Kohima

by Arthur Swinson

  The final and probably most serious charge against the 2nd Division is that it was slow. Stopford’s staff frequently alleged this, though at least one member changed his ideas once he had walked over the Japanese positions after their capture. Barker suggests the Division was slow due to the fact that mobility was ‘more difficult to maintain in the terrain and climate of Manipur than that of an Indian formation’. Most certainly it should be acknowledged that Indian troops are better on mountains than European troops—this was strikingly evident when the Punjabis brought down the 4th Brigade wounded. But it would be difficult to maintain that the Indian formations deployed or went into the attack any faster. This whole charge, in fact, must be related to the country and the enemy. To go back to Mountbatten’s letter: ‘Only those who have seen the terrific nature of the country… will be able to appreciate your achievements.’ Two factors did influence the speed of the Division’s build up, but these are never mentioned by its critics. The first is that while it was building forward, it had to keep fighting back to keep the road open to Dimapur; and the second is that its men and equipment arrived from the other side of India, piecemeal, and over a period of some weeks. If the Division could have concentrated before its move to Assam; if Stopford could have relieved it of responsibility for the road, it could have no doubt deployed and moved into action very much faster. But such were the exigencies of war that neither of these things was possible.

  Fortunately, some of the more informed critics have been there, and are agreed on one fact; the men of the 2nd Division fought magnificently and with enormous courage. Barker says: ‘No division could have fought better, no divisional commander could have proved a better leader.’ Slim, who always managed to keep his admiration for British troops under firm control, has said: ‘The only trouble with 2 Div. is you were too brave… you were far too brave.’ General Miyazaki has said: ‘I have a deep respect for the men who fought so determinedly and courageously at Kohima.’

  There is no need to defend or reassert the qualities of the other units and formations who fought at Kohima. The Assam Rifles, the Assam Regiment, the regiments of Warren’s brigade—the Royal West Kents, the Punjabis and Rajputs, and of Loftus Tottenham’s brigade—the Queens, the Punjabis, and the Gurkhas. The scale of their achievements was recognized at once; their share in the victory has never been questioned nor can be. To a man, they were magnificent.

  *

  For three out of the four generals principally engaged at Kohima it was the last battle. On Tuesday, 4th July, Grover was asked to meet Stopford on the roadside at Maram. Here he was informed that he was to be removed from command of the 2nd Division, and would be found another appointment. Though personal relations between the two commanders remained good, it had been increasingly obvious that Stopford was unhappy about Grover’s methods; while Grover did not feel that he had received the co-operation and support from 33rd Corps that he was entitled to expect. At this stage in time it is impossible to probe further into personalities; but it is quite clear that both were highly professional soldiers, and both accepted the immutable law of the British Army: that if two commanders cannot work together, then the junior must go. Grover made no complaint at the time; nor has done since.

  But the shock to the 2nd Division was considerable. They had fought to the limit of their courage and endurance, they had won a great victory; they had been showered with congratulations from Mountbatten, from Giffard, from Slim. And now their beloved general was being taken from them. The adjective is not used lightly; for seldom can a general and his division have been so identified with each other. Not only the officers, but the troops, were quite bewildered. When Churchill’s representative, Lord Munster, who had come out from England to ascertain what the troops required in the way of comforts, began his meetings the first question the troops asked him was: ‘What have you done to our general?’ Because of this, or some other reason, Grover received a decoration for his part in the victory. Even today, over twenty years after he left them, the men of the 2nd Division still look on Grover as ‘their General’.

  General Sato was officially sacked on the 23rd November, 1944, some four and a half months after leaving his Division. On his arrival at Maymyo, he had asked for an interview with Mutaguchi, but was denied this, and preparations for his court-martial were put in hand immediately. These, however, were soon stopped by orders from Tokyo. With the Japanese Army already shaken by its defeat at Kohima and Imphal, it was judged rightly that a public row between the generals would reduce confidence even further, and the General Staff were worried lest the news leaked out to the public. The doctors who examined Sato therefore announced, presumably under orders, that his nervous and mental condition was such that he could not stand trial. He was therefore transferred to the Reserve, and Mutaguchi’s threats of vengeance were therefore thwarted. Sato was sent to Java, where he was attached to the headquarters of the 16th Army; his final appointment was with an army District, in Japan. He died of cirrhosis of the liver in 1958.

  General Mutaguchi was also sacked, in December 1944, and placed on the Reserve. In January 1945, however, he was recalled and appointed as Director of the Junior Course at the Military Academy. He still lives in Tokyo; still affirms that Sato lost him the battle by disobeying the order to send a regimental group to Imphal. Whether he is right, military historians will no doubt argue in the future. All one can say at this stage is that, like Waterloo, it was ‘a damned close-run thing’.

  Could Sato have won the battle of Kohima had his anticipation, his grasp, his tactical skill been greater? The answer must be surely, that if he had been allowed to send a regiment to Dimapur, with orders to seize the base and cut the railway, he might well have done. Why did Kawabe order him back? Slim has said that: ‘The fundamental fault in their [the Japanese generals’] generalship was a lack of moral, as distinct from physical, courage. They were not prepared to admit that their plans had misfired and needed recasting.’ This is undoubtedly true; but at the end of March 1944, Mutaguchi’s plans hadn’t misfired; they had gone miraculously well, and both he and Sato wanted to exploit their swift success. It was Kawabe whose mental rigidity stopped them; to him, the campaign had to be fought exactly as planned, come failure, or success. Such rigidity is surprising in a general as experienced in action as Kawabe and there was obviously a good reason for his decision. Barker has suggested that this was simply his strict interpretation of the Tokyo directive, which was that ‘the strategic areas near Imphal and in North-East India’ did not include Dimapur. General Matsutani, however, after his researches in the archives of the Imperial Defence College, has pointed out that in all the initial studies for the operation it was anticipated that 31st Division would seize Kohima, then at once despatch a third of its strength, a regimental group, to Imphal. This fact may have unconsciously coloured Kawabe’s interpretation of the order; for obviously if a regiment became engaged at Dimapur, forty miles to the north of Kohima, it would be difficult to extract it and despatch it to Imphal as required. In the event, this earlier plan was modified and the whole 31st Division unreservedly committed to Kohima; but it probably remained like a palimpsest on Kawabe’s mind.

  While dealing with this subject, there is the curious story related by Takahide Hasegawa, according to which Colonel Kato represented his divisional commander at a conference with Kawabe and Mutaguchi, when the precise role of the 3 1st Division was being thrashed out in December 1943. The dialogue went like this:

  MUTAGUCHI: Tell me, Colonel Kato, what is your commander’s plan, once he has captured Kohima?

  KATO: TO hold it with his main body, to stop any movement through to Imphal, then to send a regiment to Dimapur.

  MUTAGUCHI: That’s foolish! Why should you stay at Kohima? The enemy will be running back to Dimapur. Your job is to get after them.

  According to Hasegawa, ‘Kawabe remained silent during this conversation, though he did not approve of all Mutaguchi’s ideas.’ It may well be that Kawabe did not wish
to oppose Mutaguchi on this point immediately, but noted his views with the intention of stopping any Dimapur adventure, should it be mooted once the offensive was launched. As already indicated, in Kawabe’s rigid conception Imphal remained the main objective, and other objectives had to be judged solely in their relation to it.

  *

  As far as can be ascertained, the anniversary of Kohima has only been observed formally in one place—Tokyo. On the 26th June, 1965, 700 survivors of the 58th Regiment, members of the Regimental Society, gathered at the Yasukuni Shrine for a memorial service. For this occasion, the officers of the Society had made considerable efforts, though without success, to contact British soldiers who fought in the battle, wishing to send an invitation to them. They still hope that some British soldiers will attend the ceremony on a future occasion. According to one of the leading members of the Society, Captain Susumi Nishide: ‘We still have a strong nostalgic feeling for Kohima… something beyond hate and love.’ Certainly, so far as these Japanese soldiers are concerned, all bitterness towards the British troops has disappeared. In letters to the author, they have said: Our greatest wish is that our children will never go to war as we did.… Never must the Japanese fight the British again.’ This thought will surely find echoes in the breasts of anyone who fought at Kohima, or indeed anywhere in the Burma campaign.

  *

  ‘The trees are all young on Garrison Hill, and in Naga Village children are playing. The wet earth and sprouting shrubs have the same spring-fresh smell. And there is no stench. Grass-filled foxholes still mark forgotten fire-lanes and some rusty ration tins and leather scraps have escaped, as too worthless to pick up, a decade of scavengers…. The track which the bulldozers drove up the hillside is now a leafy lane; and houses have hidden the pattern of war till it can be no more traced.’

  So wrote an officer returning to the battlefield a few years ago. Since then, the bungalows and houses have spread in disordered confusion along G.P.T. Ridge and up Congress Hill; across Treasury Hill, and down towards the Zubza Valley. They have swept on past the barracks of the Assam Rifles, to lap round the slopes of Big Tree Hill and Dyer Hill. The population of Kohima is so great that in the wettest country in the world there is a water shortage.

  The cemetery laid out by the War Graves Commission is sited on Garrison Hill, surmounted by a white cross and surrounded by trees, and the rhododendron bushes which have returned to claim their own territory. In the cemetery there are I,287 graves, each with a name and rank, and a regiment. There are also private memorial plaques set up by sorrowing relatives, with inscriptions varying from the trite to the powerfully moving.… ‘ Our only beloved son, who died that freedom might live.’ Or simply: ‘Good night, daddy.’ Many who fell in the hellish jungle-mountains have no known grave, and only an inscribed name bears witness to the fact that they fought in this strange land, so far from home, and finished their earthly journey here.

  ‘When you go home

  Tell them of us and say,

  For their tomorrow

  We gave our today.’

  This inscription, adapted from the Greek, is carved on the memorial to the 2nd British Division. The stone came from a local quarry and was dragged up the hillside by the Nagas a few months after the battle was over. It is rough in shape and texture, but is very moving; and more important, is right for its setting. The Nagas have cut their own memorial stones from this quarry for centuries. Within the perimeter of the cemetery, or hidden among the hills are the regimental memorials: the Royal Norfolk between G.P.T. Ridge and Aradura Spur, the Royal Welch Fusiliers up on Kuki Piquet, the 4th/i5th Punjab on D.I.S., the Durham Light Infantry on Garrison Hill, and the Dorsets near the tennis court. The memorial to the Cameron Highlanders is tucked away in a sprawling houseyard in Naga Village, with the pigs and hens around it. On the stone is inscribed the Cameron lament, ‘Lochaber No More’; and, by a happy chance, the sound of the bagpipes still wafts up the hill from the Assam Barracks.

  It would be pleasing to say that Kohima is at peace again; but unfortunately, since the British left their Indian Empire, the Nagas have been at war with the Indian Government, struggling for their independence. The rights and the wrongs of their case need not be argued here; but certainly some experienced observers believe that ‘the Underground’, the Naga guerrilla army, is supported by Pakistan for its own political reasons. If this is so, the prospects of peace in the near future seem very small. But whatever the eventual settlement, one hopes that the Nagas, this strange, courageous race, will be left to enjoy their mountain home, without interference. The Naga Hills have seen enough bloodshed to last for many centuries.

  ~

  We hope you enjoyed this book.

  For more information, click one of the links below:

  Pictures Section

  Orders of the Battle of the British and Japanese Forces

  Bibliography

  ~

  Arthur Swinson

  Also by Arthur Swinson

  An invitation from the publisher

  Picture Section

  Kohima Ridge, with I.G.H. spur in the foreground.

  F.S.D. Hill on Kohima Ridge, scene of some of the fiercest fighting. The trees in the foreground are hung with the remains of parachutes from air supply drops.

  The Deputy Commissioner’s bungalow at Kohima, in a photograph taken before the War.

  The ruined tennis court and terraces of the Deputy Commissioner’s bungalow, July 1944.

  The main street of Kohima, seen after the battle.

  Lord Louis Mountbatten, Supreme Allied Commander South East Asia, at the memorial to the West Kent regiment on Garrison Hill.

  Garrison Hill, key to the British defences at Kohima.

  Angami Nagas in full dress.

  The Naga village and Kohima Ridge, seen after the battle.

  The battlefield of the Naga village at Kohima.

  Naga women and children.

  Dug-outs in the Naga village.

  Naga girls.

  A bulldozer at work on the Kohima–Imphal road.

  Men of the Royal West Kents visit the grave of their former comrade Lance-Corporal John Harman, who was awarded the Victoria Cross posthumously for gallantry, 8 April 1944.

  Major-General John Grover, commander of 2nd Division.

  Grover and Stopford.

  Lieutenant-General Montagu Stopford, commander of 33rd Indian Corps, Imphal.

  Brigadier ‘Daddy’ Warren, commander of the 161st Indian Brigade.

  Lieutenant-General Kotoku Sato, commander of the Japanese 31st Division.

  Lieutenant-General Renya Mutaguchi, commander of the Japanese 15th Army.

  Kohima in 1965.

  Order of Battle

  BRITISH FORMATIONS

  THE KOHIMA GARRISON

  (ON THE 3RD APRIL, 1944.)

  ARTILLERY

  One 25-pounder gun with crew from 24 Reinforcement Corps

  ENGINEERS

  C.R.E. and Staff

  G.E. Kohima and Staff

  INFANTRY

  1st Assam Regiment

  One company of the 1st Garrison Battalion Burma Regiment

  One company 5th Burma Regiment

  Two platoons 5th/27th Mahratta L.I.

  One composite company of Gurkhas

  Two composite companies of Indian Infantry

  3rd Assam Rifles (organized into 7 platoons)

  Detachments of ‘V’ Force

  Shere Regiment (Nepalese contingent)

  One company of British N.C.O.s and men from the Reinforcement Camp

  SIGNALS

  221 Line Construction Section

  Detachment of the Burma Post and Telegraph Section

  Detachment IV Corps Signals Regiment

  Detachment from the L. of C. Signal Unit

  MEDICAL

  80 Light Field Ambulance (from 50 Brigade)

  Detachment 53 Indian General Hospital

  19 Field Hygiene Section

  R.I.A.
S.C.

  46 G.P.T. Company (less two sections)

  36 Cattle Conducting Section

  87 Field Bakery Section

  623 Indian Supply Section

  LABOUR

  1432 Company Indian Pioneer Company

  MISCELLANEOUS

  About 200 British Other Ranks from the reinforcement camp, together with the Administrative Commandant and staff of the unit.

  (A total of about 2,500 all told.)

  33 CORPS

  ARMOUR

  149th Regiment, Royal Armoured Corps

  150th Regiment, Royal Armoured Corps (detachment only)

  11th Cavalry (Armoured Cars)

  45th Cavalry (Light Tanks)

  ARTILLERY

  1st Medium Regiment, Royal Artillery

  50th Indian Light Anti-Aircraft/Anti-Tank Regiment

  24th Indian Mountain Regiment (from 5th Indian Division)

  ENGINEERS

  429th Field Company, Indian Engineers

  44th Field Park Company, Indian Engineers