by John Bolton;
The whole thing baffled me, but Trump made it even more moot (if that was possible) later in the day Monday, in another of his customary press encounters as he left the South Entrance to board Marine One. He said, “I’m terminating the agreement. Russia violated it. I’m terminating it…” Asked if that was a threat to Putin, Trump answered, “It’s a threat to whoever you want. It includes China, and it includes Russia, and whoever wants to play that game. You can’t play that game on me.”2 What else was there to say? I didn’t realize it at the time, but I wondered later, with Mattis’s resignation just two months away, whether this was his attempt at legacy creation, to show he had fought to the end to preserve the INF. The whole affair was a waste of time and energy, not to mention confusing to foreign friend and foe alike. I spoke with Pompeo later in the afternoon, and he insisted that Mattis was not really seeking any change in policy. I felt far away and frustrated, but I determined I would continue working to minimize the available time for opponents of our withdrawal to undo what Trump had already now said twice publicly. At about four p.m. Moscow time, I called Trump, and he confirmed that he couldn’t see what all the fuss was about or why Mattis thought it was so important. I told Trump I was telling the Russians he had clearly stated we were getting out, and Trump said, “I like our way of doing it.” That was all I needed.
The next day, I met with Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoygu. With respect to the INF, he appeared less concerned than Mattis. He said (through an interpreter) that Trump’s message was unambiguous, and that the Russians had heard it clearly. He went further, saying that under current circumstances, a reasonable man could see the situation under the INF Treaty was unrealistic because of China and changes in technology since the 1987 INF. Shoygu favored trying to rewrite the treaty to get others to join it, because he thought our unilateral withdrawal was favorable only to our common enemies, which he repeated later. I thought the implicit reference to China was unmistakable. Shoygu added that it had been a while since it was signed, and the challenge was that the technologies were in the possession of countries that shouldn’t have them. I remember him concluding by agreeing that the effectiveness of the Treaty had expired. This was the most sensible thing anyone in Russia said on the issue. Interestingly, Shoygu and Mattis had never met, and, indeed, as of then, Pompeo and Lavrov had not yet met, and here I was talking to these Russians all the time.
That afternoon, Huntsman and I placed a wreath on a bridge near the Kremlin, less than a hundred yards from St. Basil’s Cathedral, where Boris Nemtsov had been murdered, many believed by Kremlin operatives. We then placed a wreath at Russia’s Tomb of the Unknown Soldier, along the Kremlin wall, a ceremony I had first attended with Donald Rumsfeld almost exactly eighteen years earlier. My meeting with Putin followed right afterward, beginning precisely the same as the prior meeting, same ornately decorated room, same arrangements, same conference table. Putin was obviously determined to make the point while the media was present that he was unhappy the US had withdrawn from the INF Treaty. He noted that the eagle in the Great Seal of the United States is clutching olive branches in one talon (although he failed to note the eagle is clutching arrows in the other) and asked if the eagle had eaten all the olives. I said I hadn’t brought any new olives with me. So much for Soviet-style banter.
Once the press exited, Putin said he had received reports on my earlier meetings and that their side valued our contacts a lot, and that it was always a pleasure to meet with me. We discussed our respective positions on the INF at length, but what really interested Putin was “What comes next?,” meaning what were we contemplating regarding deployment in Europe? Having made the point earlier that Russia and America were effectively the only two countries bound by the INF, I replied that I thought Putin had said at our last meeting that Russia understood the strategic implications of that fact, meaning China’s large and growing ballistic and hypersonic glide missile capabilities. Putin agreed that he had acknowledged the China issue but said he had not mentioned wishing to pull out of the INF, agreeing with my point that Russia and the United States were the only two countries bound by the treaty. As for now, he continued, withdrawal was not the most important point, but rather what Washington’s future plans would be. As I would reiterate in my subsequent press conference, I told him that the US had not yet made any final decisions regarding future deployments.3 Obviously, Putin was most worried about what we might deploy in Europe, and later that week he saw a way to intimidate the Europeans by implying we were returning to the mid-1980s confrontation over deploying US Pershing II missiles. Putin made that very point publicly, threatening to target any country that accepted US missiles noncompliant with INF terms.4 Of course, Russia was already doing just that through its deployments in Kaliningrad, among other things, which was a major reason we were exiting the treaty.
Putin recalled that both of us were lawyers, saying, “We could go on talking like this until dawn,” and we then exchanged jokes about lawyers. On New START, we reviewed our respective positions, and I again pressed the benefits of reverting to a Treaty of Moscow–type agreement. Why go through the agony of renegotiating New START, adding, for example, reductions or limitations on tactical nuclear weapons, which were of major importance to the US given the large number of such weapons Russia had?5 In response to Putin’s questions, I said we had no intention of withdrawing from New START, but we were also essentially certain not to allow it simply to be extended for five years as Russia was asking (along with almost all Senate Democrats). Fortunately, we avoided long discussions of who was, and who was not, violating the INF or New START, but I urged that such detours showed how disruptive such treaties could be, rather than advancing the much-touted objective of easing tensions.
On Syria, Putin emphasized that Russians had no need of an Iranian presence, and that the right thing for both of us to do was to incentivize them to leave. He mentioned that he had discussed the topic with Netanyahu. I pointed out that having withdrawn from the Iran nuclear deal, the US was reimposing sanctions on Iran, which we expected to bite sharply, and they were not tradable just to get Iran out of Syria. Putin said that he understood our logic, and acknowledged our view that the people of Iran were tired of the regime. He cautioned, however, that if we declared war against them economically, it would consolidate support for the regime. I explained why we didn’t see it that way, and why strong sanctions would reduce support for the regime, which was already under enormous stress. Putin also acknowledged that we each had our theories about how to deal with Iran, and we would see which one worked out. Putin joked at our expense over Saudi Arabia and the Khashoggi murder, saying Russia would sell the Saudis arms if we didn’t, which was undoubtedly correct, and underscored why Trump didn’t want to renounce our pending arms sales. We ended at about 7:05, after an hour and three-quarters. (Putin subsequently told Trump at the November 11 Armistice Day centenary in Paris that he and I had a nice conversation in Moscow, and that I was very professional and specific, not that that had any impact on Trump.) As we were shaking hands good-bye, Putin smiled and said he saw that I was going to the Caucasus.
I returned home feeling that Russia, always happy to pin the blame on us, especially with perennially nervous Europeans, would run a pro forma opposition campaign against our INF withdrawal, irritating but not threatening. I did not foresee a major propaganda effort or anything that could frustrate our ultimate withdrawal. In the meantime, briefings to NATO allies in Brussels and in capitals were going well. Flying back from Tbilisi, my last stop, I spoke to Stoltenberg, who said more and more allies now understood the logic of our position. He also said, however, that several countries still resisted admitting that Russia was violating the INF because they were afraid that if they agreed the Russians were in violation it might mean that one day down the road they therefore might have to accept nuclear weapons on their territory. This was crazy, in my view: NATO allies were prepared to deny reality because they feared the consequences of admitting it.
Did they really believe if they didn’t admit it, it wouldn’t be true? Many pressed for more delay before withdrawal, a thinly veiled way to buy time to prevent it altogether, which is why Mattis’s palpable obstructionism worried me. In Paris for the Armistice Day centenary in November, I met with Sedwill, Étienne, and Jan Hecker (our German counterpart) to discuss Germany’s desire for another sixty-day delay in our withdrawal. I didn’t agree to it, especially given Trump’s evident desire to exit sooner rather than later, but the issue remained unresolved.
At a mid-November Association of Southeast Asian Nations Summit in Singapore, where I accompanied Vice President Pence, we had an impromptu “pull aside” bilateral with Putin in a corner of the large conference room. We were surrounded by Secret Service and other security personnel, so we drew a lot of attention as others were departing. Pence wanted to raise the issue of Russian election meddling, but the discussion quickly turned elsewhere. Putin asked where things stood on meeting with Trump at the upcoming G20 meeting in Argentina, to discuss strategic stability and New START, which would certainly be interesting. Putin seemed to have lost interest in the INF, saying to me (through an interpreter) that he understood our arguments and logic on the decision to withdraw from the INF, which I took to be an acknowledgment of our shared view on China. I said we would get back to them on scheduling for the G20.
Germany, however, continued to press for delay, so I explained to Trump on November 26 that we should announce withdrawal at the December 4 NATO Foreign Ministers’ meeting, rather than give Germany another sixty days. Russia was still trying to intimidate the Europeans, and the risk of further delays was simply not worth it. Trump agreed, also now worried that further delays would make us look weak in Russia’s eyes. Trump was in the right place. The next day, we were at it again, in a meeting with Trump on other subjects, when Mattis advocated the German position of an additional sixty days’ delay. Was he working some unspoken agenda? I urged Trump yet again to pull the trigger on December 4, and he said, “I agree. This is going to be a win for John. We’ll announce withdrawal on December 4.” I then pressed him to announce simultaneously the suspension of our treaty obligations because of Russia’s material breach, a concept separate from withdrawal, which would allow us to begin “violating” the treaty even as the 180-day clock was ticking, and Trump agreed. Kelly, also present, asked, “So, the full Monty, sir?” and Trump said, “Yes.”
But, of course, it wasn’t really over, and at the Buenos Aires G20 on December 1, Merkel took one more shot in her bilateral with Trump. She said she completely agreed that Russia was in violation, but complained that there had been no political talks between Russia and the US, which was nonsense, since we had held just such talks not only under Trump but even under Obama. Trump asked what I thought, and I urged him again to proceed as planned, giving notice of withdrawal on December 4. Trump said he didn’t want to look weak to Russia, and Merkel promised she would back us if we gave her sixty days. After several more minutes of back-and-forth, Trump said he agreed with me but nonetheless would give Merkel the two months she wanted, so long as we could definitely leave the INF then. Pompeo and I stressed that it was just two months, and Merkel agreed. I then urged that, at that point in time, the Germans would say they “support” our decision to withdraw, and not use some other word (like “understand,” which Hecker had previously tried with me), and Merkel agreed. I figured that was all I could get, but it was precious little compared to the potential agony we might endure by pulling the Band-Aid off slowly. We discussed explaining this to NATO allies, and Trump proposed saying, “At the request of Germany and others, we will terminate the INF Treaty sixty days from now.” It struck me he still didn’t appreciate the 180-day clock that had to run before withdrawal actually took effect, but it was too late by then to reopen the discussion.
The December 4 announcement went well, and we filed notice of withdrawal on February 1, 2019. The Russians announced immediate suspension of any new arms-control negotiations, an unexpected side benefit. The high priest of US arms controllers called me a “nuclear arms agreement hitman,” which I took as a compliment. There was some fussing as the months wore on, but at 12:01 a.m. on Friday, August 2, the US broke free of the INF Treaty. A great day!
Other bilateral and multilateral treaties involving Russia and the United States should also come under the ax, not to mention numerous multilateral agreements the US has unwisely made. Trump, for example, readily agreed to unsign the Obama-era Arms Trade Treaty, which had never been ratified by the Senate, but which anti-gun-control groups in the US had long opposed, dating back to my days as an Under Secretary of State in the Bush 43 Administration.6 Speaking to the annual NRA convention on April 26, 2019, in Indianapolis, Trump received a standing ovation while he actually unsigned the agreement right in front of the audience.
Trump also unsigned the Paris Agreement on climate change, a move I supported. That deal had all of the real-world impact on climate change of telling your prayer beads and lighting candles in church (which someone will try to forbid soon because of the carbon footprint of all those burning candles). The agreement simply requires signatories to set national goals but doesn’t say what those goals should be, nor does it contain enforcement mechanisms. This is theology masquerading as policy, an increasingly common phenomenon in international affairs.
The list of other agreements to discard is long, including the Law of the Sea Convention and two others from which the US should be immediately unshackled. The 1992 Treaty on Open Skies (which only entered into force in 2002) in theory allows unarmed military surveillance flights over the territories of its thirty-plus signatories but has been contentious since its inception.7 It has proven a boon to Russia8 but is outdated and essentially valueless to the United States because we no longer need to overfly their territory. Withdrawing the US would clearly be in our national interest, denying Russia, for example, the ability to conduct low-altitude flights over Washington, DC, and other highly sensitive locations. When I resigned, consideration was under way regarding leaving Open Skies, and press reports indicated these efforts, which I still fully support, were continuing.9
Similarly, unsigning the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty should be a priority, so the United States can once again conduct underground nuclear testing. We have not tested nuclear weapons since 1992, and while we have extensive programs to verify the safety and reliability of our stockpile, there is no absolute certainty without testing. We never ratified the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, but we are caught in “international law” limbo. Article 18 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, arguably based on “customary international law,” provides that a country that has signed but not ratified a treaty is prohibited from taking actions that would defeat “the object and purpose” of the treaty. Unsigning the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty would make it clear the US will make future judgments on underground nuclear testing based on its own national interests. Ironically, the US has signed but never ratified the Vienna Convention, and the applicability of “customary international law” is subject to heated debate.10 Other nuclear powers like China and India have either not ratified or not signed the treaty, which is why it has still not entered into force. The US has unsigned other treaties, most notably under Bush 43 when we unsigned the Rome Statute establishing the International Criminal Court.11
Protecting US Elections from Acts of War
During the 2016 campaign, I called Russian efforts to interfere in the elections an “act of war” against our constitutional structures,12 and I watched with dismay reports of Putin’s meeting with Trump at the 2017 G20 meeting in Hamburg, Germany, where Putin flatly denied any Russian interference.13
We needed not just a law-enforcement response to international cyber threats, but substantial military and clandestine capabilities as well. Accordingly, one of the first things I addressed was our ability to undertake offensive cyber operations against our adversaries, including terrori
st groups and other “nonstate actors.” There was a long-simmering struggle under way between those who favored the Obama Administration’s approach, believing that only defensive cyber efforts, with the rarest of exceptions, were sufficient, versus the more robust view that offensive capabilities were crucial. Obama’s strategy rested on the fallacy that cyberspace was relatively benign, even unspoiled, and that the best approach was to smooth over the problems and not risk making things worse. I didn’t understand why cyberspace should be materially different from the rest of human experience: initially a state of anarchy from which strength and resolve, backed by substantial offensive weaponry, could create structures of deterrence against potential adversaries that would eventually bring peace. If, as we knew with increasing certainty, Russia, China, North Korea, Iran, and others were contesting us in cyberspace,14 it was time to fight back. Such a strategy was not designed to increase conflict in this new domain but restrain it. In reality, a defense-only strategy guaranteed more provocations, more conflict, and more damage, to both businesses and other private entities as well as to the US government.
This forward-leaning approach was hardly revolutionary. Before I arrived in the West Wing, there were extensive interagency discussions to change the Obama-era rules governing cyber decision-making. These rules so centralized authority for cyber offense, and were so bureaucratically burdensome, that actual offensive cyber actions under Obama were rare. By stressing process rather than policy, Obama inhibited US operations in cyberspace without ever having to say so explicitly, thereby evading the legitimate public debate we should have been having over this new war-fighting domain. Unfortunately, bureaucratic inertia, turf fights, and some genuine unresolved issues paralyzed the Trump Administration, month after month. That had to change. One of the first things I did was clarify lines of authority within the NSC staff dealing with national and homeland security issues, since they were at bottom exactly the same thing. I also swept away duplicative, competitive billets and fiefdoms, and made it possible for the NSC staff to speak with one voice. With the deadwood cleared away, we were off, although incredibly frustrating bureaucratic battles and obstructionism still lay ahead.
