Kohima
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About Kohima
About Arthur Swinson
Also by Arthur Swinson
Table of Contents
www.headofzeus.com
To All Those Who Fought
At Kohima
And Especially My Friends
Who Still Lie There
Contents
Cover
Welcome Page
Dedication
Illustration
Maps
Preface
Chapter 1: Four Generals; One Rendezvous
Chapter 2: A Colonel from Delhi
Chapter 3: A Conference at Midnight
Chapter 4: Green for Eastertide
Chapter 5: A Phase is Ended
Chapter 6: Left Hook; Right Hook
Chapter 7: Delay and Crisis
Chapter 8: Attrition on the 4th May
Chapter 9: The Black 7th
Chapter 10: A Hole in the Centre
Chapter 11: The Turning Point
Chapter 12: Return to the Chindwin
Chapter 13: Postscript and Post Mortem
Picture Section
Orders of Battle of the British and Japanese Forces
Bibliography
Index
About Kohima
About Arthur Swinson
Also by Arthur Swinson
An Invitation from the Publisher
Copyright
Illustrations
following page 65
Kohima Ridge. I.G.H. Spur in foreground
Kohima Ridge from the North
Deputy Commissioner’s bungalow before the War
The same after the Battle (Imperial War Museum)
The Bungalow seen from Garrison Hill (Imperial War Museum)
Lord Mountbatten on D.I.S. (Imperial War Museum)
following page 145
Part of Kohima Ridge (Imperial War Museum)
Angami Nagas in Full Dress
Naga Village (Imperial War Museum)
Naga Village (Imperial War Museum)
Naga Women and Children
Naga Village—the dug-outs (Imperial War Museum)
Nagas looking at Japanese equipment (Imperial War Museum)
Naga Girls
following page 246
Bulldozer at work on Kohima-Imphal road (Inter-Services Public Relations Directorate, India)
Men of the Royal West Kents at the cemetery on Garrison Hill (Imperial War Museum)
Major-General John Grover
Lieutenant-General Montagu Stopford (U.S.A.A.F. photo)
Grover and Stopford (Inter Services Public Relations Directorate, India)
Brigadier ‘Daddy’ Warren (Inter Services Public Relations Directorate, India)
Lieutenant-General Kotoko Sato (Kyodo News Service)
Lieutenant-General Renya Mutaguchi (Kyodo News Service)
Kohima, 1965
Maps
The Kohima Battlefield
The Japanese Offensive
Kohima Ridge
Panorama
Naga Village
Aradura
Big Tree Hill
Preface
According to Admiral Lord Mountbatten ‘the battle of Kohima will probably go down as one of the greatest battles in history’; according to Field-Marshal Wavell ‘when the history of this war comes to be written, the fight here will be put down as one of the turning points of the war… when the Japanese were routed and their downfall really began’. They were both speaking soon after the battle, when its horror and fury were still vividly in mind; since then, though it cannot be said that Kohima has been forgotten, there is no doubt that it has not acquired the fame of comparable battles, such as Alamein or Cassino. The reasons for this are many, but probably the most important is that the battle was fought over terrain so extraordinary that its tactical pattern is difficult to grasp. Even the Chiefs of Staff were mystified by the battle while it was going on and asked why the fighting was characterized ‘by so many company and platoon actions’. What had eluded them was the paradox of Assam as a theatre of war; that while the country is so large that it rapidly absorbs vast numbers of troops, it denies the deployment of large formations, operating en masse. One should not imagine though that because an action in this battle was small it was necessarily unimportant. Assam is a country where a platoon well dug in can hold up a division, and a company can hold up an Army Corps; a country, therefore where the success or failure of a battalion attack may have momentous results.
Another reason why Kohima may still be so relatively unknown is that no full account of it has yet appeared. Two narratives of the siege have been published, concentrating on the action of the Royal West Kents; but the siege occupied only fourteen days out of the sixty-four, and after it was over there came the long and bitter action to clear Kohima Ridge and open the road to Imphal. I hope, therefore, that so far as the general reader is concerned, this book will go some way towards filling a gap in the history of the war in Burma.
During my discussion with Field-Marshal Slim, he warned me:
‘Whatever you do, don’t forget that Kohima and Imphal were twin battles, both fought under 14th Army control’. I hope this point has been sufficiently emphasized in my narrative, as even after twenty years I’d hate to disobey an order from my old commander. From an Army, from a strategic viewpoint, of course, the two battles were inextricably linked; but to the officers and men at Kohima, their battle was distinct and separate. For the most part, their only information about Imphal was that they had to open the road and get there—and the sooner the better. Fortunately, for those interested, a complete account of the battle of Imphal is already available, in the work of Sir Geoffrey Evans and Antony Brett-James.
In my researches for this book I have been greatly assisted by many people who were in the battle, and to them I would like to express my thanks. Field-marshal the Viscount Slim, K.G., G.C.B., G.C.M.G., G.B.E., G.C.V.O., D.S.O., M.C., formerly commander of the 14th Army, patiently submitted himself to my interrogation and put me right on a number of points. I am most grateful to him. My thanks are also due to General Sir Montagu Stopford, G.C.B., K.B.E., D.S.O., M.C., D.L., commander of the 33rd Indian Corps during the battle, for making available a large amount of documentary material, and for answering questions in correspondence; and to my old divisional commander, Major-General John Grover, C.B., M.C., for letting me have material and for sparing the time to answer endless questions. Sir Charles Pawsey, C.S.I., d.E., M.C., has helped me considerably over a number of matters concerning Assam and the siege of Kohima; and I would also like to thank General Sir Ouvry Roberts, G.C.B., K.B.E., D.S.O., who has advised me on a number of matters. Lieutenant-General S. Matsutani has carried out research for me in Tokyo and I would like to express my gratitude to him.
Many officers have helped me by making available their diaries and personal narratives, or other unpublished material, and to these I am very indebted: especially to Brigadier Victor Hawkins, D.S.O., M.C., for his account of 5th Brigade operations; to Brigadier Hugh Richards, C.B.E., D.S.O., for his account of the siege; Brigadier D. G. T. Horsford, C.B.E., D.S.O.; Lieut.-Colonel L. P. Waterhouse, M.C.; Major John Nettlefield, M.C.; Major Arthur Marment, M.C., T.D.; Major Sir Christopher Nixon, M.C.; Major Colin Hunter, M.C.; Major W. G. Graham, M.C.; Major David Graham, M.C.; Major H. Elliott, M.C.; and Captain David Young, M.C.
I am also grateful to those officers who have found time to discuss the battle with me and suggest lines of research: Lieut.-General Sir Richard Collingwood, K.B.E., C.B., D.S.O.; Major-General E. H. W. Grimshaw, C.B., C.B.E., D.S.O.; Colonel H. R. R. Conder, O.B.E.; Colonel W. A. Bickford, D.S.O.; Colonel E. R. W. Tooby, O.B.E., M.C., T.D.; Lieut.-Colonel John Brierley, M.C.; Lieut.-Colonel G. E. Braithwaite;
Lieut.-Colonel Hugh Conroy, D.S.O., M.C.; Lieut.-Colonel G. A. E. Keene, M.B.E.; Major R. A. J. Fowler, M.C.; and Major E. Lloyd Jones, M.C.
My thanks are also due to those who kindly gave me information or advice in correspondence: Major-General F. J. Loftus Tottenham, C.B.E., D.S.O.; Major-General J. D. Shapland, C.B., D.S.O., M.C.; Brigadier W. G. Smith; Lieut.-Colonel D. J. S. Murray; Major R. Kensington; and Captain S. S. F. Hornor.
Officers at the various regimental headquarters have helped me in many ways; apart from supplying material, they have tracked down officers at my request, and on many occasions suggested subjects for research. I would therefore like to express my thanks to: Colonel D. A. D. Eykyn, D.S.O. (Royal Scots); Major W. G. Cripps (Royal Norfolk); Major T. P. Shaw (Lancashire Fusiliers); Lieut.-Colonel C. P. Vaughan, D.S.O. (Worcestershire Regiment); Lieut.-Colonel D. G. W. Wakely, M.C. (Dorsetshire Regiment); Lieut.-Colonel J. C. Vyvyan (Royal Welch Fusiliers); Lieut.-Colonel C. L. Spears (Duke of Edinburgh’s Royal Regiment); and Major G. Browne (Durham Light Infantry).
In Tokyo, members of the Society of the 58th Regiment have most kindly supplied me with information and a copy of The Burma Front, a symposium of individual narratives: Mr Susumi Nishida; Mr Shyo Nishida; Mr Jiro Tamura; Mr Kiyoji Kumijura; and Mr Shuishi Nakamura. I am most grateful to them, also to Mr Mutsuya Ngao who has carried out research and interviews for me in Tokyo.
When I was beginning my researches, Brigadier E. Lucas Phillips, O.B.E., M.C, was already at work on his book concerning the siege of Kohima: but he generously suggested a number of contacts, for which I am most grateful. Lieut.-Colonel A. J. Barker, an authority on the Japanese aspects of the campaign, has found the time to discuss various problems with me, and has made available most useful material from his researches. I would like to express my thanks to him. I am also grateful to Mr Antony Brett-James for all the advice and help he has given me; to Lieut.-Col. O. G. W. White and Gale & Polden for allowing me to quote from his book Straight on for Tokyo; to Major-General M. Utsunomiya, the Japanese Defence Attaché in London; and to Colonel P. S. W. Dean, formerly Military Attaché in Tokyo.
Finally, my thanks are due to the Imperial War Museum for permission to reproduce some of the photographs in this book; to Sir Charles Pawsey for kindly supplying a photograph of his bungalow; to Mr T. S. Krishnamurti, Private Secretary to the Governor of Assam and Nagaland, for sending me the photograph of Kohima as it is today; and to the B.B.C. for permitting me to use the eyewitness report by their correspondent, the late Richard Sharp.
Before concluding this Preface, I should like to add a few words concerning accuracy, as I suspect that readers who were at Kohima themselves may not find my account of some actions in strict accord with their own memories. All reasonable efforts have been made to ensure accuracy, though no doubt it has not been achieved completely, and concerning several episodes of the battle may never be achieved. Regimental histories and Divisional histories are often inaccurate and disagree completely as to dates, times and dispositions of units; war diaries are notoriously inaccurate also. Individual memories, though often accurate as to mood and detailed observation, play curious tricks with time, and place incidents in the wrong order. More than once during my researches I have discovered instances where both parties were convinced that they were on the left (or right) of each other. Considering the close and often hectic nature of the fighting at Kohima, this is not surprising; nor is it surprising that men attending the same meetings or conferences have very different recollections as to what was said and what was decided. This may happen in ordinary civilian life and in a much calmer atmosphere. Faced with such wide disagreement as to time and place or cause and effect, I have tended to place more reliance on diaries or other documents completed during the battle, before victory was achieved and the forces of hindsight began to operate. In some cases where doubt still remains, or there are two or more distinct schools of opinion, I have indicated this in the text. Naturally, all opinions expressed in this work, except where otherwise stated, are the responsibility of myself and not of the many people who have assisted me.
1
Four Generals; One Rendezvous
On Wednesday, 15th March 1944, the Mechanical Engineers of the 33rd Indian Corps (in military parlance the R.E.M.E. and I.E.M.E.) arranged what they called a ‘Waterproofing Festival and Workshop Exhibition’ at a place called Audh, some eight miles from Poona in central India. It was an elaborate and highly-organized affair, laid out like a country show in England, and the visitors included officers from G.H.Q. India, from S.E.A.C. (Lord Louis Mountbatten’s headquarters), and nth Army Group, the formation above General Slim’s 14th Army in Burma. In the morning they were invited to inspect exhibits of various R.E.M.E. trades, and instructional films; and in the afternoon, demonstrations such as ‘Testing A and B Vehicles through Splash’, ‘B Vehicles—Recovery’, and ‘Drowned Vehicles—Recovery by Breakdown Crew’. ‘I have never been to a better show in my life…’ wrote the Corps Commander, Lieut.-General Montagu Stopford. ‘The organization was perfect, and everything was laid on in a pleasant, informal atmosphere.’
Stopford at this time was fifty-two years old, a large, solidly-built man, whom journalists liked to picture in farming terms. ‘When he walks round his units,’ one of them wrote, ‘he might be inspecting his barns, or noting the progress of his crops. He is calm, unflappable. He has the unhurried walk of a man who has lived close to the land.’ Though superficially correct, the portrait was, of course, ludicrously inadequate. The most important thing about Stopford was his ability, his achievement, and his potentiality as a soldier. Though his walk was unhurried, his mind moved very fast; and his ostensibly calm exterior often concealed the explosion already working its way to the surface. He had the courage and the power of command, two of the most important qualities of a soldier. He could write and speak powerfully and lucidly. He was very ambitious; some would call him ruthless; but that he was a very professional commander, there could be no doubt whatsoever. Commissioned to the Rifle Brigade in 1911 he had fought through the First World War. By 1935 he was a Lieut.-Colonel; and in 1939 he took the 17th Infantry Brigade to France. After Dunkirk, he commanded the 56th Division for a period before returning to the Staff College, Camberley, as Commandant. In 1943 he was promoted to the rank of Lieut.-General and took over the 12th Corps, but the same year was posted to the newly forming 33rd Indian Corps in India.
The role of this Corps—and the raison d’être of the Waterproofing Exhibition—was to act as an assault force in combined operations, and during 1943 it had taken part in large-scale exercises on the western coast of India. These had come to a sudden halt when in December 1943 it was discovered that the assault craft were needed for the Anzio landing, so the Corps devoted its energies to jungle training. At this moment there was only one infantry division in the Corps, the 2nd British, commanded by Major-General John Grover, and it was strung out over tens of thousands of square miles from Poona to Bangalore, to remote areas in the jungles below Belgaum. The 2nd British were was one of the two regular divisions of the British Army and carried with it a long and proud tradition. It had fought under Wellington in the Peninsula, in the Crimea, in South Africa, and throughout the long horror of the Western Front. Its regiments included some of the finest in the whole of the Army: the Royal Scots, the Royal Norfolk, the Lancashire Fusiliers, the Worcestershires, the Dorsetshires, the Cameron Highlanders, the Durham Light Infantry, the Royal Berkshires, and the Royal Welch Fusiliers. It was highly trained, highly equipped, and highly mobile. When on the move its transport took up 165 miles of road. The Division was detested by G.H.Q. India and by almost every officer in the Indian Army, many of whom would have liked to see it broken up. Obversely many people in 2 Div. (as it was generally called) had no great opinion of the Indian Army and were not shy of saying so. Unfortunately, not having made contact with any fighting formations, their opinion of Indian troops was based on the somewhat low-grade men they saw wandering round the base
areas. Both sides, in fact, were prejudiced and ill-informed; and the situation was a most unhappy one.
The 2nd Division had left England in April 1942 in the largest military convoy ever to be organized. Its orders were to sail west out into the Atlantic to avoid the Focke-Wulf bases, turn south and east for the Cape, then to continue up the eastern shores of Africa to Suez. The plan was for the Division to join the 8th Army for its next campaign in the desert; but some time in May, after the widespread riots and unrest organized by the Indian Congress Party, new orders reached the convoy commander, and, somewhat to their amazement, the 16,000 troops found themselves disembarking at Bombay. That they were neither expected nor welcomed by the military authorities soon became evident, as the administrative chaos slowly unwound itself; it was a month or more before the troops could be found acceptable rations. But apart from G.H.Q. the Indian politicians also viewed the arrival of the Division with disfavour. Had anyone considered the cost? They asked; then pointed out forcibly that the burden of maintaining the Division and paying its officers and men would be three times the cost of an Indian division. There had never been a whole British division in India before, they argued, except for the 5th which had made a brief stay, and there was no need for one now. In 1943, after representations had been made in London, a plan was concocted to send the division overland to Teheran, and staff officers began energetically working out schemes for setting up supply and petrol points right across the Persian desert. But the plan fell through. And with the arrival of Mountbatten, ideas were formulated to use 2nd Division for Combined Operations… so it soldiered on, its unpopularity increasing.
John Grover, the Divisional Commander, was at this time forty-seven years old, a passionate professional soldier with a great eye for detail. Of medium height and slender of physique, he was highly charged with nervous energy and drove himself and his staff mercilessly hard. He was correct, punctilious, and perfectionist; always demanded the highest standards and obtained them. A few weeks previously in jungle training a new staff officer had been asked to produce some loading tables, and rather than trudge round collecting first-hand data had used what was readily available. Grover took the document, glanced at it a second, then angrily thrust it back again, saying: ‘Take it away and do it properly.’ Faced with incompetence, sloth, or any failure of duty, even the slightest, Grover would explode with rage; and there can be no doubt that many officers were afraid of him. But on the other hand, he was selfless and extraordinarily generous; and would spare no efforts whatsoever to do a thing, once convinced it was his duty. But the most remarkable thing about him was his moral command over the division. By some miracle he seemed to acquire the personal allegiance of every officer and man, and his personality not only pervaded every single unit but seemed to permeate the very guns and equipment. Wherever the General walked the air quivered with nervous excitement and apprehension. Would he spot the one fire bucket in the area which wasn’t full of water? Would he find a cook with dirty fingernails? Or, the worst horror of all, would some misbegotten soldier come round the corner of a hut without his hat on? The whole place was on tenterhooks until the inspection was over and he’d been safely steered into the Mess. A subaltern in the Royal Scots (now a well-known actor and playwright) earned a tremendous reputation throughout the Division for his imitation of the General, and not infrequently would be invited to regimental messes so that people could hear it. On one occasion, so the story went, after a brush with his commanding officer, the subaltern crept outside his tent, put on the General’s voice, and made some caustic remarks about the battalion lines. The CO., who was having a quiet afternoon nap, leapt from his charpoy, seized his hat and belt and stumbled out into the blazing sun. Only a thorough inspection of the whole area convinced him that there was no General around.