by J E Kauffman
Both sides looked for alternative methods to breach enemy defences. They developed the flamethrower to reduce strongpoints and terrorize the enemy. The belligerents considered poison gas as an effective way to clear the enemy trenches, but it turned out to be a disappointment, even with the development of phosgene and mustard gas. Most of these methods and techniques were mere improvements on medieval and ancient methods. Even a crude form of gas warfare dates back to ancient times; the Byzantine army developed a flamethrower using Greek Fire, which used susbstances that gave results similar to those achieved with modern napalm and could not be extinguished by water. An additional method used throughout history against fortifications was revived in trench warfare: mining. Instead of digging tunnels beneath castle walls, now the soldiers excavated them under no-man’s-land to reach the enemy trench line. They filled the end of the tunnel with explosives and detonated right before a frontal assault. This procedure created a large crater and often left the surviving troops shell-shocked. Frequently the defenders detected the mining operations, but they could not necessarily abandon the targeted trench. Sometimes, the defenders dug a counter-mine and either broke into the enemy tunnel and fought with the attackers underground or they set off their own charges to destroy the enemy tunnel before it was completed.51 Mining operations often resulted in some local successes but no massive breakthrough.
Thus, from 1914–17, trench warfare remained unproductive and both sides suffered heavy casualties as each tried to wear the other down to the point it could no longer hold the line as its reserves dried up. In 1915, the French and the British launched several offensives, but the Germans always managed to repel them as Falkenhayn juggled his troops between war fronts. In 1916, General Falkenhayn tried to take the initiative in the West in the hope of wearing down the Allies.
During the war, the Germans adopted a new tactical method to break up the stalemate on the Western Front – infiltration. Shock troops infiltrated enemy lines without tackling strongpoints, which were to be eliminated by the following waves of infantry. One problem, however, was that the follow-up troops often had to negotiate heavily cratered battlefields laden with their heavy weapons. The French and British had proposed similar methods on a smaller scale earlier in the war.52
The New Factor – Air War
The French military acquired aircraft in 1909 whereas General Helmuth von Moltke merely suggested that the aeroplane might have a military role. In 1910, Igo Etrich of Austria-Hungary designed a monoplane called the Taube (Dove), which became the first military aircraft for both Austria-Hungary and Germany before 1914 and was in use during the first months of the war. Italy had used it during the Italo-Turkish War in 1911. General Ferdinand Foch was not impressed with these small, fragile machines and commented that they were interesting toys and fine for sport, but offered no military value.
Count Ferdinand von Zeppelin built his first airship in July 1900 and by the end of the decade, the German military purchased several ‘Zeppelins’. These dirigibles offered the potential for aerial reconnaissance and for bombardment of targets deep behind enemy lines. Tethered balloons had served in previous wars and offered a set of eyes above the battlefield for the artillery and the army commanders since they could communicate with the ground by various methods, but not radio until after 1914.
The French went to war with 162 aeroplanes and 6 dirigibles while the British had over 80 aeroplanes and 4 dirigibles and the Russians 190 aeroplanes. The German inventory included 232 aeroplanes – many Taube monoplanes – and 12 dirigibles (including 9 Zeppelins). Austria-Hungary had only about 70 aeroplanes and 3 dirigibles. Most aircraft operated from the headquarters of an army or army corps and there was no real strategic or tactical doctrine. When the war began aircraft had no armament, although they might carry a few small bombs or even fleches that the pilot or observer dropped over the side.
In the summer of 1914, the Germans built several aerodromes near the frontier such as at Metz. The French had ‘aerostation’ units assigned to Maubeuge, Verdun, Toul, Épinal, Belfort, Langres and Versailles with a depot unit a Chalons. In August, many of these French bases ended up too close to the front, but Maubeuge was the only one lost to the Germans.
The ‘air war’ began when Zeppelin Z-VI was sent on a bombing mission against one of the Liège forts in the first days of the war. Belgian riflemen riddled the dirigible with so many holes that it crash-landed in Germany. On 3 August, a German Taube monoplane flew a reconnaissance mission over Lunéville and dropped three small bombs and on 30 August, a Taube dropped bombs on Paris. On 21 August, two German dirigibles attacked French infantry marching into Alsace. Although they were at an altitude of about 800m, the French managed to bring both of them down. The Germans continued to use the Zeppelins on bombing missions in August, striking at several Channel ports and Lille. In August 1914, the British and French retaliated by bombing bases for dirigibles. On 12 March 1915, German dirigibles appeared over Paris after having attacked London in January 1915. Paris was not bombed again until January 1916 when another dirigible struck shortly before the scheduled Verdun Offensive. The Zeppelins continued long-range bombing missions in France and over Great Britain, but these ended during the Battle of Verdun.
Recognition was a problem for the troops, so German, French and British soldiers fired at almost anything that flew over them. The French damaged two of their own dirigibles, one in August 1914 near Lunéville, and the other on 24 September near Reims when the airship Dupuy de Lôme was retreating before a German advance. After these incidents, the French military forbade further dirigible flights until April 1915. On 16 August 1914, French troops shot down Zeppelin L7 and on 23 August, German troops brought down their own Zeppelin L8. The French soon began to arm their dirigibles and the Germans followed suit. Accidental damage by friendly fire promoted the adoption of identification markings on all aircraft and airships. On 30 September, the Germans adopted the black Iron Cross as the insignia for their aircraft and airships. In late October, the British and the French marked their aircraft with a blue and red roundel. The main danger for the aviator came from ground fire, generally from rifles. However, machine guns and some light artillery were adapted to serve as anti-aircraft weapons before long. If the pilot was passing enemy aircraft, he could do nothing unless he carried a rifle or pistol. Even then, it was no easy feat to fly and fire a weapon at the same time unless it was a two-seater aircraft with an observer. On 25 September, several British BE-2 aircraft forced a German Aviatik B to land. On 5 October, a French Voisin III armed with a machine gun shot down an Aviatik. On 1 December, the Germans equipped the first aircraft with a radio for artillery spotting. In the meantime, the French test fired machine guns through a rotating propeller.
For most of 1914, aircraft and airships usually performed reconnaissance duty. On 22 August 1914 on the Eastern Front, Zeppelin LZ5 spotted the advancing Russian 2nd Army in the Tannenberg region, which gave the Germans the edge in the upcoming battle. On 29 August, aircraft discovered another Russian force about to march. Only days later, in September, a French reconnaissance aircraft discovered that Kluck’s army was turning away from Paris, which led to the Battle of the Marne.
Gabriel Voisin mounted Hotchkiss light machine guns on several Voisin aircraft, one of which scored the first victory on 5 October 1914. The gun of this pusher type aircraft was mounted on the observer’s position in the front of the aircraft.53 The French as well as the Germans also dropped artillery shells by hand from some aircraft on bombing missions. However, a German Taube or French Voisin had limited carrying capacity. In some cases, the pilots dropped darts and one even killed a German general with fleches. During the German aerial bombing campaign in 1914, Zeppelins bombed several rail stations on the Western Front. The French and British also launched a few bombing raids against the Zeppelin airship sheds in 1914, but accomplished little of significance.
Aerial bombing increased in 1915, but it had little effect. The arming of aircraft added
a new dimension to the warfare as scout aircraft were turned into fighters that eventually became hunters of the sky. Formation flying evolved from the need to protect all types of aircraft. In 1915, most aircraft flew in groups and discovered that the ‘V’ formation was the most effective.
Joffre placed Major Joseph Barès, a veteran pilot of the Balkan Wars and ranking pilot, in charge of French aviation on 25 September 1914. His job was to organize the French aviation forces. One major step he took was to reopen flying schools and revive the aircraft industry, which had closed down in anticipation of a short war. That same month, he formed the first French bomber unit with eighteen Voisin LA5 pusher biplanes. The Morane-Saulnier monoplanes were chosen as pursuit aircraft and they formed the first fighter squadron of the war. The Caudron G III biplane was used for observation and artillery fire. The Maurice Farman VII also served for reconnaissance. Barès removed other types of planes with poorer performance. He soon doubled the number of French squadrons.
Trench Warfare in Modern History
Trenches, like forts, served as infantry and artillery positions for centuries before the First World War. In the seventeenth century, at the time of Sébastien Vauban, they formed siege lines to encircle forts or fortresses. Many of the trenching techniques, such as saps, persisted into the twentieth century.54 The most significant changes in trench warfare emerged during the Crimean War and the American Civil War. In the latter conflict, the Confederates dug trenches to defend the front running from Richmond to Petersburg and built earthen forts at intervals to strengthen the trench line. The Union forces built a similar line of trenches opposite their enemy. Both sides added wood or gabion revetments, in use for centuries. Many of the American forts had bombproofs mainly for ammunition. There was no barbed wire, so the Americans used abattis, caltrops and other devices in front of the trenches to impede enemy advance. These same age-old obstacles were used in many a trench system during the First World War until barbed wire was delivered in sufficient quantities.
The next time trenches were used extensively was during the Russo-Turkish War of 1877–8. The Turks’ use of trenches at the Battle of Plevna triggered a new trend not only in the employment of field fortifications but also in the development of permanent fortifications. Trench warfare dominated at the siege of Port Arthur during the Russo-Japanese War of 1904–5 when the Japanese took heavy losses storming the trenches. However, the Russians failed to make the best tactical use of their trenches because they neither selected the most advantageous locations for them nor took full advantage of their machine guns. Thus, some observers failed to appreciate the full potential of trench warfare in the next European conflict. The difference between early twentieth-century trenches and American Civil War trenches was that they were often deeper and provided overhead cover. In 1914 and later, armies were relatively well equipped with breech-loading rifles and artillery and they expended more ammunition in one day than armies in the previous century used in one month. They were also mostly equipped with high-velocity weapons that were less effective against trenches than the older, low-velocity artillery pieces with a high angle of fire.55 However, breastworks, which had been used with or without a shallow trench, were not able to resist high-velocity weapons and no longer provided adequate protection. Many of the new rifles, such as the Martini, were able to penetrate even breastworks with earthen protection. To protect the troops, the trenches had to be deeper and have a low parapet for better concealment. The earthen parapet had to be widened to prevent bullets from penetrating it. However, it could not be too high or it became a target for high-velocity artillery. Overhead cover and underground bombproofs became necessary for the protection of the troops not only from an extended artillery bombardment, but also from bad weather.56 They also helped maintain morale and the health of the troops.
In the 1877 war with the Russians, the Turkish soldiers, poorly equipped or supplied, demonstrated that the common soldier (as opposed to the well-trained professional) in field fortifications could easily hold off an enemy even if outnumbered three to one and short on artillery. Deep and narrow trenches with a low parapet protected the Turks from Russian field artillery, which consisted mainly of direct-fire cannons that were unable to hit the deep trenches. The overhead cover protected the defenders from shrapnel and other metal fragments from exploding shells. Although the redoubts, which served as strongpoints and protection for the Turkish artillery, stood largely above ground, their walls were thick enough to withstand most direct fire. According to Colonel Gustav J. Fiebeger, in daylight, the troops could not remain stationary without cover if they were within range of the breech-loading weapons.57 The Russians ended up digging their own trenches before they launched assaults, and brought up heavy siege artillery to use against Turkish field fortifications. After over a month of siege and three failed attacks, the Russians kept some of the redoubts under heavy bombardment. This prevented the relieving Turkish battalions from occupying the position in daylight. The Russians concluded that night attacks had a better chance of succeeding than daytime assaults. The siege intensified in November. The Turks surrendered after a failed break-out attempt on 10 December 1877 even though they had managed to penetrate the Russians first line of encircling entrenchments at several points. Outnumbered by about three to one, the Turks had stalled the Russian invasion of Bulgaria for five months and demonstrated the value of trenches combined with rapid-fire rifles. Apparently, they also had a few Gatling guns, but the efficacy of the machine gun did not become apparent until the next century. The Battle of Plevna was a major event observed by military attachés and covered by the media. Unlike the Americans at Petersburg–Richmond, the Turks and the Russians largely used trenches to fortify a single point such as a town.
The Russo-Japanese War was the next milestone in military history. After the 1880s, barbed wire slowly became part of the war arsenal. It provided good protection to the forts built in the late nineteenth century. It was used extensively during the Spanish-American War of 1898. During the Russo-Japanese War, which was fought on a larger scale and in which field fortifications played a key role, it became even more prevalent. Smokeless powder, developed in the mid-1880s, also marked a major landmark in trench warfare because the troops were now able to fire without revealing their positions with a lingering trail of dark smoke. Maxim machine guns, which fired 400 to 600 rounds per minute, were an improvement over the rifles that could fire only 10 to 16 rounds a minute and became a weapon superbly fitted for trench warfare. Improvised hand grenades, which had been used for centuries, did not seem to garner attention until after the war. The Germans and the British began manufacturing them shortly before the First World War.
Although Russian field fortifications improved during the course of the war, observers claimed they were poorly constructed. Early in the war, the Russians placed artillery batteries on the crests of ridges and sited some of the trenches inadequately. In some cases, they used sand bags for revetments and barbed wire as an obstacle. Most of their redoubts, however, proved formidable. In the end, both the Japanese and the Russians learned that the attackers could take these positions only if they were willing to accept heavy casualties.
During the campaign in Manchuria, the Japanese also had to dig trenches to protect their troops, which confirmed Colonel Friebeger’s claim that troops could not remain exposed. Comparisons of Russian and Japanese trenches showed that the Japanese construction and design offered much better protection. The Japanese-built trenches allowed the troops to get closer to the enemy by digging in after every small advance until it was time for the final surge. The Japanese army entered the war without machine guns, but soon realized their importance.
The need for heavy artillery became apparent during the war. The Japanese began using mortars with satisfactory outcomes. It seems, however, that only the Germans noticed the efficacy of these weapons since they were the only ones to manufacture them before the First World War. Although the military observers of most of the
other great powers filed reports, their military leaders seem to have focused almost solely on offensive actions regardless of their high casualty rate.
The army engineers of the major European powers continued working on permanent fortifications until 1914. The fortress rings they created consisted of a group of forts around a town or city. If war broke out, they planned to build field fortifications between many of the individual forts to prevent the enemy from advancing through the gaps. The new German Festen at Metz consisted mostly of a series of scattered individual positions such as artillery blocks, infantry positions, casernes, etc. In some cases, the Germans also built concrete trenches within the individual systems to ensure the troops’ protection. Before the First World War, they also created battery positions outside the Festen. The French did the same outside the forts of their fortress rings. The Belgians also realized that they needed field fortifications between the forts of their fortress rings, but they could not build them until war was imminent or had already begun.
The Balkan Wars of 1912–13 were too close to the First World War for most military leaders to absorb and implement what they had learned. During this conflict, it became apparent that trenches served not only for defence but also for offence when the defender dominated the battlefield with machine guns and indirect fire from concealed artillery. The Germans and the Austrians, who took heed of this lesson, continued to develop heavy howitzers and equipped their troops with entrenching tools to carry into battle. During their annual manoeuvres, units assigned to the defensive force practised digging in so entrenching was not new to their troops. German soldiers were also equipped with wire cutters for clearing the heavy barbed wire fences they expected to come across as they traversed farmland. The French were not so quick to grasp the necessity of developing these skills so their soldiers went into battle poorly equipped and poorly prepared, contrary to the claims made by German General Falkenhayn. Surprisingly, in his memoirs, Joffre claimed that he had pleaded for long-range field artillery and heavy howitzers before the war. He had not been able, however, to overrule the officers of the artillery department who were convinced that the 75mm gun was the ultimate artillery weapon.58 In addition, the Germans realized that the machine gun was ideally suited for the infantry whereas the French continued to emphasize the use of rifles and bayonets. The permanent fortifications in the Balkans were mostly old and outdated so that defence devolved on trenches with redoubts. As a result, no one was able to assess the full value of the forts built or modernized in the first decade of the new century in Western Europe.
