Verdun 1916

by J E Kauffman

  In July 1916, the entire front of the Crown Prince’s army was engaged in the Battle of Verdun. At Vauquois, the French used ‘new liquid fire trench mortar bombs …,’ he complained, ‘with such powerful charges that even their own trenches were damaged,’ adding ‘that everywhere, on both banks of the Meuse, there broke out heavy bombing fights intended to hold our forces to their ground and distract our attention from the main action on the Somme’.* Falkenhayn needed the Crown Prince to tie down as many French divisions as possible to divert them from the Somme Offensive.

  On 3 July, the German troops stormed the Damloup battery located on the edge of a steep slope just to the south of Fort Vaux. The fierce French counter-attacks that followed retook the battery and held it until 12 July, hindering preparations for the main German effort to clear the Meuse Heights.53 The loss of the Damloup battery left the French with only the Ouvrage of Laufée in front of forts Tavannes and Souville. Laufée, which had been an infantry position earlier in the century, was enlarged by the addition of a large concrete structure that housed a caserne and a turret with two 75mm guns. The garrison of about one-hundred men covered the surrounding fossé with machine guns and rifles from the ramparts at the top of the earthen scarp. The gun turret had supported Fort Vaux early in June. After that, the turret gun was used to repel several attacks of the 50th Division against Laufée itself.54

  Bad weather delayed the artillery barrage. Falkenhayn became impatient and ordered the attack on Fort Souville to take place immediately so he could send some artillery from each corps on the east bank to the Somme Front. On 10 July, the German artillery on both banks of the Meuse laid down another massive bombardment that included more Green Cross shells than ever before. The main targets were on the east bank. The French gunners responded with their own poison gas shells. At 5.45 am (German time) on 11 July, the German infantry went on the attack focusing mostly on Fort Souville.

  Fort Souville, a seven-sided fort, had begun the war with four 90mm guns and two mortars on its ramparts. It held a garrison of 250 men. Its main value was as an observation position, which made it a target of almost constant shelling in 1916. Between June and July, the 420mm guns scored two hits that collapsed the galleries leading to the powder stores. On 10 and 11 July, the fort was pummelled with artillery as well as gas shells. On 12 July, its machine guns mowed down German troops of the 103rd Division. After this unsuccessful German assault, badly needed reinforcements reached the fort. The garrison lost 50 per cent of its men in that engagement. By the end of the year, an estimated 38,000 enemy rounds had hit the fort causing major damage and turning it into rubble. Amazingly, the Germans were unable to take it. The fort had no turret artillery, but an annex 385m to the west armed with an 1891 155mm Bussière gun turret was able to fire upon key points between the Ouvrage of Froideterre and Fort Moulainville. The turret had required repairs, which had been completed in October 1915, in time for the battle of Verdun. It was bombarded between 24 February and 16 March, but managed to return fire. After it shot about 600 rounds of low-quality ammunition, a shell finally burst in one of the gun barrels damaging the turret. The battery stayed out of action for the remainder of the battle, but served as an observatory.55 The position consisted of a single turret mounted on a concrete block with only twenty men to serve it. The crew had to depend on field troops for close defence.

  Like Fort Souville, Fort Tavannes had undergone little modernization. It had been pummelled with high explosive and gas shells between 25 February and the end of May. On 7 May, the day before the accident at German-occupied Fort Douaumont, its powder magazine blew up when a grenade detonated unintentionally. It was also targeted by the German artillery on 10 July. German troops charged it from the vicinity of Fort Vaux and Damloup, but stopped less than 1km away.56 On 11 July, the Alpine and X Reserve corps attacked south of Fleury and advanced up to 400m. To the left of them, the French held up other German divisions in Chapitre Woods. The Germans’ failure to take the objectives brought Falkenhayn post-haste down upon the Crown Prince. Expressing his extreme displeasure at the poor outcome of the operation despite the fact that he had lavishly provided the personnel, materials and Green Cross shells requested, he ordered the prince to go on the defensive.

  In July, the French launched a major effort to retake the Ouvrage of Thiaumont, which had been lost on 23 June. This pushed Knobelsdorf to ask for permission to put the 5th Army back on the offensive. Falkenhayn, unconvinced, ordered additional troops to the Somme that month. Meanwhile, as the French attacks against Thiaumont continued, the ouvrage changed hands several times and the mounting losses of the 4th Division required the 14th Division to move from the west bank to relieve it.

  The Ouvrage of Thiaumont was a relatively small position that had been modernized early in the century. A caserne that included a machine-gun turret, a small block with an observation cloche and a Casemate de Bourges all in reinforced concrete and grouped closely together were added at that time. The French army removed the 75mm guns from the casemate in the autumn of 1915. During the first week of the German offensive in February, the shells broke up the surrounding parapets and damaged the barracks. In March, attempts to rearm the artillery casemate failed due to the constant bombardment. The machine-gun turret jammed and most of the wire obstacles and parts of the ramparts disappeared during the bombardment. The small garrison of about 70 men was withdrawn leaving the ouvrage to serve only as a shelter. On 20 June, the I and III Bavarian corps attacked towards Thiaumont and the Ouvrage of Froideterre. The Germans bombarded the position and took it on 23 June along with thirty prisoners. All French attacks between 24 and 29 June failed to regain the position. Until 4 July, both sides heavily contested the position, which changed hands several times. The Germans held its ruins between July and late October. In 6 days of combat, one French regiment lost over 1,200 men. When the Battle of Verdun ended, little was left of the position.

  Before the Somme Offensive, Pétain said that 23 June was ‘a specially critical day’ since, he claimed, the Germans’ bombardment had lasted two days and they had a marked superiority. He had warned Joffre that the Germans had a two to one advantage in terms of artillery. The French II and VI Corps suffered heavily from the German bombardment, he pointed out, but they had managed to hold off the German assault several hours before they finally yielded control of Fleury and the village of Thiaumont. The German advance continued relentlessly along the crest of Froideterre. At this point, the French 2nd Army did not have enough fresh divisions to meet the demands of the situation, which could leave the right bank impossible to defend if the Germans achieved their objectives. Nivelle urgently requested reinforcements and warned his troops that the decisive moment of the battle was upon them. We ‘must not let them pass!’ he exhorted his soldiers. Pétain contacted Castelnau at General Headquarters that evening and warned him that the situation was critical and that he could not hold the enemy back with ‘second class divisions’. Castelnau’s response was to send four fresh divisions on 24 June; Nivelle’s troops launched a counter-attack.

  Top: Ouvrage of Froideterre. The combat blocks were not linked to the caserne until tunnels were excavated in 1917. Bottom: Basic design for Casemate de Bourges from 1899.

  The Ouvrage of Froideterre stood beyond the Ouvrage of Thiaumont, near the end of the ridge. Its capitulation would give the Germans a dominating view over Verdun. This ouvrage, also modernized early in the century, was more widely dispersed than Thiaumont. Its positions, made of reinforced concrete, included a Casemate de Bourges, a block for a machine-gun turret and observation cloche, a block for a 75mm gun turret and a large caserne block with an emplacement for a machine-gun turret and an observation cloche. The two 75mm casemate guns had been removed in 1915. During the bombardment of February 1916, the observation position of the Casemate de Bourges was destroyed. In late March, the artillery casemate was rearmed. During the German offensive on 20 June, the ouvrage was shelled with heavy artillery including 305mm and 380mm wea
pons. The next day, 500 rounds rained down on the fort and included many Green Cross gas shells. The Germans continued to drop poison gas shells on the fort until the morning of the assault. The bombardment caused a great deal of damage, especially among the wire obstacles, and blocked the entrances, but the gun positions and the turret remained operational. On 23 June, after three days of bombardment, German infantry advanced on the ouvrage at about 7.00 am. The machine-gun turrets failed, blocked by debris, which allowed the Germans to reach the ramparts and enter the courtyard. The 75mm gun turret fired at point-blank range on the Germans in the courtyard sending them scurrying for cover. At 11.00 am, the machine-gun turrets were back in action. Before long, a chasseur battalion drove the Germans off the fort. The retreat from the ouvrage cost the Germans their best chance to control the ridge, albeit they did not give up. German artillery continued to pound the ouvrage. On 25 July, the glacis armour of the machine-gun turret on the caserne was pierced by a 305mm round. The turret became inoperable until it was repaired a year later. The infantry attack of 23 June was the last on the Ouvrage of Froideterre.

  Before 23 June, the 25th Reserve Division had made some progress near Froideterre. The Guard Ersatz Division had been stopped by heavy fire and the 21st Reserve Division had taken an extremity of the Souville Ridge. Early in July, south of Vaux, the 50th Division had captured Battery Damloup. Further efforts in July were futile in the face of French counter-attacks. The French penetrated the second line of the German VII Reserve Corps on the western part of the Poivre and the Germans could not drive them back. General Johann Hans von Zwehl, commanding VII Reserve Corps (and the commander of the 14th Reserve Division), refused to counter-attack since months of combat had worn down his troops. On 3 August, the French retook Fleury and the ruins of Thiaumont only to lose the small ouvrage the next day. According to the Crown Prince, between 23 June and the end of August, the Ouvrage of Thiaumont was attacked thirty-four times and Fleury thirteen. Casualties mounted steadily on both sides.

  Pétain’s Road to Victory

  Before the battle in February 1916, Verdun had a logistical problem. The main rail line entered the city from the direction Chalons–Bar-le-Duc–St Mihiel but was cut by the St Mihiel bridgehead. German artillery, located in the Argonne near Vauquois, interdicted the other main line from Reims–Ste Ménehould–Clermont at Aubréville. This left only a small railway that ran between Bar-le-Duc and Verdun via Souilly. It lacked the required capacity to support French forces in the Verdun Salient. A secondary road that ran more or less parallel to the railway was in poor condition. The narrow gauge railway, known as ‘Meusien’, carried a little over 80 per cent of the food supply for Pétain’s army of over 436,000 men and 136,000 horses and mules between February and March. Its capacity of 1,800 tons a day rose to about 4,000 tons in March and 10,000 tons in June. A French infantry division, which had required 70 to 140 tons a day in 1914, needed 10 times that amount by 1918. That was the equivalent of 10 to 20 wagons in 1914. The small railway needed more rolling stock in February to increase its capacity from the 1,800 tons a day. During the following weeks, the army requisitioned the necessary equipment from throughout France and increased the railway’s rolling stock to 75 locomotives and 800 railway wagons. The number of trains that made the daily run increased from twenty-two in February to thirty-five in April. The railroad was especially useful in evacuating the wounded on hospital trains, which often brought back 300 men at a time. Barracks and other large buildings were converted into hospitals at Bar-le-Duc and Revigny. Beginning in 1915, the 5th Engineer Regiment, specializing in railway work, improved the rail line leading to Verdun and doubled the number of tracks. On 23 February 1916, it also started building a new standard gauge line between Nettancourt and Dugny, finishing it by the end of June 1916. This improved the supply situation and the build-up for the big French offensive on the east bank. This new rail line was able to carry three times as much as the secondary road the army had heavily depended on and freed up many trucks for the Somme Offensive.

  Monument on the Sacred Way. A photograph of troops and convoys moving along the Sacred Way.

  As soon as he took command, Pétain set out to improve the 75km road that became the lifeline of Verdun and which was eventually dubbed ‘a Voie Sacrée’ or the ‘Sacred Way’.58 This road began at Bar-le-Duc, ran through Naives, Rumont, Chaumont-sur-Aire, Souilly, Lemmes and ended at Verdun. It was widened in 1915 to accommodate two-way traffic. On 28 February, the thaw made it quite impassable. The road was divided into six sections controlled by an officer of the Motor Traffic Commission supported by military police. Pétain established many quarries near the road and assigned civilian labour and territorial troops the task of filling in the road as quickly as the vehicles wore it down. By the end of February, 8,800 men were involved in the building and maintenance of the Sacred Way and 3,900 motor vehicles moved back and forth across it. By 6 March, in little over a week, 23,000 tons of munitions, 2,500 tons of material and 190,000 men moved into Verdun on this route. The workers spread the stone, recalled Pétain, and ‘the work of steam rollers to be done by the procession of motor-trucks’.* However, this was not the ideal solution because the partially crushed stones tore up the rubber tyres of the vehicles and the constant rattling put a stress on the engines, which required frequent maintenance.

  In June 1916, over 12,000 vehicles plied the road as one passed every 14 seconds travelling at 5–20km/h. Drivers often drove for 18-hour shifts and remained with their trucks for ten or more consecutive days. Before long, about 9,000 trucks, cars, and ambulances operated on the road making it possible for troops and supplies to move in and out of the salient. Vehicles returning from Verdun to Bar-le-Duc often carried troops, mainly from units leaving the front lines. Fresh troops arrived by rail at Revigny, Bar-le-Duc and Baudonvillers (south of Bar-le-Duc) and boarded a convoy of trucks that headed down the Sacred Way to Verdun. Each day, the road handled an average of 13,000 troops, 6,400 tons of materials and 1,500 tons of ammunition. There is no doubt that the small railway and the Sacred Way not only provided logistical support, but also allowed Pétain to rotate divisions constantly in and out of the Verdun Salient. The road and railways were mostly beyond the range of most German artillery, and the German air force proved to be a minor threat. Thus, this lifeline was instrumental in preventing a German victory at Verdun.

  Sources: Jean Boucheré’s Chemin de Fer Historique de la Voie Sacree at http://translate.google.com/translate?hl=en&sl=fr&u=http://traintouristique-lasuzanne.fr/index.php/fr/l-histoire-du-meusien/la-guerre&prev=search

  Ministère de la défense: http://www.defense.gouv.fr

  Henri Philippe Pétain and Margaret MacVeagh (trans.), Verdun (Toronto: Dial Press, 1930).

  * Pétain, Verdun, p. 96.

  The Alpine Corps illustrates how German units at Verdun operated for extended periods and its history highlights the problems associated with long service in the front lines. This corps lost slightly over 70 per cent of its infantry at Verdun between June and early August 1916. It transferred to the Argonne on 12 August to recoup its losses before it was sent to Rumania at the end of September.57 The Guards Ersatz Division took part in operations at Verdun beginning in May. It drew back from the front at the end of August after having lost 50 per cent of its infantry. The 4th Division reached the front in May and took heavy losses a few days later in the attack on Hill 304. In July, it incurred heavy further casualties in the fighting around Thiaumont. The 2nd Bavarian Division showed up at Verdun in May. During operations near Douaumont in June, it lost 50 per cent of its contingent and had to be reconstituted. It returned to the front on 23 June and once again, it took such heavy losses that one regiment was left with only forty men. The division had to withdraw to the St Mihiel Salient to recover. The 7th Reserve Division, which took part in the operations of early June and the attack in Chapitre Woods on 21 June, took over 50 per cent casualties. On 1 July, it was sent to the Argonne to reorganize. The 12th Reserve Divisio
n was in the Verdun sector on the west bank when the battle began. It joined the fight in March. By mid-May, it had lost 70 per cent of its infantry and had to be sent into reserve. The 38th Division reached the Verdun Front in mid-May 1916 and remained there until October. It had lost 52 per cent of its infantry when it transferred to the Somme. The 39th Division fared even worse. It served with the XV Corps on the Woëvre from the beginning of the offensive. In March, it took heavy losses at Caillette Woods and became involved in fighting around Vaux in August ending the battle with 69 per cent infantry casualties. Although French and German units were decimated at Verdun, the Germans had the harder time of it. Their units stayed fully engaged for months with only enough respite to replenish their forces whereas most of the French divisions did their time, moved to another front and returned for a second or third round at Verdun.

  Pay Back

  July represented the high water mark for the Germans on the east bank of the Meuse. The French had already stymied their advance on the west bank in early June. The resolute French defence of Verdun in the spring should have made it obvious that Operation Gericht would be futile. The French had taken up the challenge to fight it out at Verdun, but they were not being bled white. The attrition rate did not reach the levels Falkenhayn had expected. In the summer, the Austrians were once again on the verge of collapse on the Eastern Front in the face of the Brusilov Offensive. On the Western Front, the Somme Offensive presented a major threat to the Germans. Both fronts began to sap the strength of the 5th Army.

  On 11 July 1916, Falkenhayn ordered the 5th Army to end offensive operations, but he had a change of heart at the end of the month and he told the Crown Prince to launch another offensive on the east bank in August. The 5th Army had already dispatched some divisions to the Somme on 18 July. The X Reserve Corps (7th Reserve, 19th Reserve and 9th Landwehr Divisions) moved from the east bank to the Argonne.59 The XVI Corps remained in the Argonne. The Western Attack Group still consisted of the VI Reserve Corps (13th, 14th and 20th Reserve divisions). General Hermann von François replaced Max von Gallwitz as commander of the Western Group.60 Höhn’s Group (4th and 6th Bavarian divisions) formed under General Maximilian von Höhn and XVIII Reserve Corps (21st Reserve and Guard Ersatz divisions) made up the remainder of the group.61 The Eastern Attack Group consisted of the XXIV Reserve Corps (38th, 54th and 192nd divisions) and VII Corps (13th and 14th divisions). The XV Corps remained unchanged (30th, 39th and 50th divisions).