The Political Theory of Che Guevara

by Renzo Tramer Llorente

  The fighting, therefore, did not stop on the first day of the revolution, as Guevara reminds his audience in his speech at the University of Montevideo in August 1961.89 Indeed, Guevara contends, effectively confirming one of Lenin’s theses, the class struggle actually intensified after the Revolution; and it is for this reason that revolutionary leaders must exercise repression, “the hardest and gloomiest side” of a revolution.90 Early on, in the crucial, initial stages of the revolution, these leaders had come to realize that every relaxation of this repression was inevitably followed by a corresponding increase in the activities of “the forces of reaction.”91 As Guevara puts it in a speech delivered to militia members in January 1961 and that draws together some of these themes, “Now comes the phase of fighting against all those who are trying to undermine our Revolution internally; against all those who belong to the exploiting social classes, who have been defeated in Cuba once and for all, but do not know it. And, not knowing this, they fight day after day, and that also is a lot of work for Cubans—to crush attempts at counterrevolution every time.”92As Guevara says in this speech, the counterrevolution must be crushed. (Notice, incidentally, the reference to the “exploiting social classes” in a speech that antedates by a few months Fidel Castro’s declaration that the Cuban Revolution was a socialist revolution; it represents an anticipation of Guevara’s explicit use of Marxist categories, concepts, and terminology.) Guevara reiterates this idea on a variety of occasions, including in his interview with American socialist historian Leo Huberman: “Our intention,” he told Huberman, “is to eliminate the counterrevolutionaries.”93 Just as the immediate viability of a revolution requires the destruction of the prerevolutionary army, so, too, its long-range survival requires the eradication of the counterrevolution.

  Guevara’s views on the inevitability of counterrevolutionary opposition, and the imperative of thoroughly eradicating it, differ little from the views of the other major figures in the Marxist tradition.94 But these views no doubt owed more to Guevara’s firsthand experience of the 1954 coup that overthrew Jacobo Arbenz’s progressive, democratically elected government in Guatemala than to his theoretical preparation—or, for that matter, to his experience of counterrevolutionary activity in Cuba from the very start of the revolution. In fact, Guevara often cites the lessons of Guatemala in analyzing challenges and developments in postrevolutionary Cuba, and his reflections on the problem of the counterrevolution are no exception in this regard.95 And it was those reflections that would lead him to adopt an uncompromising attitude with respect to those who sought to overthrow the revolution: “We have no mercy for those who take weapons [sic] against us; it does not matter if they are weapons of destruction or ideological weapons.”96

  But if Guevara counsels severity in dealing with counterrevolutionaries, he also insists on the importance of respect for those who, while not supportive of the revolution, do not engage in counterrevolutionary activities and should therefore not be deemed counterrevolutionaries. Indeed, how one treats members of groups that may not instinctively sympathize with the revolution (in its transition to socialism), such as the petite bourgeoisie, may determine whether or not they eventually come to embrace it.97 But revolutionaries should respect the attitude of even those who have no sympathy for the revolution at all and likely never will, provided these people do their jobs and do not combat the revolution.98 These people are less of a problem than “anyone who uses his influence for his personal benefit or for that of his friends,” for such conduct also makes one a counterrevolutionary, just like “anyone who fights against the revolution.” “Those who violate revolutionary morality while speaking of revolution,” Guevara adds, “are not only potential traitors to the revolution but are also the worst detractors of the revolution.”99

  The Significance of Guevara’s Views on Socialism, Communism, and Revolution

  There is, to my mind, little to challenge in Guevara’s views on the aspects of socialism, communism, and revolution discussed in the present chapter (the need for a new revolutionary regime to systematically dismantle oppressor armies, the function of the dictatorship of the proletariat, the problems posed by counterrevolutionaries, and so on). Moreover, what is most noteworthy about Guevara’s views on these topics is surely their overall similarity, despite the novel modifications of some details, to standard Marxist views on these same topics. Yet one of Guevara’s views, his conviction that it is possible to “skip stages” in building socialism, also offers striking parallels to a theory that, while put forward by a major Marxist theorist, was anathema to many twentieth-century communists—namely, those of a Stalinist persuasion. This theory is, as many familiar with the Marxist tradition will doubtless have already guessed, Leon Trotsky’s theory, or doctrine, of “permanent revolution.” These parallels, which are by no means the only similarities between the two thinkers, have admittedly not gone unnoticed in commentary on Guevara’s thought100; what I wish to do here is merely summarize them in a very brief form.

  It may be helpful to begin by summarizing Trotsky’s theory of permanent revolution, whose main elements can be briefly stated as follows. First, Trotsky’s theory holds that “for backward [e.g., “colonial and semi-colonial”] countries the road to democracy passed through the dictatorship of the proletariat. Thus democracy is not a régime that remains self-sufficient for decades, but is only a direct prelude to the socialist revolution.” That is, contrary to much conventional socialist thinking, it is not the case that a lengthy period of democracy must precede the dictatorship of the proletariat; rather, the dictatorship of the proletariat ushers in democracy and national liberation. Second, “the dictatorship of the proletariat which has risen to power as the leader of the democratic revolution is inevitably and very quickly confronted with tasks, the fulfillment of which is bound up with deep inroads into the rights of bourgeois property. The democratic revolution grows over directly into the socialist revolution and thereby becomes a permanent revolution.” In other words, social emancipation requires the enactment of policies and the establishment of practices that transcend and undermine the (bourgeois-) democratic framework. As a result, “for an indefinitely long time and in constant internal struggle, all social relations undergo transformation. Society keeps on changing its skin. Each stage of transformation stems directly from the preceding. . . . Revolutions in economy, technique, science, the family, morals, and everyday life develop in complex reciprocal action and do not allow society to achieve equilibrium.” There is a blending of successive stages of economic development, such as precapitalist and advanced-capitalist methods and relations of production, and this is made possible by the presence of advanced industry and technology alongside primitive productive processes (“combined and uneven development”); this blending corresponds to different phases of political evolution, together with a shortening of the duration of these stages. Finally, the theory holds that the socialist revolution must of necessity assume an “international character” so that “the completion of the socialist revolution within national limits is unthinkable.” While “the socialist revolution begins on national foundations . . . it cannot be completed within these foundations. . . . In an isolated proletarian dictatorship, the internal and external contradictions grow inevitably along with the successes achieved. . . . The way out for it lies only in the victory of the proletariat of the advanced countries. Viewed from this standpoint, a national revolution is not a self-contained whole; it is only a link in the international chain.” This vital need for support from other nations means that “socialist construction is conceivable only on the foundation of the class struggle, on a national and international scale.”101

  As these are the theses that constitute the essence of the theory of permanent revolution, it is no wonder that many have found a kinship between some of Guevara’s views and Trotsky’s theory. While Guevara would likely agree with the first postulate mentioned in the preceding paragraph,102 the most striking parallels
between his thought and Trotsky’s theory of permanent revolution have to do with the second and third postulates mentioned here. First, Guevara’s notions of “skipping stages” and the “radicalization” of the revolution plainly invite comparison with Trotsky’s notion of a democratic revolution that “grows over directly into the socialist revolution” and is thus characterized by “revolutions” within different domains of social life that “do not allow society to achieve equilibrium.” To be sure, when Guevara speaks of the possibility and desirability of skipping stages (quemar etapas), he is typically referring to distinct phases of economic development, whereas the emphasis in the passage from Trotsky cited above refers to phases of political development. But we should bear in mind that for Marxists a correspondence obtains between the economic organization of a society and its political institutions (an idea contained in Marx’s famous “base-superstructure” metaphor103). And just as Trotsky elsewhere focuses on the skipping of stages of economic development, Guevara also alludes to the process of skipping stages with respect to the institutional arrangements of politics, a process that he likely thought had been facilitated by the rapid and profound changes in the mentality of most Cubans that he had witnessed during the first few years of the Cuban Revolution.104 As for parallels with Trotsky’s insistence on the unavoidability of effecting “deep inroads into the rights of bourgeois property,” it is enough to recall Guevara’s support for a thoroughgoing nationalization of industry and, more generally, his commitment to a ceaseless “radicalization” of the revolution.105

  As for the third postulate of the theory of permanent revolution, Guevara never ceases to argue that the triumph of socialism requires internationalization and the international coordination of revolutionary struggles. Most emphatically expressed in his “Message to the Tricontinental,” including its exhortation to “create two, three, many Vietnams,” Guevara’s belief in the necessity of internationalizing national and socialist liberation struggles, and of internationalizing the support for these struggles, is, as we have already seen, an important motif in many of his speeches and writings. His essay “Guerrilla Warfare: A Method” offers something of a summation of his perspective in this regard, for in this piece he remarks that “it is difficult to achieve and consolidate victory in an isolated country,” and he insists on “the continental nature of the struggle,” which will be a war with “many fronts.”106 It is significant that Guevara returned to the theme of a continental struggle, and the need for international unity and coordination of this struggle, in his last “public” appearance in Cuba, a talk given before his collaborators at the Ministry of Industries in March 1965107; barely a week later he would depart Cuba to join rebel forces in the Congo. It is likewise significant that in one of his final texts, an unfinished proclamation or communiqué drafted in Bolivia, Guevara claims that obtaining Bolivia’s “independence” will require the assistance of friendly nations, which will enable those who are fighting for the country’s liberation to break through the imperialist encirclement.108

  The resemblance between Guevara’s theses and Trotsky’s theory of permanent revolution is, then, undeniable. It also has quite significant implications: as Tamara Deutscher has rightly observed, “The cornerstone of Trotskyism has been and remains the theory of permanent revolution.”109 This is one reason that it should not surprise us that Soviet authorities would come to suspect Guevara of being a “Trotskyist”—though one must bear in mind, of course, that after the rise of Stalinism the Soviets used the term, always meant as a slur, quite loosely—or that students in Moscow would level the same accusation during a meeting with Guevara in November 1964.110 What is surprising is that Guevara arrived at his theoretical conclusions despite a near total unfamiliarity with Trotsky’s works.111 Likewise surprising, in light of the kinship between Guevara’s and Trotsky’s views (but not in light of Guevara’s ignorance of Trotsky’s views), is Guevara’s rather dismissive attitude toward Trotsky throughout most of his political “career”: only in the last three years or so of his life did Guevara begin to believe that one might need to take Trotsky’s ideas seriously. For example, Guevara remarks during his December 1964 lecture at the University of Oriente that Trotsky had represented an “ultra-left” current, or one of “left-wing opportunism,” at the time of Lenin’s death, and at a meeting in the Ministry of Industries just a few days later he would state that some of the fundamental bases for Trotsky’s ideas were mistaken, as were his actions (Guevara seemed to be referring to Trotsky’s actions after being forced into exile). Yet in the very same meeting Guevara would tell his collaborators that “it is clear that we can take a series of things from Trotsky’s thought,” while a year later he would include Trotsky’s works in a proposal for an ambitious publishing project sent to Armando Hart, an important figure in the Cuban Revolution’s leadership (the Bolshevik leader’s works were to be included in a section covering “Heterodox” Marxist thinkers).112 Furthermore, Guevara read Trotsky’s History of the Russian Revolution during his guerrilla campaign in Bolivia and in fact praised it in his brief notes on his reading.113

  Guevara’s attitude toward Trotskyism and Trotskyists, on the other hand, was, if anything, even less favorable and may not have changed much in the last years of his life. During his major press conference at the Inter-American Economic Conference in Uruguay in August 1961, Guevara condemned the Cuban Trotskyists’ “ultra-leftism” and criticized them for fomenting “subversion,” insinuating that they might even be working on behalf of the United States.114 (It so happened that Cuban Trotskyism was particularly strong in Guantánamo, a city located just a few minutes away from the US naval base in Cuba.) Two years later Guevara would complain, during a meeting with American students, that the Trotskyists “are more revolutionary than anyone, but they do nothing and they criticize everything,” while during the December 1964 meeting just cited he would claim, in a similar vein, that “the Trotskyists have not contributed anything to the revolutionary movement anywhere.”115 Finally, in a brief note on C. Wright Mills’s The Marxists dating from the days of Guevara’s guerrilla struggle in Bolivia—that is, the last year of his life—Guevara observes that Mills’s opinions are “tinged with a Trotskyist type of senile anti-Stalinism.”116 On the other hand, Guevara accepted an invitation to meet with a group of Uruguayan Trotskyists, representing “Trotskyists the world over and those of Latin America in particular,” only a few days after the press conference in which he had denounced their Cuban counterparts’ “ultra-leftism,” and Guevara’s close collaborator Orlando Borrego has pointed out that it was widely known that there were Trotskyists working in the heart of Guevara’s Ministry of Industries, including one who held the position of “director,” and that this never represented a problem.117 Guevara’s more or less uninformed dismissal of Trotskyism was compatible, therefore, with his support for broad freedom of debate “within the Revolution,” a commitment that would involve him, as we have seen, in defense of Trotskyists on more than one occasion.

  5

  Consolidating the Revolution and the Building of Socialism

  In the previous chapter I discussed Guevara’s views on certain general aspects of revolution, socialism, and communism. The present chapter represents a continuation of chapter 4 to a certain extent but, as the title suggests, focuses somewhat more narrowly on the policies and practices that should, in Guevara’s view, govern the consolidation of a revolution and the building of socialism. Accordingly, I will consider some additional, general principles espoused by Guevara, but I will also discuss the concrete system of economic management devised by Guevara, a form of administration that he believed would enable Cuba to effect the transition to socialism more quickly and more efficiently. As we shall see, contrary to what many seem inclined to believe, perhaps because they are only familiar with his military exploits or uncompromising anti-imperialism, Guevara took the task of “building socialism” very seriously, bringing the same zeal and dedica
tion to the mundane bureaucratic and managerial tasks of administration that he brought to the theorization and practice of guerrilla warfare.1 In fact, besides his writings and speeches on political and military questions, Guevara produced numerous reports on his visits to production centers and on the progress of different sectors and activities within his ministry. Moreover, many of his speeches, talks, presentations, interviews, and other communications contain extensive discussion of practical problems relating to production and industrialization, including abundant data and highly detailed observations on all manner of economic questions.2 Furthermore, and as already mentioned earlier, Guevara typically worked at least sixteen-hour days, often staying at the Ministry of Industries until 3 a.m. or later. Guevara was indeed a “man of action,” but, as we shall see, it was not merely in the more romantic sense that his name evokes for many.

  The Cuban Transition to Socialism in Context

  Before discussing Guevara’s ideas on the consolidation of the revolution and the construction of socialism, it will be useful to consider the context in which Guevara developed and defended these ideas. In political terms, this was a context characterized, first of all, by unrelenting hostility on the part of the United States and, to a lesser degree, those nations that embraced the United States’ position toward Cuba and, second, by the violent opposition of counterrevolutionaries (typically with US support). In economic terms, the principal problem was the relatively “underdeveloped” state of the Cuban economy at the beginning of the Cuban Revolution.