Hitler's Raid to Save Mussolini

by Greg Annussek

  From the Italian point of view, this new proposition, though sensible enough on its face, was unexpected and sinister. Badoglio had requested just such a meeting shortly after the coup, but Hitler had rebuffed him. Was it in the Fuehrer’s nature, the Italians must have wondered, to experience a true change of heart during the intervening days? It hardly seemed likely. In light of Hitler’s increasingly aggressive behavior, the idea of sitting across the table from Germany’s top Nazi was probably enough to send shivers down the collective spine of the Italian regime.

  And with good reason. The offer may have been the first step in a German ploy to kidnap the king as well as Badoglio, the latter of whom was also invited to attend. “Whatever it was,” recalled Dollmann, “Guariglia retained his composure with Machiavellian skill and referred the matter to Rome, well knowing that current negotiations with the West ruled out any possibility of agreement.”15

  Before leaving Tarvisio, Ribbentrop took care of one bit of unfinished business that had nothing to do with the Italians directly. It concerned Mackensen, the German ambassador to Rome. As was seen earlier, Mackensen had been surprisingly oblivious to the warning signs preceding the Italian coup. But now it was time for a reckoning. Once the business of the conference had ended, Ribbentrop summoned Mackensen, who was also at Tarvisio, and gave him the bad news: He was being recalled to Germany, effective immediately.

  Mackensen had received no advance warning. When he boarded the train with Ribbentrop, he carried only a single bag.

  On August 3, Hitler had expressed hesitations about snatching Mussolini right away. However, after Tarvisio, the operation to find and free the Duce was viewed with a greater sense of urgency. The Nazis, of course, had no inkling that Mussolini had been put aboard a destroyer right under their noses and transferred to the island of La Maddalena, near Sardinia. Hitler was still putting his money on Ventotene, the small island west of Naples.

  On August 8, Admiral Doenitz finally vetted Petty Officer Laurich—the navy witness that Hitler had summoned several days earlier—and made him promise to “observe absolute secrecy” in the matter of the missing Duce.16 The following morning, the two men flew to the Wolf ’s Lair in East Prussia. There, Doenitz sat in on the afternoon Fuehrer Conference (sans Laurich) and listened to Hitler berate the Italians.

  “A report was made on the general war situation,” noted Doenitz, “which was followed by a discussion of the situation in Italy. The entry of our troops into Italy has been marked by an ever increasing number of incidents still of minor importance. Distrust is mounting. The Fuehrer is convinced that both the King of Italy and the Badoglio Government are planning treachery.”17

  But the main event took place that evening. It was then that the unassuming Laurich, petty officer second class, found himself standing before Adolf Hitler and a veritable A-list of the Nazi elite. “After the general war situation has been discussed,” noted Doenitz, “Laurich, PO/2c, makes his report before a select few.”18 Aside from Hitler, the “select few” included Doenitz, Ribbentrop, Goering, Himmler, and an assortment of other diplomats and military officers. General Student may also have been in attendance because earlier in the day Hitler had ordered that he be summoned at once to GHQ.

  Hitler was impressed by Laurich’s presentation. (As was seen earlier, Laurich had spotted Mussolini boarding a corvette in Gaeta and was subsequently informed by his friend, an Italian naval officer, that the ex-dictator had been conveyed to Ventotene.) “The Fuehrer dismisses him,” wrote Doenitz, “with the words ‘Well done, my boy’. Then follows a long discussion concerning the operation ‘Eiche’ [Oak] and Italy.”19

  The focus of the search had now shifted slightly to the tiny islet of Santo Stefano, a small, rocky, volcanic protrusion located less than one mile to the east of its larger neighbor, Ventotene. Resembling a large boulder tossed into the sea, Santo Stefano was practically barren aside from the presence of an odd-looking, horseshoe-shaped prison dating back to the eighteenth century. This prison was apparently what had captured Hitler’s interest.

  He was moving closer to giving the go-ahead for a rescue attempt. “An early execution of the operation ‘Eiche’ appears necessary,” Doenitz noted in his summary of the August 9 evening conference. “The general conviction is that Mussolini is on Santo Stefano. Therefore the action will be confined to this island. An aerial photograph shows that the only possible access to the island, by means of steps and a road cut into the rocks, can easily be secured. The rest of the coast is practically inaccessible because of cliffs over 150 feet high.”20

  The next step was to devise a rescue plan. “The question, whether the use of parachutists is preferable to a landing along the coast, is debated at length. [Doenitz] considers a sea landing, at an unguarded spot at night, the only possibility that promises success. An alternative, in case the landing party cannot get through, the use of parachutists and support by the Air Force might be planned [sic]. The Fuehrer points out the necessity of covering the operation with several submarines.”21

  The operation was growing more complicated by the minute: Hitler was beginning to toy with the idea of snatching the Duce without shattering the Axis—a delicate proposition. To avoid an open break, he was apparently thinking of denying responsibility for the rescue and placing the blame on Italian Fascists. “Under given circumstances it may become necessary to deny, at least temporarily, any part played by the Navy and Air Force in order to give the impression that the deed was accomplished by local Fascists.”22

  Hitler, the same man who had threatened to send German tanks into Rome on July 25, or soon thereafter, had become a bit more cautious in the intervening days. The relationship between the Axis powers was now a “game,” after all, and he was determined to play his cards carefully.23

  After discussing the rescue plan in broad outline, Hitler began once again to editorialize. “He calls it shameful the way the Duce has been treated after he had directed the destinies of Italy for twenty years and had been hailed by all of Italy during this time,” wrote Doenitz. “The Fuehrer feels the predicament of the Duce all the more due to the close ties of friendship which exist between them. The Fuehrer still considers the Italian Government as being extremely unreliable and, on the basis of recent events, believes it capable of most any kind of treason.”24

  Two days later, on August 11, Hitler was ready to review a more detailed plan for grabbing Mussolini. During the afternoon Fuehrer Conference, he continued to rail at the Badoglio regime: “The Italians will not show their true colors,” he said, “until the presumed trip of Grandi to Lisbon or the meeting of Churchill and Roosevelt in Canada has produced results. The Italians are going ahead with their negotiations at full speed. They will be taken in by any promise of the Anglo-Saxons if only the continued rule of the Royal House is guaranteed. Their negotiations are treasonable. They go along with us in order to gain time.”*25

  Hitler was referring to Dino Grandi, the sponsor of the so-called Grandi resolution and one of the key figures responsible for engineering the no-confidence vote against the Duce in the Grand Council of Fascism. The Nazis believed that Grandi was preparing to travel to Portugal on behalf of Badoglio in an effort to obtain a separate peace from the Western powers. As shall be seen later, Hitler’s suspicions concerning Grandi were not far from the truth.

  The disastrous meeting at Tarvisio, which both Axis partners had viewed as unproductive, had also increased Hitler’s suspicions. “In contrast to former occasions,” he said, “they have not appealed to us for military support in connection with the meeting at Tarvisio, but remained completely inactive.”26 More German soldiers in Italy were the last thing Badoglio wanted at this point!

  That night, Hitler and his advisors discussed their plans for Operation Oak. Among those in attendance were Doenitz, Himmler, Ribbentrop, General Alfred Jodl (an important figure on the General Staff), General Student, and Captain Gerhard von Kamptz of the navy.

  Erwin Rommel was also present for at lea
st part of this conference, but apparently he managed to make his exit before the discussion turned to Mussolini’s liberation. And that was how Rommel liked it. “During the evening conference,” he wrote in his diary on August 11, “the Fuehrer kept studying air photographs of Ventotene [i.e., Santo Stefano], the island where Mussolini is held prisoner. He kept Doenitz and Student back to discuss the liberation of Mussolini. I hope this job won’t be put on my plate. I can see no good in it.”27

  Once Rommel had departed, Hitler and his lieutenants discussed the concept for the Santo Stefano raid, which involved a combined air-sea operation involving several hundred paratroopers and sailors. “General Student is put in charge of the whole operation,” said Hitler. Though the ostensible target was Santo Stefano, the flexible plan also made room for the possibility of multiple assaults. “The operation is to be limited to [Santo] Stefano,” Hitler explained. “Only in case M. [Mussolini] is not found there and his actual whereabouts have become known, will a new action be undertaken immediately by parachutists against the new site. Participation of the naval forces will have to be improvised accordingly. For this purpose special code words are given for Ventotene [i.e., Santo Stefano] and Ponza.”28

  Now that it was too late, Ponza had finally made it onto Hitler’s short list of targets. (It was on Ponza that the Italians had hidden the Duce during the ten days or so between July 28 and August 7.) The credit for this development goes to the Mussolini task force in Rome. However, it is not exactly clear how Skorzeny and the others managed to score this coup or why Hitler chose to give the island a secondary status. Years later, Student claimed that Herbert Kappler had traced the Duce to Ponza early in the investigation—probably after the German eyewitness sightings in Gaeta—but that Hitler did not believe it.29 Karl Radl, Skorzeny’s deputy, maintained that one of the “agents” working for the Mussolini task force got the information from an Italian grocer who supplied the island with his goods.*30 According to Radl, this discovery was made sometime during the first ten days of August.31

  But Hitler’s gut told him that the Duce was on Santo Stefano, and he wanted Student’s tough paratroopers to be in the vanguard of the assault. “From 100 to 200 parachutists are to jump from troop-carrying gliders and small gliders and to land soon after dawn. These will be followed by additional forces coming in from the sea. If necessary, the way for the troops landed from the sea must be cleared by the parachutists.”*32

  Once Mussolini was freed, Student’s soldiers would make their escape by sea aboard navy vessels under the command of Captain Kamptz who, according to Student, had “distinguished himself as a particularly smart daredevil by a series of operations in the Mediterranean.”** 33 The Duce would leave Santo Stefano by seaplane, change planes at the airfield at Pratica di Mare near Rome, and fly off to Germany without delay. It is unclear what role Skorzeny and his commandos would play in the assault.

  Hitler continued to stress the importance of pre-mission security. One example of this involved a German-manned radar station on Ventotene. Hitler ordered that, just prior to the rescue operation, some of its staff be evacuated and replaced with operatives who were in the know. “The ‘Wuerzburg’ radar station in Ventotene is to be given secret orders not to take radar-bearings of airplanes on this day. Part of the crew is therefore to be relieved by men who have received the new instructions. The relieved men shall be questioned about [Santo] Stefano, particularly about cables, wireless station, other observations made, and rumors among the population.”34 (“Wuerzburg” was a type of radar and not a place name.) Hitler also suggested that some undercover reconnaissance of the island might be in order.

  Several more days would be needed to implement these measures and put the finishing touches on the rescue plan. “Further preparations and final instructions will follow later,” Doenitz noted. “The final order will be given by the Fuehrer.”35

  But certain questions remained unanswered. For instance, what would happen if the raid were executed and Mussolini could not be found? Would the botched rescue mission shatter the Axis and trigger large-scale battles between Italian and German soldiers on the mainland, where Hitler’s military preparations were far from complete?

  In the mind of Admiral Doenitz, who was fast becoming one of Hitler’s closest advisors, these concerns were somewhat beside the point.36 The important thing was that Germany had Adolf Hitler at the helm. In fact, Doenitz was so impressed by Hitler’s handling of the so-called Italian question that he added a personal note in the records of the German navy.

  “The enormous strength which the Fuehrer radiates,” he gushed around this time, “his unwavering confidence, and his far-sighted appraisal of the Italian situation have made it very clear in these days that we are all very insignificant in comparison with the Fuehrer, and that our knowledge and the picture we get from our limited vantage [point] are fragmentary. Anyone who believes that he can do better than the Fuehrer is silly.”37

  While Hitler fretted over Mussolini, the relentless march of the Allied armies continued to put additional pressure on what was left of the fragile Axis alliance. By early August, it was already apparent that Hitler’s major offensive in the East, launched just several weeks earlier, had failed. In dramatic fashion, the Russians had turned the tables on the German Wehrmacht and were now advancing westward (in the general direction of Germany), wiping out Hitler’s past gains as they went.

  In Sicily, where Germans and Italians were nominally working together to throw back the invaders, Axis forces were gradually losing ground to British and American troops. Hitler’s advisors were still debating whether the Germans should stand and fight in Sicily or pack up and get out. The tenuous nature of the Rome-Berlin alliance greatly complicated Nazi calculations. When they were not mulling over plans for rescuing Mussolini, Doenitz and General Jodl continued to argue over Sicily. Jodl was in favor of evacuating the island. He believed that the German position on Sicily was becoming increasingly untenable and would only worsen if Hitler broke relations with Italy or if the Italians suddenly switched sides in the war.

  Doenitz vehemently disagreed. He wanted to contest every inch of Sicilian soil to keep the Allies out of Italy and away from the allimportant Balkans. “The evacuation,” argued Doenitz on August 11, “means an irreparable loss of this strategically important position which should not be undertaken while present developments are obscure but only when we have no alternative.”38 Rommel sided with Doenitz. Hitler listened to these debates but continued to defer his decision. “In regard to Sicily and the southern tip of Italy he [Hitler] makes no definite decision but wishes to have the various solutions considered as possible choices,” Doenitz noted.39

  When it came to defending Italy against the Allies, Hitler wished to keep his options open. He put off the evacuation of Sicily, General Walter Warlimont later argued, because he was afraid that it might give the Italians an excuse to break the Axis. Hitler “continued to postpone the evacuation of Sicily in order that this should not be an excuse for the Italians to renounce the alliance,” Warlimont wrote, “and in this Dönitz agreed with him for reasons of maritime strategy.”40

  Meanwhile, in Germany, which remained untouched by the ground wars raging in distance lands, the Nazis were still coming to grips with the devastating aftermath of the Hamburg bombing. They feared that Berlin would be next.

  On August 3, Wilhelm Keitel wrote to his wife and advised her in graphic terms to flee Berlin, which he feared would soon be the victim of major air attacks. “Hamburg has been a catastrophe for us,” he wrote, “and last night there was yet another very heavy air raid on it. The same must be expected for Berlin. . . . That is why I want you to leave Berlin as soon as possible. . . . I am afraid of vast conflagrations consuming whole districts, streams of burning oil flowing into the basements and shelters, phosphorus, and the like.”*41

  The mighty Third Reich, it seemed, was incapable of protecting its own capital from Allied wrath. For this reason, the Nazis organized a mas
s exodus from Berlin during August.42 One million civilians were eventually evacuated from the city, many of them women and children.43

  In the face of these and other setbacks, even an able spin-doctor such as Joseph Goebbels was finding it increasingly difficult to rally Germany’s spirits. It was all the more important to avoid the loss of Italy, the Nazis’ strongest European ally.

  * * *

  *Ambrosio and Guariglia, incidentally, were on the list of Italian notables to be arrested during Operation Student.

  *Roosevelt and Churchill met in Canada for the Quebec conference (code-named Quadrant). Allied relations with Italy were not the only item on the agenda.

  *Skorzeny also mentions an Italian merchant. But he says the man got the information from a female client on the mainland whose boyfriend was a member of the carabinieri stationed on Ponza (the latter had apparently written her a letter in which he hinted at Mussolini’s presence on the island).

  *Italics in original.

  **Kamptz had received a Knight’s Cross in 1940.

  *Italics in original.

  THE MYSTERY OF MADDALENA ISLAND

  Skorzeny had imagination and good ideas. He was able to smuggle one of his SS officers, who spoke fluent Italian, onto the island disguised as a sailor.1

  —General Student, Memoirs

  THE GERMANS NEVER CARRIED OUT HITLER’S PARATROOPER DROP ON Santo Stefano. Sometime around mid-August, while they were still finalizing their plans to pounce on this small rock near the island of Ventotene, new intelligence emerged suggesting that Mussolini had already flown the coop. It was fortunate for Hitler that the raid did not materialize, for the Duce had never set foot on Santo Stefano.