by John Bolton;
This was hardly the way to do relations with Russia, and Putin had to be laughing uproariously at what he had gotten away with in Helsinki. Condi Rice called to tell me she was not going to make any public comment on Helsinki, but she said, “You know, John, that Putin only knows two ways to deal with people, to humiliate them or dominate them, and you can’t let him get away with it.” I agreed. Lots of people were calling on various senior officials to resign, including Kelly, Pompeo, Coats, and myself. I had been in the job only a little over three months. Things sure moved fast in the Trump Administration!
CHAPTER 6 THWARTING RUSSIA
Defenestrating the INF Treaty
Since my days in George W. Bush’s Administration, I had wanted to extricate the United States from the INF (Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces) Treaty. This may seem like a tall order, but I had been there before. I knew what to do, having helped Bush 43 get America out of the dangerous, outmoded 1972 ABM Treaty, which precluded the US from mounting an effective national missile defense. There was no learning curve. And since one of Helsinki’s few tangible outcomes was to be increased cooperation between the US and Russian national security councils, the tools were at hand. I proposed to Nikolai Patrushev we meet in Geneva, and he accepted for August 23.
Russia had been violating the INF Treaty for years, while America stayed in compliance and watched it happen. Barring missiles and launchers with ranges between 500 and 5,500 kilometers (310 to 3,420 miles), the Reagan-Gorbachev agreement between the US and the USSR was intended to prevent a nuclear war being fought in Europe. Over time, however, the INF’s fundamental purpose was vitiated by persistent Russian breaches, changed global strategic realities, and technological progress. Even before Trump took office, Russia had begun actual deployment of missiles violating the INF’s prohibitions in the Kaliningrad exclave on the Baltic Sea, laying the basis for a substantial threat to NATO’s European members. Moreover, and of even greater long-term consequence, the treaty bound no other countries (apart from, in theory, other USSR successor states), including many of the biggest threats facing the US and its allies. China, for example, had the greatest proportion of its large, growing, already-deployed missile capabilities in the INF-forbidden range, endangering US allies like Japan and South Korea, as well as India and Russia itself, a fine irony. Iran’s intermediate-range ballistic-missile force threatened Europe and was poised to expand, as were North Korea’s, Pakistan’s, India’s, and those of other would-be nuclear powers. Finally, the INF Treaty was outdated technologically. While it forbade ground-launched missiles within its prohibited ranges, it did not forbid sea- and air-launched missiles from nearby waters or airspace that could hit the same targets as ground-launched missiles.
The real bottom line was that the INF Treaty bound only two countries, and one of them was cheating. Only one country in the world was effectively precluded from developing intermediate-range missiles: the United States. It made no sense today, even if it did when adopted in the mid-1980s. Times change, as liberals like to say.
Patrushev and I met at the US Mission to the UN in Geneva. Beforehand, NSC staff had consulted widely within the US government on the agenda, and Pompeo and I had discussed arms-control issues several times; he agreed with my approach to Patrushev. In typical Cold War style, Patrushev and I started with arms control and nonproliferation, particularly Iran and North Korea. The Russians followed Putin’s approach in our Moscow meeting, focusing on “strategic stability,” their foundational phrase for attacking our withdrawal from the ABM Treaty. They asserted, which they had not done in 2001 when we withdrew, that missile defense was inherently destabilizing strategically, and they clearly wanted more-detailed negotiations between the two security councils on this proposition. I quickly disabused them of that notion and then explained again that we had withdrawn from the ABM Treaty to deal, at least initially, with threats to the homeland from emerging nuclear-weapons states and accidental launches from Russia and China. Patrushev said our respective levels of trust would define how successful we will be, pointing to the INF Treaty, where he claimed there were “conflicting” claims of “compliance.” That was pure propaganda. Russia had been violating the INF Treaty for well over a decade, a point made repeatedly during the Obama Administration, to no avail whatever. As with all US treaties, the Defense and State Departments were overgrown with lawyers; we couldn’t violate a treaty if we wanted to.
As usual, the Russians had a long list of alleged US violations to discuss in excruciating detail; we had an even longer list of actual Russian violations I emphatically did not want to waste time on. We considered the theoretical possibility of “universalizing” the INF by bringing in China, Iran, and others, but it was a fantasy that they would voluntarily destroy large quantities of their existing missile arsenals, which would be necessary to comply with the treaty’s terms. Instead, I wanted to make clear that US withdrawal from the INF was a real possibility, even though there was no official US position, something that must have astounded them.
I also said it was unlikely we could agree to a five-year extension of Obama’s New START,1 which Moscow and most US liberals were praying for. There were many reasons not to succumb to a knee-jerk extension, including the need to involve China in strategic-weapons negotiations for the first time, a view that I could see took the Russians by surprise. We also needed to cover tactical nuclear weapons (which New START did not) and new technologies being pursued aggressively by Russia and China (such as hypersonic glide vehicles) that were only in the early stages of design when New START was adopted in 2010, as I explained at some length. Finally, we needed to consider returning to the conceptually far simpler model of the 2002 Treaty of Moscow (negotiated by yours truly). There was much more to cover, but this was a good start. After Geneva, I went to Kiev to participate in Ukraine’s Independence Day ceremonies and to confer with President Petro Poroshenko, his Prime Minister, and other officials. I briefed them on the INF discussions, which directly affected their defense planning. Who knew that just over a year later, Ukraine would figure so centrally in US politics?
On returning to Washington, I spent the next months preparing for the dramatic step of INF withdrawal. To prevent leaks that would agitate the press and foreign-policy establishment, I thought we should pursue a quiet, low-profile, but expedited approach, rather than endless meetings among staffers who had lived with the INF Treaty their entire government careers and couldn’t bear to see it die. Trump, I believed, was on board, although I was never certain he understood the INF Treaty did not regulate nuclear weapons as such, but only their delivery vehicles. I wanted to launch US withdrawal from the treaty (which would be an important signal to China, among others), or possibly even mutual withdrawal, before my next meeting with Patrushev, in Moscow, in late October. Experience taught me that without action-forcing deadlines, bureaucracies could resist change with incredible tenacity and success.
We also needed to prepare our NATO allies for the INF’s demise. Too many European political leaders believed they lived beyond “the end of history” and that nothing external should be allowed to roil their contented continent. It was a nice thought: tell it to Russia and China, not to mention all Europe’s good friends in Iran. An example of the conversations we needed to have took place on October 3 with German Foreign Minister Heiko Maas. Maas, a Social Democrat, was part of Merkel’s coalition, and doubtless an INF supporter. I didn’t say how far along our thinking was, but I emphasized that Europe was already under growing threat as Russia proceeded unchallenged. I also explained why we wouldn’t be discussing “strategic stability” with Moscow, meaning what Russia didn’t like about America’s national missile-defense program, which we had no intention of negotiating, let alone modifying or abandoning.
The best news came when Mattis and I had breakfast in the Ward Room a couple of days later (Pompeo being away), following a just-concluded NATO Defense Ministers’ meeting. He had explained at length to his counterparts that Russia wa
s in material breach of the INF, and he believed they fully understood. Mattis recommended that Pompeo repeat these arguments the first week in December at the NATO Foreign Ministers’ meeting, giving Russia, say, ninety days to return to compliance with the treaty, or the US would withdraw. I thought we should skip the ninety-day pause, since there was no way Russia was coming back into compliance. Besides, the treaty itself provided, following notice of withdrawal, a six-month waiting period before withdrawal became effective. This was a standard provision in international agreements, basically the same as the ABM Treaty clause we invoked in 2001. With that built-in waiting period, there was no reason to give Moscow more time to sow further confusion and uncertainty among the Europeans; I urged we give notice and start the 180-day withdrawal clock running.
At one of our weekly breakfasts, on October 11, Mattis, Pompeo, and I confirmed we still all favored withdrawal. Mattis, however, was averse to mutual withdrawal, fearing it implied “moral equivalence.” None of us believed there was moral equivalence, and notwithstanding Mattis’s point, mutual withdrawal would give Trump something he could announce as a “success” with Russia, perhaps thereby reducing the pressure to make real concessions in other areas. I called NATO Secretary General Stoltenberg that afternoon and explained where we were headed. He stressed we shouldn’t give Russia the pleasure of dividing us, especially from Germany. I agreed but explained to Stoltenberg and all who would listen that US withdrawal from the INF didn’t threaten Europe. What was threatening were Russian violations of the treaty, and the capability they now possessed to strike most of Europe with INF-noncompliant missiles. Stoltenberg asked what we understood “material breach” to mean and whether we had totally given up on Russia coming back into compliance. As to “material breach,” I thought Mattis’s presentation at the Defense Ministers’ meeting had proved “materiality” by anyone’s definition. As for Russia, did anyone seriously believe they would junk existing assets that violated the treaty, especially since China’s growing missile threat along its Asian borders was likely driving Moscow as much or more than what it was seeking to achieve in Europe? Stoltenberg was optimistic that we could play our cards right on this issue.
On October 17, before my meeting with Patrushev in Moscow the following week, I briefed Trump on where things stood, including all the interagency work we had done, our preliminary diplomacy with NATO allies and others, and our likely schedule for withdrawal, kicked off on December 4 by Pompeo’s giving Russia notice to resume compliance or else. Trump responded, “Why do we have to wait so long? Why can’t we just get out?” I said I was certainly ready. I explained that once we announced our intention to withdraw, the Russians would likely do the same, accusing us of violating the treaty, which was untrue but which could involve us in a series of recriminatory statements between Moscow and Washington. Instead, I suggested, why didn’t I ask Patrushev that the two countries withdraw mutually; this approach could spare us a lot of grief and allow us to announce an agreement with Russia on something of importance. Trump, however, said, “I don’t want to do that. I just want to get out.” I had thought mutually withdrawing would be a more appealing route to Trump, but if not, so be it. For myself, I couldn’t have cared less what Moscow did.
I left Joint Base Andrews on Saturday, flying uneventfully for all of twenty minutes until we saw that, responding to a reporter’s question at an Elko, Nevada, campaign rally, Trump had said we were leaving the INF Treaty. My first thought was, “Well, that settles that.” It wasn’t the timing that Mattis, Pompeo, and I had agreed on, but apparently Trump had decided that “now” was better (subject, of course, to the treaty’s 180-day waiting period). I immediately called Sanders in Washington, who hadn’t heard Trump’s remark, and suggested we quickly draft a statement to embody his comment, with which she agreed. I then called Pompeo, who said it was “horrific” Trump could make an announcement as significant as withdrawing from the INF just in response to a reporter’s question, a rare occasion of Pompeo’s being explicitly critical of something Trump did. I didn’t agree, since all he had really done was accelerate our timetable, which was fine with me. As long as the decision was public, we might as well give formal notice of withdrawal to start the six-month clock ticking. I said we should also announce the immediate suspension of our treaty obligations, thus allowing us to begin the race to catch up to Russia, China, and other INF-capable countries. I had the NSC staff on the plane with me start calling their colleagues at State and Defense to get busy on drafting and clearing a statement. Unfortunately, the statement never got issued, for reasons I do not even now understand, but almost certainly because Mattis and possibly Pompeo didn’t want to act on what Trump had already publicly said.
After refueling at Shannon, Ireland, we headed off to Moscow, and I called Stoltenberg Sunday morning Europe time. He had, by then, heard about Trump’s statement. I explained what had happened and that now we would simply accelerate our consultations with allies and others, because we obviously couldn’t walk back what Trump had said openly. Stoltenberg was worried that, as of now, a NATO resolution on withdrawal would not be unanimous, and he wanted time to make it so. That was fine, since none of us had contemplated a NATO resolution this early anyway. Stoltenberg wasn’t as panicky as some Europeans, but he was obviously nervous. I said I would report back after my meetings with the Russians.
When I landed in Moscow, Ambassador Jon Huntsman met me and said the Russians were agitating, playing on Europeans’ fears we were abandoning them, leaving them defenseless. This line had also swept Europe during the ABM Treaty withdrawal. It hadn’t been true then and wasn’t true now. Someone should have said, “Steady in the ranks, Europeans.” In any case, I still didn’t know why Trump had made his Nevada comments or why the statement elaborating on them hadn’t been issued. Inexplicably, Ricardel received word of a four p.m. Sunday meeting with Trump at the Residence, requested by Mattis. I called Pompeo, who didn’t understand why the meeting was urgent, even after speaking with Mattis on Saturday. Pompeo believed Mattis would ask to return to our original timetable for announcing the withdrawal, not for reopening the underlying decision. Since Trump had already effectively made the announcement, I didn’t see how to roll it back, and Pompeo agreed. There was no dispute we needed more discussions with our allies, but we were now in a fundamentally different position than before Trump’s comments. Why not, therefore, file notice of withdrawal, suspend our treaty obligations, and get moving? Pompeo said that was what Mattis wanted to avoid, which led me to wonder if Mattis really only wanted to slow the pace of withdrawal, or if he had changed his mind on withdrawing and was now trying to play for time. I could imagine that Washington’s High-Minded were already on the phone to Mattis, and I was intrigued he hadn’t bothered to call me, rushing instead to schedule a weekend meeting when I was out of town. I asked Pompeo what he thought about the timing issue. He said he was agnostic and could live with it either way.
My meeting with Patrushev the next day was at 1A Olsufyevskiy Pereulok, which he happily described as the former headquarters of the FSB’s “Alfa Group” of the Spetsnaz, or special forces, formed by the KGB in 1974. Alfa Group was a “counterterrorism task force,” helping remind us, I thought, of Patrushev’s prior role as head of the FSB. We again started off with arms control, as the Russians solemnly advised us that official Russian doctrine had no plans to use military power for offensive goals, and that defensive power was the key to strategic stability. Patrushev explained why they didn’t want us to exit the INF, noting the critiques of our decision by certain of our helpful European allies. In response, I laid out the reasons we felt Russia was in violation and why the capabilities of China, Iran, and others made it impossible to universalize the treaty, as we had once thought possible. Former Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov best summed up the Russian reaction: “If you want to leave, go ahead, but Russia will stay in.” That was fine by me.
We were then treated to a lecture on our alleged violations of
New START. For the second time I explained to Patrushev and his delegation why it was unlikely we would simply extend New START, given the ratification debates, where many Republicans objected that key issues, such as tactical nuclear weapons, were not addressed at all. I pressed again for a 2002 Treaty of Moscow format, which was simpler, clearer, and had worked well. Patrushev did not dismiss the idea. Instead, he stressed that the 2002 treaty was more complicated than it seemed because it relied on START II verification provisions, which was not quite true, but I didn’t take time to revisit the issue. What struck me was that, even with the INF disappearing, they seemed willing to consider the 2002 model. There might yet be hope.
Late in the afternoon, with the day’s meetings concluded except for a dinner hosted by Foreign Minister Lavrov at Osobnyak, I called Ricardel to see what had happened at the Sunday meeting with Trump. She said Mattis had started with a filibuster on the eighteen-month plan he had to withdraw from the INF, which was now in shreds. He wanted to return to where we were before Trump spoke in Nevada and put out a press statement to that effect. I still couldn’t comprehend how we could roll the clock back, pretending we were consulting about whether to leave the treaty, or that Russia might take some action to return to compliance (as to which there was not the slightest hint). What was the purpose of this charade? Trump said he didn’t see any reason not to proceed with withdrawing as he had said, but he didn’t object to making a formal announcement on December 4, which was contradictory and ignored the new reality his own statement had created. After the Trump meeting, Mattis, Pompeo, and Ricardel argued over Mattis’s draft statement, which at best muddied the waters, but which in fact was aimed at rolling back what Trump had said. I told Ricardel to do everything she could to kill it.
