Verdun 1916

by J E Kauffman

  11. In early August, the French 1st and 2nd Armies invaded Lorraine only to be beaten back by the German rearguards. Elements of the 1st Army advanced into Alsace and took Mulhouse, but a German counter-attack on 9 August drove them out of the city. These French units were reformed into the Army of Alsace on 10 August and sent back to the front. However, this army was defeated and dissolved late in the month when its remnants became the new 7th Army.

  12. According to Norman Stone, World War One: A Short History (New York: Basic Books, 2007), the Belgians sabotaged only about ⅙ of their rail system in early September. In addition, supply relied mainly on horse transport. Priority was given to ammunition. Tens of thousands of horses died from eating green corn (living off the land) and from the summer heat. The German army had a small number of trucks totalling about 4,000, but only about 1,300 of these were still operational after the end of the first month (pp. 43–4).

  13. Many historians accused Moltke of reducing the right wing that advanced through Belgium to strengthen the left. However, this decision did not alleviate the logistics problem Schlieffen had failed to anticipate.

  14. The Aisne forms a 64km (40-mile) east–west trench with steep walls that drop to a flat floor about 150m below containing the meandering, narrow and deep river. The Chemin des Dames (Ladies’ Path) refers to the road and ridge on which it runs and which was held by the Germans. Limestone quarries left extensive galleries, which were used by the Germans. The first French assaults between Compiègne and Soissons, hindered by the flooded Aisne and heavy rains, failed. The British had a similar experience east of Soissons. By 14 September, the Allies were only able to cross to the north bank with the Germans situated above them. The German 2nd Army held on to the Suippe River, a tributary of the Aisne. The first stalemate began here with the Battle of the Aisne, 12–18 September. The Germans retook their lost positions overlooking the river (Douglas Wilson Johnson, Topography and Strategy in the War (New York: Henry Holt & Co., 1917), pp. 39–40).

  15. Fort Manonviller, located in an isolated position blocking the Charmes Gap and one of the most heavily armed French forts, came under heavy bombardment, including 305mm and 420mm weapons, for over two days before surrendering on 27 August. The commander gave up since he did not appreciate the ability of the fort to continue to resist and did not believe French forces would rescue him. The Germans destroyed the fort days later when they had to retreat.

  16. Hew Strachan points out in The First World War (New York: Penguin, 2003), p. 136, that Ludendorff through self-aggrandizement created his reputation as the conqueror of Liège by seizing the undefended citadel and then claiming Liège would fall in the first 48 hours. He was wrong, since the forts of the Liège ring took another ten days before the last one fell.

  17. The battle, which actually took place at Allenstein (Polish Olsztyn) rather than Tannenberg, lasted from 26–30 August 1914. After crushing Samsonov’s Russian 2nd Army, the Hindenburg/Ludendorff team turned against Rennenkampf’s Russian 1st Army, handing it a defeat in the 1st Battle of the Masurian Lakes between 7 and 14 September. In each of these battles the Russians lost over 125,000 (nearly 300,000 according to some sources). Samsonov committed suicide, while Rennenkampf retained his command until he was relieved later in 1914 for another failure. Some historians combine the battles of Tannenberg and the Masurian Lakes into one.

  18. The Gniła Lipa and Złota Lipa rivers are tributaries of the Dniester.

  19. General Ivanov, a non-stellar veteran of the Russo-Japanese War, was very cautious and deliberate. These qualities prevented him from achieving an even greater victory in August/September 1914. He was relieved for incompetence after the German Gorlice-Tarnów Offensive of 1915. His replacement, Alexi Brusilov, had commanded the 8th Army during Ivanov’s offensive with great success.

  20. Hindenburg took a couple of corps from 8th Army and troops from large fortress garrisons and the Landwehr to create the 9th Army in the latter half of September.

  21. Hindenburg became Commander-in-Chief of Eastern Front on 1 November 1914 and he was promoted to Field Marshal on 27 November.

  22. As in Galicia, the September and October rains turned roads and fields to mire.

  23. The Russians did not have time to bring up their heavy siege artillery during the two-week siege.

  24. General Mackensen commanded a corps in the 8th Army during the Battle of Tannenberg. During Hindenburg’s advance to the Vistula, his corps tried to break through the defences of Warsaw. Like Hindenburg, he was overconfident and looked down upon the Slavs as inferior people. In addition, like Hindenburg, it was only a matter of months before he received promotion to Field Marshal for his operations against Russia.

  25. The Battle of Łódź raged until 6 December when the Germans finally took the city and temporarily stabilized the Eastern Front.

  26. Casualty figures on the Eastern Front for both sides vary widely, more so than those of the Western Front. In fact, many sources disagree upon dates because the Russians still used the Julian calendar.

  27. In December 1914 the Russian troops received their first shipments of barbed wire.

  28. Many of the young men, who had recently come from universities and served in units with few experienced officers, charged the enemy in the old fashioned way, like the French. The press called it the ‘Massacre of Innocents’.

  29. Some historians place the beginning of 1st Champagne in February 1915 because there was no major action before that month.

  30. Alsace had fewer mineral resources.

  31. Potiorek was in charge of Archduke Franz Ferdinand’s security at Sarajevo in 1914. After his humiliating defeat in Serbia, the government forced him into retirement on 23 December 1914.

  32. The Aubers Ridge, over 6km long and 14m high at its highest point, dominated, nonetheless, its surroundings much like the Vimy Ridge, which was more impressive at about 7km long and 60m, above the Douai Plains.

  33. Both sides worked on developing poison gas. In early 1915, gas cylinders were the only practical delivery method since the use of artillery shells in gas attacks had yet to be perfected. Unfortunately for the Germans, the prevailing winds were westerly, which could blow the gas right back at them if they were not careful. Neither side had yet provided their troops with gas masks, although research was underway.

  34. The German divisions were part of the German Sud Armee, formed to help the Austrians.

  35. The ‘hurricane bombardment’ tactic has often been credited to Colonel George Bruchmüller, artillery commander of the 86th Division. He perfected it to take the achieving enemy by surprise and neutralize him. It consisted of several hours of intense bombardment. The British employed a similar method at Neuve Chapelle in 1915. In the first years of the war, the Allies generally devoted 30 per cent of their artillery to destroying the enemy wire. Since the hurricane bombardment failed to achieve this objective for the Allies, who lacked indirect-fire weapons in 1914, their barrages often lasted up to a week or more, alerting the enemy to the impending attack.

  36. The Germans used poison gas against the retreating Russians on 31 May. They experimented with tear gas shells against the Russians at Bolimov, west of Warsaw, at the end of January 1915 (before 2nd Ypres), but the liquid did not vaporize because of the cold weather.

  37. In 1941, the German army ran into the same problem when it invaded Russian (Soviet) territory.

  38. The Austrians established well-built defences with communications and zigzag trenches. This was the only battle where the Austrian losses exceeded the Italian ones. Cadorna was convinced that infantry could attack uphill and defeat a well dug-in opponent (or enemy) with appropriate artillery support and elan. He firmly believed in frontal attacks and claimed that the campaign in France supported his views. Overall, his strategy proved as preposterous as Conrad’s, his opponent, since neither man factored in weather, terrain and the enemy’s capabilities.

  39. This expansion often resulted in a large amount of defective ammuniti
on.

  40. The 77mm Feldkanone 96 fired up to twelve rounds a minute at a maximum range of 7,800m. The new gun ready in 1916, the 77mm Feldkanone 16, fired fifteen to twenty rounds a minute at ranges up to 10,700m. The French 75mm Mle 1897 had a range of up to 9,500m and could fire fifteen to eighteen rounds a minute with greater accuracy than the German 77mm FK 96.

  41. The French replaced the flamboyant army uniform with a light-blue (known as horizon blue) one at the end of 1914. The government had considered the change before the war began.

  42. The US military adopted a modified form of the German design late in the twentieth century.

  43. In 1915, French Captain André Laffargue’s pamphlet entitled ‘The Attack in Trench Warfare’ recommended a similar attack procedure. The French high command, however, rejected his proposal and the Allies were slow to adopt such methods. The Germans refined these methods at Riga in 1917 and then in the West in 1918.

  44. Small forts or strongpoints were not an uncommon feature of the trench lines, and were common in the US Civil War.

  45. The London Pact of April 1915 offered the Italians Austrian-controlled Trentino and the South Tyrol, the Istria Peninsula, sections of the Dalmatian coast and other territories and concessions.

  46. The Russians built the Kovno Fortress complex between 1882 and 1903. It consisted of nine forts and eight battery positions. The fortifications were modernized with reinforced concrete. The Germans brought up a 420mm Gamma howitzer and reduced the forts one by one in 11 days, inflicting 20,000 casualties among the 90,000-man garrison. The Osowiec Fortress, built in 1882, consisted of four brick forts and several water defences that received reinforced concrete late in the century. The Germans bombarded it in September 1914 and in February–March 1915. In August four 420mm Big Berthas moved into position. On 6 August 1915, the Germans opened a new bombardment and assault, this time leading off with chlorine gas. As three regiments prepared to assault the fortress 60 dazed and bloodied Russians, still choking from the chlorine gas attack that had killed over 2,000 of their comrades, emerged from the rubble like the living dead, ready to fight back. According to legend, the ‘Dead Men’s Attack’ so spooked the Germans that they broke off the assault. Finally, as the Germans moved to encircle the fortress, the front started breaking up and the Russians evacuated the site on 18 August.

  47. In his book, Pétain: Verdun to Vichy (Dulles, VA: Potomac Books, 2008), Robert B. Bruce provides additional details on Pétain’s rise from colonel to general early in the war in addition to this description.

  48. Unlike in pre-twentieth century wars, the commanding general seldom commanded from the front since battlefields now extended over many kilometres. Sites from which a commander could observe the entire operation of all units involved and direct the action were rare. Modern communications made it possible for commanders to maintain contact with units that were out of sight. Thus, most generals only arrived on the battlefield to inspire their troops or for a first-hand view of the conditions.

  49. Planning for the Artois offensive began before the German offensive in Russia. The French 10th Army took one of the key objectives, Vimy Ridge, but lost it soon afterwards.

  Chapter 2

  1. Some of these older fortifications were partially modernized. According to Clayton Donnell, author of Breaking the Fortress Line 1914 (Barnsley: Pen & Sword, 2013), the old citadel of Montmédy was modified by Séré de Rivières in the early 1880s when new casemates, magazines in one of the bastions, and underground barracks were built. Traverses were added before 1890. Plans were prepared for Galopin Mle 1890 turrets for 155mm guns, but they were not carried out. In 1914, the old fortress held a garrison of 2,300 men and included 4 120mm guns on the ramparts. Longwy also had a Vauban era fortress with fifty guns on its ramparts, twelve of which were 120mm Mle 1878 cannons. Lille, like Verdun, had an old citadel and it was surrounded by a ring of six forts from the 1870s and thirteen ouvrages from the early 1890s. Maubeuge also had a ring of seven detached forts from the 1870s and seven intermediate works built between 1886 and the late 1890s (details from Rudi Rolf’s Dictionary on Modern Fortification (Middelburg: PRAK Publishing, 2004)).

  2. The Vosges formed a barrier along the border between the Rhine Valley and the Alsatian border with France. They offered only two significant invasion routes: through the Belfort Gap down the Rhine Valley and through the Saverne Gap towards Strasbourg. The Metz–Thionville fortified region blocked the main transportation route into the more open terrain of Lorraine.

  3. In March 1913, the Schneider works produced a 105mm howitzer. Joffre had limited success in obtaining medium and heavy guns, and indirect-fire weapons for the army. A few long-range 105mm guns were ordered in 1913. Thus, France went to war without a field howitzer and its troops paid dearly for the lack of such a weapon. In August 1914, each French army corps had 120 75mm guns. In contrast, a German army corps had 108 77mm guns, 36 105mm howitzers and 15 150mm howitzers. The French army had 104 Mle 1904 Rimailho 155mm guns and 96 Bacquet Mle 1890 120mm guns. The Bacquet gun had a recoil system. This gun and the Bacquet 155 C Mle 1890 cannon were considered the first French heavy field artillery. They were replaced by the 105mm Mle in 1913. There were 20 batteries (about 100 guns) equipped with the long De Bange 120mm Mle 1878 gun on a Cingoli mounting. The Cingoli system consisted of a plated track over the carriage wheels which increased gun mobility. The German army had 360 100mm guns, 360 130mm guns and 128 howitzers of 210mm. The French siege artillery consisted of old 120mm guns modified to be tractor drawn and short 155mm guns on a mobile platform. These weapons lacked the modern recoil system of the French ‘75’ so they had to be realigned every time they fired. The French also had long 155mm, short 155mm guns and 220mm howitzers. The army ordered eighteen 280mmm howitzers in late 1913 (delivery began after November 1915). The French did not develop weapons similar to the German Minenwerfers, the design of which was influenced by the Russo-Japanese War. (Sources: Joseph Joffre, Colonel T. Bentley Mott (trans.) and Colonel S.J. Lowe (trans.), The Personal Memoirs of Joffre, 2 vols (New York: Harper & Brothers Publishers, 1932), Vol. 2, p. 589 and Guy François, Pierre Touzin and Francois Vaulliller, Les Canons de la Victoire 1914–1918, 3 vols (Paris: Historie & Collections, 2006–10), Vol. 1).

  4. Joffre expected the main German advance to go through the Ardennes instead of Liège, whereas in the 1930s, Pétain among others concluded that region was ‘impassable’ to a modern army.

  5. Italy did not enter the war with the Triple Alliance; instead, it joined the Entente in the spring of 1915.

  6. Known as the Rotunda, this fort was used by German security police in the Second World War and became a site for executing prisoners.

  7. It was not possible for the Russians to shorten the axles on their railway vehicles.

  8. General Herr’s evaluation was published in the American Field Artillery Journal in 1927. He mentioned that the Germans developed a 77mm gun, which, in his estimation, was not as good as the French gun. The German actual response to the French gun, he claimed, was curved or indirect fire provided by the 105mm howitzer Model 1898, which was modified in 1909. This was a quick-fire weapon equipped with shields to protect the crew and had the mobility of field guns. According to the German artillery regulations of 1912, ‘the light howitzer accomplishes the same missions as the field gun. It has a much greater efficacy than the gun against defiladed artillery, objectives protected by overhead cover, against localities, and against troops placed in heavy woods.’ According to Herr, the French 75mm gun was not effective in counter-battery fire whereas German doctrine emphasized counter-battery fire.

  9. In Belgium, Brialmont had already installed a turret on a fort at Antwerp in the 1860s and mounted six more in two forts in the same ring in 1870.

  10. Mougin turrets were found at forts Liouville (turret damaged and destroyed during bombardment of September 1914), Pagny, Frouard, Manonviller (both turrets were out of action when the fort surrendered in 1914), Pont Saint-Vincent, Lu
cey, Villey Le Sac, Longchamp, Parmont and Girmagny.

  11. The French term for rolled iron is ‘laminated iron’.

  12. The rolling compressed the metal sheets (iron or steel). A full hard roll resulted in the greatest reduction in thickness (about 50 per cent), whereas a half-hard roll did not decrease the thickness appreciably.

  13. These Mle 1890 turrets are not to be confused with a second one-gun turret designed to reduce the cost.

  14. Compared to the 1890s Galopin turret mounting two 155mm guns, this 1907 model cost 60 per cent less (500,000 Francs compared to 850,000 Francs). It cost more than three times as much as a 75mm twin gun turret of 1902 (800,000 Francs to 140,000 Francs). Thus, for the price of one single 155mm gun turret the army could purchase three twin 75mm gun turrets (1 x 155mm gun or 6 x 75mm guns). The prices cited come from various sources and represent the price at the time of installation.

  15. At Verdun, one each was installed at forts Douaumont, Moulainville and Rozellier and two at Fort Vacherauville. At Toul, Fort Lucey received two, the forts at Épinal three and the forts of Belfort two.

  16. On his Internet site (http://www.fortiffsere.fr/), Cédric Vaubourg claims that this was due to the fact that an exercise at Toul revealed that poisonous gases were released in the turrets during firing.

  17. There is some confusion regarding the type of metal used in the turrets. Plans and descriptions published in a 1909 French manual on fortifications for army engineers indicate that the roof armour was made of rolled iron, but according to other sources, a form of nickel steel was used instead. In 1890, the Bulletin of the American Iron & Steel Association stated that the nickel-steel plates made by the Creusot works were tested at Annapolis and performed better than other metals when a 6in projectile penetrated them creating a hole, but no cracks. Nickel steel alloy contains about 3.5 per cent to 5 per cent nickel. At the time, however, sources of nickel were limited and its price was high. By 1900 it was replacing compound armour.