Iran: Empire of the Mind

by Michael Axworthy

  Some commentators argue that the doctrines of Ja‘far al-Sadiq reflected a period of Shi‘a quietism—a retreat from politics, from confrontation and efforts to overturn the Caliphate. This quietism, with its disposition to modesty and unpretentious virtue, was at least one thread of Shi‘ism in the following centuries (and still is)—but there were Shi‘a movements that emphatically did not follow this pattern, and several major Shi‘a revolts in Ja‘far’s lifetime (including of course, significant Shi‘a participation in the revolt of Abu Muslim that founded the Abbasid Caliphate). After Ja‘far al- Sadiq’s death (in 765) there was a further schism. One group of Shi‘as supported Ja‘far’s son Musa, while another group acclaimed his other son Ismail as the seventh Emam, giving rise to the Ismaili or ‘Sevener’ branch of Shi‘ism espoused by the later Fatimid rulers of Egypt. The Ismaili sect also gave rise to the notorious movement of the Assassins, a shadowy organisation whose doings were much distorted by western chroniclers, who established themselves as a power in the Alborz mountains in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, and were especially important in the period just before and after the Mongol invasions of the 1220s.

  In the ninth century a further period of confusion followed the death of the eleventh Emam (it was the dome of the shrine of the eleventh Emam, at Samarra in Iraq, that was blown up by Sunni extremists in February 2006, precipitating a new phase of serious Sunni/Shi‘a intercommunal violence), because it seemed he had no living heir. The main, non-Ismaili strand of Shi‘ism divided into many different sects with different theological solutions to this problem. Eventually the faith coalesced again around the explanation that the eleventh Emam had had an heir, a son, but that this boy had been concealed or ‘occluded’ shortly after the death of his father to avoid persecution. At the right time, a time of chaos and crisis, this twelfth Emam, the hidden Emam, would reappear to re-establish the righteous rule of God on earth. The parallels with the Christian doctrine of the apocalypse and the second coming of Christ are obvious (in fact, many Shi‘as believe that Jesus will accompany the Hidden Emam on his return). But the doctrine also compares with the Zoroastrian tradition of the Saoshyant.

  This development added a further, messianic, millenarian element to Shi‘ism. But it also added a new instability, a self-doubt, a kind of permanent question-mark, to the problem of the relation of Shi‘a Muslims to both secular and religious authority. If the Emam was the only legitimate authority, then what of a world without the active presence of the Emam? Shi‘ism already had a problem with temporal power, but now it had a further problem about authority within Shi‘ism itself.

  The Hidden Emam was the twelfth and last in succession to Ali, and those who awaited his return were called Twelver Shi‘as; the largest Shi‘a community. It was a scattered sect, perhaps better regarded as a tendency, with elements in southern Mesopotamia, in central Iran around Qom, in north-eastern Iran and Central Asia, in the Lebanon, along the southern shore of the Persian Gulf, and elsewhere (today there are Shi‘as in Afghanistan, Pakistan and India also). But after a phase of powerful Ismaili and other Shi‘a dynasties like the Fatimids, Buyids, Qarmatians and others from the tenth century, Sunni Muslim rulers predominated, and after the Mongol invasions the staunchly orthodox Sunni Ottomans rose inexorably to control the western part of the Islamic world.

  The Safavids

  By the end of the fifteenth century a militant brotherhood from north-west Iran and eastern Anatolia, made up of Turkic horsemen and based initially at Ardebil, had grown to military and political importance and had begun to look to expansion on a grander scale. Eastern Anatolia and Azerbaijan at this time and earlier contained many such brotherhoods, more or less militant, more or less exaggerated or extreme (ghuluww) in their beliefs (as perceived by their neighbours), often incorporating elements of Sufism, millenarianism, Shi‘ism and saint-worship. Their beliefs have been traced back to connect them with pre-Islamic, Mazdaean roots, through the Khorramites of the eighth and ninth centuries.3 They attracted the dispossessed, fugitives, opponents of powerful tribal chiefs and others; the flotsam and jetsam of warrior society after the destruction and dislocation of the Mongol and Timurid invasions. They created an alternative centre of power, comparable in that way to the rebel sarbedari in Khorasan under the Mongol Il-Khans. Further west, in the fourteenth century, a not dissimilar group of Turkish warriors had established the beginnings of the Ottoman empire through the prestige of successful fighting against the Byzantines.

  The group in Ardebil were the Safavids, named after one of their early leaders, Shaykh Safi(1252-1334), a Sunni and a Sufi, who had preached a purified and restored Islam, and a new religious order on earth. It is possible that he was of Kurdish descent. The early history of the Safavids is an uncertain and complex subject, but it seems his successor Sadr al-Din (1334-1391) organised the movement and created a hierarchy and arrangements for it to own property, turning it from a loose association into a more disciplined organisation, and starting to create a wider network of tribal alliances through favours and marriages. Under the later Safavid Shaykhs new groupings or tribes (oymaq) coalesced, held together by these alliances, and by religious fervour4 (in which devotion to the spiritual and military example of the Emam Ali was also an element). Under the leadership of Shaykh Junayd (1447-1460) the Safavids and their followers allied themselves with the Aq-Qoyunlu (White-Sheep Turks, referred to in the preceding chapter)—then the dominant power in the ancient territories of Iran, made successful raids into Christian Georgian territory and developed into a significant military force, later fighting other local Muslim tribal groups.

  After the account of Sufism and Sufi poetry in the previous chapter, the appearance with the Qezelbash of fervently warlike Sufis, intent on conquest, might be hard to reconcile. But Sufism was an extensive, diverse and multi-faceted phenomenon, and the school of love was only one manifestation of it. Some Sufi shaykhs were learned hermits, wedded to poverty and contemplation. But others were less contemplative and more proselytising, more ghuluww (extreme), more inclined to the realisation of divine purposes in the world through worldly acts, and more ambivalent about violence. The obedience of the Sufi postulant to his Sufi Master (pir) was an institution common to most Sufi brotherhoods, but it had an obvious military value in the more militant ones, like the Safavids. The military power of the Safavids lay in the fighting prowess of the Turkic warriors that followed them, known collectively as the Qezelbash, after the red hats they wore (Qezelbash means ‘red heads’). Some of the Qezelbash went into battle on horseback without armour, believing that their faith made them invulnerable. The Sufism of most of the Qezelbash would have been unsophisticated, centring on some group rituals and a collective mutual loyalty; just as their Shi‘ism may initially have amounted to little more than a reverence for Ali as the archetype of a holy warrior. But it created a powerful asabiyah.

  It is uncertain just when the Safavids turned Shi‘a; in the religious context of that time and place the question is somewhat artificial. Shi‘a notions were just one part of an eclectic mix. By the end of the fifteenth century a new Safavid leader, Esma‘il, was able to expand Safavid influence at the expense of the Aq-Qoyunlu, who had been weakened by disputes over the dynastic succession. Esma‘il was himself the grandson of Uzun Hasan, the great Aq-Qoyunlu chief of the 1460s and 1470s, and may have emulated some of his grandfather’s charismatic and messianic leadership style. In 1501 Esma‘il and his Qezelbash followers conquered Tabriz in north-western Iran (the old Seljuk capital), and Esma‘il declared himself Shah. He was only fourteen years old. A contemporary Italian visitor described him as fair and handsome, not very tall, stout and strong with broad shoulders and reddish hair. He had long moustaches (a Qezelbash characteristic, prominent in many contemporary illustrations), was left-handed and skilled with the bow5.

  At the time of his conquest of Tabriz, Esma‘il also proclaimed Twelver Shi‘ism as the new religion of his territories. Esma‘il’s Shi‘ism took an extreme form, which
required the faithful to curse the memory of the first three Caliphs that had preceded Ali; something very offensive to Sunni Muslims, who venerated them, along with Ali, as the Rashidun or righteous caliphs. This intensified the division between the Safavids and their enemies, especially the staunchly Sunni Ottomans to the west. Recent scholarship suggests that even if there was a pro-Shi‘a tendency among the Qezelbash earlier, Esma‘il’s declaration of Shi‘ism in 1501 was a deliberate political act.

  Within a further ten years Esma‘il conquered the rest of Iran zamin and all the territories of the old Sassanid empire, including Mesopotamia and the old Abbasid capital of Baghdad. He defeated the remnants of the Aq-Qoyunlu as well as the Uzbeks in the north-east and various rebels. Two followers of one rebel leader were captured in 1504, taken to Isfahan and roasted on spits as kebabs. Esma‘il ordered his companions to eat the kebab to show their loyalty (this is not the only example of cannibalism as a kind of extreme fetish among the Qezelbash).6

  Esma‘il attempted to consolidate his control by asserting Shi‘ism throughout his new domains (though the conventional view that this was achieved in a short time and that the import of Shi‘a scholars from outside Iran was significant in the process has been put into doubt7). He also did his best to suppress rival Sufi orders. It is important to stress that although there had been strong Shi‘a elements in Iran for centuries before 1501, and important Shi‘a shrines like Qom and Mashhad, Iran had been predominantly Sunni, like most of the rest of the Islamic world; the centre of Shi‘ism had been the shrine cities of southern Iraq.8

  Esma‘il wrote some poetry (mostly in the Turkic dialect of Azerbaijan, which became the language of the Safavid court) and it is likely that his followers recited and sang his compositions as well as other religious songs. This poem gives a flavour of the religious intensity and militant confidence of the Qezelbash:

  My name is Shah Esma‘il.

  I am on God’s side: I am the leader of these warriors.

  My mother is Fatima, my father Ali:

  I too am one of the twelve Emams.

  I took back my father’s blood from Yazid.

  Know for certain that I am the true coin of Haydar [ie Ali]

  Ever-living Khezr, Jesus son of Mary

  I am the Alexander of the people of this age9

  In addition to these great figures of the past, Esma‘il identified himself also with Abu Muslim, who had led the revolt that had overturned the rule of the Umayyads in 750 and established the Abbasid caliphate. But Esma‘il’s hopes of westward expansion, aiming to take advantage of the Shi‘a orientation of many more Turkic tribes in eastern Anatolia, were destroyed when the élan of the Qezelbash was blown away by Ottoman cannon at the battle of Chaldiran, north-west of Tabriz, in 1514. A legend says that Esma‘il vented his frustration by slashing at a cannon with his sword, leaving a deep gash in the barrel.

  After this defeat Esma‘il could no longer sustain the loyalty of the Qezelbash at its previous high pitch, nor their belief in his divine mission. He went into mourning and took to drink. Wars between the Sunni Ottomans and the Shi‘a Safavids continued for many years, made more bitter by the religious schism. Tabriz, Baghdad and the shrine towns of Iraq changed hands several times. Shi‘as were persecuted and killed within the Ottoman territories, particularly in eastern Anatolia where they were regarded as actual or potential traitors. The Safavids turned Iran into the predominantly Shi‘a state it is today, and there were spasmodic episodes of persecution there too, especially of Zoroastrians, Christians and Jews, despite the ostensible protected status as ‘people of the book’ of at least the latter two groups. One could make a parallel with the way that religious persecution intensified either side of the Roman/Persian border in the fourth century AD, in the reign of Shapur II, after Constantine made Christianity the state religion of the Roman empire.

  The Safavid monarchs also turned against the Sufis, despite the Safavids’ Sufi heritage, and they too were persecuted, to the point that the only surviving Sufi order was the Safavid one, and the others disappeared or went underground. The main beneficiary of this in the long term were the Shi‘a ulema. This was important, because the Sufis had previously had a dominant or almost dominant position in the religious life of Iran, especially in the countryside. But the effect of the Safavids’ wars with the Ottomans weakened Shi‘ism outside Iran, and the Ottomans perpetrated massacres of Shi‘as in Anatolia.

  The empire established by Esma‘il established also a series of problems for itself. Prime among these was the unruly militancy of the Qezelbash, and related difficulties; the suspicion between Turks and Tajiks (the latter being a disparaging Turkic term for a Persian) and the division between the Sufi-inclined, eclectic Qezelbash and the shari‘a tradition of the urban Shi‘a ulema. Gradually all of these were resolved in favour of the Persians and the ulema, as Ibn Khaldun would have predicted. Esma‘il’s successor Tahmasp (r. 1524-1576) lived through several years of civil war as a minor, and over his reign lost territory to both the Ottomans in the west (including Baghdad in 1534) and to the Uzbeks in the east. He moved the capital from Tabriz to Qazvin, making it more secure, but after his death there was civil war again, and a troubled period that saw two Shahs in succession before Abbas, cleverly manipulating alliances with chosen Qezelbash tribes, took the throne in 1587.

  Abbas the Great

  Abbas’s achievements as Shah ranged from military success to institutional reform and the building of spectacular architectural monuments, for which he is usually referred to as Abbas the Great. He was a talented administrator and military leader, and a ruthless autocrat. His reign was the outstanding creative period of the Safavid era. But the civil wars and troubles of his childhood (when many of his relatives were murdered) left him with a dark twist of suspicion and brutality at the centre of his personality.

  Most of Abbas’s innovations and reforms centred on the military. He deliberately sidelined the Qezelbash tribes, establishing instead the core of a new standing army based in the new capital, Isfahan (Abbas moved the seat of government there in 1598). Building on foundations laid in the time of Tahmasp, the new army was largely organised around the introduction of gunpowder weapons on a significant scale for the first time, including up-to-date cannon and a corps of musketeers. Many features of it echoed Ottoman practice—the musketeers were designed to be the equals of the Ottoman janissaries. Troops were recruited from among the Qezelbash (serving in new cavalry units as qurcis), and from the Persian population of the towns and villages (the infantry); but Georgians, Armenians and others were also brought to Isfahan for the army in large numbers, at least nominally as slaves (becoming qullar or ghulams and serving as cavalry guards; some also went into the infantry). The loyalty of such soldiers, far from home and in a more or less alien environment, wholly dependent on the Shah, was more reliable. Many Georgian and Armenian ghulams also served as commanders, bureaucrats and regional governors. But despite the improvements, when the Shah went to war the central core of the army was augmented by provincial Qezelbash troops and the latter were usually in a majority in the field.10

  As for any pre-industrial state, policy on land and taxation was closely tied in to military necessities. The Qezelbash tribal leaders lost out here too. Abbas took over many of the lands they had previously enjoyed and either gave them over to be administered centrally by his bureaucrats, or distributed them as tuyul—lands apportioned not to individuals but to state offices, from which office-holders drew an income only for so long as they held the office. Usually the income was only a proportion of the total yield of the land holding. The idea was to maximise the loyalty of the office-holders to the state, and to minimise the likelihood that land would be permanently alienated away from the crown to ambitious magnates. State revenue was also boosted by the tightening of the government’s grip on trade, especially the silk trade, based on silk production in Gilan (most Persian trade in this period went east, to India, but some silk was exported west to Europe, e
specially by Armenian merchants). To the same end, Abbas used the English East India Company (who acquired the right to trade in Persia in 1616) to take back control of the straits of Hormuz from the Portuguese and re-establish the Persian presence in the Persian Gulf.11

  A weaker monarch would have not have lasted long with the Qezelbash if he had attempted these reforms. But Abbas cunningly played off the tribes against each other, and his success in war gave him huge prestige, making almost everything possible. With his new army he defeated the Uzbeks in the east, restoring the border on the Oxus river, and the Ottomans in the west, taking Baghdad twice. To consolidate his victories, especially in the north-east, he sent large numbers of Kurds, along with parts of Qezelbash tribes like the Qajars and Afshars to serve as protectors of the new borders. This resettlement policy served also to reinforce his authority over the tribes, and to weaken their independent power by fragmenting them. He moved provincial governors from post to new post regularly, to avoid any of them creating a regional power base for themselves. He also resettled many Armenians from the north-west to a suburb south of Isfahan, New Julfa, where Christian Armenians and their bishop still live today.

  The new capital, Isfahan, had been a significant place even in the time of the Sassanids, and contained important monuments and mosques from later periods. But it stands today, as perhaps the most splendid and impressive gallery of Islamic architecture in the world, substantially as a creation of the Safavid period. The central structures, the soaring blue iwans of the Shah mosque, the beautiful Allahvardi Khan bridge, the Ali Qapu and Chehel Sotoun palaces, the Shaykh Lotfallah mosque and the great Meidan-e Shah (as well as other palaces, pavilions and gardens that have disappeared under the shops and houses of the modern city), all were built or at least begun in the time of Shah Abbas, though others were added later. The buildings assert Safavid power and prestige, and their identification with Shi‘a Islam, with a magnificence that has rarely been surpassed.