shakespeare's Montaigne

by Michel de Montaigne

  Many abuses are engendered into the world, or, to speak more boldly, all the abuses of the world are engendered upon this, that we are taught to fear to make profession of our ignorance and are bound to accept and allow all that we cannot refute. We speak of all things by precepts and resolution. The stile [45] of Rome did bear that even the same that a witness deposed because he had seen it with his own eyes and that which a judge ordained of his most assured knowledge was conceived in this form of speech, It seemeth so unto me. I am drawn to hate likely things when men go about to set them down as infallible. I love these words or phrases which mollify and moderate the temerity of our propositions: It may be; Peradventure; In some sort; Some; It is said; I think; and such like. And had I been to instruct children, I would so often have put this manner of answering in their mouth, enquiring and not resolving—What means it? I understand it not; It may well bee; Is it true?—that they should rather have kept the form of learners until three score years of age than present themselves doctors at ten, as many do. Whosoever will be cured of ignorance must confess the same. Iris is the daughter of Thaumantis. [46] Admiration [47] is the ground of all philosophy, inquisition the progress, ignorance the end. Yea, but there is some kind of ignorance strong and generous that for honor and courage is nothing beholding to knowledge, an ignorance, which to conceive rightly, there is required no less learning than to conceive true learning. [48]

  Being young, I saw a law case which Corras, a counsellor of Toulouse, caused to be printed of a strange accident of two men who presented themselves one for another. I remember (and I remember nothing else so well) that methought he proved his imposture, whom he condemned as guilty, so wondrous-strange and so far exceeding both our knowledge and his own who was judge, that I found much boldness in the sentence which had condemned him to be hanged. [49] Let us receive some form of sentence that may say, The Court understands nothing of it, more freely and ingenuously than did the Areopagites who, finding themselves urged and entangled in a case they could not well clear or determine, appointed the parties to come again and appear before them a hundred years after.

  The witches about my country [50] are in hazard of their life upon the opinion of every new author [51] that may come to give their dreams a body. [52] To apply such examples as the Holy Word of God offereth us of such things (assured and irrefragable [53] examples) and join them to our modern events, since we neither see the causes nor means of them, some other better wit than ours is thereunto required. Peradventure it appertaineth to that only most-mighty testimony [54] to tell us: “This here, and that there, and not this other are of them.” [55] God must be believed, and good reason he should be so. Yet is there not one amongst us that will be amazed at his own narration (and he ought necessarily to be astonished at it, if he be not out of his wits) whether he employ it about others matters or against himself. [56]

  I am plain and homely and take hold on the main point and on that which is most likely, avoiding ancient reproaches. Maiorem fidem homines adhibent iis quæ non intelligunt. Cupidine humani ingenii libentius obscura creduntur. Men give more credit to things they understand not. [57] Things obscure are more willingly believed through a strange desire of man’s wit. [58] I see that men will be angry and am forbid to doubt of it [59] upon pain of execrable injuries. A new manner of persuading! Mercy for God’s sake. My belief is not carried away with blows. Let them tyrannize over such as accuse their opinion of falsehood; I only accuse mine [60] of difficulty and boldness. And equally to them I condemn the opposite affirmation, if not so imperiously.

  He that with bravery and by commandment will establish his discourse declareth his reason to be weak. For a verbal and scholastical altercation..., they have as much appearance as their contradictors. [61] Videantur sane, non affirmentur modo. Indeed let them seem, so they be not avouched. [62] But in the effectual consequence they draw from it, these have great odds.

  To kill men, there is required a bright-shining and clear light. [63] And our life is over-real and essential to warrant their supernatural and fantastical accidents. [64] As for drugs and poisons, they are out of my element; they are homicides, and of the worst kind. In which nevertheless, it is said, that one must not always rely upon the mere confession of those people, for they have sometimes been seen to accuse themselves, to have made away men which were both sound and living. [65]

  In these other extravagant accusations, I should easily say that it sufficeth what commendations soever he hath, a man be believed in such things as are human; but of such as are beyond his conception and of a supernatural effect, he ought then only be believed when a supernatural approbation hath authorized him. [66] That privilege it hath pleased God to give some of our testimonies ought not to be vilified or slightly communicated. Mine ears are full of a thousand such tales. Three saw him such a day in the east; three saw him the next day in the west, at such an hour, in such a place, and thus and thus attired. Verily, in such a case I could not believe myself. How much more natural and more likely do I find it that two men should lie than one in twelve hours pass with the winds from east to west? How much more natural that our understanding may by the volubility of our loose-capering mind be transported from his place than that one of us should by a strange spirit, in flesh and bone, be carried upon a broom through the tunnel of a chimney?

  Let us, who are perpetually tossed to and fro with domestical [67] and our own illusions, not seek for foreign and unknown illusions. I deem it a matter pardonable not to believe a wonder, so far forth at least as one may divert and exclude the verification by no miraculous way. And I follow Saint Augustine’s opinion, that a man were better bend towards doubt than incline towards certainty in matters of difficult trial and dangerous belief.

  Some years are now past that I travelled through the country of a sovereign prince who, in favour of me and to abate my incredulity, did me the grace, in his own presence and in a particular place, to make me see ten or twelve prisoners of that kind, and amongst others an old beldam witch, a true and perfect sorceress, both by her ugliness and deformity and such a one as long before was most famous in that profession. I saw both proofs, witnesses, voluntary confessions, and some other insensible marks about this miserable old woman; I inquired and talked with her a long time, with the greatest heed and attention I could; yet am I not easily carried away by preoccupation. [68] In the end, and in conscience, I should rather have appointed them Eleborum than Hemlock. [69] Captisque res magis mentibus, quam consceleratis similis visa. The matter seemed liker to minds captivate [70] than guilty. [71] Law hath her own corrections for such diseases.

  Touching the oppositions and arguments that honest men have made unto me, both there and often elsewhere, I have found none that tie me and that admit not always a more likely solution than their conclusions. True it is, that proofs and reasons grounded upon the fact and experience I untie not, for indeed they have no end; but often cut them, as Alexander did his knot. [72] When all is done, it is an over-valuing of one’s conjectures, by them to cause a man to be burned alive.

  It is reported by diverse examples (and Præstantius sayeth of his father) that being in a slumber much more deeply than in a full-sound sleep, he dreamed and verily thought himself to be a mare and served certain soldiers for a sumpter-horse [73] and was indeed what he imagined to be. If sorcerers dream thus materially, if dreams may sometimes be thus incorporated into effects, I cannot possibly believe that our will should therefore be bound to the laws and justice; which I say, as one who am neither a judge nor a counsellor unto kings and furthest from any such worthiness, but rather a man of the common stamp and both by my deeds and sayings born and vowed to the obedience of public reason. He that should register my humours to the prejudice of the simplest law or opinion or custom of his village should greatly wrong himself and injure me as much. For in what I say, I gape for [74] no other certainty but that such was then my thought, a tumultuous and wavering thought.

  It is by way of discourse that I speak of
all, and of nothing by way of advise. Nec me pudet, ut istos, fateri nescire quod resciam. Nor am I ashamed, as they are, to confess I know not that which I do not know. [75] I would not be so hardy to speak if of duty I ought to be believed; and so I answered a great man who blamed the sharpness and contention of my exhortations: “When I see you bent and prepared on one side, with all the endeavour I can, I will propose the contrary unto you, to resolve and enlighten your judgement, not to subdue or bind the same. God hath your hearts in his hands, and He will furnish you with choice. I am not so malapert [76] as to desire that my opinions alone should give sway to a matter of such importance. My fortune hath not raised them to so powerful and deep conclusions.” Truly, I have not only a great number of complexions [77] but an infinite many of opinions from which, had I a son of mine own, I would dissuade him and willingly make him to distaste them. [78] What if the truest [opinions] are not ever the most commodious for [79] man, he being of so strange and untamed a composition?

  Whether it be to the purpose or from the purpose, it is no great matter. It is a common proverb in Italy that He knows not the perfect pleasure of Venus that hath not lain with a limping woman. Either fortune or some particular accident have long since brought this by-saying in the people’s mouth; and it is as well spoken of men as of women. For the queen of the Amazons answered the Scythian that wooed her to loves-embracements: The crooked man doth it best. [80] In that feminine commonwealth of theirs, to avoid the domination of men, they were wont in their infancy to maim them, both in their arms and legs and other limbs, that might any way advantage their strength over them and make only that use of them that we in our world make of women.

  I would have said that the loose or disjointed motion of a limping or crook-backed woman might add some new kind of pleasure unto that business or sweet sin and some unassayed [81] sensual sweetness to such as make trial of it. But I have lately learnt that even ancient philosophy hath decided the matter. Who sayeth that the legs and thighs of the crooked-backed or halting-lame, by reason of their imperfection, not receiving the nourishment due unto them, it followeth that the genital parts that are above them are more full better nourished and more vigorous. Or else that, such a defect having the exercise, such as are therewith possessed do less waste [their] strength and consume their virtue and so much the stronger and fuller they come to Venus’ sports. Which is also the reason why the Græcians described their women-weavers to be more hot and earnestly-luxurious [82] than other women: because of their sitting-trade, without any violent exercise of the body. What cannot we dispute of according to that rate? I might likewise say of these that the same stirring which their labour, so sitting, doth give them, doth rouse and solicit them, as the jogging and shaking of their coaches doth our ladies.

  Do not these examples fit that whereof I spake in the beginning? That our reasons do often anticipate the effect and have the extension of their jurisdiction so infinite that they judge and exercise themselves in inanity and to a not-being? [83] Besides the flexibility of our invention to frame reasons unto all manner of dreams, our imagination is likewise found easy to receive impressions from falsehood by very frivolous appearances. For by the only authority of the ancient and public use of this word or phrase, [84] I have heretofore persuaded myself to have received more pleasure of a woman in that she was not straight, and have accounted her crookedness in the number of her graces.

  Torquato Tasso, [85] in the comparison he makes between Italy and France, reporteth to have noted that we commonly have more slender and spiny legs than the Italian gentlemen, and imputeth the cause unto our continual riding and sitting on horseback; which is the very same from which Suetonius draweth another clean contrary conclusion. For he sayeth that Germanicus had by the frequent use of this exercise brought his to be very big. There is nothing so supple and wandering as our understanding. It is like to Theramenes’ shoe, fit for all feet. [86] It is double and diverse, and so are matters diverse and double. “Give me a drachma of silver,” said a Cynic philosopher unto Antigonus. “It is not the present of a king,” answered he. “Give me then a talent.” “It is not gift for a Cynic,” quoth he.

  Seu plures calor ille vias, et cæca relaxat

  Spiramenta, novas veniat qua succus in herbas:

  Seu durat magis, et venas astringit hiantes,

  Ne tenues pluviæ, rapidive potentia solis

  Acrior, aut Boreæ penetrabile frigus adurat.

  Whether the heat lays open holes unseen,

  Whereby the sap may pass to herbs fresh-green:

  Or rather hardens and binds gaping veins,

  Lest sharp power of hot sun, or thinning rains

  Or piercing North-cold blast,

  Should scorch, consume, and waste. [87]

  Ogni medaglia ha il suo riverscio. Each outside hath his inside, sayeth the Italian. [88] Lo, why Clitomachus was wont to say that Carneades had surmounted the labours of Hercules, because be had exacted consent from men [89]—that is to say, opinion and temerity to judge. This fantasia [90] of Carneades, so vigorous (as I imagine), proceeded anciently from the impudency of those who make profession to know and from their excessive self-overweening. [91]

  Aesop was set to sale [92] together with two other slaves. A chapman [93] inquired of the first what he could do: he, to endear himself, answered: mountains and wonders and what not, for he knew and could do all things. The second answered even so for himself and more too. But when he came to Aesop and demanded of him what he could do, “Nothing” (said he). “For these two have forestalled all, and know and can do all things, and have left nothing for me.”

  So hath it happened in the school of philosophy. The rashness of those who ascribed the capacity of all things to man’s wit, through spite and emulation, produced this opinion in others that human wit was not capable of anything. [94] Some hold the same extremity in ignorance that others hold in knowledge. To the end none may deny that man is not immoderate in all and everywhere, and hath no other sentence or arrest than that of necessity and impuissance [95] to proceed further. [96]

  Of Experience

  (selections)

  3.13

  THERE is no desire more natural than that of knowledge. We attempt all means that may bring us unto it. When reason fails us, we employ experience—

  Per varios usus artem experientia fecit,

  Exemplo monstrante viam.

  By diverse proofs experience art hath bred,

  Whilst one by one the way examples led. [1]

  —which is a mean by much more weak and vile. But truth is of so great consequence that we ought not disdain any induction that may bring us unto it. Reason hath so many shapes that we know not which to take hold of. Experience hath as many. The consequence we seek to draw from the conference of events is unsure because they are ever dissemblable. [2] No quality is so universal in this surface of things as variety and diversity.

  The Greeks, the Latins, and we use for the most express examples of similitude that of eggs. Some have nevertheless been found, especially one in Delphos, that knew marks of difference between eggs and never took one for another; and having diverse hens, could rightly judge which had laid the egg.

  Dissimilitude doth of itself insinuate into our works; no art can come near unto similitude. Neither Perozet [3] nor any other card-maker can so industriously smooth or whiten the backside of his cards but some cunning gamester will distinguish them, only by seeing some other player handle or shuffle them. Resemblance doth not so much make one as difference maketh another. Nature hath bound herself to make nothing that should not be dissemblable.

  Yet doth not the opinion of that man greatly please me that supposed by the multitude of laws to curb the authority of judges in cutting out their morsels. [4] He perceived not that there is as much liberty and extension in the interpretation of laws as in their fashion. [5] And those but mock themselves who think to diminish our debates and stay them by calling us to the express word of the sacred Bible. Because our spiri
t finds not the field less spacious to control and check the sense of others than to represent his own. And as if there were as little courage and sharpness to gloss [6] as to invent.

  We see how far he was deceived. For we have in France more laws than all the world besides—yea, more than were needful to govern all the worlds imagined by Epicurus: [7] Ut olim flagitiis, sic nunc legibus laboramus. As in times past we were sick of offenses, so now are we of laws. [8] And we have given our judges so large a scope to moot, to opinionate, to suppose, and decide that there was never so powerful and so licentious a liberty. What have our lawmakers gained with choosing a hundred thousand kinds of particular cases and add[ing] as many laws unto them? That number hath no proportion with the infinite diversity of human accidents. The multiplying of our inventions shall never come to the variation of examples. Add a hundred times as many unto them; yet shall it not follow that, of events to come, there be any one found that in all this infinite number of selected and enregistered events shall meet with one to which he may so exactly join and match it. But some circumstance and diversity will remain that may require a diverse consideration of judgement. There is but little relation between our actions that are in perpetual mutation and the fixed and unmoveable laws. The most to be desired are the rarest, the simplest, and most general. And yet I believe it were better to have none at all than so infinite a number as we have.