Here Come the Black Helicopters!: UN Global Governance and the Loss of Freedom

by Dick Morris

  The International Criminal Court, organized by the United Nations, is battling to gain worldwide acceptance. Already 120 countries have signed on to the court and thirty-two others have signed the treaty recognizing its jurisdiction, but have not yet ratified it.

  But until the court can claim jurisdiction over the United States, Russia, and China, it cannot hold sway over the world. None of the big three have signed on.

  But President Obama and Secretary Clinton have begun to move in that direction and will likely move further in a second term—should Obama win one—or even in the lame-duck part of this term. (Even if the Senate does not ratify this treaty, under the Vienna Convention—see page 30—we must abide by it until we explicitly renounce it.)

  President Bill Clinton did actually sign the treaty in 2000, but he did not submit it to the Senate for ratification because he had problems with some of its provisions. President George W. Bush renounced the treaty and, now, Obama is cozying up to it again.

  State Department legal counselor Harold Koh said, “After 12 years, I think we have reset the default on the US relationship with the Court from hostility to positive engagement. In this case, principled engagement worked to protect our interest, to improve the outcome, and to bring us renewed international goodwill.”1

  But that “international goodwill” comes with quite a price!

  NO WAR WITHOUT UN APPROVAL

  The International Criminal Court is a typical UN bait-and-switch routine. Nominally established to bring dictator/war criminals to justice, its real purpose is to hamstring the US military and force it to abide by UN Security Council rule and regulation. The globalists are using the reasonable desire to get an international court to catch war criminals to restrict the use of military force without the approval of the Security Council—that is to say, without Russian and Chinese approval.

  The Treaty of Rome creates a new international crime of “aggression,” which means “the use of armed force by one State against another State without the justification of self-defense or authorization by the [UN] Security Council.”2 Under the terms of the court’s operation, US presidents who went to war without council approval are liable to arrest, prosecution, and punishment by the International Criminal Court after they leave office.

  Former president George W. Bush was planning a trip to Switzerland, where he was to be the keynote speaker at a Jewish charity gala. But Reuters reported that “pressure [was] building on the Swiss government to arrest him . . . if he entered the country,” since Switzerland is a signatory to the ICC. On December 2, 2011, Amnesty International called for Bush’s arrest while he was touring East Africa. Bush canceled his trip to Switzerland “due to the risk of legal action against him for alleged torture.” He went to East Africa without incident.3

  American negotiators succeeded in getting an amendment to the Rome treaty passed that permitted signatories to opt out of the provisions governing the crime of aggression, but it is worth noting that even though the US is not a signatory to the treaty, Bush was still in jeopardy if he had set foot on Swiss territory.

  In any event, the ICC’s powers are very elastic. The Rome Treaty says that the court “shall satisfy itself that it has jurisdiction in any case brought before it.”4

  As with many of the UN treaties, the carefully crafted protections and codicils on which our diplomats insist can be swept aside by the body the treaty creates in years ahead without any need to go back to the signatories for approval.

  OBAMA’S READY TO SIGN

  The evidence that Obama is planning to move toward membership in the ICC is overwhelming. While he has neither signed the treaty yet nor submitted it for Senate ratification, US Ambassador-at-Large for War Crimes Issues Stephen Rapp told the media “our government has now made the decision that Americans will return to engagement at the ICC.” The US participated as an observer at the ICC annual meeting in 2010, the first time we sent a delegation to such a meeting.5

  Secretary of State Hillary Clinton told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that the US would end its “hostility” to the ICC. Susan Rice, US ambassador to the UN, expressed support for the ICC investigations in the Sudan.

  President George W. Bush, on the other hand, was very negative on the ICC and even renounced American cooperation with it, stating that the United States has no legal obligations arising from its signature on the Rome Treaty. He was particularly worried that the ICC might prosecute American soldiers deployed in Iraq, Afghanistan, or other countries and insisted on concluding bilateral agreements with more than one hundred nations hosting our troops, specifying that they would not hand over our personnel to the court for trial.

  Now President Obama has removed the sanctions that governed those bilateral agreements, and so has signaled our willingness to cooperate with the court.

  $100 MILLION, 700 STAFF, AND ONE INDICTMENT

  The ICC does a terrible job of the task for which it was nominally created: the prosecution of human rights violators. In ten years of operation, it has accumulated a staff of seven hundred and spends an annual budget of $100 million. It has, according to the Wall Street Journal, “so far completed precisely one trial—that of Thomas Lubanga, a commander in the civil war in Congo. It took three years and ended with a conviction on March 14, 1012. The appeals have not begun. A few other trials are ongoing or set to begin. Even by the low standards of international tribunals, this performance should raise an eyebrow.”6

  While 120 countries have signed on to the ICC, few of the really bad actors have done so. The Journal reports that the court’s membership “includes few authoritarian countries that employ repression or conduct military operations. Mostly democracies with some semblance of rule of law have joined.”7 Since the ICC cannot intervene unless a nation is a signatory to the treaty, it doesn’t get much business.

  But the possible implications of this court are terrifying. It would have the right, if we signed on, to prosecute Americans for crimes committed on American soil. If a person had already been acquitted by our own courts, it could indict and try him anew without any restrictions on double jeopardy.

  The court could even overrule decisions of our own Supreme Court if we become a party to its jurisdiction.

  And the ICC has none of our constitutional protections. It has no trial by jury, no right to a speedy trial, no separation of prosecutorial and judicial functions (the judge and the prosecutor are the same person). It has no protections against search and seizure and does not follow American jurisprudence.

  Some people have cited the court’s inability to go after war criminals as a reason to strengthen its jurisdiction, but Eric Posner, a professor at the University of Chicago Law School, drew the opposite conclusion, writing in the Journal, “Now . . . it is clear that the ICC will serve no country’s interests, let alone international justice. . . . It is too weak to deter atrocities, end impunity, or keep the peace, but it is strong enough to serve as an irritant in international relations.”8

  But the globalists will continue to press for ICC jurisdiction, always remembering that the court is the judge of its own powers. While their initial sales pitch for the court sounds impressive—the prosecution of war criminals—it really is a heavily disguised attempt to bring the United States and our military under the jurisdiction of a global court. If the Law of the Sea Treaty is a threat to our naval dominance, the ICC is poised to restrict our military power.

  We must be vigilant on this issue and move quickly to defeat it should the Obama administration move to resurrect the court and deepen American participation.

  PART SEVEN

  GLOBALIST CONTROL OF SPACE

  Even as the UN tries to take over control of the seas, the globalists are also pushing for international control of outer space. In January 2012, Hillary Clinton announced we would enter into negotiations with the European Union and other “space-faring” nations to develop a Code of Conduct for Outer Space Activities.

  On its surface, the code see
ms to be aimed at keeping outer space tidy by curbing the growing amount of debris in outer space. It is, literally, an anti-littering agreement.

  Rose Gottemoeller, acting undersecretary of state for arms control and international security, explains that “orbital debris and irresponsible actions in space have increased the chance of collisions that could have damaging consequences for the United States and others. As more nations and organizations use space, the United States must work with our allies and partners to minimize these problems. The United States is joining with the European Union and others to develop an International Code of Conduct for Outer Space Activities to reduce the potential threat to American space assets by endorsing nonbinding best practices and transparency and confidence-building measures.”1

  A BACKDOOR BAN ON DEFENSIVE SPACE WEAPONS

  But Taylor Dinerman, of the Gatestone Institute, explains the code’s real purpose: “What this Code would, in fact, ban is what the Europeans, the Russians, and the Chinese see as American ‘space weapons.’ The code is designed to prevent the United States and other liberal democracies from deploying systems actively to defend their own satellites, while it would allow Russia, China, and just about anyone else to continue their space weapons program, probably with only minimal cosmetic changes.”2

  To curb debris in outer space, the code would prohibit the launch of any missile or satellite that might contribute to litter in outer space. This would ban defensive space-based anti-missile satellites and weapons systems designed to defend against nuclear attack. (The theory is that such systems would contribute to debris by destroying missiles as they fly through space en route to targets in other nations.)

  The potential for the development of effective defenses against missile attack has been a hot-button issue ever since the signing of the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (ABM) in 1972. Back in the Cold War, both sides worried overtime about the possibility that the other would develop a “first strike capability,” which would allow it to attack first and get away with it. As intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) became more accurate, arms control advocates worried that they had become a first-strike weapon. So precise was the ability to target these weapons that they could literally travel five thousand miles and actually enter the silos of enemy missiles poised to retaliate, and destroy them before they could be launched.

  Compounding this worry was the chance that one side or the other (most likely the US) would develop an effective defense against incoming missiles, which would give it the ability to attack with impunity and without worrying about being wiped out in a retaliatory strike.

  These fears led the US and the Soviet Union to sign the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty in 1972, sharply limiting the development, testing, and deployment of defensive weapons systems.

  Reagan danced to the edge of the limits of the ABM Treaty as he developed his Strategic Defense Initiative, dubbed Star Wars by his opponents. Exploiting America’s vast lead in computer technology, he sought to develop a shield to protect us from incoming missiles.

  The left throughout the world was outraged by Star Wars and, although it was never really developed, fighting against defensive weapons became a cause célèbre on the left.

  George W. Bush opted out of the ABM Treaty (the document allowed this) in 2002 and announced that we would not be bound by its provisions any longer. The Bush administration noted that the real threat was no longer a massive Soviet missile strike, but terrorist or rogue states like Iran or North Korea launching missiles to hit the US or Israel. While Star Wars was never able to stop twelve thousand Soviet ICBMs from hitting American targets, it has developed to the point where it can be relied upon to shoot down smaller numbers of missiles.

  American plans to base defensive missiles in postcommunist Eastern Europe raised Russian hackles and rallied the European left to oppose the deployment. But, to be truly effective, anti-missile systems need to be based in outer space, where they can hit enemy missiles during their slow-moving launch phase. This strategy has the added advantage that the radioactive debris would fall on the aggressor nation.

  Now the European left has devised a backdoor way to stop defense deployments of outer space weapons—the Code of Conduct.

  But, as John Bolton points out, we have vital security interests in space that the proposed code may hobble. Bolton writes, “Outer space has become the next frontier for American national security and business. From space, we follow terrorists and intercept their communications, detect foreign military deployments, and monitor a proliferation of unconventional weapons. Our Global Positioning System gives us targeting and tactical advantages, spacecraft create image-rich maps, and satellites beam data around the world.”3

  And, we hope, we can deploy satellites and anti-missile missiles to shoot down whatever Tehran and Pyongyang are prepared to launch against us.

  The Europeans have been at work on a Code of Conduct for four years. In January 2012, Hillary announced that the US would not join the EU code as a signatory, but would promise to abide by its provisions even as we proceeded to negotiate an international code of conduct for space. Bolton calls this maneuver “a transparent end run around the constitutional requirement that the Senate ratify all treaties.”4

  Bolton explains that “Obama is eroding American sovereignty on the sly. He knows that an arms-control treaty for space is unlikely. He barely managed to push the new strategic arms reduction treaty with Russia—a bad deal—through the Senate.”5 So, Bolton argues, he and Hillary are cooking up a “code of conduct” to limit US activities without requiring Senate approval.

  The administration argues that the code exempts security activities that are for self-defense, but Bolton points out that this “term [is] often defined narrowly to include only cross-border attacks. We should not take the unnecessary risk that our rivals will exploit such ambiguity to prevent legitimate American actions. Taken literally, the European Union code would interfere with our ability to develop antiballistic missile systems in space, test antisatellite weapons and gather intelligence.”6

  ADVANTAGE: CHINA

  And, of course, our adversaries won’t give the code a second thought. In 2007, China created about half of the outer space debris currently encircling the earth when it shot down a weather satellite. The code would do little to stop Iran, North Korea, Russia, or China from using outer space to counter US technological advantages.

  Bolton says that “in a war, China could potentially destroy our satellites and still retain its own GPS capabilities.”7 An analysis prepared by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and submitted to the House Armed Services Committee says that “if the United States were to make a good-faith effort at implementing the requirements of the draft Code, it would most likely have an adverse impact on military operations.”8

  Because it could not hope to get the Code of Conduct through the Senate, the Obama administration maintains that it is not a binding treaty, but only a voluntary guideline for conduct. Michael Listner, of Space Safety Magazine, explains that “the administration asserts that since both the European Code of Conduct and the proposed International Code of Conduct are not intended to be legally binding treaties, the administration is not required to seek the advice and consent Congress, nor does it require Congressional intervention while negotiating it.”9

  But, while technically the code is not legally binding, congressmen have been quick to note that it would guide the writing and implementation of regulations that would govern NASA, the Defense Department, and commercial firms operating in space.

  Congressmen Michael Turner (R-OH) and Joe Heck (R-NV) and Senators John Kyl (R-AZ) and Jeff Sessions (R-AL) argue that while the code would be nonbinding, it would nonetheless “require the Department of Defense and the intelligence community to implement regulations, which would be binding and could influence both the national and economic security of the United States.”10 The letter also warns that the regulations could impede the “growing commercial space market and the jobs
that are created from it.”11

  Dr. Robert Zubrin, president of Pioneer Astronautics and the author of Energy Victory, gives a fuller explanation of why the code would be de facto binding on the US:

  Imagine you are a Pentagon colonel, trying to advance your program to develop an anti-satellite weapon system. You need to conduct an in-space test to validate it. You will be told by the brass above you to forget it, because such a test would violate the Code, and it’s far above their pay grade to do anything to alter the rules. Now imagine that you are a scientist or engineer doing defense work. You have a new idea for an anti-satellite system, but its development would require in-space testing that might create space debris. Your proposal to start development will be rejected on sight, should you be so intemperate as to not censor the idea yourself.12

  Zubrin cites as an example of how such a code can become binding in fact, the “planetary protection” agreements reached by the international nongovernmental Committee of Space Research (COSPAR), which have “crippled NASA efforts to mount a mission to Mars to retrieve samples of its soil.” He explains that

  a few bureaucrats meeting together at COSPAR come to an agreement imposing all sorts of difficult requirements on any sample return mission in order to avoid the (nonexistent) threat of back-contamination of Mars. For example, COSPAR requires that the MSR mission “break the chain” of contact between the Mars surface and Earth, which means that instead of directly returning the sample from Mars, there will need to be an autonomous rendezvous and dock in Mars orbit (which has never been done), and the mission will have to be done with two spacecraft, instead of one, increasing costs and greatly adding to mission risk (since BOTH spacecraft need to succeed in order for the mission to succeed). As a result of such imperatives, current NASA designs for the MSR mission are excessively complex and expensive, so much so that the program is now dead in the water. But if you challenge the engineers involved on why they incorporated such irrational features into their design, they will answer that they had to do so, because our COSPAR agreements require it. Thus the mission is killed in the design phase, because it is far above the pay grade of the engineering teams attempting to make it a reality to change the rules. The same dynamic would take hold to block the work of those seeking to develop space defense systems should the Code be put in place.13