The Battle of Matapan 1941

by Mark Simmons

  About 70 miles southeast of VALF, the British battle fleet received news at about 08:27 from Admiral Pridham-Wippell that he had sighted the enemy. Admiral Cunningham altered course towards him and increased speed to 22 knots, dictated by Warspite’s condenser troubles. Warspite and Valiant began to pull ahead of Barham and Formidable, which was preparing to fly off strike aircraft The situation was unclear to Cunningham, but fearing the VALF might be in danger, at 09:39 he ordered an air torpedo striking force. Six Albacores of 826 and 829 Squadrons with an escort of two Fulmar fighters were flown off from Formidable.5 Another strike force was readied at Maleme, but delays in signals and waiting for aircraft to return from patrols meant the three Swordfish of this force did not take off until 10:50.

  At last, at 10:58 the Orion spotted one Vittorio Veneto class battleship about fifteen miles to the north. Admiral Pridham-Wippell, once he had identified the ship, altered course south making smoke and increased speed to maximum in an attempt to disengage. The chase was on again. However, the British cruisers were under bombardment for 30 minutes, as the official history says ‘15-inch salvoes, which though desultory was at times uncomfortably accurate.’6 Orion did receive considerable damage from a near miss.

  Aboard the Warspite Cunningham felt the situation was becoming alarming.

  We knew that the ‘Littorio’ [also known as Vittorio Veneto] class of battleship was capable of 31 knots, and the night before, because of engine trouble, the Gloucester had reported herself capable of no more than 24. There was another strong enemy cruiser squadron to the northward of Pridham-Wippell. However, the sight of an enemy battleship had somehow increased the Gloucester’s speed to 30 knots.7

  Cunningham was frustrated by Warspite’s lack of speed; he ordered Valiant to go on at her ‘utmost speed’, while he sent Fleet Engineer Officer Captain B.J.H. Wilkinson below in the flagship to see what he could do. ‘In a short time I was gratified to see the Valiant, which had been coming up at full speed from astern, was no longer gaining. We pressed on together.’8 The C-in-C had hoped to hold the air strike until he was closer, but felt his hand was forced by the danger to VALF, and ordered the strike to go in as soon as possible.

  Admiral Iachino had closed the range beyond his best 25,000 metres for Vittorio Veneto’s guns because of bad visibility. The three main turrets in the battleship were firing in rapid succession at different elevations – ‘ladder fire’ – trying to find the range. VALF responded by turning 90° to port and began making smoke and to zigzag. Gloucester at the end of the line, being less covered by the smokescreen became the main target.

  Shortly before 11:00 lookouts on Vittorio Veneto reported six aircraft approaching from astern. At first they were thought to be Italian from Rhodes, but as they came closer they were identified as British. They flew parallel to the Italian ships, then moved away to organise into an attack formation.

  At 11:15 the Albacores of Formidable’s first strike came in low over the sea. The main armament of Vittorio Veneto ceased firing, while the ship prepared to meet the air attack, the anti-aircraft batteries already firing. The torpedo bombers came in at an angle about 30 feet above the sea trying to aim at the battleship’s bows. Lieutenant F.H.E. Hopkins was observer aboard Albacore 4A flown by Lieutenant Commander Gerald Saunt.

  Eventually we got into an attacking position and the first flight of three aircraft dived to the starboard bow of the target and dropped torpedoes. As the Vittorio turned to comb the tracks she was caught beam on by the second flight of three aircraft. At least one torpedo hit and Vittorio Veneto circled through 360o and apparently stopped.9

  Iachino at his ‘action station’ in the armoured control turret ordered the rudders put hard to starboard. He could see little from his position so returned to the bridge; by the time he reached there he could see the tracks of the torpedoes had passed astern of the ship. The enemy aircraft then withdrew. By now he was convinced he would have no air support. At 11:30 Vittorio Veneto, undamaged, changed course to 300° and the fleet headed for home.

  The Albacores from Formidable had been attacked by two Junkers JU 88 fighter bombers, but the Fulmars shot one down and drove the other off. The first strike reported once back on Formidable that they were convinced they had hit Vittorio Veneto, at least once, maybe more.

  VALF was unaware that the Italians had come under air attack, but realised that they had broken off the action. By 11:38 Gloucester informed him the enemy had moved away to the north. Pridham-Wippell therefore set course to join the battle fleet, with which he made visual contact about 12:30.10

  At 12:07 the three swordfish from Crete attacked the 3rd Division cruisers concentrating on Bolzano, the rear ship of the group. Coming out of the sun for a bow shot, again all three Mark 12 torpedoes missed. Despite heavy anti-aircraft fire from the ships no aircraft were lost.

  Notes

  1 Seth, Ronald, Two Fleets Surprised: The Battle of Matapan p.56

  2 Pack, S.W.C. The Battle of Matapan p.128

  3 MacClonnell, J.E. As you Were, www.diggerhistory.au

  4 Bragadin, M.A. The Italian Navy in World War II p.88

  5 Playfair, Major-General I.S.O. The Mediterranean and Middle East Volume II p.64

  6 Ibid p.64

  7 Cunningham, A. B. A Sailor’s Odyssey p.327

  8 Ibid p.328

  9 Pack, p.66

  10 Playfair, p.64

  14

  Afternoon, 28 March

  After a Herculean effort by the crew of Formidable, at 11:55 the Rear Admiral Air was able to report to the C-in-C that the second strike force was ready. It was made up of aircraft that had been on reconnaissance duties earlier in the morning; the last Swordfish of that mission had landed back on the carrier at 11:30, requiring refuelling and arming with a torpedo.

  Cunningham ordered Boyd to hold the second strike. This order presented Boyd with a problem as the first strike force was on its way back to the carrier, while the flight deck was ranged with the second strike aircraft. It would mean delays if this force was put below. Therefore he asked Cunningham for permission to fly off the second strike and recover the first. The C-in-C agreed, so around 12:00 Formidable hauled out of line, flying off the second strike of three Albacores and two Swordfish of 829 Squadron, with two Fulmar escort fighters. They had orders to stay over the fleet to see if the ships became engaged; if this did not happen by 13:30, they were to locate and attack the enemy themselves.

  Formidable had completed this operation, which meant detaching herself from the fleet, by 12:44, but it took her until 14:00 to catch up. She was attacked by two S79s – Italian torpedo bombers – during this time. They came in low under the fighter patrol but they failed to hit the carrier.

  At 12:25 Warspite and Valiant flew off their Swordfish float aircraft for reconnaissance during the expected action, two from each ship. Warspite’s A aircraft was to act as observer while B would spot for the flagship’s guns. Valiant’s aircraft were to spot for Valiant and Barham. Warspite’s B aircraft and both of Valiant’s were to fly on to Suda Bay once they reached their fuel-endurance limit.

  When VALF made contact with the battle fleet at 12:30 Vittorio Veneto was farther away than Cunningham had thought, some 65 miles to the west. The strong north-easterly wind had dropped, easing flying operations.1

  The Swordfish float plane K 8863 ‘Lorna’ had left Warspite at 12:15, as the observer aircraft. She was flown by PO Ben Rice, with Maurice Pacey as her TAG and Lieutenant-Commander A.S. Bolt as the observer. Bolt noted:

  The main forces were meeting at high speed. The battle fleet steering to support the cruiser squadron at 23 knots was expected to make contact with the advanced units of the Italian fleet within at most two hours when Warspite launched my aircraft for action observation. My duties were to obtain a visual link between the fleets as soon as possible and then report generally on the tactical situation as seen from the air.2

  Shortly after this Cunningham was made aware by VALF that the Italians were muc
h farther away than he had expected.

  After the first torpedo bomber attack on the Italian fleet, Admiral Iachino set course for Taranto. He was disappointed with the results of the surface action, where he had held the advantage for a while. Vittorio Veneto had fired 29 salvoes, 94 shells from her 15-inch guns, without registering a major hit. Eleven shells had misfired and the salvoes’ spread was too great; they often straddled a target but were unable to tighten the spread. The 3rd Cruiser Division had done no better, having fired hundreds of 8-inch shells with no hits. This was chiefly, as Iachino knew, the result of a lack of training and technical skill and could not be practically addressed with the disadvantages under which the fleet operated. Admiral Iachino was still ignorant at this time that the British battle fleet was at sea and so close. He felt he was unlikely to encounter any more British surface units, but expected more air attacks.3

  About 14:00 Admiral Cunningham issued a special signal to the fleet of his appreciation of the situation. The Italian fleet appeared divided into two groups, northern and southern. The southern consisted of one battleship, three cruisers and seven destroyers, which had last been seen around 11:15 by VALF, and had been attacked by the Formidable first strike. The northern group appeared to consist of two battleships (an erroneous identification as all were cruisers) three cruisers and destroyers. This had been attacked by the Maleme strike force from Crete, west of Gavdos Island steering west.

  We settled down to a chase, and it was clear enough that it would be a long one and without reward unless the Vittorio Veneto was damaged and slowed by our aircraft attacks. The pursuit was made even longer as speed had to be reduced to 22 knots to allow the Formidable to rejoin and the Barham to keep up. But we had one providential piece of good fortune. The easterly wind dropped and it became flat calm with occasional light airs from the westward, which meant that the Formidable could carry out all her flying operations from her station in the line.4

  A shortage of reconnaissance aircraft meant they had lost contact with the Italian fleet altogether. Three Albacores of 826 Squadron, part of Formidable’s first strike, were refuelled and sent out to search at 14:00. About 15:00, Lieutenants Ellis and Haworth of aircraft 4F sighted Vittorio Veneto, and at about 15:15 they were able to give the battleship’s position and speed.

  Ten minutes later the second Formidable strike force sighted Vittorio Veneto with two destroyers on each side. The squadron commander, Lieutenant-Commander J. Dalyell-Stead 5G, prepared to attack.

  Throughout the day, Admiral Iachino received more conflicting signals. About noon Supermarina informed him the British Fleet was still in Alexandria, and the only forces in his area were the four cruisers, which he had recently engaged. This was a relayed signal from Italian Air Command on Rhodes which was hours out of date, having been transmitted from Rhodes to Italian Air Force Command in Rome, then to Supermarina and finally to Iachino. Two more signals came in about the same time, one from X Cat German Air Command in Sicily and one from Supermarina, informing him that Formidable was at sea and it was her aircraft that had attacked him, by then something he was well aware of. He found it odd that Formidable was at sea on her own, but reasoned that the German spotter plane must surely have seen the battleships if they were at sea. Of course Formidable at that time was detached for flying operations, and the aircraft did not see the rest of the fleet.

  The Italian fleet continued to withdraw west. About 14:30, a delayed message from Rhodes arrived, timed at 12:25. ‘Aircraft 1 Aegean Strategic Reconnaissance sighted one battleship; one carrier, six cruisers, and five destroyers sector 5647.’5 This put the enemy 80 miles to the east, and Iachino began to wonder if the Rhodes aircraft was reporting his own ships. All he could do was continue on his present course and speed and see what Supermarina had to say. About 15:00 a D/F intercept (direction finding on radio transmissions) came in, putting the enemy 110 miles 60° from Tobruk, 170 miles away, transmitting to Crete and Alexandria. Were these the same ships the Rhodes aircraft had seen? If so it could not be his ships mistakenly identified as British. Also these ships transmitting to Crete and Alexandria made them fairly important.

  Iachino reached the conclusion that there must be two British groups at sea: the cruisers and a battleship carrier group. Were they apart or together and where, 80 or 170 miles away? He felt a D/F bearing was likely to be more reliable than the eyes of the aircraft crew, so he took the 170-mile distance as correct.

  These conflicting messages were confusing Iachino and his staff, due mainly to delays in transmission. However, mistrust of the Regia Aeronautica and Luftwaffe may have clouded his judgement, as the aircraft report he rejected in favour of the D/F report was sent by an aircraft within sight of land, so the observers would have been well aware of their position. In contrast the D/F bearing was inaccurate due to instrument malfunction or lack of operator skill.

  For unexplained reasons Supermarina did not decode Cunningham’s signals to Crete ordering the Fleet Air Arm there to attack the Italian fleet at dusk. However Iachino had rightly identified his greatest danger would come from the air. The 3rd Cruiser Division had been attacked, and by 14:20 the Vittorio Veneto group had been hit twice, once by Formidable’s first strike and then by three RAF Blenheims of 84 Squadron based in Greece. The latter group had dropped bombs but no hits were made, but another six Blenheims from 113 Squadron attacked at 14:50. These attacks by the RAF were making history, for in effect Admiral Cunningham, through arrangements with the bases at Menidi and Paranythia, had these aircraft under command standing by.

  Admiral Iachino was justifiably upset by the total lack of air cover his ships received. ‘I felt pretty well deceived by the lack of cooperation. We continued to remain for the rest of the day without any fighter cover.’ X Cat on Sicily replied to repeated requests from Iachino and Supermarina for air cover, saying ‘it could not go out on such missions because there was a danger that its planes might accidentally attack the Italian ships, since the position of the British ships was not known.’6

  The second Blenheim attack came in shortly before Formidable’s second strike led by Lieutenant-Commander Dalyell-Stead. On sighting the Vittorio Veneto he led the three Albacores and two Swordfish into the sun to get down to 5,000 feet before he was seen. One Italian destroyer soon spotted them and opened fire. The Fulmars strafed the ship trying to keep their fire down. The three Albacores flew on through the destroyer screen to some 3,000 yards ahead of the Vittorio Veneto then breaking formation, two turning to port and one to starboard; turning about they came at the ship from three different angles.

  Iachino believed the high-level bombers had distracted his gunners until the torpedo bombers were close, and admired the coordination. The Fulmars also strafed the battleship’s upper works and bridges, momentarily scattering the anti-aircraft gunners. Thus the three Albacores continued their approach with not so much attention from anti-aircraft fire.

  They came in fast above the waves trying to keep level to release their torpedoes and let them run true. Men on the Vittorio Veneto reported that the aircraft came in about 1,000 yards before dropping their torpedoes; as the ship was healing over to starboard they could see the tracks in the water. 5G Dalyell-Stead’s aircraft was hit by a barrage of fire as he crossed in front of the ship’s course and the anti-aircraft gunners came to life. His aircraft was fatally hit a dozen yards ahead of the battleship’s bows, crashing into the sea 1,000 yards out on the starboard side. All three of the crew – Lieutenant-Commander Dalyell-Stead, Lieutenant Cooke the observer and PO Blenkhorn the air gunner – were killed. With the turn of the ship the torpedo track was heading toward the stern, and within seconds of the death of the crew of 5G their torpedo hit home. ‘The screws on the port side took the blow. For a time the ship was unable to move, and 4000 tons of water poured in through the breach.’7

  Mike Haworth was watching in his reconnaissance role with 4F from Formidable and wrote of the attack.

  The attack was delivered in two waves beca
use the Albacores in the striking force climbed at a higher speed than the Swordfish. Diving out of the sun, the leading sub flight appeared to achieve a degree of surprise and the enemy made a turn of 180o to avoid them.

  He saw ‘smoke rings from the funnel, and a further, 180o turn to revert to the original retreating course.’ However the speed of the Vittorio Veneto, he felt, was much reduced.8

  The two Swordfish saw the Vittorio Veneto’s turn to starboard away from her destroyer screen, so they dived down from 8,000 feet to attack the starboard side. By the time they reached sea level the ship’s speed had dropped by half. This presented the aircraft with an easier shot, but the anti-aircraft fire had grown in intensity, and no hits were scored.

  At about the same time as the torpedo attacks were going on against Vittorio Veneto, Blenheims from RAF Squadrons 113 and 84 attacked the 3rd Cruiser Division; they claimed three hits on two ships but all were near misses. Further attacks came in against Admiral Cattaneo’s 1st Cruiser Division, but again only near misses were achieved on the Zara and Garibaldi causing no damage. These tailed off about 17:00 by which time six Blenheims from 211 Squadron had also attacked the Italian fleet.

  About this time Lieutenant-Commander Bolt on board Warspite’s Swordfish K 8863 observer float plane was still airborne. ‘My routine reports of fuel state evoked no response from HMS Warspite, until I reported only fifteen minutes of fuel remaining.’ The aircraft could not reach Suda Bay, by now over an hour’s flying time away. The fleet was steaming flat out in pursuit of Vittorio Veneto which had been slowed by Formidable’s second strike, and did not want to slow to recover an aircraft, a fact Bolt was well aware of.