The Second World War

by Winston S. Churchill

  At Maleme the bulk of our anti-aircraft artillery was put out of action practically at once. Before the bombardment was over gliders began to land west of the airfield. Wherever our troops were noticed they were subjected to tremendous bombardment. Counter-attacks were impossible in daylight. Gliders or troop-carriers landed or crashed on the beaches and in the scrub or on the fireswept airfield. In all, around and between Maleme and Canea over 5,000 Germans reached the ground on the first day. They suffered very heavy losses from the fire and fierce hand-to-hand fighting of the New Zealanders. At the end of the day we were still in possession of the airfield, but that evening the few who were left of the battalion fell back on its supports.

  Retimo and Heraklion were both treated to a heavy air bombardment on that morning, followed by parachute drops in the afternoon. Heavy fighting followed, but at nightfall we remained in firm possession of both airfields. The result of this first day’s fighting was therefore fairly satisfactory, except at Maleme; but in every sector bands of well-armed men were now at large. The strength of the attacks far exceeded the expectations of the British command, and the fury of our resistance astonished the enemy.

  The onslaught continued on the second day, when troop-carrying aircraft again appeared. Although Maleme airfield remained under our close artillery and mortar fire, troop-carriers continued to land upon it and in the rough ground to the west. The German High Command seemed indifferent to losses, and at least a hundred planes were wrecked by crash-landing in this area. Nevertheless the build-up continued. A counter-attack made that night reached the edge of the airfield, but with daylight the German Air Force reappeared and the gains could not be held.

  On the third day Maleme became an effective operational airfield for the enemy. Troop-carriers continued to arrive at a rate of more than twenty an hour. Even more decisive was the fact that they could also return for reinforcements. Altogether it was estimated that in these and the ensuing days more than six hundred troop-carriers landed or crashed more or less successfully on the airfield. Under the increasing pressure the New Zealand Brigade gradually gave way until they were nearly ten miles from Maleme. At Canea and Suda there was no change, and at Retimo the situation was well in hand. At Heraklion the enemy were landing east of the airfield, and an effective hostile lodgment there began and grew.

  Next night our weary troops saw to the northward the whole skyline alive with flashes and knew the Royal Navy was at work. The first German seaborne convoy had started on its desperate mission. For two and a half hours the British ships hunted their prey, sinking not less than a dozen caiques and three steamers, all crowded with enemy troops. It was estimated that about four thousand men were drowned that night. Meanwhile Rear-Admiral King, with four cruisers and three destroyers, had spent the night of the 21st patrolling off Heraklion, and at daylight on the 22nd he began to sweep northwards. A single caique loaded with troops was destroyed and by ten o’clock the squadron was approaching the island of Melos. A few minutes later an enemy destroyer with five small craft was sighted to the northward, and was at once engaged. Another destroyer was then seen laying a smoke-screen, and behind the smoke were a large number of caiques. We had in fact intercepted another important convoy crammed with soldiers. Our air reconnaissance had reported this fact to Admiral Cunningham, but it took more than an hour for this news to be confirmed to Admiral King. His ships had been under incessant air attack since daylight, and although they had hitherto suffered no damage all were running short of anti-aircraft ammunition. The Rear-Admiral, not fully realising the prize which was almost within his grasp, felt that to go farther north would jeopardise his whole force, and ordered a withdrawal to the west. As soon as this signal was read by the Commander-in-Chief he sent the following order:

  Stick it out. Keep in visual signalling touch. Must not let Army down in Crete. It is essential no seaborne enemy force land in Crete.

  It was now too late to destroy the convoy, which had turned back and scattered in all directions among the numerous islands. Thus at least five thousand German soldiers escaped the fate of their comrades. The audacity of the German authorities in ordering these practically defenceless convoys of troops across waters of which they did not possess the naval command as well as that of the air is a sample of what might have happened on a gigantic scale in the North Sea and the English Channel in September 1940. It shows the German lack of comprehension of sea-power against invading forces, and also the price which may be exacted in human life as the penalty for this kind of ignorance.

  Inflexibly resolved, whatever the cost, to destroy all seaborne invaders, Admiral Cunningham threw everything into the scale. It is clear that throughout these operations he did not hesitate for this purpose to hazard not only his most precious ships but the whole naval command of the Eastern Mediterranean. His conduct on this issue was highly approved by the Admiralty. In this grim battle the German command was not alone in playing the highest stakes. The events of these forty-eight hours of sea-fighting convinced the enemy, and no further attempts at seaborne landings were made until the fate of Crete had been decided.

  But May 22 and 23 were costly days for the Navy. Two cruisers and three destroyers were sunk, one battleship, the Warspite, was put out of action for a long time, and the Valiant and many other vessels were considerably damaged. Nevertheless the sea-guard of Crete had been maintained. The Navy had not failed. Not a single German landed in Crete from the sea until the battle for the island was ended.

  May 26 was decisive. Our troops had been under ever-growing pressure for six days. Finally they could stand it no more. Late that night the decision to evacuate Crete was taken, and we had to face once again a bitter and dismal task and the certainty of heavy losses. The harassed, over-strained Fleet had to undertake the embarking of about twenty-two thousand men, mostly from the open beach at Sphakia, across three hundred and fifty miles of sea dominated by hostile air forces. It was necessary for the troops to hide near the edge until called forward for embarkation. At least fifteen thousand men lay concealed in the broken ground near Sphakia, and Freyberg’s rearguard was in constant action.

  15 + s.w.w.

  A tragedy awaited the simultaneous expedition by Admiral Raw-lings, which went to rescue the Heraklion garrison. Arriving before midnight, the destroyers ferried the troops to the cruisers waiting outside. By 3.20 a.m. the work was complete. Four thousand men had been embarked and the return voyage began. Fighter protection had been arranged, but partly through the change in times the aircraft did not find the ships. The dreaded bombing began at 6 a.m., and continued until 3 p.m., when the squadron was within a hundred miles of Alexandria. The destroyer Hereward was the first casualty. At 6.25 a.m. she was hit by a bomb and could no longer keep up with the convoy. The Admiral rightly decided that he must leave the stricken ship to her fate. She was last seen approaching the coast of Crete. The majority of those on board survived, though as prisoners of war. Worse was to follow. During the next four hours the cruisers Dido and Orion and the destroyer Decoy were all hit. The speed of the squadron fell to 21 knots, but all kept their southerly course in company. In the Orion conditions were appalling. Besides her own crew, she had 1,100 troops on board. On her crowded mess-decks about 260 men were killed and 280 wounded by a bomb which penetrated the bridge. Her commander, Captain G. R. B. Back, was also killed, the ship heavily damaged and set on fire. At noon two Fulmars of the Fleet Air Arm appeared, and thereafter afforded a measure of relief. The fighters of the Royal Air Force, despite all efforts, could not find the tortured squadron, though they fought several engagements and destroyed at least two aircraft. When the squadron reached Alexandria at 8 p.m. on the 29th it was found that one-fifth of the garrison rescued from Heraklion had been killed, wounded, or captured.

  After such experiences, General Wavell and his colleagues had to decide how far the effort to bring our troops off from Crete should be pursued. The Army was in mortal peril, the Air could do little, and again the task fell upon the
wearied and bomb-torn Navy. To Admiral Cunningham it was against all tradition to abandon the Army in such a crisis. He declared, “It takes the Navy three years to build a new ship. It will take three hundred years to build a new tradition. The evacuation [i.e., rescue] will continue.” By the morning of the 29th nearly 5,000 men had been brought off, but very large numbers were holding out and sheltering on all the approaches to Sphakia, and were bombed whenever they showed themselves by day. The decision to risk unlimited further naval losses was justified, not only in its impulse but by the results.

  On the evening of the 28th Admiral King had sailed for Sphakia. Next night about 6,000 men were embarked without interference, and, though attacked three times during the 30th, reached Alexandria safely. This good luck was due to the R.A.F. fighters, who, few though they were, broke up more than one attack before they struck home. On the morning of the 30th Captain Arliss once more sailed for Sphakia, with four destroyers. Two of these had to return, but he continued with the other pair and successfully embarked over fifteen hundred troops. Both ships were damaged by near-misses on the return voyage, but reached Alexandria safely. The King of Greece, after many perils, had been brought off with the British Minister a few days earlier. That night also General Freyberg was evacuated by air on instructions from the Commanders-in-Chief.

  On May 30 a final effort was ordered to bring out the remaining troops. It was thought that the numbers at Sphakia did not now exceed 3,000 men, but later information showed that there were more than double that number. Admiral King sailed again on the morning of the 31st. They could not hope to carry all, but Admiral Cunningham ordered the ships to be filled to the utmost. At the same time the Admiralty were told that this would be the last night of evacuation. The embarkation went well, and the ships sailed again at 3 a.m. on June 1, carrying nearly 4,000 troops safely to Alexandria.

  Upwards of 5,000 British and Imperial troops were left somewhere in Crete, and were authorised by General Wavell to capitulate. Many individuals however dispersed in the mountainous island, which is 160 miles long. They and the Greek soldiers were succoured by the villagers and countryfolk, who were mercilessly punished whenever detected. Barbarous reprisals were made upon innocent or valiant peasants, who were shot by twenties and thirties. It was for this reason that I proposed to the Supreme War Council three years later, in 1944, that local crimes should be locally judged, and the accused persons sent back for trial on the spot. This principle was accepted, and some of the outstanding debts were paid.

  Sixteen thousand five hundred men were brought safely back to Egypt. These were almost entirely British and Imperial troops. Nearly a thousand more were helped to escape later by various Commando enterprises. Our losses were about thirteen thousand killed, wounded, and taken prisoner. To these must be added nearly two thousand naval casualties. Since the war more than four thousand German graves have been counted near Maleme and Suda Bay, and another thousand at Retimo and Heraklion. Besides these were the very large but unknown numbers drowned at sea, and those who later died of wounds in Greece. In all, the enemy must have suffered casualties in killed and wounded of well over fifteen thousand. About 170 troop-carrying aircraft were lost or heavily damaged. But the price they paid for their victory cannot be measured by the slaughter.

  The Battle of Crete is an example of the decisive results that may emerge from hard and well-sustained fighting apart from manœuvring for strategic positions. We did not know how many parachute divisions the Germans had. But in fact the 7th Airborne Division was the only one which Goering possessed. This division was destroyed in the Battle of Crete. Upwards of five thousand of his bravest men were killed, and the whole structure of this organisation was irretrievably broken. It never appeared again in any effective form. The New Zealanders and other British, Imperial, and Greek troops who fought in the confused, disheartening, and vain struggle for Crete may feel that they played a definite part in an event which brought us far-reaching relief at a hingeing moment.

  The German losses of their highest class fighting men removed a formidable air and parachute weapon from all further part in immediate events in the Middle East. Goering gained only a Pyrrhic victory in Crete; for the forces he expended there might easily have given him Cyprus, Iraq, Syria, and even perhaps Persia. These troops were the very kind needed to overrun large wavering regions where no serious resistance would have been encountered. He was foolish to cast away such almost measureless opportunities and irreplaceable forces in a mortal struggle, often hand to hand, with the warriors of the British Empire.

  We now have in our possession the “battle report” of the 11th Air Corps, of which the 7th Airborne Division was a part. When we recall the severe criticism and self-criticism to which our arrangements were subjected, it is interesting to read the other side. “British land forces in Crete,” said the Germans, “were about three times the strength which had been assumed. The area of operations on the island had been prepared for defence with the greatest care and by every possible means.… All works were camouflaged with great skill.… The failure, owing to lack of information, to appreciate correctly the enemy situation endangered the attack of the 11th Air Corps and resulted in exceptionally high and bloody losses.”

  The naval position in the Mediterranean was, on paper at least, gravely affected by our losses in the battle and evacuation of Crete. The Battle of Matapan on March 28 had for the time being driven the Italian Fleet into its harbours. But now new, heavy losses had fallen upon our Fleet. On the morrow of Crete Admiral Cunningham had ready for service only two battleships, three cruisers, and seventeen destroyers. Nine other cruisers and destroyers were under repair in Egypt, but the battleships Warspite and Barham and his only aircraft-carrier, the Formidable, besides several other vessels, would have to leave Alexandria for repair elsewhere. Three cruisers and six destroyers had been lost. Reinforcements must be sent without delay to restore the balance. But, as will presently be recorded, still further misfortunes were in store. The period which we now had to face offered to the enemy their best chance of challenging our dubious control of the Mediterranean and the Middle East, with all that this involved. We could not tell they would not seize it.

  SYRIA AND IRAQ

  CHAPTER XXI

  GENERAL WAVELL’S FINAL EFFORT

  WHILE the struggle in Crete and the Western Desert was moving to a climax and the Bismarck was hunted and destroyed in the Atlantic Ocean, less sanguinary, though not graver, dangers had threatened us in Syria and Iraq. Our Treaty of 1930 with Iraq provided that in time of peace Britain should, among other things, maintain air bases near Basra and at Habbaniya, and have the right of transit for military forces and supplies at all times. It also provided that in war we should have all possible facilities, including the use of railways, rivers, ports, and airfields, for the passage of our armed forces. When war came Iraq broke off diplomatic relations with Germany, but did not declare war. When Italy came in Iraq did not even sever relations, and the Italian Legation in Baghdad became the chief centre for Axis propaganda and for fomenting anti-British feeling. In this they were aided by the Mufti of Jerusalem, who had fled from Palestine shortly before the outbreak of war and later received asylum in Baghdad. With the collapse of France British prestige sank very low, and the situation gave us much anxiety. But military action had been out of the question, and we had had to carry on as best we could.

  In March 1941 there was a turn for the worse. Rashid Ali, who was working with the Germans, became Prime Minister, and the pro-British Regent, Emir Abdul-Ilah, fled. It became essential to make sure of Basra, the main port of Iraq on the Persian Gulf, and a brigade group sent by General Auchinleck, the Commander-in-Chief in India, disembarked there without opposition on April 18. Rashid Ali, who had been counting on the assistance of German aircraft, and even of German airborne troops, was thereupon forced into action.

  His first move was against Habbaniya, our Air Force training base in the Iraqi desert. The cantonment held just o
ver 2,200 fighting men, and no fewer than 9,000 civilians, and its Flying School thus became a point of grave importance. Air Vice-Marshal Smart, who commanded, took bold and timely precautions. The School had previously held only obsolescent or training types, but a few Gladiator fighters had arrived from Egypt, and eighty-two aircraft of all sorts were improvised into four squadrons. A British battalion, flown from India, arrived on the 29th. The ground defence of the seven miles perimeter, with its solitary wire fence, was indeed scanty. On the 30th Iraqi troops from Baghdad appeared barely a mile away on the plateau overlooking both the airfield and the camp. They were soon reinforced until they numbered about 9,000 men, with fifty guns. The next two days were spent in fruitless parleys, and at dawn on May 2 fighting began.

  In Syria the threat was no less imminent and our resources no less strained. It was one of the many overseas territories of the French Empire which considered themselves bound by the surrender of the French Government, and the Vichy authorities had done their utmost to prevent anybody in the French Army of the Levant from crossing into Palestine to join us. In August 1940 an Italian Armistice Commission appeared, and German agents, who had been interned on the outbreak of war, were released and became active. By the end of the year many more Germans had arrived, and, with ample funds, proceeded to arouse anti-British and anti-Zionist feeling among the Arab peoples of the Levant. At the same moment as Rashid Ali seized power in Iraq, Syria forced itself on our attention. The Luftwaffe were already attacking the Suez Canal from bases in the Dodecanese, and they could obviously, if they chose, operate against Syria, especially with airborne troops. If the Germans once got control, then Egypt, the Canal Zone, and the oil refineries at Abadan would come under the direct threat of continuous air attack. Our land communications between Palestine and Iraq would be in danger. There might well be political repercussions in Egypt, and our repute in Turkey and throughout the Middle East would be smitten.