Terrorism, Inc.: The Financing of Terrorism, Insurgency, and Irregular Warfare

by Colin P. Clarke Ph. d.

  Fighting against other warlords and violent non-state actors in Afghanistan is completely different than trying to defeat the United States and ISAF forces that have such a pronounced military advantage over the Taliban. To stand a chance, the insurgents must maintain annual expenditures directed toward operational costs, maintaining (and adapting) organizational infrastructure, growth and recruiting initiatives, and savings. These organizational costs, which comprise the bulk of the finances, include administrative functions, provisions, and logistical support like fuel, transportation, and so on.82

  Leadership

  Even 10 years after the start of the insurgency, it remains difficult to present an accurate depiction of the Taliban’s group composition. As of 2012, Tier I of the Taliban is comprised of the strategic leadership, the Quetta Shura, province shadow governors and old fighters from the 1990s. These are thought to be the most hardcore ideologues of the entire group and those most inimical to negotiating. Of course, these are the individuals most removed from the actual fighting, so they are the least likely to be affected by ISAF kinetic operations. Local leaders, fill-time fighters, and active supporters make up most of Tier II. While it is difficult to gauge the political commitment of this tier, the full-time fighters are undoubtedly suffering the brunt of the COIN force military offensive. Finally, Tier III is composed of part-time fighters (to include those fighting for remuneration), less committed local supporters, and those that sympathize with the Taliban’s cause.83

  Ideology

  Over time, the Taliban has increasingly recognized the utility of alienating the population from the government and acquiring its active support, an indispensable outcome for any insurgent group involved in an asymmetric conflict against far superior military forces.84 In 2009, the Taliban released a 69 page “Code of Conduct,” which was updated a year later. The two main purposes of the booklet were to rein in unruly commanders and win back segments of the population that were disenfranchised by the Taliban’s harsh tactics. The Taliban’s ideological transformation has addressed the group’s continuing effort to garner legitimacy, as well as changes in its organizational structure. Finally, it includes a concerted effort to portray the group as a national movement whose appeal extends beyond the traditional Pashtun strongholds of southern Afghanistan and into parts of the country dominated by Tajiks, Hazaras, and Uzbeks.

  An analysis of the Taliban’s ideology would not be complete without addressing the group’s changing tactics over the course of the insurgency. During the early stages of the insurgency, those Taliban fighters who remained in Afghanistan organized into small pockets of resistance throughout the south and east of the country. They fought U.S. forces in the P2K region (Paktia, Paktika, Khost), and Kunar province.85 At least initially, the Taliban relied on rocket attacks, small arms fire, and ambushes as its main tactics. However, beginning in 2005 and increasing exponentially over the next several years, the Taliban conducted a campaign of suicide attacks and roadside bombings through the use of IEDs unseen before in the Afghan conflict.

  While it is difficult to pinpoint precisely when the Taliban began to reconsider the more austere elements of its ideology, some scholars argue that the genesis of the “neo-Taliban” harkens back to 2002.86 Like the Coalition, the Taliban also realizes the importance of gaining the trust and support of the population, although the increased use of IEDs, suicide bombing, and the targeting of civilians might suggest otherwise.87 The driving force behind the switch to the use of suicide bombing was Mullah Dadullah, a leading Taliban military commander who adopted suicide bombing as a tactic after watching DVDs of similar attacks by Iraqi insurgents.88 Suicide attacks in Afghanistan increased each year from 2003 until 2007, the year that the Dadullah was killed by U.S. forces in Helmand province.89 After Dadullah’s death, suicide attacks began to decline steadily, and in 2009 the Taliban’s Code of Conduct provided guidance on the subject. The document suggested that suicide attacks were only acceptable in the case of high-value targets and that civilian casualties should be avoided with great care.90

  Even with the guidance offered to avoid civilian casualties, a 2011 United Nations Report estimated that nearly three-quarters of all civilian deaths in Afghanistan are caused by the Taliban and other insurgents. Possibly in response to this report and an increasing perception in Afghanistan that Taliban fighters are undisciplined, often showing wanton disregard for the lives of their fellow Afghans, the group publicly announced the start to its spring offensive in late April 2011, the first time such an announcement has been made since the beginning of the insurgency.91 In its statement, the Taliban mentioned the protection of civilians as a priority, claiming that every effort would be made to avoid harming or killing Afghan civilians.

  The most important component of the Taliban’s evolution is the group’s shift to an inclusive and less draconian political platform. In sum, the Taliban still values power over profit, even if as many believe, the group’s ideological shift is disingenuous and a byproduct of political expedience. Indeed, while comparisons of insurgent groups often oversimplify the complexities inherent in these organizations, comparative historians know that sequence matters and will always look to the past for answers.

  In 2007 and 2008, an element of the insurgency that came to be called “pious Taliban,” came out against the group’s use of suicide bombing as a tactic. This group of insurgents, a sub-element of the “Kandahari mainstream” Taliban, recognized that victory through military means was not possible. Splintering and spoiling both remain acute possibilities with respect to a negotiated settlement. Like most insurgent groups, the Taliban has its share of hardcore fighters who will refuse to give up the fight, especially those who see it as a religious obligation to retake the country and implement sharia in an Islamic Emirate governed by religious leaders.

  The Taliban has already moderated its position on several fronts. This moderation is largely superficial and is mostly an attempt to avoid alienating potential supporters in its quest for legitimacy. If negotiations do take place, ideological hardliners could seek to play the role of spoiler, as they did in the post-Bonn period.92 To that end, radical splinter groups aligned with the HQN or Al-Qaida is almost guaranteed to emerge following a negotiated settlement.

  The Taliban, or the “neo-Taliban,” as it is sometimes referred to, has developed a more nuanced understanding of the political dynamics of the insurgency since 2001 and is currently engaged in a struggle with the Afghan government to gain the allegiance of the Afghan people. The group’s focus on affecting public opinion, demonstrates that the Taliban has political goals and is using economic gain to further these goals. With so much attention paid to how the insurgency is funded, the Taliban’s ideological evolution has been misinterpreted. By temporarily shelving some of its more austere policies, the Taliban is angling to position itself as a legitimate political actor in Afghanistan.

  Organizations change over time and adapt to new circumstances. Insurgent groups are no different. The changes implemented by the Taliban have been deliberate and carefully calculated. The willingness to put certain objectives on hold in the short-term is nothing more than misdirection. Once in power, it is possible the Taliban will return to these goals. Having an idea about what the group’s objectives are will go a long way toward fashioning a peace deal amenable to all sides. As Shinn and Dobbins point out, in any negotiation there are “must haves” and “want to haves.” Taliban “must haves” include the removal of foreign forces from Afghanistan (with no presence other than temporary peacekeepers), a guarantee of security for the insurgents, and the prospect of political legitimacy, both internal and external.93

  One of the most important questions is whether or not the Taliban remains committed to building an Islamic state in Afghanistan. To this point, all indications have suggested that this is the case, although just how much Afghanistan would move toward the institutionalization of Islamic law is likely an area of compromise.

  Human Resources and
Recruitment

  The Afghan Taliban is a decentralized network comprised of four regional shuras located in Quetta, Peshawar, Miramsha, and Gerdi Jangal.94 Three overlapping networks, including the HQN, Hizb-i-Islami Gulbuddin, and the Mansur network are also associated with the group.95 The Taliban maintain both formal and informal structures, with the former consisting of the Leadership Council, provincial leadership councils, and a host of different commissions.96 In addition to regional shuras, the Taliban maintains four “regional commands,” covering southern Afghanistan, eastern Afghanistan, southeastern Afghanistan, and western Afghanistan. Each “regional command” has a different relationship with the group’s leadership in Pakistan as well as with the Pakistani Army and ISI.97

  Since each of the four regional shuras is located across the border in Pakistan, the Taliban created shadow governments in each of Afghanistan’s provinces, mainly as an alternative to the corrupt Afghan government. Taliban shadow governance includes a mechanism for land dispute resolution and a provincial level commission where civilians can file formal complaints against local commanders. This stands in stark contrast to an Afghan government that takes months to resolve disputes, is widely viewed as both corrupt and inept, and operates with little fear of consequence for accepting bribes and preying on the population.98 The Taliban shadow government rules through sharia, or Islamic law.99 According to Dressler and Forsberg, the Taliban’s parallel institutions “are more effective than anything the Afghan government or international community has been able to muster.”100

  Each province has its own Taliban shadow governor responsible for civil and military matters, including financial oversight and judicial processes.101 In some areas, the Taliban dispenses licenses, collects a form of taxation known as zakat, and is preferred over the Afghan government because it is perceived as more reliable and less corrupt.102 These provincial level commissions were established to make the Taliban’s shadow governance competitive with Kabul’s administrative ability, which in many cases it either equals or surpasses in efficiency. The shift toward structural reorganization, rather than merely “tactical and financial in motive,” appears to be a strategic move aimed at gaining support over the medium to long-term.103

  Minimizing the financial exploitation of the population and creating the mechanisms that allow for censure against those Taliban members convicted of wrongdoing places the group in juxtaposition to the corrupt and unaccountable Karzai government.104 In the “Code of Conduct,” one passage follows that “the Taliban must treat civilians according to Islamic norms and morality to win over the hearts and minds of the people.”105 From the standpoint of basic strategic approaches to insurgency, these directives should not be seen as revolutionary. In fact, many of these same tenets were laid out by Mao in “Six Main Points for Attention,” which provided his troops with directions on how to treat the population as they marauded through the countryside.106 These basic guidelines for maintaining the goodwill of the population have become more important to the Taliban’s campaign as the group’s ideology has evolved to include a more nuanced view of the importance of the population in fighting an insurgency.

  If the population is truly the sea in which insurgents (the fish) swim, then the popular support of the population is critical to their success.107 The Taliban has picked up on the Americans’ insistence on a population-centric counterinsurgency strategy and has countered with its own campaign to win over the population, making critical changes to its approach over the past several years of the insurgency, including its views regarding narcotics.

  In 2006, at about the same time the Taliban placed a higher priority on earning legitimacy in the eyes of the Afghan people, the group also greatly expanded recruitment efforts throughout Afghanistan, including at the village level.108 One of the main driving forces behind local recruitment of Afghans into the insurgency was the influence of the clergy.109 While the Taliban undoubtedly draws recruits from madrassas along the Afghan-Pakistani border, after 2006 the group expanded efforts to recruit in urban areas, especially in universities, and began to reconnect with former mujahedin commanders to grow its fighting force.110 The Taliban recruitment process also relies on family and clan loyalties, tribal lineage, personal friendships, and social networks.111

  Taliban recruitment efforts are bolstered by continuing corruption in the Afghan government, which extends from the highest reaches of the Karzai government all the way down to provincial, district, and village officials and security forces.112 Indeed, a desire to respond to grievances is a commonly cited factor motivating the radicalization of individuals who make the decision to join an insurgent or terrorist group.113 By exploiting the narratives of oppression, occupation, and corruption, the Taliban can appeal to both theological justifications and nationalist sentiments at the same time.114 Thomas Ruttig believes that the current U.S. strategy of degrading the Taliban to force it to the negotiating table is having unintended effects. The most serious of these is contributing to the rise of younger, more radical Taliban commanders who are filling the ranks of the “neo-Taliban,” an iteration of the insurgency with a more “jihadist internationalist” worldview.115

  Media, PR, Propaganda, and Publicity

  For a group comprised largely of illiterate and rural fighters, the Taliban has displayed an effective propaganda effort by taking advantage of the full range of media outlets—radio, Internet, DVDs, audio cassettes, magazines, and traditional songs and poems.116 Through its propaganda, the Taliban attempts to portray itself as the only legitimate actor in the conflict, the vanguard of not just the Pashtun population, but of the Afghan people as a whole. The Americans are cast as just the next wave of foreign occupiers, no different than the Russians before them and the British before them.

  Taliban propaganda routinely points out ISAF and Afghan government shortcomings. Frequent themes include civilian casualties resulting from Coalition air strikes and the rampant corruption of the Karzai government. In addition to these messages, Taliban propaganda assails the American-run prison at Guantanamo Bay and also provides justifications for the use of suicide bombings in Afghanistan. A significant component of the organization’s propaganda machine, which former commander of NATO forces in Afghanistan David Richards characterized as the most sophisticated he’s ever seen, is the group’s public relations activities. Taliban spokesmen eagerly address the press by arranging meetings with journalists and satellite phone calls to explain their side of the story.117

  While public relations and propaganda would not play much of a role in influencing the Taliban’s decision to negotiate or keep fighting, they will certainly affect the course of negotiations should the insurgents pursue this option. Taliban spokesmen control the group’s message and influence its followers through carefully crafted public relations. This skill carries over to the realm of politics, where these same insurgents will attempt to position the Taliban as the most legitimate and representative entity of the Afghan people.

  The Taliban’s efforts to present itself as the most legitimate actor in the Afghan conflict require buttressing its own credentials while simultaneously discrediting the ISAF and the Afghan government. In this sense, legitimacy is a zero-sum game. Beginning in 2006, as the insurgency increased in strength, the Taliban portrayed itself as a broad-based independence movement.118 Public statements drew attention to the American occupation, egregious corruption within the Afghan government, and even attempted to offer commentary on political events.119 Furthermore, the Taliban crafted its public statements in a way that avoided mentioning specific tribes or ethnic groups and even softened its anti-Shia rhetoric.120

  Another departure from past views includes a different approach to women’s rights and female education, which the Taliban no longer opposes as fervently as it once did.121 In Taliban-controlled areas, there has been an easing of social restrictions, including a toleration of television, music, and movies.122 Finally, the Taliban’s shadow governance has imbued the group with a sense of l
egitimacy because the judicial arm of the group’s parallel government is credited with offering swift justice in areas including disputes over land, family issues, loans, and crime.123 The Taliban’s “hearts and minds” offensive has been girded by an attempt to distance itself from Al-Qaida, although any separation is likely more rhetoric than reality. To be sure, several senior Taliban leaders, including Mullah Omar and Mullah Zakir, continue to have working relationships with senior Al-Qaida leaders.

  HOW TALIBAN FINANCING WAS COUNTERED

  Prior to September 11th and in the nascent stages of the insurgency, the Taliban was able to rely on a steady stream of income from Osama bin Laden and Al-Qaida’s financial network.124 Furthermore, while the Taliban once relied heavily on extorting transportation companies and other privately-hired contractors, as the Western footprint in Afghanistan diminishes, the funding is drying up along with it.125 As this source of internal revenue declines, the Taliban will continue to solicit donations from Middle Eastern sheikhs with deep pockets and sympathizers from the Persian Gulf and elsewhere to keep its bankroll steady. Overall, however, figuring out how the Taliban financed its organization did not become a priority for Coalition forces until several years into the conflict, by which point the Taliban had already become well entrenched in both the gray and dark economies.126

  Kinetic Activities

  By 2012, after a decade of ISAF forces in Afghanistan, it became clear that there was a different strategic scenario in each of Afghanistan’s regional commands (RCs). Regional commands North and West, commanded by Germany and Italy respectively, were relatively pacified compared to the rest of the country. In RCs South, Southwest, East, and Capital (Kabul), Taliban and insurgent activity was still an everyday reality. For the countries operating in these RCs—the United States, France, Holland, Britain, and several others—the insurgent threat showed little sign of abating. According to Ruttig, “despite the significant number of casualties the Taliban have suffered, including among commanders, there is no sign that their momentum has been stopped, in spite of U.S. military assertions to the contrary. Instead, their geographic reach, ethnic inclusiveness, and potential for intimidation seem to be growing.”127