by J E Kauffman
(Second photograph from the top – control level of 155mm gun turret – by Frank Philippart; other photographs by the author)
Map of Fortress Toul and detail of the unusual Fort Villey le Sec.
Only a few forts were equipped with their own power generating system before the war because it was a new technology and required the building of a powerhouse (usine) on the premises that could house the dynamos, fuel storage, workroom, etc. At Fortress Verdun, the construction of a usine began at Fort Douaumont in 1914 whereas it had already been installed at the new fort of Vacherauville. It appears that higher priority was given to Toul and Épinal where five forts and ouvrages in each ring were provided with electric power between 1910 and 1914. Power generators were installed at the main forts of the Charmes Gap (Frouard, Pont Saint-Vincent and Manonviller) between 1910 and 1913 and in four positions at Belfort, which was more than at Verdun. The majority of French forts continued to rely upon candles and oil lamps for lighting. Some forts lacked an adequate water supply because it had not been possible to sink wells in them, so their water reservoirs had to be refilled by truck or pipeline.36 Many forts included a filtering system for collecting rainwater. Unlike Brialmont’s Belgian forts, the French forts were provided with latrines and kitchen facilities in secure and accessible positions. A heating system that used largely wood or coal for fuel served the kitchen ovens and warmed the barracks and other sections of the forts. The majority of the modern or modernized forts had sufficient storage and resources to resist for weeks if they were isolated.37 By 1914, all the forts and ouvrages of Verdun were equipped with a telegraph post connected to the citadel of Verdun or to some of the nearby fortifications. In addition, many forts had optical signalling equipment. Once a fort was isolated, carrier pigeons sometimes proved to be the most effective form of communication. Most of the forts on the Meuse Heights had similar equipment. At Toul, the telegraph system connected to Fort St Michel, which served as the command post. They also linked with some adjacent fortifications. At Épinal and Belfort, the communications situation was similar. Only a few forts, located mostly in the Charmes Gap, had an underground telephone link.
A comparison of the four fortresses of the main line shows Verdun to be the strongest.
Table 4: French Fortresses of the Main Line
If the number of 155mm gun turrets and Casemate de Bourges is a measure of strength, Verdun had the advantage, but Toul was better armed with 75mm gun turrets. Thus, it can be concluded that the Verdun–Toul fortified zone was the strongest when compared to that of Épinal–Belfort. Each of these four fortresses could hold a garrison of 50,000–70,000 men, including contingents for forts and intervals. There were also numerous support facilities like casernes, warehouses for supplies and ammunition depots – usually a large magazine for each sector and smaller intermediate ones. Much of the artillery was located in an artillery park where it could be safely stored and maintained in peacetime.38 In addition to the interval ouvrages, there were many abris for individual infantry and battery positions. The infantry combat abri varied in scale from half-company size to full-company size. Some of these fortresses included a military airfield and/or facilities for observation balloons and dirigibles. In addition to the regular national railroads that linked each fortress to the main line of supply, the army built 60cm-gauge military railroads in the fortress area that linked up with many of the fortifications.
A rough estimate of the number of artillery pieces of 75mm, 90mm, 95mm, 120mm and 155mm guns at the Verdun fortress emplaced outside the forts and ouvrages in 1914 is about 36 batteries of 90mm or 95mm (mostly 90mm), 25 batteries of 120mm and 15 batteries of 155mm guns. These batteries usually consisted of four, sometimes two guns. In the forts, there were five 120mm guns (about enough for one or two batteries) and forty 75mm guns from the Casemate de Bourges (and four 95mm guns). Thus, when Joffre stripped the fortress of its artillery, the forts of Verdun furnished enough weapons to form about twelve batteries of 75mm guns. Since the turret-mounted 75mm and 155mm guns did not have field mounts, removing the barrels to make up seven additional batteries of 155mm gun barrels and twenty-eight of 75s was not worth the effort. In addition, many of the weapons, especially the 90mm, 95mm and 120mm guns, were outdated. The army removed similar weapons from the fortresses of Toul, Épinal and Belfort.
Tactics of Trench Warfare
Trench warfare rendered traditional battlefield tactics obsolete in 1914. Since the time of Vauban, trenches were an important part of siege operations, but their use in the field was limited until 1864 in the American Civil War. Their use continued until 1914 when trenches formed long continuous lines across the front. Before the twentieth century, as armies took to the field, infantry and cavalry went into battle in company and battalion-size formations, which they maintained until they closed with the enemy and bayonets and swords came into play. Generally, the formations were similar to those on a parade ground with soldiers marching almost shoulder to shoulder, especially during an attack.39 The British, who usually had smaller armies than their opponents in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, placed more emphasis on marksmanship, while the Germans stressed manoeuvre. In 1914, the main tactical unit was the battalion. The French, for example, deployed the companies of a battalion in columns or lines (sometimes referred to as a skirmish formation) for the attack, often with flags flying and bands playing in the rear. In some of the early French attacks against ‘dug-in’ German troops, the French Poilus, formed into almost parade-ground formation, advanced at a steady pace upon the enemy, bayonets fixed, to the tune of the national anthem or a military tune played by a military band.40 Some of the officers, a sword or a pistol in hand, and a flag bearer marched along with them. French artillery, mostly 75mm guns, tried to hit the enemy positions with rapid fire before the troops advanced into the line of fire. These direct fire weapons did little damage to the entrenched enemy.
In October 1914, as the Poilus charged the German lines, they ran into few obstacles but came under a hail of German artillery fire. Shrapnel and high explosive rained down upon them tearing gaps in their formations, but adrenaline pumping, they raced towards the enemy lines as the thunder of the artillery drowned out their regimental music. Before the Poilus reached the German positions, the rat-tat-tat of the Maxim 08 machine guns joined the cacophony of sounds, with their enfilading fire mowing down the French formation more effectively than the other artillery combined. The few Poilus that survived swooped on their enemies in the trench and a savage hand-to-hand combat for the position ensued. If they succeeded in clearing the position, they would still have to face the enemy on both of their flanks and possibly more enfilading fire, but the traverses of the trenches might protect them. Additional troops would quickly reinforce them, but bringing up machine guns would require more time, especially over the cratered battleground. Friendly artillery support for a further advance was impossible unless the guns moved forward. However, before that could happen, the Germans would launch a counter-attack from a second trench a couple hundred metres to the rear. Their artillery was already within range of the lost forward trench. What’s more, there were additional machine-gun positions between the first and the second lines.41 The German rifleman’s Mauser had a five-round magazine that he easily replaced, whereas this was not the case for the French Lebel’s with a built-in eight-round magazine. Once his magazine was empty, the French rifleman had to fumble around loading the next eight rounds individually into his rifle while the enemy closed on him. The chances were good that the Poilu would be overrun. In 1915, all the belligerents followed similar procedures during their assaults in the West.
Once machine guns were produced in significant numbers, they changed the complexion of the battlefield where men in tightly packed formations were easily decimated.42 When barbed wire appeared in front of the trenches late in 1914, the situation deteriorated further.43 For an assault to succeed the enemy’s machine guns had to be silenced and the wire entanglements had to be b
reached. To achieve this objective, each side had to deploy its infantry in loose attack formations and take advantage of the terrain. Colonel Pétain, who commanded a brigade in late August 1914, was ordered to take part in a counter-attack. While other brigades preceded his in mass and were shattered, his troops spread out into a looser formation. Thus, Pétain and several other generals launched the revolution in French assault tactics that would continue during 1915. The British still used the old method on the first day of the Somme in 1916, losing 90 per cent of their massive casualties to German machine guns.
Trench warfare bears a similarity to siege warfare, but with a significant difference. In a siege, a fortification such as a castle, fortress or city is surrounded. Either the besieged are starved into surrender or their defences are breached, ending the siege. Occasionally, the besieger is forced to lift the siege. In trench warfare when the trenches ran from one end of the front to the other, encirclement was impossible, unless the trench lines were part of a fortress ring. On the Western Front, the trench lines were anchored at one end by the English Channel and at the other by the Swiss border and encirclement was definitely unfeasible. However, both sides had plans to outflank the trench line by invading Switzerland if necessary. The British toyed with the idea of invading Germany from the North Sea coast. The Germans, on the other hand, had constructed some heavy artillery such as the 420mm Big Berthas and a limited number of trench mortars to smash the Belgian and French fortresses, not because they had envisaged a trench war. Since it was impossible to outflank trench lines on the tactical level without breaching them first, the attacks had to be frontal. On a strategic level, it was possible to attack the flanks of a salient in order to envelop the enemy forces there, but the tactical assaults at these points still had to be frontal. Thus, like in the siege of a fortification, the assailants had to find a weak point, such as a location manned with second-rate troops, a site too far from rapid support from reserves or have some other shortcoming. Combat patrols or raiding parties often went out at night to identify these weak points, to probe the enemy position or to bring back prisoners for interrogation. Air photography also helped to determine the location and condition of enemy positions and the depth of the defences.
Balloons: Hanging Around
When the war began, manned balloons were not a novelty. Balloons had been around for over a century and had served as observation posts during the American Civil War. The French employed them at the siege of Paris during the Franco-Prussian War as a means of escape and communication. The French and the British, as well as the Germans, had balloons, but they had not used them much before 1914. When these tethered balloons were aloft, they were visible for miles around. For this reason in the French army all but one balloon company were disbanded and their personnel became infantry replacements. The Germans proceeded in a similar way, but changed their minds after the Battle of the Marne.44 French spherical balloons were almost useless on windy days. On the other hand, the German balloons – built by Parseval-Sigsfeldand and called ‘Drachen’ (Dragon) – were sausage-shaped, had a single fin and handled like kites.45 After they saw the Germans using an increasing number of these balloons for observation, the French considered doing the same.46
Eventually, Lieutenant Albert Caquot, considered one of the best military engineers in half a century in France, was put in charge of a balloon company equipped with Drachen type balloons. Since high winds made them ineffective, Caquot came up with his own design known as the Caquot dirigible. It could maintain its position in 60km/h winds thanks to its three fins. The Germans captured one and copied the design because it could attain greater heights and was more stable in windy conditions than the Drachens.
By 1915, both sides used these kite-like balloons for artillery observation. An observer dropped a weighted message with data for the artillery or used a telephone line connecting the balloon to the ground, which was obviously more effective. The weighted message could include a map on which the enemy positions were marked. Later, the army produced maps with coordinates so the observers could call in the information. The problem with the dropped messages was it could take the ground crew an average of 20 minutes to find them. After 1914, both German and French balloonists faced the ever-present danger of enemy aircraft. Keeping the balloons at a good distance behind the lines prevented enemy guns from targeting them. Some pilots became expert at balloon busting once machine guns were mounted on their aircraft. The pilots had to be at a safe distance before the hydrogen in the balloon exploded. The crew in the basket below still had time to use their parachutes.47
In an article published in the American Field Artillery Journal, Lieutenant Crivelli of the French Air Service explained that the consequence of improved heavy artillery was that ‘Our own trenches were fired upon as often as those of the Germans, and everyone tried to put the blame on everyone else.’* Between 17 and 22 August 1915 – observed Crivelli – the weather had been excellent and some operations had been taking place at Verdun. Each squadron carried eight to fifteen observers. The balloon units deployed eight balloons for the divisional artillery, twelve for heavy artillery and two for the naval guns. Each balloon carried two to four observers. Whereas the aeroplane squadrons identified German batteries 521 times and performed ranging missions 690 times for the French artillery batteries, the balloons identified German batteries 1,064 times and adjusted the range for the artillery 1,078 times. Thus the balloons, which required fewer men and less equipment, outperformed the aircraft. However, this stellar performance was only possible when the weather was good and when the French had air superiority over the area. In poor weather, only the aircraft could perform missions for the artillery.48 The presence of balloons often deterred artillery batteries from firing in 1916 and later.
In the summer of 1916 during the Battle of the Somme, the French targeted the German balloons. During the initial assault, they shot down nineteen, forcing the Germans to move them far behind the front. As a balloon observer during the Battle of the Somme, Crivelli himself was brought down 5 times on 5 successive days and his balloon was pierced with up to 300 bullet holes. In 1917, when incendiary bullets appeared, the balloons exploded and only a parachute escape was possible.
* Lieutenant Crivelli, ‘Observation Balloons’, Field Artillery Journal (January–March 1918), Vol. VIII, 342–8.
After the soldiers dug the first trenches, they excavated a second line behind it and linked the two with narrow communication trenches. In many cases, they made a third trench. In the area between the front line and the rear trenches, they built other facilities such as first-aid stations, headquarters, shelters, etc. Troops in the second line could launch a counter-attack to drive the enemy from the first line if it fell. If the first line fell, an attack on the second line was still problematic because it took time to move forward the weapons supporting the assault. If no-man’s-land was churned up with craters, movement was even more difficult.
In 1914, most attacks were launched with limited artillery support. As a result, the assaulting infantry was unable to take the enemy trenches or it was pushed out of them almost as soon as it captured them. In 1915, both sides realized that artillery had to plough the way for the infantry to advance and take enemy trenches. The Germans opted for the short hurricane bombardment, whereas the British and the French preferred prolonged barrages that could last several days. The belligerents further refined their assault techniques by developing the creeping barrage, which moved forward on a schedule and which was closely followed by the infantry. The German routine consisted of short bombardment, a short pause, followed by another round of firing, and repeating the procedure several times. During the storm of artillery shells, the defenders ducked into their shelters or crouched in their trenches. When the firing stopped, they returned to their posts, waiting for the infantry assault that was sure to follow. However, if nothing happened after two or three bombardments, they were prone to let down their guard and were slow to return to their posts think
ing it was another false alarm. During one of those interludes, the infantry went on the attack.
During the offensives of 1915, Joffre and his subordinates first had to select their objectives. Next, they had to determine whether to assault on a narrow or broad front. Attacks on narrow fronts often allowed the penetration of the enemy’s trench line, but yielded little gain and usually ended up in failure. Selecting a broad front and multiple sectors offered better prospects because it made it more difficult for the Germans to position their reserves and know when and where to send them until the battle had already developed. The broad front also allowed the possibility of neutralizing the enemy on the flanks of the main assault force. In 1915, the problem for the French and the British, though, was the lack of heavy artillery for breaking up wire obstacles and trenches.
During 1915 and later, the trench lines became more complex, especially on the German side. The French, on the other hand, wanted to avoid creating a feeling of permanency, which would hurt morale because it was their duty to drive the enemy from their homeland. A few kilometres behind the first defensive belt, which consisted of two or three lines of trenches, troops excavated a second and sometimes a third one, especially in vulnerable areas.49 The Germans began building concrete shelters in their trench lines that could withstand most French artillery. They added strongpoints, sometimes made of concrete and even redoubts. These strongpoints often provided enfilading fire in front of the trench line. In late 1914, when barbed wire was provided in sufficient quantities, the soldiers strung out multiple strands in front of the first trench in no-man’s-land. To alert the defenders of approaching enemy patrols, they added cans and other noise-making materials. On patrols and raids, both sides favoured hand grenades and rifle grenade launchers. Early in the war, the patrols included grenadiers protected by the other men in the group.50 Assaults generally took place in daylight and were much more dangerous than patrol or raiding party duties were because machine-gun fire took a heavy toll and the attackers had no other shelter than shell craters. Wire entanglements slowed their advance if they were not breached. While the defenders were often able to keep their superiors apprised of the situation by telephone, the attackers had to depend on runners who had to scurry across no-man’s-land to keep their own leaders informed.
