No Victory in Valhalla

by Ian Gardner

  It was to be the most serious defeat of US armed forces since Japan invaded the Philippines three years earlier. The breakthrough, supported by 1,000 Stug self-propelled guns (SPGs), Mk III, IV, and V Panther (aka “Panzer”) tanks, penetrated over 50 miles in three days.

  The idea was to drive a wedge between the British in Holland and Americans in France, and to capture the Belgian seaport of Antwerp. Known as Operation Watch on the Rhine, the “Last Hope” offensive was the brainchild of Commander-in-Chief West, Feldmarschall Gerd von Runstedt. The 88-mile front, running due south from Monschau (in western Germany) along the Belgian border to Echternach (in eastern Luxembourg), encompassed a total force of 250,000 troops who had over 2,000 artillery pieces at their disposal. Heeresgruppe B, together with 5.Panzer-Armee, formed the central core of the attack. The 6.Panzer-Armee, commanded by SS-Oberstgruppenführer Josef “Sepp” Dietrich, and 7.Armee, led by General der Panzertruppen Erich Brandenberger, were tasked with the north and south. MajGen Norman Cota’s 28th Infantry Division (ID) had been fighting a rearguard action to the north, allowing the 10th Armored Division time to occupy Bastogne and deploy its tanks. With a population in 1944 of 4,500 people, the town of Bastogne was, and still is, a central hub. Located in the southeastern corner of Belgium, Bastogne is situated in the province of Luxembourg, close to the independent Grand Duchy of Luxembourg and the border with Germany. Comprising seven major roads, the network was vitally important to the Germans and their ultimate goal to capture the seaport of Antwerp.

  From the important road junction at St Vith (18 miles northeast of Houffalize) the “Keystone Boys” were initially assigned to defend a 21-mile front extending south along the German border to the confluence of the rivers Sûre and Our. At the same time the 106th ID fought a bloody six-day battle in and around St Vith against 5.Panzer-Armee alongside the 7th and elements of the 9th armored divisions. Several days later on December 22, the commander of the 106th ID, MajGen Alan Jones, suffered a serious heart attack and had to be replaced by his deputy, BrigGen Herbert Perrin.

  The 2nd and 99th infantry divisions from MajGen Leonard Gerow’s V Corps carried out another essential blocking maneuver at Elsenborn Ridge. The battle caused serious delays to 6.Panzer-Armee and their attempt to reach the river Meuse beyond Verviers in the west. Despite the overwhelming situation facing V and VIII Corps, the troops from First Army did an incredible job, and their actions made a valuable contribution to the successful deployment of the two US airborne divisions.

  Caserne Heintz

  At the time, 46-year-old BrigGen Anthony McAuliffe (divisional artillery commander) was in charge of the 101st Airborne, after Gen Maxwell Taylor had been recalled to Washington, DC for an urgent conference with the War Department. It is a little known fact that Taylor and McAuliffe had pet names for each other – “Major Killer” and “Minor Killer.” However, when word reached Taylor of the German breakthrough, he immediately made plans to return. Taylor’s assistant, BrigGen Gerald Higgins, had just arrived in Belgium from the United Kingdom and sensibly acquiesced to Tony McAuliffe who had a better understanding of what was happening.

  The previous morning (the 18th), while on his way to Werbomont, McAuliffe decided to visit Bastogne and get an impromptu situation report from Troy Middleton at his HQ in the Caserne Heintz (Heintz Barracks) on Rue de la Roche. The barracks had previously been in use as a “boot camp” by the Hitler Youth, and when liberated on September 10, the main gate was still decorated with the German national emblem. On the other side of the main entrance, lined by a neatly trimmed row of small conifers, was a tar macadam vehicle park and parade ground. Adjacent to a pair of tall radio antennas (belonging to VIII Corps Signal Co) and facing the square were eight oblong-shaped accommodation blocks. Situated behind the two-storey barracks were several larger buildings, comprising of garage, saddlers, and carpentry workshops plus an indoor rifle range 100 yards long. These barracks would become McAuliffe’s HQ for the next two and a half weeks. Opposite the caserne, across Rue de la Roche, was the cemetery. During the ensuing battle this would see much use as a temporary burial ground.

  Into the abyss

  McAuliffe had left Mourmelon ahead of the divisional advance party with his aide, Lt Ted Starrett, G3 divisional operations officer LtCol Harry Kinnard, and driver Sgt Irwin Brown. During the meeting at Caserne Heintz, LtGen James Gavin – deputy commander of the 82nd Airborne Division and now, due to the absence of Matthew Ridgeway, temporary commander of XVIII Airborne Corps (part of the First Allied Airborne Army) – appeared with vitally important news. Gavin had just come from Werbomont, where MajGen Gerow and V Corps were clearly in trouble. After some discussion it was decided to assign the 82nd Airborne to V Corps and deploy them around Werbomont.

  Intelligence revealed that Heeresgruppe B and 5.Panzer-Armee, led by General der Panzertruppen Hasso von Manteuffel, were now well on their way. After advising Mourmelon of the change in plan, McAuliffe sent LtCol Kinnard to a crossroad, codenamed “X,” near Herbaimont, along the N4, 7 miles northwest of Bastogne. Here the road is dissected by the N826 that runs northeast to Bertogne and southwest to Libramont and Libin. Spanned by a pontoon bridge, the river Our was only 3 miles further west. Immediately upon arrival Kinnard instructed the MPs to direct all traffic belonging to the 101st to Bastogne, and not Werbomont as previously planned.

  First to arrive, 1/501 were redirected to the village of Neffe, 2 miles east of Bastogne, where a number of German tanks were now massing. Their ultimate goal was the river Meuse and the garrison town of Namur in southern Belgium. The Panzer-Lehr-Division (an inexperienced training division), 26.Volksgrenadier-Division (“People’s Army” Division) under command of Generalmajor Heinz Kokott, and 2.Panzer-Division had already been forced towards Bastogne. Collectively these three main enemy assault groups made up the 47.Panzerkorps and would ultimately be tasked to capture the city, while further north 116.Panzer-Division supported by 560. Volksgrenadier-Division were targeting Houffalize.

  Several makeshift tank forces had been formed by the 10th Armored Division (from Third Army) to defend the eastern approaches of Bastogne. The 10th Armored (known as the “Tiger Division”) was commanded by MajGen William Morris, who had dispatched two groups, codenamed Combat Command A and B, to the battlefront. Each command was made up of around 50 tanks, one battalion of infantry, a company of engineers, and antiaircraft units equipped with “quad fifties” (a truck or half-track mounted with four .50cal machine guns).

  Combat Command A went to the river Sûre on the southern flank of the German advance while Combat Command B headed to Bastogne. Led by Col William Roberts, Combat Command B was divided into three forces and initially deployed in a wide arc, facing east, 5 miles from the city. Task Force Desobry, led by Maj William Desobry (CO [Commanding Officer] of the 20th Armored Infantry Bn) was sent north with 15 tanks to Noville. Task Force Cherry, under LtCol Henry Cherry, headed northeast to Longvilly. Meanwhile Task Force O’Hara, commanded by LtCol James O’Hara, moved southeast to Wardin. The three armored groups established roadblocks in an attempt to stem the advance of the 47.Panzerkorps. Many of the personnel who made up the German Volksgrenadier, or “People’s Army,” units were conscripted and given the most basic of military training. Among the Volksgrenadier infantry were teenage boys, older men, and in some cases even women; others came from across Europe as prisoners of war, press-ganged into service under threats of retribution. It was a desperate attempt to turn the Allied tide, and now the 26.Volksgrenadier-Division, together with the rest of 47.Panzerkorps, would be at the very forefront of the battle.

  The presence of Team Cherry at Longvilly actually influenced General Fritz Bayerlein (the CO of Panzer-Division-Lehr) into delaying his attack on Bastogne until the following morning. Bayerlein stopped briefly at Mageret after local intelligence reported a convoy of American tanks were heading his way. Fortunately for the Allies, this decision turned out to be a grave error of judgment, because at that moment, Bastogne was his for
the taking. However, the early deployment of 1/501 turned out to be crucial and in fact coincided with the delayed attack at 0730hrs on December 19, from the over-cautious Bayerlein. During the first hour of the battle the Volksgrenadiers suffered 84 casualties and were unable to break the resolve of the 501st PIR. The arrival of the 101st came as no great surprise to Hitler and his senior commanders, who had been hoping to achieve their aims before the Allied parachute divisions could be fully deployed.

  Back at Caserne Heintz, McAuliffe decided to take over VIII Corps CP – located below ground level on the southern side of the camp. For reasons of safety Gen Middleton moved his command center to Neufchâteau (12 miles away to the southwest). The bunker system at the barracks ran underneath the building and was accessed by a single flight of stairs. McAuliffe selected the first chamber on the left at the base of the steps for his work and sleeping area. The 81st AA Bn and 326th Airborne Engineer Bn also established their HQs at the barracks. The 101st Airborne Signal Co called a meeting with all the communication officers to determine on which road or in which direction each regiment was located in order to begin running wire between switchboards. The following evening, Middleton ordered the 705th Tank Destroyer (TD) Bn to proceed north from Neufchâteau and assist the 101st Airborne.

  Softly spoken, McAuliffe – who often described himself as “an Old Croc” – felt that the 101st Airborne could realistically hold Bastogne for 48 hours, before needing full back-up from Gen George Patton’s Third Army, who at that moment were 100 miles away, fighting through the “West Wall” beyond Saarbrücken.

  Patton’s staff had trained for such a scenario and when Gen Eisenhower asked him to counterattack from the south, Patton was confident he could deliver. While Third Army was being redirected, Patton mobilized his 4th Armored Division, who were being held in reserve near Fénétrange, 20 miles further south across the border in Alsace Lorraine.

  Commanded by MajGen Hugh Gaffey, 4th Armored was desperately short of tanks and crews. Gaffey split the division into three battle groups, codenamed “A,” “B,” and “R” (Reserve), and issued orders for “A” to spearhead north through Luxembourg while “B” advanced further to the west, with “R” on their far-left flank.

  As Middleton was leaving for Neufchâteau he smiled and wished McAuliffe and Kinnard good luck, adding, “Tony – now don’t let yourself get surrounded.” Although Gen Middleton would be instrumental in organizing Allied tank tactics and roadblocks during the next few weeks, luckily McAuliffe and Kinnard chose to ignore his advice. Rather than create one straight line to the north, McAuliffe decided to gamble on a defensive ring around Bastogne, 14 miles in length, thinking it would be easier to command and maintain. Ultimately Von Manteuffel would need total control of the roads to keep 5.Panzer-Armee freely on course and moving toward Antwerp. McAuliffe ordered every man under his command in the pocket of Bastogne (approximately 11,840 paratroopers and 6,500 other troops, totaling around 18,000) to form and defend the perimeter at all costs. In contrast, the enemy forces directed against the 101st at that time numbered 38,000 (although this was reduced to around 20,000 shortly before Christmas).

  As McAuliffe was settling in, Capt Willis McKee from the 326th Airborne Medical Co arrived, seeking permission to relocate the 101st field hospital closer to Bastogne from Herbaimont. Believing the hospital was safer where it was, Tony refused and sent McKee back to his unit, which would turn out to be a disastrous and costly mistake.

  Boots on the ground

  Just after midnight on December 18, the commander of 3rd Bn HQ Co, 28-year-old Capt Jim Morton from New York, was sent with 1/Sgt Fred Bahlau, Sgt Dennis Wester, and Sgt William Cooley as part of the regimental advance party to the village of Orsinfaing in Belgium. Also with Morton was his runner, Pvt Charles Coppala Jr, who had recently been transferred from G Co. Shortly after dawn, Morton was ordered northeast to Champs where Col Sink had already established a forward CP. After posting guides along the road to Mande-St-Étienne near “Crossroad X,” the regimental convoy was re-routed to Champs with the last vehicles passing through at 0600hrs the following morning.

  When at 0400hrs 3rd Bn arrived at Champs, nobody seemed to know what was happening. But after unloading, the troops set about digging temporary defensive positions on the northern edge of the village. The ground here was muddy and partially saturated with water. Barely audible in the distance, the men could hear explosions of artillery and tank fire possibly coming from Neffe or Noville.

  A few hours later the regiment was formed into a combat team (consisting of 1st Bn, 3rd Bn, Regt HQ Co, and 321st GFA) and marched through Hemroulle along Rue de la Roche to a large field south of the barracks, with 2nd Bn bringing up the rear. Commanded by LtCol Edward Carmichael, most of the 321st GFA were detached and sent northwest to Grande Fontaine and Savy where Carmichael established his CP inside the schoolhouse. The 321st consisted of 12 75mm pack howitzers belonging to A and B batteries who were centrally controlled by their own HQ Battery.

  It was vitally important for McAuliffe to be close to his artillery, and the CP at the barracks allowed him quick access to the 321st, who were now only 500 yards away. McAuliffe had around 130 guns at his disposal, including a significant number of M1, 155mm field guns, nicknamed “Long Toms.” With a range of up to 14 miles, the 155s were operated by the 333rd Field Artillery Group, whose African-American crews were part of VIII Corps and had recently been incorporated with a battery from another black unit, the 969th Field Artillery Bn. During the first two days, artillery ammunition was in plentiful supply and no doubt helped to keep the German forces pinned down during the early stages of the battle.

  B Battery was located on a large farm half a mile south of Savy overlooking Grande Fontaine. At least one gun was attached to 3/506 as gunner Pvt Ray Nagell recalls: “Initially my crew was sent forward in support of 1st and 3rd Bn. Each 75mm pack howitzer had a 12-man team including a sergeant, who acted as the section commander. I operated the elevation and deflection, via the optics, using two sighting stakes placed into the ground in front of the howitzer. Using these stakes I was able to accurately place the crosshairs from my dial-sight onto pre-recorded targets around Noville. Most of the time our positions were protected by a defensive circle of .50cal MGs from the 81st AA Bn.”

  Radio operator Pfc Victor Sauerheber (HQ Battery) was re-assigned to Col Sink, in order to coordinate the newly attached artillery support. “Because my boss 1st Lt Bill Nugent (a forward observer) was in hospital back at Mourmelon with pneumonia they posted me to the 506th.” Col Sink established a permanent CP in one of the accommodation blocks overlooking the holding area on the northern side of the caserne. Bizarrely, among the abandoned equipment inside the building were silk stockings and passports belonging to a group of Belgian nurses who had been assisting VIII Corps before the attack.*

  The previous occupants had departed in such a hurry that the remnants of their supper, along with several half-written letters, were spread across the tables in one of the rooms. Stored in another room were around 30 large sacks of flour previously procured by LtCol Carl Kohls (Div G4 supply officer) from the municipality of Bastogne. Seven tons of flour and 2 tons of tinned biscuits had been stored at the Catholic Seminary in Bastogne for safekeeping. The flour store at the barracks prompted many Americans to think that there was a bakery somewhere on site. The man behind the donation was Acting Mayor Leon Jacqmin, who had been appointed three months earlier by Troy Middleton.

  Painted in large letters on the wall of one room were the words “We’ll be back – The Yanks” which solicited a response from the paratroopers along the lines of “Hell, when did we ever leave?” “For the most part over the next three days,” continues Vic Sauerheber, “I worked at Sink’s CP manning the radio. It was an exhausting time and I don’t think I slept at all for the first 72 hours.”

  After reaching the holding area by the barracks and dispersing his squad, Sgt Hank DiCarlo remembers the delay before fresh orders arrived: “We wa
ited in the bitter cold for almost five hours and the only sound was the stamping of feet as everyone did their utmost to restore some semblance of warmth and circulation. A fortunate few had overcoats but most like me were clad only in basic combat uniform – although I did have a woolen sweater underneath my jacket.”

  The platoon commanders briefed their men as best they could on the uncertain tactical situation. “Col Patch told me that he couldn’t say where the breakthrough was exactly,” recalls 1st Lt Clark Heggeness (2 Ptn H Co), “but that we had been ordered to proceed north.” Shortly afterwards it was decided to place 2nd Bn in reserve at nearby Luzery. Before the battalion moved out Capt Anderson took Sgt Barrios and seven of his men and designated them as a makeshift recon squad, as Manny recalls: “Part of our job was to act as Forward Observers (FOs) and also a kind of mobile reserve. It turned out from then on we got all the chicken-shit jobs. Over the next few weeks, I taught my boys a heck of a lot about soldiering and I truly believe that they made a valuable contribution to I Co and the battalion.” In Manny’s absence, Harold Stedman was given command of the 60mm mortar squad until further notice.