Margaret Thatcher: The Autobiography

by Margaret Thatcher

  A month before the NATO summit I set out in my speech to the North Atlantic Council my own views on the matter. The stress I placed on preservation of the United States’ military presence in Europe and the continuing role of updated nuclear weapons would not have surprised my audience. But I also emphasized that NATO must consider an ‘out of area’ role. I asked the question:

  Ought NATO to give more thought to possible threats to our security from other directions? There is no guarantee that threats to our security will stop at some imaginary line across the mid-Atlantic. It is not long since some of us had to go to the Arabian Gulf to keep oil supplies flowing. We shall become very heavily dependent on Middle Eastern oil once again in the next century. With the spread of sophisticated weapons and military technology to areas like the Middle East, potential threats to NATO territory may originate more from outside Europe. Against that background, it would be only prudent for NATO countries to retain a capacity to carry out multiple roles, with more flexible and versatile forces.

  This passage reflected my thinking over a number of years. I had seen for myself how important a western presence could be in securing western interests in far-flung areas of the world. I did not believe that even if the military threat from the Soviets had diminished, that from other dictators would not arise. But of course I could not know that within two months we would be confronted by an explosive crisis in the Gulf.

  * The US-Soviet Strategic Arms Reduction Talks, which had begun in the first year of the Reagan Administration.

  * The Helsinki Final Act of 1975 contained the following commitment: ‘The participating States regard as inviolable all one another’s frontiers as well as the frontiers of all States in Europe and therefore they will refrain now and in the future from assaulting these frontiers. Accordingly, they will also refrain from any demand for, or act of, seizure and usurpation of part or all of the territory of any participating State.’ However, the Final Act also provided that ‘frontiers can be changed, in accordance with international law, by peaceful means and by agreement’.

  CHAPTER THIRTY-NINE

  No Time to Go Wobbly

  The response to Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait in 1990

  ON THE MORNING OF WEDNESDAY 1 August 1990 the VC10 left Heathrow with me and my party aboard bound for Aspen, Colorado. The President was due to open the Aspen Institute Conference on the Thursday and I was to close it on the Sunday. At the time I left I already knew that the Iraqis were sending troops down to the border with Kuwait. The negotiations between Iraq and Kuwait, which had been taking place in Jeddah, had broken for the day but we understood that they were to be resumed. It therefore seemed that the Iraqi military action was a case of sabre rattling. We soon learned that it was not. At 2 a.m. Kuwaiti time on Thursday 2 August Iraq carried out a full-scale military invasion – though claiming that it was an internal coup – and assumed total control.

  An hour later – early evening on Wednesday, Colorado time – Charles Powell telephoned me to tell me the news and I decided at once to instruct two ships in Penang and Mombasa, both about a week’s sailing time away, to make for the Gulf while the situation developed. We already had one ship of the Armilla patrol in the Gulf – HMS York, at Dubai. First thing the following morning I learned in a note from Charles about the latest situation. Other Arab governments had evidently been caught off balance. The Arab League of Foreign Ministers meeting in Cairo had failed to agree a statement. King Hussein was trying to excuse the Iraqi action on the grounds that the Kuwaitis had been unnecessarily difficult. The ruling families in the Gulf were alarmed. With strong British support the UN Security Council had passed a resolution condemning Iraq for its action and calling for total withdrawal and immediate negotiations. Back in London, Douglas Hurd – competent professional that he was – had ordered the freezing of Kuwaiti assets in Britain, the Iraqis unfortunately having only debts. An immediate question now was whether Saddam Hussein would go over the border and seize Saudi Arabia’s oil fields.

  I was staying at the guesthouse to Ambassador Henry Catto’s ranch while all this was going on. I read Charles’s note, listened to the news and then went for a walk to sort things out in my own mind. By the time I got back Charles and Sir Antony Acland, our ambassador, were waiting for me. We established from the White House that President Bush was still coming to Aspen and would arrive later that morning. As is my wont, I set about arguing through the whole problem with them and by the end had defined the two main points. By the time I was due to meet him at the main ranch I was quite clear what we must do.

  Fortunately, the President began by asking me what I thought. I told him my conclusions in the most straightforward terms. First, aggressors must never be appeased. Second, if Saddam Hussein were to cross the border into Saudi Arabia he could go right down the Gulf in a matter of days. He would then control 65 per cent of the world’s oil reserves and could blackmail us all. Not only did we have to move to stop the aggression, therefore, we had to stop it quickly. In making these two points I felt that experience as well as instinct enabled me to trust my judgement. There was, of course, the enormously valuable experience of having been Prime Minister through the Falklands War. My visits to the Gulf had also allowed me to establish bonds of trust with the rulers of many of these states. I understood their problems and could gauge their reactions. At this point President Bush was told that the President of Yemen wanted to speak to him on the telephone. Before the President left to take the call, I reminded him that Yemen, a temporary member of the Security Council, had not voted on the resolution demanding the withdrawal of Iraqi forces from Kuwait. It turned out that the President of Yemen too wanted time to come up with an Arab solution. President Bush told him that such a ‘solution’ must involve the withdrawal of Iraqi forces and return of the proper Government of Kuwait if it was to be accepted. The President of Yemen then apparently compared what had happened in Kuwait to US intervention in Grenada, at which George Bush rightly bridled. When he returned President Bush and I agreed that all this did not seem very encouraging. We then went out to give a press conference. The President was asked if he ruled out the use of force. He replied that he did not – a statement the press took to be a strengthening of his position against Saddam Hussein. But I had never found any weakness in it from the first.

  Understandably, I now had only half my mind on the programme of events which had been arranged for me. That said, I was fascinated by what I saw. Friday was a day of presentations and discussions about science, environment and defence – punctuated by news about what was happening in the crisis which now gripped the international community. I was talking to the young scientists working at the SDI National Test Facility at Falcon when I was called away to speak to President Bush on the telephone. He gave me the good news that President Ozal of Turkey had said he would take action to cut off the Iraqi oil which was going through the Turkish pipeline. As a secular but predominantly Muslim state with a large army, looking westwards to Europe but also on the fringe of the Middle East, Turkey would be a vital bulwark against aggressive Islamic fundamentalism or other brands of revolutionary Arab nationalism like that of Saddam Hussein.

  After lunch I went by helicopter to the Strategic Air Defense Monitoring Center at Cheyenne Mountain which keeps a watch on every satellite launched. Again I felt awed by the sophistication of America’s scientific and technological achievement. From within this hollowed-out mountain the United States could observe deep into space for military and scientific purposes. Two days later I was told by the general in charge of the operation that they had observed that the Soviets had now put up two satellites over the northern end of the Gulf. It was a useful indication of their concern.

  On Saturday morning I spoke with President Mitterrand on the telephone. As over the Falklands, he was taking a robust position: in spite of a misconceived speech at the United Nations which tried to link a solution of the Gulf crisis with other Middle Eastern issues, President Mitterrand and France showed
throughout the crisis that the French were the only European country, apart from ourselves, with the stomach for a fight.

  Though the speech I gave on Sunday morning to the Aspen Institute addressed broader international issues, I inserted a section on the Gulf. It read:

  Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait defies every principle for which the United Nations stands. If we let it succeed, no small country can ever feel safe again. The law of the jungle would take over from the rule of law.

  The United Nations must assert its authority and apply a total economic embargo unless Iraq withdraws without delay. The United States and Europe both support this. But to be fully effective it will need the collective support of all the United Nations’ members. They must stand up and be counted because a vital principle is at stake: an aggressor must never be allowed to get his way.

  My mind was now turning to the next practical steps we could take to exert pressure on Iraq. The EC countries had agreed to support a complete economic and trade embargo of Iraq. But it was the Iraqi oil exports and the willingness of Turkey and Saudi Arabia to block them which would be crucial. I instructed the Foreign Office to prepare plans to implement a naval blockade in the north-east Mediterranean, the Red Sea and the north of the Gulf to intercept shipments of Iraqi and Kuwaiti oil. I also asked that more thought be given to precise military guarantees for Saudi Arabia and for details of what aircraft we could send to the Gulf area immediately. I had planned to take a few days’ holiday with my family, but after an invitation from the White House decided instead to fly to Washington and resume my talks with the President. For all the friendship and co-operation I had had from President Reagan, I was never taken into the Americans’ confidence more than I was during the two hours or so I spent that afternoon at the White House. The meeting began in a very restricted session with just the President, Brent Scowcroft, myself and Charles Powell. Half an hour later we were joined by Vice-President Dan Quayle, Jim Baker and Chief of Staff John Sununu. The last twenty minutes were attended by the Secretary-General of NATO.

  The President that day was firm, cool, showing the decisive qualities which the Commander-in-Chief of the greatest world power must possess. Any hesitation fell away. I had always liked George Bush. Now my respect for him soared.

  The President began by reporting what was known about the situation and US plans to deal with it. Saddam Hussein had sworn that if American forces moved into Saudi Arabia he would liberate the kingdom from the Saudi royal family. There were now clear photographs showing that Iraqi tanks had moved right up to the border with Saudi Arabia. I said that it was vital to bolster the Saudis. The main danger was that Iraq would attack Saudi Arabia before the King formally asked the United States for help.

  In fact, part of the way through our discussions, Defense Secretary Dick Cheney telephoned the President from Saudi Arabia. He reported that King Fahd was fully behind the United States plan to move the 82nd Airborne Division together with forty-eight F-15 fighters to Saudi Arabia. The King’s only condition was that there should be no announcement until the forces were actually in place. This was excellent news.

  This meeting also saw the beginning of an almost interminable argument between the Americans – particularly Jim Baker – and me about whether and in what form United Nations authority was needed for measures against Saddam Hussein. I felt that the Security Council Resolution which had already been passed, combined with our ability to invoke Article 51 of the UN Charter on self-defence, was sufficient. Although I did not spell this out on the present occasion my attitude, which had been reinforced as a result of our difficulties with the UN over the Falklands, was based on two considerations. First, there was no certainty that the wording of a resolution, which was always open to amendment, would finish up by being satisfactory. If not, it might tie our hands unacceptably. Of course, with the end of the Cold War the Soviet Union was likely to be more co-operative. Communist China, fearful of isolation, was also disinclined to create too many problems. But the fact remained that if one could achieve an objective without UN authority there was no point in running the risks attached to seeking it.

  Second, I did not like unnecessary resort to the UN, because it suggested that sovereign states lacked the moral authority to act on their own behalf. If it became accepted that force could only be used – even in self-defence – when the United Nations approved, neither Britain’s interests nor those of international justice and order would be served. The UN was a useful – for some matters vital – forum. But it was hardly the nucleus of a new world order. There was still no substitute for the leadership of the United States.

  I returned to London on the Tuesday. The following day I had an hour’s telephone conversation with King Fahd to receive his formal request for our own planes and (if necessary) armed forces to be stationed in Saudi Arabia. He expressed incredulity that King Hussein should have sided with Saddam Hussein, whose party had murdered King Hussein’s relatives. But King Fahd was as strong as ever in his determination to stand up against aggression.

  Later that day I also had the sad duty of attending Ian Gow’s funeral. One of my most loyal and candid advisers, there were to be many times when I missed his shrewd counsel and his deadpan wit.

  I was not allowed by the Conservative Party to see through the campaign to throw Saddam Hussein out of Kuwait. But in the months which now followed – and in spite of the other difficulties I faced – my attention was rarely away from the Gulf for long. I set up a small Cabinet sub-committee – Douglas Hurd (Foreign Secretary), Tom King (Defence Secretary), John Wakeham (Energy Secretary), Patrick Mayhew (Attorney-General), William Waldegrave (Minister of State at the Foreign Office), Archie Hamilton (Minister of State for the Armed Forces) and the Chief of the Defence Staff. It was this group, which met regularly, rather than the wider Cabinet Committee OD, which took the main decisions.

  One of our first tasks was to provide the promised support for Saudi Arabia. On Thursday 9 August Tom King announced the dispatch of two squadrons of aircraft – one made up of Tornado F3 air defence fighters and the other of Jaguar ground attack planes, 24 aircraft in all. They were in place and operational two days later. Nimrod maritime reconnaissance and VC10 tanker aircraft were also sent. We reinforced them at the end of August with a further squadron of Tornados – but this time the GRI ground-attack version – which were sent to Bahrain to provide a day-and-night anti-armour capability. Rapier air defence detachments were deployed in support.

  Of course, I kept in frequent touch with President Bush over the telephone. We regularly discussed the latest information about Saddam Hussein’s intentions. The general view seemed to be that whatever he had originally planned, he would not attack Saudi Arabia once American forces were there. But it seemed to me that the important lesson for us was that Saddam Hussein was simply not predictable. As I put it in a minute to the Ministry of Defence on Sunday 12 August:

  We thought that Iraq would not move into Kuwait, although their forces were massing on the border. Let us not make the same mistake again. They may move into Saudi Arabia. We must be ready.

  These were weeks of vigorous telephone diplomacy. I encouraged Turkey in its steadfast opposition to Iraq. The Turkish economy was badly hit because – unlike Jordan – Turkey was applying UN sanctions effectively. I never failed to remind the Saudis and the governments of the Gulf States how much they owed to Turkey and urged them to offer generous financial compensation.

  A less savoury ally was Syria, with which we still had no formal diplomatic relations. I disliked the regime and had no illusion about its continued willingness to employ terrorism and violence if they suited its purposes. But the fact remained that the rivalry between Syria and Iraq gave us an opportunity which must not be missed. Moreover, it made no sense to have our forces fighting alongside the Syrians if we still had no diplomatic channels for discussion. Reluctantly, therefore, I agreed to the reopening of diplomatic relations, though the formal announcement came a few days after I left of
fice in November.

  In the evening of 26 August President Bush telephoned me from Kennebunkport. I told him how pleased I was with Security Council Resolution 665 which had been passed the day before, enabling us to enforce the embargo. We must use our powers to stop Iraqi shipping. This was no time to go wobbly. Information we had gleaned from secret sources must be published to show up sanctions busting. The President agreed. I told him that the only area in which I thought we were not doing well was in the propaganda battle. We were now probably going into a longish period to see whether sanctions would work and we must not let the faint hearts grow in strength. The President was worried also about the use of the port of Aqaba in Jordan to evade sanctions and I told him that I would raise the question when I saw King Hussein in a few days’ time.

  I was saddened that one of Britain’s most long-standing friends appeared to be siding with the enemy. I had been on the friendliest of terms with King Hussein of Jordan but there could be no question of just allowing him to continue to flout sanctions and justify the Iraqi invasion. So when he came to see me for lunch on Friday 31 August I could not conceal my feelings.

  He began by making a forty-minute statement which yet again justified what the Iraqis had done. I said that I was amazed at his account of what was in fact a blatant act of aggression. Iraq was a country which had used chemical weapons against its own people. Saddam Hussein was not only an international brigand, he had done immense damage both to the Palestinian cause and to the Arabs and, over eight years, had vainly thrown wave after wave of young Iraqis into the war against Iran. I said that the King should not be attempting to negotiate on Iraq’s behalf but rather to implement sanctions against it. But no amount of pressure was likely to alter the calculation which the King had made: that he could not come out openly against Saddam Hussein and survive.