The Chief
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Ranck directed the Hearst representative in Rome to inform Sarfatti that they were not going to publish her and Mussolini’s year-end article or any other that referred to American war debts. Sarfatti offered instead to write one on the role of women in Fascist Italy, but Mussolini refused to cave in entirely to Hearst’s demands and ordered his ghostwriter to rewrite the year-end forecast article, which she did, this time eliminating any reference to war debts.9
Although highly appreciative of the exposure to American audiences and the money he was getting from Hearst (with which he bought his country house in the Romagna), Mussolini was no longer willing to abide by the rules the Chief had established. According to Cannistraro and Sullivan, Mussolini and Sarfatti knew in advance how Ranck and Hearst were going to react to their articles, as they intercepted all the cables sent back and forth from Hearst’s office in Rome. Still they persisted in pushing their own agenda in their articles, instead of adhering to the Chief’s.
In February of 1933, they suggested again that it would be wise for the United States to forgive European war debts. This time Hearst had had enough. “I would just as soon not have Mussolini article or any of these articles by foreign statesmen, if they are going to be employed for foreign propaganda against the interest of our country,” he cabled Ranck. Mussolini, realizing belatedly that he had gone too far this time, agreed to rewrite the column.10
As the time approached for negotiating a new contract with Il Duce, Ranck questioned whether he was still worth the money and the trouble: “Am experiencing greatest difficulty with Mussolini not only in getting his material on time but in choice of subjects.” Mussolini was now insisting that while Hearst had the “right to suggest topics, final choice rests solely with him. Agreement by us to Mussolini’s point of view,” Ranck continued, “would enable him to make us take any old pot-boiling topic that he pleases at any time at twelve hundred dollars per article. Not only has Mussolini been endeavoring to work off some very uninteresting subjects but in spite of all our admonitions has been providing some of them so late as to miss our [deadlines]. I can readily understand that some diplomatic topics are too delicate for Mussolini to discuss but that should not prevent him from getting together with us on subjects that he can cover and which are of interest to America.”11
The Chief agreed: “Have noted that Mussolini has been less interesting of late ... There is no reason why we should take and pay for dull stuff.... I think Mussolini will understand that if his political complications prevent his writing the articles that are interesting in the United States there is no reason why we should suffer because of that foreign situation.”12
Though the Chief did not countenance insubordination from any of his writers, even those who were heads of state, as long as Il Duce produced articles, as he did in 1933, attacking France’s foreign policy and defending Hitler, the Chief accepted occasional duds for publication, like “Mussolini Works on Farm, Visits Factories to Learn Needs of Italian Masses,” which appeared on November 19, 1933.
When in 1936, Hearst learned that Sarfatti and Mussolini, who had declined to renew their contract, were negotiating with the Herald Tribune and the United Press, he offered them a raise to $1,750 an article for twelve articles. With the invasion of Ethiopia in the fall of 1935 and his intervention in the Spanish Civil War the following year, Mussolini had put himself back in the headlines. Though Hearst was prepared now to allow Mussolini to publish articles in other foreign journals—a right denied him in earlier contracts—he still insisted on preapproval of all topics. “Do not miss Mussolini,” Hearst cabled Ranck in New York. “He is particularly important now and will be for the next couple of years. However I would rather pay him two thousand a week with the understanding that he write on topics of interest to America than half that amount on any other basis.”13
In the realm of journalism, Hearst was the II Duce; Mussolini, Hitler, Lloyd George, Churchill, and all the others were merely writers under contract. There was an enormous danger here, which Hearst quickly succumbed to. He could not resist the temptation to imply that his power as publisher denoted something more substantial, that in approving the topics and editing the words of his statesmen, he was influencing their thoughts as well.
Mussolini was not the only national leader who wrote for Hearst in the 1930s. General José Félix Uriburu, president of the Argentine Republic, and Emilio Portes Gil, president of Mexico from December 1928 to February 1930, were also among his foreign correspondents. When, on September 14, 1930, the National Socialist German Workers’ Party unexpectedly won 6.5 million votes—it had polled only 800,000 two years earlier—to become the second largest party in Germany, the Chief offered and Adolf Hitler, the party’s leader, accepted a contract to write for the Hearst papers. The fee was one thousand marks an article, equivalent then to about $240, far less than Mussolini was getting, but enough, according to Putzi Hanfstaengl, Hitler’s foreign press chief, to enable Hitler to stay at the plush Kaiserhof Hotel when he went to Berlin.14
Two weeks later, on September 28, 1930, the first article by Hitler appeared. All that week, the Hearst papers had advertised on their front pages their upcoming exclusive: “Adolf Hitler’s Own Story; He Tells What Is the Matter with Germany and How He Proposes to Remedy It.” The article appeared in the Sunday March of Events section alongside a photograph of Hitler staring straight at the reader, arms akimbo, in full-length leather jacket: “Let not the world deceive itself, Germany will either become a free nation again or, losing faith in any other future, will be driven into the beckoning arms of Bolshevism. That is no mere phrase, no threat, no prophecy, but just a statement of fact, of the sentiment of the German masses of today. I know that sentiment as no other statesman or politician in Berlin.”
The following Sunday, October 5, a second Hitler article was featured in the March of Events section. Hitler’s pronouncements, though angrier and much more bombastic, echoed Hearst’s own editorials about the injustices Wilson and the Allies had foisted on Germany with their Treaty of Versailles:
The Germany I lead—the new and coming Germany, the young Germany— is certainly not guilty of war, had nothing to do with making it, and upon Germany no amount of legislative acrobatics can morally place the slightest responsibility. This being the fact, this new and young Germany which I lead does not propose to be convict labor for its entire own generation.... France can stand on her head, can invade Germany, and can create a still greater depression in the economic world by eliminating Germany. All that and more can happen and we shall suffer, but it will not break the determination of the young Germany I lead that there shall be a more reasonable and sensible adjustment of the unfulfillable burdens dictatorially imposed on Germany.
Though Hitler was for a time a favorite commentator of Hearst’s because he produced headlines and delivered sharp, incisive copy, he fell out of favor because he was terrible at meeting deadlines. In December of 1931, Hitler promised Ranck that he would give the Hearst papers an exclusive on the next open letter he planned to send Chancellor Brüning. When he delayed delivery for three consecutive days, Ranck was furious, Hearst annoyed. “Hitler article losing value because so much Hitler material published in past few days,” the Chief telegrammed Ranck in New York. “If he doesn’t come through now, please cancel.”15
Hitler was never quite broken in by Hearst and his editors. He continued to miss deadlines and withhold his promised exclusives. On December 30, 1931, Ranck telegrammed Hearst that Hitler, “after agreeing sell New Year’s message to us for $500 and to withhold general publication until nine o’clock Munich time changed mind late tonight and gave out to all papers in Berlin for immediate publication without charge.... Have asked for explanation.”16
Apparently the explanation, when it came, was enough to convince Ranck and Hearst to give Hitler another chance. “Hitler writing article blasting ratification any disarmament agreement in Geneva if unfavorable to Germany. Wants $1,000,” Ranck telegrammed Hearst in San Sim
eon in late January of 1932. “As he’s been writing profusely, some of it not vital, have offered $500 ... provided he can make it stand up for ... publication. Don’t think it’s worth more than that, do you?” Hearst cabled back that he thought that “Hitler writes interestingly and that article on disarmament question would be interesting in America. If you cannot get it for $500 better increase the bid.” Ranck contracted for the article—we don’t know at what price—only to be put off by Hitler, who continued to postpone writing it. “This,” Ranck telegraphed Hearst, “in spite of our persistent efforts to get it. Will keep right after him.”17
Hearst’s access to Hitler, together with his public record of support of Jewish causes, prompted Hollywood’s Jewish community to seek him out as a potential champion. In mid-January 1932, while Hearst and Ranck were negotiating to publish Hitler’s articles, Carl Laemmle, the president of Universal Pictures, wrote Hearst at length “on a subject which I firmly believe is not only of great concern to my own race but also to millions of Gentiles, throughout the world”:
It is about the current political situation in Germany and the probable consequences to the Jewish population in that country in the event Hitler is successful, as seems likely, in getting control of the Government. I realize perfectly, Mr. Hearst, that the political situation in Germany is something that no other country, or foreigner, can consistently attack or even criticize. At the same time, I am convinced that the personal safety of the many thousands of Jews in Germany is of definite concern today to all reasonable, thinking people the world over; and it is strictly on that premise that I am presuming on your time and patience in submitting my own thoughts.... Speaking as an individual, I have been greatly worried for some time about the members of my own family in Germany....I might be wrong, and I pray to God that I am, but I am almost certain that Hitler’s rise to power, because of his obvious militant attitude toward the Jews, would be the signal for a general physical onslaught on many thousands of defenseless Jewish men, women and children in Germany....As a man so sincerely and consistently the champion of human rights, there is none whose voice would carry more effectively to the consciences of all races alike than your own. As the foremost publisher in the United States, the moulder of the opinions of millions of thinking American people and the spokesman thereof, there is none in America whose influence and opinions would command more respect and consideration from Mr. Hitler than your own....A protest from you would bring an echo from all corners of the civilized world, such as Mr. Hitler could not possibly fail to recognize.18
There is no record of any response by Hearst to Laemmle’s letter. Hearst, we can only conclude, did not take the studio head’s warnings very seriously. Though Hitler had made no secret of his obsessive anti-Semitism—it was a major theme in Mein Kampf and in his public speeches—his rhetoric had, according to his biographer Ian Kershaw, shifted somewhat in the late 1920s. His “anti-Semitism seemed now rather more ritualist or mechanistic. The main stress had moved to anti-Marxism.” Still, as Kershaw'reminds us, it was only the presentation of his ideas that had been modified. Hitler’s pathological hatred of Jews remained unchanged.19
Six months after Laemmle’s letter to Hearst, his predictions came true. In national elections held in late July of 1932, the Nazis increased their share of the vote to 37.4 percent, making them the largest party in the Reichstag. On August 30, Hermann Goering was elected Reichstag president. Ranck telegrammed the Chief for permission to pay Goering for a front-page article to be published on September 11, 1932, the day before he was scheduled to present the Nazi program to the Reichstag: “In line with our policy of getting strong articles from foreign contributors for first page news section Sunday papers would suggest Goering article for that position.” Hearst agreed, sending Ranck into near ecstasy at their journalistic triumph. “In his article Goering tells precisely what the Hitlerites propose to do which includes forcing situation in Reichstag,” Ranck telegrammed the Chief at San Simeon. “Last Monday he openly announced that no action would be taken by the Hitlerites until September 12. As this is the coming Monday, our article will be the first announcement of the Hitlerite plans. Mussolini [who also had an article in that Sunday’s paper] comes out boldly with statement Germany is entitled to arms equality, the contrary attitude of France notwithstanding. So far as I can ascertain this is first announcement of this policy by Italy. Hearst papers thus become the official spokesman for the Hitlerites and for Italy on these two important situations.”20
Because Hitler refused to abide by his agreements and deliver exclusive and timely copy, Ranck and Hearst recognized that they would not be able to count on him for regular contributions. Still, Hearst was able to maintain direct access to Hitler through Putzi Hanfstaengl, his foreign press chief, a well-connected, cultured six-foot-four-inch graduate of Harvard who counted himself a personal friend of the Chief. Hearst had known Hanfstaengl’s mother, an American, and his father, an internationally known Munich art dealer, with whom Hearst had done business. Hanfstaengl had been close to Hitler since the early 1920s. Hitler had often visited Hanfstaengl’s home to have dinner with him and his family and listen to Putzi play Wagner on the piano. Though Hanfstaengl was no longer part of Hitler’s inner circle, he retained sufficient access to serve as Hearst’s liaison.21
In seeking Hearst’s support in 1932, Roosevelt had on several occasions declared publicly and privately that he was not an internationalist. The Chief had, in the end, taken him at his word. The first test of their understanding occurred with the opening of the International Monetary and Economic Conference convened in London in June 1933.
To Hearst’s dismay, Roosevelt, who had inherited the conference from Hoover, not only agreed to participate, but placed at the head of the American delegation his secretary of state, Cordell Hull, a Wilsonian internationalist. Hearst was unalterably opposed to the United States entering into any sort of negotiations with the Europeans, at least until they had paid back their war debts. Like Roosevelt, he believed that the quickest way to revive the economy was to pump more money into it by inflating the dollar relative to the European currencies. When the European nations at the London Conference tried to get the United States to agree to a monetary stabilization plan that would have prevented it from unilaterally raising the price of the dollar, Hearst cabled T. V. Ranck, his editorial director in New York, that it was “desirable to dynamite this foreign situation. Please have cartoons made showing ... Hull [and the other members of the American delegation] hauling down American flag and running up British flag and singing quote Great Britain is the Gem of the ocean unquote. Make other cartoons along same lines such as English pound eclipsing the American dollar. We have got to arouse American public to danger this country is in by surrendering so many advantages to foreign nations, especially England. We can probably do it best by powerful cartoons and brief editorials under them.”22
Two days later, the Chief’s anger at Roosevelt had reached the boiling point. “As a general instruction to writers of editorials,” he wrote T. V. Ranck in New York, “would it not be well to begin to hold President Roosevelt responsible for some of the discredit and perhaps danger which the American representatives abroad are bringing upon this country. Mr. Hull, for instance is a most embarrassing Secretary of State—a vapid visionary, apparently willing to sacrifice the interests of the American people for his fantastic theories.”23
President Roosevelt, acting almost as if he had read Hearst’s telegrams, torpedoed the London Conference the next day by sending what the newspaper reports referred to as a “bombshell” message to London, denouncing the “old fetishes of so called international bankers.” The Chief hailed the president’s message, which effectively broke up the London Conference before any substantive agreement had been reached, as nothing less than “a modern declaration of independence.”24
The first breach in the Hearst-Roosevelt entente occurred not because the president was an “internationalist,” as Hearst had always fear
ed, but because he was not the “conservative” the publisher had believed him to be. The centerpiece of the Roosevelt New Deal was the National Industrial Recovery Act (NIRA) which established the Public Works Administration (PWA) and the National Recovery Administration (NRA). Roosevelt allocated $3.3 billion to the PWA to get Americans back to work. While the sum was less than the $5 billion Hearst had called for in his 1931 recovery proposal, the Chief supported the initiative because he considered it a conservative recovery measure intended to pump money back into the economy. The NRA was another matter entirely. Not content with simple recovery measures, the president, Hearst feared, had been persuaded by his radical advisers to try and reform the economy through the NRA by reducing what they saw as the destructive competition and rampant overproduction that had been responsible for plunging the economy into the Depression in the first place.
The NRA was a new governmental agency established to persuade industrialists and businessmen to soften competition and limit production by signing industry-wide agreements or codes that would raise wages and reduce work hours. All his life, Hearst had advocated government regulation of trusts, monopolies, transit and traction companies, railways, and public utilities. But he had never imagined that such regulation would ever be extended to every industry in the nation, especially to newspaper publishing, which he believed was explicitly protected from government interference by the First Amendment. He was not only astounded then, but outraged when news leaked out of Washington that the NRA expected the newspaper publishers to draw up their own industry-wide code, with regulations on minimum wages and maximum hours.
“Please tell the President,” he directed Ed Coblentz in New York, “that I consider his proposal to license the press under the NRA in direct violation of the Bill of Rights, that it is an abridgment of the freedom of the press guaranteed by the Constitution, and that I will fight his proposal with every means at my command, even if it means taking it to the Supreme Court of the United States, and even if it costs me every nickel I possess.”25