Verdun 1916

by J E Kauffman

  Opening positions for the Battle of Verdun.

  Relief map of Verdun.

  After Falkenhayn ordered them to prevent French aircraft from penetrating beyond the front line, the German aviation units flew patrols along the front, which took a toll on their engines. Some of the German reconnaissance units photographed the French positions while others flew artillery observation missions. On the first day, the German artillery received support from at least six tethered observation balloons, also known as kites.33 The French balloonists were unable to locate the enemy batteries because they were targeted by German anti-balloon guns on the first day. German squadrons flew behind the lines to bomb railway stations in order to impede the transport of reinforcements into the salient. According to the French, the first wave of about ten German aircraft flew over Bar-le-Duc at about 10.00 am (French time). A second wave of five aircraft bombed Revigny at about 2.00 pm (French time). French pursuit aircraft reportedly shot down a couple of them as they fled. The best-known aerial operation of that day took place in the early evening over an airstrip near Revigny that had been lit up for returning French planes. Suddenly the spotlights fell on a yellow, fish-shaped object in the sky. It was a Zeppelin L77 on a bombing mission. A battery of French 75mm autocannons (vehicle-mounted 75mm guns used as anti-aircraft weapons) opened fire at 9.00 pm (French time). Within 15 minutes, the dirigible took six hits, burst into flames and came crashing down to earth. There were no survivors.34

  Drawing of an observation balloon under attack and photograph of an anti-balloon gun (later referred to as an anti-aircraft gun).

  In the late afternoon of 21 February, General Herr and his staff did not know where to expect the German strike on their front, but they must certainly have anticipated a big offensive since no one had yet witnessed a bombardment on this scale since the beginning of the war. Most of the divisions on the northern sector were not first rate and the soldiers had spent a cold winter sharing their trenches with rats. Fortunately, morale had been improving thanks to changes instituted to ease their daily lives. The constant artillery fire destroyed much of the first French position, but not to the extent hoped for by the Germans. At 5.00 pm (German time), the barrage shifted to the second French line and the German infantrymen emerged from their stollen expecting to reach and occupy the French positions easily. The battalions did not advance in normal assault formations, but adopted the newly developed storm-troop tactics. The advanced elements consisting of infantry and pioneer (combat engineer) companies were given the mission of moving quickly into the French positions and eliminating any strongpoints.35 They advanced in small groups armed with grenades, light machine guns and small arms and they wore the new steel helmets. The pioneers carried flamethrowers and trench mortars to use against the strongpoints.36 The weather was still cold and snow had still covered much of the ground before the bombardment. In many places, the snow was turning into slush. The assault troops had little cover between their own positions and the French first line because no-man’s-land was wide, in some cases more than several hundred metres. Furthermore, the Germans had not dug sap trenches into it to provide advance jump-off positions for fear of alerting the French of an imminent attack.

  Table 5: German Assault Units and Targeted French Formations with Objectives

  The follow-up infantry companies stayed behind until the assault troops broke into the first French line. Despite the massive bombardment, they were surprised to find surviving French troops stubbornly resisting at a number of points, especially in Caures Woods held by the chasseurs. Driant’s two chasseur battalions, the target of some 80,000 artillery rounds, had lost 60 per cent of their troops to the bombardment and many of their concrete shelters had been smashed. Yet the surviving chasseurs surprised the troops of the 21st Division with their ferocity.37

  German attack, February 1916.

  East of Caures Woods, German troops advanced towards Ville and Bois-de-l’Herbebois where their artillery had destroyed some sections of the woods, but ran into stiff resistance from the French regiments of the 51st Division, particularly around Herbebois. While Driant’s men held the XVIII Corps in check at Bois de Caures, the VII Reserve Corps made somewhat better progress at Bois de Haumont. Here the French troops of the 72nd Division occupied the high ground and a series of trenches with rows of wire obstacles blocked access and turned the heights into a formidable strongpoint. The German artillery had destroyed significant sections of the wire obstacles and, in some places, almost levelled the woods allowing their troops to take the position between 5.00 pm and 10.00 pm (German time). This gave the Germans a good jump-off position for 22 February as more of their troops and artillery poured into the Haumont area.

  On 21 February, Driant’s chasseurs prevented the Germans from advancing beyond Bois de Caures. As twilight set in early on that winter day, the Germans consolidated their positions. The soldiers on both sides spent the night shivering in freezing temperatures. German patrols went out to reconnoitre the remaining positions in the French first line and even the second line where it had collapsed. The next morning, the artillery received new firing data for another barrage. Much of the French 51st and 72nd divisions, which had reeled back in shock on the first day, prepared to launch desperate counter-attacks. The VII Reserve Corps continued to advance on the German right hoping to overrun the next French position quickly. However, the dazed and shocked survivors of the two French divisions who had weathered the shelling and assault had a brief reprieve that first night. The unrelenting bombardment had shredded many trees, levelled many of their trenches and smashed their shelters.38 A repeat of a day like 21 February could have rendered the shell-shocked Poilus totally ineffective, yet they put up a strong resistance in some strongpoints and towns. The German storm units bypassed strongpoints that grenades or flamethrowers could not easily take out, leaving them to the mercy of the pioneers trudging behind with the trench mortars.

  By the end of the first day of the German offensive, things looked grim for the French front-line divisions. General Herr faced a difficult situation with few resources to counter the enemy. The battalions of the 37th Division rushed into the northern sector to take part in counter-attacks the next day. The French artillery, especially 75mm guns, endured a bad day, but the batteries that survived the bombardment gave the advancing Germans an unpleasant surprise. After the war, General Joffre claimed that when ‘the Germans hurled themselves against Verdun, the attack did not take us unawares …’.* If that was the case, the question remains why sufficient materials, such as barbed wire, and troops to finish the almost non-existent second and third lines had not been sent in time. His explanation was that the first two positions in fortified regions were meant to channel an enemy advance and served as points of support for counter-offensives. In addition, he explained, before the German offensive, most critical sectors in need of strengthening were around Amiens where the British and French forces connected, in the Oise Valley which led directly to Paris, the area around Reims, the Argonne – a threat to the Verdun Salient – and the Vosges, which buttressed the French right wing. He had had to set priorities regarding where to build fortifications, and – he had no problem admitting – Verdun had not been first on his list.39 In December, he had sent the VII Corps and the 15th Division to Bar-le-Duc for training, but not for reinforcing Verdun.40 On 19 February, Joffre had gone to Bar-le-Duc to meet with Herr, Balfourier (XX Corps commander), Bazelaire (VII Corps commander) and Humbert (3rd Army commander). He was satisfied that Herr’s command included twelve divisions and the VII Corps was detraining to reinforce Verdun. When the attack came on 21 February, Joffre decided he must maintain his reserve of twenty-six divisions echeloned along the Western Front. He admitted that at the end of 21 February he still did not think that Verdun was the main objective. Thus, Herr was left with little prospect of getting reinforcements the next day. It was not until the night of 24/25 February Joffre began to doubt his own judgement regarding the German offensive. However,
he never thought to leave his headquarters to investigate the situation. He was satisfied with the notion that the surprise German attack had failed because it did not take Verdun. Despite his rosy views, the Germans successfully misled Joffre for several days. Their mistake was to attack only on the right bank of the river and to stop for the night after taking the first position.

  General Falkenhayn and Crown Prince Wilhelm were satisfied with the progress of the first day, even though their gains were not impressive compared to their investment in the attack. On the first day, the Crown Prince drove to his battle headquarters at Vittarville, located about 10km from the front, while the bombardment was already underway. He arrived at the town at about 10.00 a.m. (German time) where General Knobelsdorf informed him that the French artillery response was weak and aimless, while their own guns were producing excellent results. Minutes later, French artillery shells fell in the town and near his headquarters. The Crown Prince and his staff promptly decamped to return to their old headquarters at Stenay, about 20km from the front, from where they operated for the remainder of the year.

  During the night, the Germans moved their artillery forward and the second day of battle dawned with another violent bombardment. The troops of the VII Reserve Corps readied themselves in their newly occupied positions beyond the remnants of the French first line on the southwestern edge of Bois de Haumont. The XVIII Corps occupied positions in the French first line they had taken on the previous day. However, the remnants of the two French chasseur battalions still held much of Caures Woods and occupied several positions that covered the main road through the forest. Not far behind them, there were emplacements for 75mm and 90mm guns, some of which had been destroyed in the bombardment. At the entrance to the wood, the German artillery had brought down many branches leaving many of the remaining trees still standing. However, without spring foliage, the view of the ground was only slightly obstructed by the broken tree limbs. The III Corps held positions in Bois de Ville and Soumazannes. All its units had advanced the first day with light casualties, whose numbers increased in the evening of the first day when surviving French troops joined by nearby 75mm guns put up stubborn resistance.

  On 22 February, the German artillery concentrated on the French second line and the towns of Brabant and Haumont, which were part of or behind the first line. At midday, the VII Reserve Corps launched its ground assault. The Germans encountered stiff resistance in the ruins of Haumont, but late in the day, the surviving French soldiers of the defending battalion, fewer than eighty men, finally surrendered. The XVIII Corps still had to clear Caures Woods. The chasseurs put up a heroic resistance that afternoon in the face of grenade and flamethrower assaults. By evening, the Germans secured with difficulty the woods they had been ordered to take at all costs. The III Corps advanced through Ville Woods. The troops from Rohr’s detachment and the 6th Division now faced the strongpoints in Bois de l’Herbebois on the northern and eastern edges where there was a double line of entrenchments and obstacles. Caures and Ville woods covered the west flank of the Herbebois Woods.

  On 23 February, day three of the offensive, an infantry assault came on the heels of another morning bombardment. The VII Reserve Corps had moved artillery up to the edge of Haumont Woods to fire on the French positions running from the town of Brabant to the village of Haumont. Less snow had fallen then the previous day. The approaches to Brabant, located on the Meuse, were covered by several lines of barbed wire obstacles and trenches from the north. These defences extended eastward and combined with additional positions in the hills. That afternoon, the German troops fought their way into Brabant and secured the ridges to the east of the town as the French troops retreated. A few dozen French soldiers of a detachment of the 44th Territorial Regiment surrendered the town on 23 February.41 General Étienne Bapst, 72nd Division commander, shifted his headquarters back and forth on 21 and 22 February, which caused command difficulties.42 Bapst wanted to retreat, but General Adrien Chrétien, the corps commander, refused to give the order. By the time Chrétien had a change of heart, Brabant had fallen and other units of the division were in retreat. That night, the corps commander ordered a counterattack to take back Brabant, but Bapst did not have enough troops. Troops of the 37th Division were sent in, but their attempts to counter-attack and help the troops of the 72nd Division failed.43

  On the previous day (22 February), the XVIII Corps in the centre of the German drive had cleared most of Caures Woods. The last of the chasseurs’ strongpoints fell and Colonel Driant was killed that night. The two neighbouring corps had to support the XVIII Corps in accomplishing its mission that day. On 23 February, the corps cleared the last of the resistance from Caures Woods despite a French counter-attack and moved to the south of the village of Beaumont. The III Corps on the left flank of the XVIII Corps fought its way into Herbebois Woods and took the French strongpoint in Wavrille Woods, incurring heavy casualties. It joined with the XVIII Corps, which was emerging from a small wood to outflank Beaumont. The German troops were unable to drive the defending French regiment of the 51st Division out of Beaumont that day. The French held off repeated German assaults and inflicted heavy losses before actually succumbing on 24 February. Some of the surviving Poilus fell back on positions at Louvemont. By the end of the day, three German corps had thrown the French back to their second position, which ran from Samogneux on the Meuse to Beaumont, through Fosses and Chaumes woods and to the town of Ornes. The Germans dominated Ornes from the twin hills of the same name, so the town was lost to all intents and purposes. This second line was far from complete when General Herr rushed in reinforcements. Thus, after three days of heavy bombardments followed by infantry attacks three relatively fresh German corps with six divisions and the largest concentration of artillery ever seen had advanced for 2–3km, had almost obliterated the French 72nd Division and roughed up the 51st Division. Although this was hardly impressive, it seriously alarmed the French. The next two days proved decisive for Falkenhayn’s plan as well as for the French forces.

  That evening, when he was informed that Samogneux had fallen, General Bapst ordered a counter-attack soon after midnight on 24 February. The remnants of one of his battalions still held the town, which had not actually surrendered. Meanwhile, Herr ordered his artillery on the west bank to fire on the position that was presumably lost, which devastated the poor defenders who surrendered the town to the Germans at 3.00 am (French time).44 In the morning of 24 February, the Germans once again began the day with a heavy bombardment. The infantry emerged from its positions at about 2.00 pm (German time). The 13th Reserve Division spearheaded the assault. French artillery from hills on the west bank mauled the VII Reserve Corps as it moved toward and past Samogneux.

  The 37th Infantry Division, which was thrown into the battle piecemeal to stem the tide after the first day, was in poor condition by 24 February. Its two Zouave and two Algerian Tirailleur regiments of high-quality troops fared poorly in futile counter-attacks during the first days. On 24 February, General Léon de Bonneval, the division commander, received orders to defend the Côte de Talou and the Côte du Poivre (Pepper Hill). General Balfourier’s XX Corps was on its way to the east bank, but only elements of the 153rd Division, its general and his staff arrived on 24 February. Elements of his 39th Division crossed the Meuse the next day. Thus, only the XX Corps had fresh units on the east bank to bolster the French third position that ran from Champneuville, through Louvemont and Bezonvaux, and south to Fort Douaumont and Fort Vaux. There was little left of Chrétien’s XXX Corps. The 51st Division clung to Louvemont and the area around it while the 14th pulled back, but still held Bezonvaux and positions to the south toward Damloup. What was left of the 72nd Division assembled around Champneuville and the Talou Hill (or ridge), but had to be removed from the battle at the end of 25 February. On 24 February the Germans had penetrated the front running from Samogneux to Beaumont to Ornes, having already taken Samogneux early in the morning. The VII Reserve Corps’s main achieveme
nt that day was the capture of Hill 344. Other corps moved through Bois de Fosses and Chaume Woods and the village of Ornes. During the night of 24/25 February, the French pulled back from Ornes to Bezonvaux, and, following Herr’s orders, the French units on the north side of the line withdrew to an incomplete line that ran from Vacherauville to Côte du Poivre, Chambrettes Farm, La Vauche, Hardaumont and Vaux. This move apparently went undetected by the Germans.

  The decisive day of the offensive was 25 February. Command changes on the French side altered the course of French strategy. In his memoirs, Joffre recounted that he did not learn of the German offensive until 10.00 am (French time) on 21 February. By the end of the day, he found out that the Germans were in the woods of Caures and Herbebois. Early the next morning, he was informed that Bois de Haumont and Caures Woods had fallen as well. The information about Caures Woods, however, had been erroneous. Reports that the French troops were performing admirably in heavy fighting buoyed his spirits. The news was no better on 23 February when, at mid-morning, he learned that the 72nd Division had abandoned Brabant and the Germans had taken most of Caures and Wavrille woods. The evening dispatches reported that his troops had a precarious hold on Ornes and Beaumont and that some positions were already lost. The ferocity of the German attack finally made him realize that he needed to commit fresh reserves. ‘I Corps and XIII Corps – he wrote – had already been sent by motor transport to the region … and the commanders of groups of armies had been warned to be ready to furnish reinforcements up to the extreme limit of their resources’.* He had delayed in sending reinforcements because he had expected attacks on other fronts to follow this one. On the night of 23 February, Joffre sent Colonel Claudel, his assistant chief-of-staff, to investigate the situation at Verdun. On the afternoon of 24 February, Claudel telephoned to tell him that the attack had been slowed and that counter-attacks should be possible, apparently unaware of the condition of the divisions of XXX Corps. When the Germans renewed their assault with a ferocity equal to the previous days, Joffre could only say, ‘the situation suddenly changed’. The Bois de Fosses, Louvemont and Hill 344 fell as French troops evacuated Ornes and German troops pushed into the Meuse Heights. General de Langle called Joffre at 7.30 pm to inform him that the situation was critical. Joffre authorized him to evacuate the Woëvre if he deemed it necessary, but told him that his forces must face northward and resist the German attack while maintaining positions between the Meuse and the Woëvre. According to historian Robert Doughty, de Langle had already anticipated Joffre’s order.** On 24 February, Herr ordered his troops to prepare the bridges and forts for demolition. De Langle stopped all troop movements across the bridges to the east bank to keep them open for support troops evacuating the east bank. At 8.00 pm on 24 February, General de Langle ordered the outposts in the Woëvre to be evacuated the next day at 9.00 pm (French time). When he was informed of these measures, Joffre instructed Langle and Herr to rescind the orders concerning the abandonment of the east bank and the demolition of the forts. Herr obeyed his superior. Joffre also ordered the troops to hold the right bank of the Meuse and authorized de Langle to use the entire XX Corps to accomplish this mission. At this point, Joffre was becoming anxious because the situation was changing rapidly and he feared a collapse that would degenerate into a rout if the troops tried to make it to the left bank. The most important change on the east bank took place on 25 February when the XX Corps replaced the XXX Corps and took over the remaining divisions. This meant that General Maurice Balfourier and his staff would replace Chrétien whose XXX Corps was coming apart.