Flash Point

by Kenneth Andrus

  “Go on,” Stuart said.

  “If we give our tacit support to bilateral negotiations, we’ll be sending a positive signal to Beijing.”

  “What’s going on?” Brown asked. “This more of Cruz’s doing?”

  “It’s consistent with actions he’s orchestrated within the DFA,” Valardi replied flipping over a page of his notepad. “I’ll quote the article:

  ‘Following informal talks between DFA officials and a Chinese delegation led by Vice Foreign Minister Yang Po at the sidelines of the Forum for East Asia-Latin American Cooperation meetings held in San Palo last week, the Philippines and China are eyeing joint projects such as natural gas exploration and development of the fisheries industry in the Spratly Islands in a bid to build confidence and trust between the two countries to make way for a possible resolution of border issues in the South China Sea.’”

  “That was one sentence? Long-winded, just like their diplomats,” Payne said.

  Those observations earned the Defense Secretary a look of disapproval from Stuart. “Do we have any evidence of any off-line discussions at the conference?”

  “No, sir. But we did tell Manila they should handle the Spratly issue with Beijing. I’m not sure how much we should read into this development.”

  “The context then was different,” Brown countered. “We were talking about the release of a fishing boat crew and trying to keep from getting dragged into a war with the Chinese.”

  “That turned out well, didn’t it?” Payne said.

  “Gentlemen,” Stuart interrupted. “We’ve left some broken glass on the ground, but let’s press on, shall we? Richard, what exactly did the Chinese say?”

  Valardi extracted a sheet of paper from his briefcase. “The Chinese ambassador in Manila said that, for the time being, Beijing would put aside differences with Manila on the exploration of natural gas to set an example of dispute settlement.’”

  “Natural gas. Not oil. Everyone note that detail?” Payne asked.

  “There’s also a subtle threat woven in,” Brown said.

  Stuart urged, “Please elaborate.”

  “Nine years ago, China negotiated an agreement with Manila to develop natural gas deposits in the Reed Bank sea mount. That was all well and good until the Filipinos went behind Beijing’s back and issued a drilling permit to an American consortium.”

  “There you have it in a nutshell. The genesis of China’s move to occupy Mischief Reef and Scarborough Shoal,” Payne said

  “Exactly. Taken within this context, the wording ‘set an example’ is ominous. So is the ambassador’s next statement: ‘China would urge the other claimants to enter into similar agreements while territorial disputes remain unsettled.’”

  “Pretty tough,” Gilmore said. “I doubt Hanoi is thrilled.”

  “They aren’t,” Valardi answered. “Their Foreign Minister has already been in touch with our ambassador.”

  Stuart drew a spiral on his notepad tapping his pen on the center point. “Bob, is there anything new I should know about Exercise Balikatan?”

  “No, sir. The advance team is already in-country. Expeditionary Strike Group Five is operating with elements of the Philippine navy off Luzon. It goes without saying, the AFP wants to push through our military assistance package.”

  “No surprise there, Sheldon, but in the interest of time, let’s skip the details. What else?”

  “I’d like to provide a synopsis of the progress we’ve made with the Fleet Response Plan.”

  “Go ahead.”

  “By the end of the summer, we’ll have in place the components enabling us to surge fifty-percent more combat power to the Western Pacific.”

  “This increased capability will not escape the notice of the Chinese.”

  “No, sir. We’ve validated JTF 519 with our Terminal Fury exercises. Those exercises focused on identification and mobilization of the command staff and worked C4ISR. We’re ready to plug in the various operational components.”

  “The broader question is: how will the Chinese react?” Stuart said. “The last thing I need right now is for the Law of Unintended Consequences to come into play.”

  “We should expect some saber rattling.”

  “Such as?”

  “Making another move to strengthen their position in the Spratlys. Less likely would be a move on Taiwan.”

  “The PLA’s defense strategists’ goals are to secure their borders and establish a protective zone extending hundreds of miles into China’s surrounding seas. If threatened, they may act before we’ve strengthened our capabilities,” Lawson cautioned.

  “Bob, where would you focus?”

  “If there’s a flash point, I’d expect the oil platforms in the Con Song Basin.”

  “What’s behind your reasoning?”

  “The PLA’s setback in the Spratlys will not deter them for long. Since they were rebuffed in their attempt to push eastward toward the Philippines, we shouldn’t be surprised if they don’t turn south to test the resolve of the Vietnamese. There’s a smaller chance they’d look to the Senkaku Islands and challenge the Japanese.”

  “Your best guess?”

  “They’ll go south.”

  “Anyone disagree? Bryce?”

  “It fits. Xiao has made it clear he’s losing patience with countries taking advantage of his restraint to the theft of crude oil in waters claimed by China.”

  “Beijing's biggest club is not the military option. It’s their economic power,” Valardi said.

  Brown threw another opinion out on the table. “I don’t believe we should reverse our position to oppose bilateral agreements between China and the nations of ASEAN. We can’t approach these discussions between Manila and Beijing as an isolated event. There are other avenues we can pursue to establish common ground with Beijing.”

  “I’d suggest you propose to Montalvo he continue to stress the importance of the Manila Declaration,” Valardi said.

  “That’s my intention,” Stuart replied.

  “The PLA has sustained a series of embarrassing setbacks that should strengthen the influence of the moderates supporting Zhu,” Payne said. “The time’s opportune to advocate complete acceptance by all parties of the terms of the declaration.”

  “I concur,” Valardi said. “Now is not the time for Manila to get cold feet. They have an advantage even if their window of opportunity is closing.”

  “My guess is that’s Manila’s thinking. They have to exploit what little advantage they still have,” Gilmore observed.

  “There’s trouble on the horizon if Montalvo insists on going it alone.”

  “I don’t believe he will,” Stuart said. “They’re other points we shouldn’t lose sight of. The Filipinos are bringing their Malampaya natural gas fields online. When they do, they will have secured their national energy needs for years to come...which the Chinese haven’t.”

  “We’re back to oil.”

  “Indeed, we are. We can discuss alliances, terrorism, regional security, military deterrence, and economic growth, but in the end, the single strategic issue that underpins all of these is oil. Bryce, why don’t you summarize the National Intelligence Council’s report?”

  “The bottom line: The world will reach its maximum crude oil production capacity within the next two years. No new substantial deposits have been discovered and the existing reserves will not meet surging worldwide demand.”

  “Where do we stand?” Payne asked.

  “Our strong suit is natural gas and fracking.”

  “But we still have to secure the world’s crude oil supplies,” Payne added.

  “And that, gentlemen, is ultimately what the South China Sea is all about,” Stuart said.

  He looked around the table to signal he wanted everyone’s undivided attention. “While we must take these into consideration, there is one Montalvo doesn’t have to contend with. With no meaningful industrial or financial base and cheap labor, the Philippines can’t be economically i
nfluenced by China.”

  “Coerced is the more applicable term,” Gilmore said. “That and they’re buying folks like Atencio on the cheap.”

  “For starters, we all need to understand the degree to which our two economies are interdependent. Raising our national debt limit was necessary, but it comes with risks. China has helped support our currency, but the Chinese Central Bank may well sell off U.S. Treasury notes because of a weakening dollar against the yuan.”

  “Even the rumor of such an action sent the dollar plunging against the yen last year,” Valardi said.

  “And that in turn, negatively affected our trade balance with Japan and resulted in a panicked sell-off in the New York Stock Exchange.”

  “What do you propose?” Valardi asked.

  Stuart seized the moment to re-exert control and cut off any further discussion. “Bob is on the mark when he identified the Con Song Basin as a flash point. I want a balanced approach that contains Xiao and the hardliners of the PLA while providing every opportunity for Zhu’s moderates to retain control of the government this fall. Am I understood?”

  Stuart confirmed the affirmative responses. “Richard, I’ve reviewed the Deputies Committee’s point paper on foreign policy initiatives for the Asia-Pacific. I want you to float the proposal for a forum for energy cooperation to the principals. Japan, Korea, Russia, and China.”

  “If the overtures are received favorably, we’ll be able to develop them further at the upcoming APEC meeting, Mr. President.”

  “There will be no ‘ifs’ in these negotiations.”

  “Yes, sir.”

  “Good. Our plans for dealing with the Chinese will be flexible and capable of responding to unanticipated events. Be alert for subtle signs that represent a threat to our long-term objectives in the region. I expect you all to have contingency plans in place for us to review and execute on a moment’s notice. Tomorrow and Thursday we’ll take those measures to keep our friends in Manila from wandering off the path.”

  “Be reasonable––do it my way?” Lantis summed up to Stuart after the room emptied.

  “That’s the intent.”

  “You don’t think you were too hard on them?”

  “No. I appreciate their passion, but they do have to remain civil. I’ll talk to Bryce and Sheldon.”

  “By the way, I’ve got another item. I couldn’t find an appropriate place to work it in,” Lantis said, pulling a newspaper clipping out of his coat pocket. “I doubt this made it into Bryce’s Intel brief.”

  Stuart scanned the header: China Tackles Toilet Summit.

  “Dan, it’s apparent I don’t keep you busy enough,” he quipped, then sobered. What’s this all about?”

  “An example of multilateralism?”

  “Spare me.”

  “How about a three-day international commode conference with delegates from nineteen countries discussing such pressing issues as toilet technology, lavatory management, and the causal relationship between toilets and tourism development.”

  “Who comes up with this stuff?”

  “It’s on a need-to-know basis, Mr. President.”

  “Please tell me we were not represented.”

  “Sorry, sir.”

  “Oh, Lord.” Still grateful for the respite, Stuart smiled. “Would you please remind me again why I asked you to be a member of my personal staff?”

  “I serve at the convenience of The President, sir.”

  Chapter 24

  SPRATLY ISLAND

  THE SOUTH CHINA SEA

  07:45 FRIDAY 21 MARCH

  Nguyen Tran Thang stood at ease on the bridge of his patrol boat, HQ371, watching a frigate bird wheel and dip a short distance away. He took a sip of his morning tea, savoring the strong flavor of the Oolong blend. It was one of his few indulgences and he could feel the stress of the previous night’s mission drain from his body.

  He shifted his gaze to an awkward vessel tied up off his starboard side. He’d escorted the transport ship three hundred miles from Da Nang to this isolated outpost on Spratly Island.

  A satisfied smile crossed his face. The first contingent of troops assigned to the garrison had disembarked and were lining up in a loose formation on the pier.

  Labeled ‘tourists’ by the Foreign Ministry, these men represented only a single component of his country’s complex plan to counter Beijing’s expansion into Vietnamese waters. When completed, the installation on the three-square-kilometer island wouldn’t amount to much, but it would be a persistent thorn in the side of their enemy’s outposts scattered across the Spratly archipelago.

  For the past several months the Army Air Force had been working to extend the island’s 2,000-foot runway last used by South Vietnamese forces in 1975. The strip was being prepared for commercial flights by Vietnam Airways. Or so they wanted the media to believe. In point of fact, the new airstrip would expand the country’s defensive perimeter.

  He studied the soldiers. The Ministry’s ruse would be exposed soon enough. After that, any further pretense of secrecy would be self-deceiving. But no harm would come from continuing to claim the island was a resort.

  While he pondered Beijing’s possible responses, his executive officer, Lieutenant Tien, joined him. “XO.”

  “Yes, Comrade Commander?”

  “Prepare to get underway for Amboyn Cay. I want to weigh anchor within the hour.”

  Nguyen took a final sip of tea. The tea’s name, Fu Shou, was auspicious, meaning Buddha’s hand. He wondered if he should heed the urgings of the monks and devote himself to the peaceful teachings of this master, but dismissed the thought. Perhaps in another lifetime. Not after the events on Cuarteron Reef that had led to his assignment.

  The sandy cay lay just to the northwest of his current location and had played a much larger role in the recent confrontation with the PLAN than its size would suggest.

  The island was claimed by Hanoi in 1988, but no one had even bothered to step foot on it except a few enterprising souls mining guano. The barren island had none-the-less become part of the strategic initiative to counter Chinese expansionism in the region––a pawn in an escalating game of international chess.

  The Foreign Ministry had even provided Beijing several proposals the year before to resolve claimancy issues and establish Vietnam’s right to explore oil deposits in the Blue Dragon and White Tiger fields.

  The areas were of particular importance to the government because of the recent agreements PetroVietnam had signed with the American company, Horizon Offshore Exploration.

  Regrettably, China denounced as impertinent the Ministry’s offer to submit the issue to the International Court of Justice for arbitration. The government erected a stone marker on Cuarteron Reef and several other atolls in the immediate vicinity following the collapse of this initiative.

  Beijing countered by claiming irrevocable sovereignty over the entire area and increased its naval presence to back up its privilege.

  The Chief of the General Staff, in turn, countered the PLA’s actions and ordered his forces to begin patrolling the islands that defined the southern border of Vietnam’s claims in the South China Sea.

  The bulk of these contested islands formed a scattered chain extending east from Nguyen’s current location and terminated in Pigeon Reef one-hundred and forty miles away.

  While he thought the characterization overstated, the army had fortified two of them. The garrisons on Amboyna Cay and Barque Canada were each manned by a single platoon of soldiers. These small outposts southeast of Spratly Island were his next destination. Any further effort to establish an agreement on demarcation lines delineating maritime sovereignty was a complete waste of time.

  Nguyen made note of a dotted line on this chart representing Beijing’s alleged maritime boundaries. ‘The ‘Nine Dash Line.’ He marveled at the sheer audacity of the Chinese. He traced his finger over the map stopping at the strategic Balabac Strait separating the southern Philippine Islands from Malaysia.

 
; “Is something wrong, sir?” Tien asked.

  “They are seeking to assert their dominion over an expanse of ocean that defies comprehension.”

  “The Chinese?”

  “Yes.”

  “They cannot enforce their claim, can they?”

  “Not without difficulty, XO.”

  “Will we encounter trouble at Ambyon Cay and Barque Canada?”

  “Our mission will proceed as planned unless we run into an unexpected entanglement with the Filipinos. They’ve negotiated agreements with Beijing’s Ministries of Fisheries and Geology and Mineral Resources to pursue aquatic and seabed exploration. Using those agreements as pretext, the Chinese have begun a construction project on Commodore Reef to support their fishing industry.”

  “Should we divert and update our intelligence? It’s not far from our research station on Pigeon Reef.”

  Nguyen paused. “Commodore Reef has become a source of consternation for the Foreign Ministry in their dealings with Manila.”

  “Filipino fishermen are thumbing their noses at us, dragging their nets around the atoll with impunity,” Tien added.

  “Their actions can no more be tolerated than Beijing’s. Since the Ministry’s complaints to Manila continue to be met with indifference, we’ve been ordered to put some bite into our diplomatic protests.”

  “Do you have a plan, sir?”

  “I have the latitude to escort out of the area any Filipino boats illegally fishing near Pigeon Reef.”

  “And the Chinese?”

  “Our guidance in dealing with them is less precise.”

  “That could be to our benefit.”

  Nguyen tired of the questions. “What are the potential risks and planning factors required to conduct a reconnaissance of Commodore Reef?”

  Tien straightened. “Sir, if the Chinese have established a presence on Commodore Reef, the advantage the PLA will be intolerable. Even if the Chinese were there under the auspices of a collaborative effort with the Filipinos, it’s probable they would twist the partnership to their advantage. Beijing will not have forgotten their betrayal by Manila under similar circumstances several years ago.”

  “Very good, XO. The Chinese failure to grab the Reed Bank natural gas fields caused them considerable loss of face.”