Verdun 1916

by J E Kauffman

  The Stosstruppen carried a special assault pack instead of the normal infantry backpack, a canteen and a greatcoat. They also carried a bayonet and cartridge pouches, a haversack attached to their belt containing eating utensils, a canister with filters for a gas mask and an entrenching tool or wire cutters. Most of them were also armed with grenades, especially the famous M1915 stock grenade with fuses of 3, 5 or 7 seconds, or a percussion fuse that detonated on contact with a hard surface. By mid-1916, they were issued with a new ‘egg grenade’ that could be thrown up to 50m with a 5-second fuse. Many of these assault troops carried a bag of grenades and slung their rifle over their back during an assault. Some troops carried shovels to use when occupying an enemy position. Since they often advanced behind a creeping barrage, they often had their gas masks on or at the ready. The assault parties also received the Danish-manufactured Madsen 7.92mm light machine gun to provide fire support when they advanced.45 Some assault units included flamethrower teams and a trench-mortar unit. They formed the advance force for an assault and had the weapons needed to breach the enemy trenches and isolate strongpoints.

  Joffre’s 1915 strategy of ‘nibbling at the enemy’ was over. He planned instead for a massive offensive against the face of the German salient in northern France, but Falkenhayn’s Verdun Offensive would spoil his plans.

  Why Verdun?

  General von Falkenhayn had a choice of two fortress areas for the site of his great offensive. The question is why he would select a fortress zone over another section of the Western Front. He knew the French and British had concentrated their forces between Champagne and the coast. In addition, previous major Allied efforts on that front in 1915 had demonstrated that minimal German forces were sufficient to hold them in check. Even if the fortress zones had a smaller concentration of French troops, they could easily fend off a German assault long enough for reserves to reach them by rail. If he was aiming for a simple battle of attrition, he could have achieved it at many other points along the front if he launched an offensive as ineffective as those of Allies had been. It is possible that, like the French high command, he believed that the forts were mere shell traps and would fall easily. He may have also been aware that the French had largely stripped and abandoned their forts.

  Fort Manonviller with photographs showing destruction caused by German demolitions after the capture of the fort. Also, detail of the iron grille fence of the same type used around other forts.

  The record for forts on the Eastern as well as the Western fronts was not good. The Liège forts were the first to face the German juggernaut. Fortress Liège fell quickly because the intervals between its forts had inadequate defences. In addition, these concrete forts were not well built. Unlike most French and Germans forts, the forts built by Belgian General Brialmont had not been made of reinforced concrete.46 Supposedly built to resist 210mm-calibre weapons, they were unable to withstand weapons of that calibre, much less the Austrian 305mm and German 420mm howitzers. Despite these and other problems, those forts did impose a small and unexpected delay on the German invasion plan. The Belgian forts of Namur and Antwerp suffered a similar fate. The French frontier forts a Maubeuge and other border locations also fell quickly, but in their case the reason was significant downgrading that had occurred well before the war. Fort Manonviller, a relatively modern but isolated fort of the Charmes Gap, also fell in 1914.

  Even though it was considered ‘modern’, Fort Manonviller had been built a few years before Fort Douaumont. It had been updated with two Mougin Mle 1876 turrets (two guns each) shortly after its construction in the 1880s. Like other French forts, it underwent further modernization in the 1890s. In 1890, the army removed its two-dozen 120mm and 155mm guns and its old 220mm and 270mm mortars from the ramparts. In 1892, counterscarp casemates replaced its caponiers. In 1906, the fort received additional turrets that included two Galopin turrets Mle 1890 (each with two 155L guns), two turrets for rapid-fire 57mm guns, a GF3 machine-gun turret, two searchlight turrets and nine observation cloches. Thus, on the eve of the war, the fort had substantial firepower. On mobilization, its garrison numbered almost 800 men including 2 infantry companies and an artillery battery. On 11 August 1914, the fort’s turret artillery supported a chasseur battalion in a nearby forest. On 21 August, units of the French 2nd Army were seen retreating after their failed offensive. German troops surrounded the fort by the morning of 24 August and the bombardment began the next day. The enemy artillery, which consisted of 210mm and 305mm Mörser, caused serious damage to the fort.47 One of the Mougin turrets was jammed and could not retract. The big guns damaged parts of the kitchen facilities. In the afternoon, the Germans cut the underground telephone cable to Toul. On 26 August 1914, the German artillery inflicted additional damage knocking out a Galopin 155L turret. A 57mm gun turret was damaged and incapable of rotating. The Germans emplaced a 420mm Big Bertha that went into action the next day. The bombardment of 27 August brought more problems as toxic fumes from exploding shells spread through the fort. That evening, the fort surrendered. The Germans had bombarded the fort for 54 hours using over 5,800 heavy rounds from 150mm to 420mm and over 10,000 smaller calibre rounds. However, the fort’s 155L Galopin turret and a 57mm gun turret were still serviceable. The concrete casemates and caserne had not suffered much damage although shells had severely damaged one counterscarp casemate. The garrison suffered only thirty-four casualties including four killed. Over 150 men were affected by toxic fumes from the explosives. Soon after they occupied the fort, the Germans went about destroying parts of it before they departed on 12 September. The French reoccupied the position on 13 September, but they could not readily distinguish the battle damage from the post-battle German demolitions, so the high command was not aware that the fort had continued to function before the surrender. Naturally, the Germans were aware of the fact that the fort had been still in relatively good condition when it had surrendered. Their demolitions prevented the French from realizing that their forts had resisted better than the Belgian forts.

  The record for forts on the Eastern Front was dismal. The first fortress to face the test of battle was Przemyśl when the Austro-Hungarian forces reeled back from their premature 1914 offensive and the Russians surrounded the fortress. Hyped as the ‘Verdun of the East’ by some writers after the war, the fortress simply achieved little more than sacrificing a large number of Austrian troops. The fortress supposedly protected the Carpathian passes and occupied the main railway crossings of the San River, but in reality it defended very little of importance. At best, it anchored a defensive line that the Russians blew by, even after the garrison attacked the Russian flank on 21 September allowing the garrisons of Radom and Jarolsaw to escape. Over 100,000 troops held the fortress.48 The defenders had dug about 50km (30 miles) of trenches to link all the forts and could hold out against several divisions of the 3rd Russian Army.49 On 26 September, the Russians encircled the fortress and on 5 October began a bombardment, although they lacked heavy artillery. This culminated on 7 October with an assault against Fort I/1 Łysiczka. The Russians advanced the 500m and fought their way into the fort where Austrian forces trapped many and forced the survivors to surrender. Other attacks were focused on forts XIV Hurko, XV Borek, I/2–I/6 and IV Optyn and cost the Russians 10,000 casualties. On 8 October, the 3rd Army commander launched assaults against forts Xa Pruchnicka Droga, XIa Cegielnia, XI Dunkowiczki and XII Żurawica, but all these efforts failed on the glacis of these forts on the northern sector.50 One source, of doubtful reliability, claimed the Russians suffered 40,000 casualties in all these failed attacks. Meanwhile, only two weeks after the first siege, an Austrian offensive began and that was one reason the Russian 3rd Army commander had launched those failed attacks. The day after the last of the assaults, 9 October, the Austrian relief force arrived from the Dukla Pass to break the siege. The Russians, unable to stop the advance, pulled back across the San River. The relieving forces were met with a jubilant celebration, but proceeded to use up so
me of the fortresses supplies. When Hindenburg called off his failed offensive in Russian Poland at the beginning of November 1914, the Austrian forces in Galicia moved back from the San River Line allowing Russians forces to return and again isolate Przemyśl by 8 November 1914. The fortress had received 128 trainloads to resupply its stocks before the Austrians retreated. Before the second siege began, Conrad chose to order the civilian population to evacuate the area, although he decided to maintain the garrison.

  The Russian commander hesitated from launching attacks during the siege. The garrison sortied several times in November but failed to reach the relief forces. Conrad attempted more relief efforts in December, but the arrival of winter snows further complicated these attempts. On 15 December 30,000 troops inside the fortress attacked in a southwesterly direction hoping to break the Russian ring. The Austrian force penetrated no further than 25km and another relief force was a further 45km away in the Dukla Pass. On 19 December, the Russians pushed the Austrians back into Przemyśl and captured several positions. Three days of Austrian counter-attacks failed to retake the lost positions. The Russian 11th Army had taken over the siege operations from 3rd Army, but launched no further ground assaults and allowed their artillery to do the work. Conrad sent the Austrian 2nd and 3rd armies on another rescue mission in January 1915, but the last 2 weeks of the month resulted in 89,000 casualties or half its strength after the troops struggled through deep snow. The garrison attempted another break-out on 1 February, but again the Russians drove them back. Meanwhile, the Austrians attempted to fly in supplies with some of the primitive aircraft available at the time. They also used the aircraft to deliver mail.51 Conrad’s final attempt came at the end of February 1915 with 2nd Army, Südarmee (a small German army sent to bolster the Austrian armies) and 3rd Army with another 46,000 men lost. His bid to recapture the prestigious fortress had resulted in 800,000 casualties in 1915. One last attempt in March by the 2nd Army resulted in another 51,000 casualties. Only the inability of the Russians to bring up siege artillery prolonged the resistance of the fortress. However, in March, their big guns arrived and were set in place. These included some Schneider 280mm guns purchased from the French and 152mm guns. A round from the Schneider struck at least one turret of a fort. On 10 March, the Russians captured several outposts and advanced positions on the northern part of the fortress that the garrison was unable to recapture. Conrad informed the Austrian commander, General Hermann Kusmanek von Burgneustädten, that he was on his own. So on 18 March, Kusmanek launched a final break-out attack in the rain and snow using Hungarian troops. Instead of attacking in the obvious direction, their assault was directed eastward in an attempt to capture Russian supply dumps, but they failed to reach the Russian trench line. The Russians had built their own lines of circumvallation that successfully kept the garrison trapped. On 22 March, Kusmanek began the destruction of the fortress including blowing up bridges, stores and military installations as well as gun positions on the forts. None of the forts had sustained significant damage during the siege. The commanding general surrendered his remaining 117,000 men after 133 days (9 November 1914–22 March 1915).52

  Russian attack on Fort Siedliska, Przemyśl.

  Russian Fortress Novogeorgievsk and Austrian Fortress Przemyśl. Photos of brick barracks and a concrete fortification of Fortress Novogeorgievsk.

  The Russians proceeded to repair the fortress for their own use and the Tsar even made a victory tour on 25 April. The Austro-German offensive at Gorlice-Tarnów in May broke the Russian front. Before the end of the month, the Russians in the fortress were under siege when Austrian 305mm mortars began bombarding the forts of the northern sector. On 17 May, the defenders forced back Austrian troops attacking Fort VII Prałkowce. On 30 May, the Austrians attacked again and captured Fort VII. A Russian counter-attack drove them out. A German force with a 420mm howitzer came to join the bombardment leading to the capture of forts on the left bank of the river. This was enough to convince the Russians to evacuate the fortress on 3 June, although it took until 5 June for the last forts to fall. The war was over for the fortress.

  Przemyśl demonstrated that a twentieth-century fortress could withstand a siege of several months acting as a thorn in the enemy’s side, but it also showed that when it was isolated the risk of surrender with immense losses was great. The fortresses’ location was only strategic in the respect that it controlled several bridges over the San and blocked the main rail line to Cracow. The railway was of little use to the Russians, even if they controlled it because of the different gauge. Thus, the strategic value of the fortress was very limited. The Russians lacked the type of heavy artillery that could significantly damage the forts so when their big guns finally arrived they were not enough to prove the strength or weaknesses of the fortress. Thus, General Falkenhayn could not be certain how strong or weak this fortress was when it was subjected to the large-calibre weapons, but he did realize that the national pride of his Austrian allies was enough to make them fight tooth and nail for such a major fortress. Besides, the battle for the fortress had caused massive casualties. Thus, he could be almost certain that Verdun might evoke a similar reaction from the French.

  The Russian fortresses, as previously mentioned in Chapter 2, were scattered along a line on the Russian northwestern front from Warsaw to Kovno, but had large gaps between them. They occupied a number of strategic points the Germans could easily bypass by cracking other parts of the defence line. With Warsaw abandoned on 5 August 1915, the fortress complex of Novogeorgievsk lost its strategic value. The Russians left its 90,000-man garrison to be encircled by 10 August.53 The Germans brought in siege artillery that included four 420mm Big Berthas and a 305mm howitzer and in a preliminary bombardment shattered three forts before the battle. To these guns were added 10 305mm Skoda mortars and 2 420mm Skoda howitzers in 9 batteries with about 200 rounds per battery (approximately 1,800 rounds including 600 rounds of 420mm).54 The attack opened on 13 August with a bombardment of forts XIV, XV and XVI for a few days. These forts, directly north and northeast of the citadel, were part of the outer girdle built between 1912 and 1915. They continued to resist. On the morning of the fourth day, German infantry began the assault on forts XV and XVI. The artillery continued to fire and a 420mm round hit an attacking company, but Fort XV fell that day. Despite this, the Russians continued to resist until forced to abandon their outer ring of forts. Soon three forts of the inner line (including fort II and III) fell followed by the citadel. The 24 battalions, mostly Landwehr troops, had the defenders trapped and by the morning of 20 August the fortress surrendered yielding a large number of prisoners and 700 artillery pieces.55

  The Russian fortresses simply did not prove of much value when it came to assessing the strength of the forts and their ability to resist because the Germans avoided engaging them as part of any major battle. In the case of Kovno, the Germans arrived in front of it and began their bombardment in early August 1915 concentrating their efforts on the three oldest forts (almost all the forts were from the 1880s and the first seven were brick reinforced with earth). The fortress held 1,300 guns, but only about 240 were part of its defences and a second rate infantry division added to the defenders of the fort. The Germans brought up several batteries of siege artillery which included three 420mm Gamma howitzers, two 420mm Big Bertha howitzers, four 305mm mortars and a 280mm howitzer. Unlike, the action at Osowiec (described below) in February, aircraft and a tethered balloon provided observation for the artillery. On 15 August, the 420mm rounds shattered Fort I. On 17 August, German infantry overran four badly damaged forts. A week of bombardment left over 20,000 of the 90,000 Russian defenders as casualties and the fortress fell after only 11 days on 18 August.

  A Russian fortress that successful resisted was Osowiec. This fortress occupied a site through which the Konigsberg–Łyck–Białystok railroad passed on a narrow strip of land surrounded by impassable marshes and crossing the Bobra River. The Russians built the citadel, Fort I, near the
town and on the north side of the railway bridge Fort II between 1882 and 1892. Forts III and IV, built early in the 1900s, occupied a plateau southwest of Fort I. The defences took full advantage of the swampy terrain. The Germans placed the fortress under siege early in the war and assaulted it on 21 September 1914.56 A frontal assault followed, but Russian artillery devastated the German attackers and counter-attacks on both flanks ended the assault. A second effort took place on 3 February 1915 with German artillery ranging from 105mm to 420mm firing a heavy barrage. In addition, four 305mm howitzers from the Western Front took part as the barrage reached a peak and ended on 16 February. The Russian high command did not believe the fortresses would last more than a couple of days, but that was wrong. Another bombardment began on 25 February and lasted until 5 March 1915. The German artillery already included two battalions of 210mm howitzers and one of 305mm mortars. A second battery of 305s was added and a 280mm howitzer along with a two-gun battery of 420mm Gammas. Marc Romanych and Martin Rupp state that the bombardment was ineffective since they fired blindly without any form of observation while Russian counter-battery fire hit both 305mm Skoda batteries. The town did suffer a large amount of damage, and the Russians claimed they silenced two of the 420mm Big Berthas, although that was not correct. The Germans withdrew their siege guns for operations elsewhere on the front.57 They failed to reach the second line of defences when the attack ended. Hindenburg ordered the 8th Army to launch another assault on 6 August. This time, since the siege artillery was gone, the guns fired chlorine gas shells. Once the Germans thought resistance was broken, over a dozen Landwehr battalions totalling 7,000 men from the 11th Landwehr Division advanced on the fortress.58 However, about sixty of the gassed Russians, coughing up blood and looking like the living dead, charged the Germans who had taken their first line sending them running. Their heroic counter-attack went down into history as ‘The attack of the dead men’. A fortnight later, on 18 August, after the fall of the fortresses of Kovno and Novogeorgievsk, the victorious Russians forces at Osowiec found themselves in a precarious position due to the collapse of the flanks of the fortified line and they were ordered to withdraw to new positions. Before they left, the Russian engineers demolished much of the fortress.