The Third Pillar

by Raghuram Rajan

  WHAT WILL CITIZENSHIP LOOK LIKE?

  There is a fond hope among the populist nationalists that they will make the nation pure again by shutting off the flow of immigrants (except immigrants like themselves). Furthermore, they will impose a majoritarian template on existing immigrants and minorities so that they will be forced to shed much of what is different and alienating (and interesting) about them.

  Race and religion are hard for immigrants and minorities to shed, but once they conform their other attributes to the template, these differences will only define their second-class status. The secret hope of the more extreme populist nationalists is that life will become so difficult for everyone who is different that they will “self-deport,” returning to their “own” country. The most extreme actually want to initiate expulsions or ethnic cleansing that will make the country “pure.” Obviously, for minorities who have been in the country for centuries, and for the children of immigrants, for whom the country has been the only one they have known, there is nothing to return to. The extremists do not care, and do not see that their legitimacy as citizens is no stronger than that of these minority citizens whom they want to push out—for, after all, everyone’s ancestors came as an immigrant, ultimately from Africa.

  WHY THE POPULIST NATIONALIST DREAM CANNOT WORK

  No one is happy with a second-class existence, so if the populist nationalists push, the minorities and immigrants will be forced into taking a stand, to push back. In this twenty-first century, where the civilized norm is that every citizen in a country has the right to determine their destiny and they have equal political rights, people will fight for the norm. The attempted tyranny of the majority in a country with a significant minority and immigrant population is a recipe for escalating conflict and increasing authoritarianism.

  Some populist nationalists in countries with a substantial immigrant and minority population fear that their culture will be swamped. They want to preserve it by imposing it on everyone through national mandate. Hence, for example, the seemingly trivial debate in the United States on whether everyone should say “Merry Christmas!” while “Feliz Navidad!” or “Happy Holidays” are discouraged, and the related discussion about whether schools should be allowed to be bilingual. Yet such cultural imposition seems extremely shortsighted for countries where the identity of the majority group will almost surely change within the next few decades. Would the new majority also not use the same powers, fortified by precedent, to impose its culture? Is it not better to protect minorities and their culture better, by allowing cultural diversity between communities under an overall national framework of common values, given that the day when the majority shifts to being a minority is not so far away?

  If the populist nationalist approach cannot work without creating an authoritarian apartheid regime, what can? If a country does need to attract immigrants over time and wants to give full opportunity to its minorities, how does it balance this need against the concerns of those in the majority group who fear their culture will be swamped?

  TOWARD AN INCLUSIVE CIVIC NATIONALISM

  One of the reasons populist nationalism appears to be spreading today is because alternative sources of social solidarity, such as the neighborhood or community, seem to be tenuous, especially for those with lower incomes and sliding status. For example, the World Values Survey indicates that in the United States, only 57 percent of low-income respondents trusted people from their neighborhood, while 85 percent of upper-middle-class respondents did so.6 Similarly, when asked whether they saw themselves as part of the community, there was a thirteen-percentage-point lower response for low-income respondents than for those who saw themselves as upper-middle-class. When asked whether they saw themselves as part of the nation, though, responses were much closer together at 92 percent and 98 percent respectively. In general, upper-middle-class respondents seem more confident of their membership and relationships in social structures than low-income respondents, but the sense of belonging to the nation is very strong at all income levels. This suggests that nationalism may persist when other social ties fray, and may indeed substitute for them.

  Instead of allowing the populist nationalist agenda to hijack the nation entirely, it is better that their concerns be addressed at two levels. There are certain attributes that an immigrant or minority cannot change, like their race. There are also certain attributes that are so central to one’s identity that it would be extremely difficult for anyone to abandon, such as one’s religion and certain aspects of one’s culture. At the national level, we therefore need a concept of nationality that does not exclude anyone based on ethnicity or religion but is based on shared values.

  German philosopher Jurgen Habermas proposes that countries should aim for a constitutional patriotism, where the loyalty of the citizen is to the principles, ideals, and justice enshrined in the nation’s constitution.7 In addition, most nations have some founding narratives that give color and meaning to the values that formed the nation, and that stir the soul of citizens. These could offer a backdrop to the agreed covenant. For example, India’s freedom struggle against British rule, led by Gandhi and Nehru, is the narrative that appeals to all Indians and gives meaning to the constitution and citizenship.8 Countries such as Australia, Canada, France, India, and the United States, which embrace such civic nationalism, are inclusive in that anyone from anywhere can theoretically become a citizen, provided they satisfy residency requirements and sign up to the nation’s values. They offer a nationalism that can hold a diverse country together and still inspire the great deeds that nations are capable of.

  In addition, there are a lot of other ways in which an immigrant can and should integrate, including learning the local language and going along with important local customs and manners, sprinkled whenever beneficial with their own traditions. The intent at the national level should be integration, not submission.

  So where does ethnicity and cultural continuity, which populist nationalists care about, get expressed? At the community level. If more powers are delegated from the state to the local community level (the “localism” in inclusive localism), a community can shape its own future better, and will have more control over it. Some communities will have a specific ethnic concentration, and community culture will gravitate toward that ethnic group’s culture—the Pilsen community described in the Preface emphasizes its Mexican links and its Hispanic culture. A strong local community could satisfy people’s need to live in a cohesive social structure with others of the same culture or religion. It would also slake their desire to preserve, celebrate, and pass on their heritage. The large number of communities where the majority group is concentrated will be ones where the populist nationalists can emphasize the ethnic aspects of nationalism that they care about. None of this implies exclusion—having monocultures that satisfy the tastes of those who want monocultures is as important as having multicultures.

  This does raise the specter of a country dotted with segregated communities, each with its own race, national origin, and cultural traditions, and totally barred to outsiders. We must make sure that this is not the default outcome, not by forcing people to mix, but by emphasizing—if necessary, through laws—that in a nation, all communities are open to flows of people, goods, services, capital, and ideas, both in and out. Some communities will be thoroughly mixed, especially in the cosmopolitan cities, because of the myriad advantages of mixing. At the same time, many neighborhoods, even within cities, will be more representative of a certain religion or national origin, simply based on the choices of who moves in and out, without any overt discrimination.

  As Canadian writer and politician Michael Ignatieff observes of the multi-ethnic neighborhood of Jackson Heights in Queens, New York, it is possible for communities to live side by side amicably, provided there is a fair institutional framework and policing structure that enables mutual trust and reciprocity.9 Indeed, studies show that developed countries, which have a bett
er ability to create such frameworks, can use diversity better to further growth.10 Such communities thrive on their ethnic cohesion, but also see themselves as an integral part of the host nation. Streets will be closed for community celebrations, which will include both festivals from the host country and the favorites of the ethnic majority in the community. And over time, communities will mix, for familiarity first breeds comprehension then cohabitation.

  Will the majority settle for communities while giving up the nation? In a sense, some diverse nations have already informally made the transition. Sanctuary cities in the United States, dominated by an immigrant electorate, refuse the diktats of the federal administration. Populist nationalism is then a rearguard action, attempting to reverse what has already largely changed. What is needed is a compromise, where communities have substantial autonomy, but respect national laws. That is what inclusive localism implies. In other countries, Populists nationalists still believe they can recapture the nation, and are applying discriminatory authoritarian polices to do so. How much of the country’s soul will its citizens be willing to give up in order to maintain its ethnic purity? For some countries, unfortunately, the answer may be, “A lot!”

  ENABLING THE DISADVANTAGED

  Finally, what about affirmative action, a red rag to populist nationalist groups? Most large diverse countries have minority groups that have been discriminated against, are disadvantaged, and are underrepresented among the elite. Most such countries have scholarship and admission preferences in schools and colleges for these underprivileged minorities, as well as quotas for government jobs and preferences for government contracts. While not all these supports work well, in my previous job as the governor of the Reserve Bank in India, I had firsthand experience of the positive difference affirmative action could make.

  Our lowest tier of employee was the chaprasi, or office peon, a position that essentially involves managing the flow of visitors to the office and carrying messages and files from the manager to other offices. This job requires only basic educational skills, but lots of diplomacy. Most of our peons had little education and came from underprivileged segments of Indian society (whence they qualified for affirmative action). The pay, benefits, and job security in public-sector jobs at the lower tiers typically exceed private-sector pay significantly, so getting a public-sector job is a form of affirmative action benefit. Our peons could send their children to decent schools and then to college. At periodic gatherings at my house, where I got to meet the families of office staff, the peons proudly introduced their children—here a bank manager, there a software engineer, everyone able to speak managerial English. The children had made it to comfortable middle class in a generation. It is hard to imagine this would have been possible without their father’s public-sector job. When there is a hunger to take advantage of opportunity, affirmative action seems to work.

  The problem, of course, is who should be allowed to take advantage of such preferences and for how long. From an economic perspective, it is not very helpful to see affirmative action as a righting of the historical wrongs suffered by an ethnic group. Instead, it is best seen as a way of righting current disabilities that hold groups back—and affirmative action should therefore also apply to subgroups within the majority group that are struggling economically and are socially unconnected to the elite. For instance, the bestselling book Hillbilly Elegy describes one set of groups among whites in the United States that should well qualify.11 When the underprivileged group’s path into higher positions in society is eased—for example with admission preferences into elite colleges—their successful members can demonstrate their capabilities and earn respect and acceptance for the group, they can serve as exemplars for young members within the group as well as mentor and aid them, and they can create networks that support group members. Easing the way for a few can create a pathway for many.

  To succeed, affirmative action also requires affirmative support—the coaching and hand-holding that someone from an underprivileged section of society, thrown into the competitive elite world, needs, because they have not had the same privileges growing up as the others. Else, affirmative action risks reinforcing stereotypes. In a similar vein, while organizations should consider a broad variety of relevant skills and capabilities while deciding on promotions, eventually everyone ought to meet those standards for promotion. Else, the underprivileged who are promoted will always be under a cloud—did they get promoted because they met the standard or because they are underprivileged? Such uncertainty hurts them in the informal relationships that build in every organization, and thus in their ability to be chosen to lead exciting projects, get challenging clients, or attract good subordinates. If, however, an organization does not succeed over time in improving diversity at the top, it has to ask itself whether its systems and processes create blind spots that make it harder for it to nurture or recognize capabilities in others. Otherwise, it is all too easy for monocultures to maintain themselves by saying, “They just did not meet the bar.”

  In the interests of leveling the playing field, affirmative action for a minority group should eventually end. But when? Some early beneficiaries from affirmative action do well enough to put their children into good schools and colleges, as did our peons at the Reserve Bank. Should affirmative action end for their children (the peon’s grandchildren)? The answer, India has decided, turns on whether the grandchildren continue to be disadvantaged or discriminated against, and whether their parent’s higher incomes are sufficient to get them out of the trap of disadvantage. For groups that do not suffer social discrimination, affirmative action ends once parents have a middle-class income. For those who still continue to face social discrimination—in India the lowest castes and tribes are still discriminated against socially, including being treated as untouchables in some areas—affirmative action does not end even when the family attains decent incomes. How India will gauge when social discrimination has ended remains to be seen, but for now, this seems to be an acceptable answer in the world’s most raucous democracy. It may well be worth examining by others.

  CONCLUSION

  It may seem naive to discuss the need for continuing immigration when countries seem unable to absorb existing flows and are dealing with fiery populist nationalist movements. All too often, though, the debate focuses too much on the here and now, and does not take a realistic view of the future, given where nations are headed. It is hard to imagine that the trend of increasing diversity in developed countries can be reversed without them losing their fundamental character as liberal democracies. Unlike ethnically homogenous countries like Japan that still have a choice of whether to become more diverse or not, civilized democratic countries with sizeable immigrant and minority populations really do not. For nations where the majority, because of differential birth rates, is slated to become a minority, populist nationalism is a tempting but mistaken diversion. Inclusive localism is a better, feasible alternative.

  Many countries that are grappling with diversity already have much of the structure proposed in this chapter, including a citizenship framework that implies civic nationalism. Their task is to decentralize powers to the community, even while encouraging flows of trade and people between communities so that through contact, they eventually appreciate and welcome their differences. In the next chapter, we will examine how the state can help create bridges between communities. Nation building, under the umbrella of civic nationalism, is a task that never ends.

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  REBALANCING THE STATE AND THE COMMUNITY

  In the last chapter, I argued for bringing back the largely self-governing community as the locus of self-determination, identity, and cohesiveness, taking pressure off the nation to fulfill much of that role. Stronger communities will make it easier for diverse groups within countries to express their identities even while coexisting peacefully. Through localism, countries can also bypass the divisive policy gridlock that a number of them now experience at the fe
deral level, as suggested by Bruce Katz and Jeremy Nowak in their book The New Localism.1 Since some of that gridlock is because of identity politics, localism can even alleviate it.

  An interesting historical study by Luigi Zingales and others highlights the long-term benefits of localism.2 They find that Italian cities that achieved self-government in the Middle Ages have higher levels of social capital today—as measured by more nonprofit organizations per capita, the presence of an organ bank (indicating a willingness to donate) and fewer children caught cheating on national exams. They conclude that self-governance instilled a culture that allowed citizens to be confident in their ability to do what was needed and to reach goals. Decentralizing powers to communities may thus reduce apathy and force their members to assume responsibility for their destinies rather than blaming a distant elitist administration.