White Gold

by Peter Burns

  But the disadvantages did not stop there. According to Zaza Kassachvili, the Georgian Rugby Union’s vice president, there was only one scrum machine for the team to train with – in the whole of Georgia. And to compound matters, the pre-tournament training camp planned for the Caucasus and a warm-up tour of Canada were both cancelled when funding was withdrawn by the Georgian government. The team therefore turned up both under strength and underprepared. The differences between the haves and the have-nots in world rugby remained as big as ever, and with the financial largesse that had been poured into preparing England for their campaign, the disparities could not have been more acute.

  In the event the Georgians were brave and passionate, as had been expected, but they were completely blown away by the power, speed and accuracy of the England team, who barely broke sweat in an 84–6 victory. England scored twelve tries, nine conversions and two penalties and held their line resolutely intact. Amid the flood of tries a world record was broken as Jason Leonard came off the bench to win his 112th cap. He had had harder games before that day, but few as special. And as for his team as a whole, they were up and running. It had not been an arduous workout but it was an important one to get the players’ minds focused and their bodies ready for the battles ahead of them.

  *

  There were several injury concerns during the run-up to the Springboks match. All three of England’s scrum-halves were struggling – Kyran Bracken had pulled up with a back spasm during the warm-up to the Georgia game, Matt Dawson had limped off with a dead leg after thirty-eight minutes and Andy Gomarsall had a heavily bruised shin. On top of that, Richard Hill had pulled a hamstring, Mike Tindall had been replaced during the game after taking a heavy knock and Danny Grewcock had broken a toe in training when Ben Cohen stood on his foot, though Woodward was relatively unconcerned by this latter injury, stating that the Bath lock could still be pressed into service in an emergency.

  An analysis of the Springboks team named to face them revealed further proof of the turmoil that South African rugby had been through in recent seasons. Constant chopping and changing of playing personnel in the Springboks squad thanks to injury, fatigue, loss of form and the vagaries of selection had given the South Africans a listless look. With the exception of captain Corne Krige and scrum-half Joost van der Westhuizen, South Africa were desperately short of experience, with the rest of the team averaging a paltry ten caps each. England’s experience, meanwhile, totalled 580 caps. While youthful exuberance is often a great positive, and the information available to Tony Biscombe on many of the Springboks was limited, there was no hiding the gulf in Test match experience between the teams.

  The demolition of the Springboks at Twickenham the previous November was still fresh on everyone’s minds as the game approached, but every participant understood that a repeat of that scoreline was not going to happen in such a high-stakes game. For Woodward and his medical staff, however, the biggest fear was that the game might bear witness to the violence that had dogged the Twickenham encounter.

  Krige, South Africa’s captain, was quick to try to dispel those worries, knowing that if his players gave even a hint of such misdemeanors again, the referee and his assistants would take swift action and the challenge to topple England would be even greater. ‘When you are in a situation like we were you’ve got one or two decisions to make,’ said Krige of the infamous November 2002 match. ‘You can either say, “We’re getting a hiding, I might as well give up,” or you can say, “I’m going down but I’m taking a few guys with me.” It wasn’t the right attitude to take and I apologised to the people I needed to, and since then I haven’t played like that again. As a South African and a Springbok, losing by that margin is totally unacceptable. It took me a long time to recover from that.’

  England were equally aware of the importance of maintaining discipline and reducing their penalty count. As ever with Woodward, he went the extra distance and employed international referee Steve Lander to join the back-room staff as an adviser. Lander offered thoughtful insight into the transgressions that the referees would be looking to pick up on, particularly around the breakdown. ‘The work Steve does for us is tremendously important,’ said Phil Larder. ‘His work at full-contact sessions has been essential. I’m sure his presence has made a massive difference.’

  ‘We have had a very intense four years since losing the 1999 World Cup quarter-final to South Africa,’ said Martin Johnson in the final press conference before the match. ‘Everything has moved on – our preparation, fitness levels, Test experience as a squad. By hard work we have become very difficult to beat. There have been some notable high points, such as beating South Africa in Bloemfontein, France in Paris, Ireland in Dublin, New Zealand in Wellington and Australia in Melbourne. But none of these games was as big or as important to England as our next game. It’s absolutely massive for both countries... Like New Zealand, South Africa are historically the giants of world rugby. They have lost only one World Cup game in the three tournaments they have been allowed to enter, including this one. That is the calibre of what we face on Saturday. And both camps are realistic enough to accept that it will be pretty difficult for the losers of this game to go on and win the World Cup.’

  While England were publicly walking the walk and talking the talk, behind the scenes things were not running as smoothly as they seemed. Neither Dawson’s nor Hill’s injuries were responding well to treatment and both were ruled out of the game. And for centre Will Greenwood, there was a development at home that had completely taken his thoughts away from the match.

  In September 2002, Greenwood and his wife, Caro, had lost their son, Freddie, after he had been born eighteen weeks premature. Just days before the South Africa match, Greenwood received a call from Caro telling him that she was being rushed into an emergency operating theatre as the tragic scenario seemed to be happening again with her second pregnancy. Greenwood went straight to Woodward to tell him.

  ‘Will came to see me at the start of the week to tell me there had been complications,’ said Woodward. ‘He knew how big the South Africa match was and didn’t want the team worrying about him. He wanted to keep it to himself – but he also wanted to stay and play if he could.’ Woodward instructed Louise Ramsay to provisionally book Greenwood on every flight out of Perth and back to the UK between that moment and the day after the game. If things worsened with Caro, Greenwood would be on the next plane heading north; if she remained stable, he would be heading home to be by her side as soon as the final whistle sounded.

  ‘I spoke to him almost on an hourly basis before the match,’ said Woodward. ‘He wanted to play and Caro wanted him to play, but we prepared in the knowledge that if her condition worsened, he would be on the first flight home. It had been a tough week for Will but he handled it brilliantly. He didn’t want the rest of the team to get worried about it so we only told them in the changing room after the game. Caro was also fantastic.’

  ‘Twelve thousand miles away with your missus in intensive care, it’s very difficult to know what to do with yourself,’ said Greenwood. ‘What do you do with your time? You think you should be back at home and then you think, what can I actually do if I’m back there? So rugby training and the games were a break from the constant thinking.’

  ‘What he did, playing that game and playing as well as he did, was phenomenal,’ said Martin Johnson. ‘I don’t think I would have been able to do it.’

  ‘During the match I even scored a try,’ said Greenwood. ‘And if you watch the replays you can see a smile on my face, because for a short time rugby had pushed the worry from my mind. There are not many jobs you can say that about.’

  Greenwood’s determination to stay and play the key group game was a testament to his dedication to the team and the iron-willed support of his wife and family back home. His importance to the team, as far as Woodward was concerned, could not be overstated.

  The son of former England flanker and coach, Dick Greenwood, Will followed
in the footsteps of England great Will Carling first at their alma mater, Sedbergh School, then in the colours of Harlequins, England and the Lions. His career had been fascinating; while still uncapped by England, he had been selected for the 1997 Lions tour to South Africa and had played with great aplomb until he suffered a near-fatal injury playing against Orange Free State. Carrying the ball into contact he had been hammered in the tackle and his head and shoulder had been swung on to the hard ground, knocking him unconscious and dislocating his shoulder. The danger had been that as he was knocked out his tongue had blocked his airway. Only swift intervention by the veteran Lions doctor James Robson saved Greenwood’s life.

  Upon his return to the UK he had a shoulder operation, but the joint troubled him for the rest of his career and he would have periods out of the game as a result. He won his first cap under Woodward in the autumn of 1997 against Australia, but his career began to falter as injury plagued him and his form dipped at Leicester, where he was playing at the time. He was released by coach Bob Dwyer and was signed by Harlequins, where he experienced a renaissance in his career and soon established himself as a key member of the England team. ‘Greenwood was Jonny Wilkinson’s secret weapon,’ said Woodward. ‘He was absolutely key to the success of the England team while I was in charge. Was he the best passer? No. Was he the best kicker? No. All round was he the best player? By a mile. His big thing was hitting the line flat and being able to offload the ball. He had everything. In terms of his communication skills and understanding of the game, his offloading ability, he was the best player I have ever seen play in the centre for England.’

  And so with Greenwood in place and only Richard Hill and Matt Dawson unavailable, Woodward had virtually his strongest team available to face the challenge of the Springboks. After the carnage at Twickenham the previous November, there was great anticipation that another bloody battle would ensue at the Subiaco Oval. In the event, none of the dark play that had so blighted the most recent encounter emerged as both sides let their rugby do the talking.

  In what was still a ferociously physical confrontation, Jonny Wilkinson played a typically calm and controlled game, keeping his team on the front foot with booming punts that pinned the Springboks back in their half and keeping the scoreboard ticking over with four penalties, a conversion and two beautifully struck drop-goals.

  The huge Springboks pack were causing difficulties for England at the scrum and around the breakdown and Martin Johnson’s team were clearly missing the influence of Richard Hill. Lewis Moody was a tenacious replacement but he had a difficult night, spilling ball, losing turnovers in the face of the bigger South African forwards at the breakdown and conceding one soft penalty with a high tackle that gifted the Springboks three points. Woodward had long espoused the qualities of Hill and now the man who had been ever present for England since Woodward had taken over was showing just how important he was with his absence.

  Despite the strength of their forwards, South Africa struggled to assert much authority on the game, not helped by their fly-half, Louis Koen, who missed four attempts at goal. His evening was made all the worse when Moody, in a moment of redemption, charged down a Koen clearance kick in the South African half. Greenwood was the first to react and he skilfully shepherded the ball over the line to score the game’s only try. From there England never looked back and they went on to win 25–6.

  The day after the game, Greenwood was on a flight back home. He arrived to find Caro in good spirits, her condition stabilised. She had a minor operation to help carry her pregnancy through its full duration and then, a week later, she sent her husband back to the airport.

  He missed only one match – against Samoa – and was back on the bench for the final pool game against Uruguay. Caro had sent him away with one message: don’t come back without the Webb Ellis Cup. ‘A lot of people have inspiring stories,’ said Greenwood. ‘But I felt like I was a man with an extra mission after that.’ Just over three months later, on 3 February 2004, Archie Frederick Lewis Greenwood was safely delivered.

  *

  In many regards the victory over the Springboks had been a disappointment in terms of performance. England had turned over a lot of ball, their scrum had come under some pressure and the service of Kyran Bracken to Wilkinson had been notably below par, which had placed the fly-half under unnecessary strain and interrupted the flow of ball to his outside backs. But England had won and won well against one of the superpowers of the world game despite playing relatively poorly.

  Phil Vickery held his hands up for the poor scrummaging performance, having been given a particularly hard time by South Africa’s monstrous prop Christo Bezuidenhout. ‘I had given everything I had, couldn’t have wrung one more ounce out of myself, and, even though we’d won, it hadn’t gone that well for me,’ said Vickery in an interview with Stephen Jones, recounted in On My Knees. ‘At the end of the match, you hold your hands out but there’s nothing there. You’ve given 110 per cent and you’ve got nothing to show. Everyone goes away from the game and they start going through the performances: “Ah, Vickery. Looked slow, a bit sluggish, a couple of dodgy scrums, a couple of good ones, average performance.” God, it can be demoralising. Because then you’ve got to go back and face your teammates. There is no hiding place in this squad. You haven’t had a good game, why haven’t you had a good game? There’s none of this, “Ah, it’ll be all right next week.” No, it’s how many times were you a fraction late getting to the rucks, why were there twelve minutes between tackle number five and tackle number six? Everything is on the video; every excuse you try can be checked. So you front up, and this is why not everyone plays for England.’

  ‘We are so relieved,’ said Woodward after the game. ‘But it was nowhere near the level of performance we can achieve.’ For the rest of the big guns in the tournament, it was an ominous warning.

  ‘For me, England are the best,’ said Bernard Laporte when the France coach was asked his opinion of England’s performance. ‘They have hardly lost for three years. They are the most complete team and far more mature in their rugby. Besides, what won the last World Cup? Defence. Australia had one try scored against them four years ago. Who has the best defence now? England. It is the best part of their game.’

  ‘I would always pick a team to attack but modern players love the physicality of defence,’ recalled Woodward. ‘With England, we did a fifteen-minute defensive drill on a Tuesday called “murder-ball”. It was brutal, aggressive stuff – full-on tackling. The players wanted to do it, I wanted to keep them fit and I eventually negotiated with defensive coach Phil Larder to bring it down to ten minutes. The idea was that if your body wasn’t ready for this, you weren’t ready for Saturday. We used to put Jonny Wilkinson in a yellow vest and say “nobody touch him”, but of course he would go flying in smashing somebody because he wanted to get involved.’

  ‘The collisions are very fierce in a Test match and the only way to prepare for that is to train with the same ferocity,’ remarked Phil Larder. ‘We do a lot of organisation, we do a little bit of technique that is only 60 or 70 per cent intensity, then we do ten minutes or so of Test match ferocity work. There are three areas of defence that I look at. There’s technique and you can improve technique at 50 per cent intensity, but some of it can only be improved when you work at 100 per cent. So throughout a Test week we will build from 50 per cent to 100 per cent ferocity. The second thing is organisation. We can do organisational strategy at 50 or 60 per cent intensity, but then the thing that really makes a defence as good as ours is the third thing: enthusiasm and desire. The only way to get that enthusiasm and desire is to go full-on. Obviously there is a danger of picking up injury, so we keep it short. But it’s essential. The fear of being unprepared is greater than the fear of picking up injuries – and that comes from the players as well. They want to feel that they are 100 per cent prepared to play at the highest intensity that they possibly can when they step into the Test arena.’

  Englan
d’s defence would have to be primed and ready for their next game, against Samoa in Melbourne. Samoa, like Georgia, were missing some front-line players – in their case twelve – for the tournament, who had opted instead to stay with their clubs in England and France. They too had meagre financial resources. The All Blacks side at the World Cup were fielding no less than six players who could have been playing in the blue of Manu Samoa – backs Mils Muliaina, Tana Umaga and Ma’a Nonu and forwards Keven Mealamu, Jerry Collins and Rodney So’oialo.

  To the uninitiated these impediments suggested that England would sweep the islanders aside just as they had done with Georgia. But the uninitiated would have no appreciation of the physical magnificence of the Samoans, the dazzle of their attacking play, the bone-crunching force of their defence or the unabandoned joy with which they played the game. Perhaps certain technical aspects of their play could be flawed, notably around the set-piece, but they remained a clear and present danger to England.

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  In terms of the scientific analyses of performance that have been discussed in this book, it is interesting to hold the England–Samoa match up to the light of two contrasting scientific hypotheses. The first, as discussed previously, is the theory that England’s developing excellence under Woodward was, in part, thanks to the 10,000-hour rule, obsessive organisation and preparation, first-rate medical resources, deep financial backing and dedicated programmes to achieve world-class levels of strength and fitness.