Three Roads to the Alamo

by William C. Davis

  Scarcely two months later, when congress decreed the establishment of Austin's colony as a separate administrative jurisdiction from Béxar by creating the Department of Brazos, the ayuntamiento had to submit nominees for the position of political chief. Alcalde Williamson's name naturally came forth. So did that of James H.C. Miller, not to be confused with James B. Miller, Travis's landlord. The surprise was the third nominee, William B. Travis. It would have been a considerable elevation to go from mere secretary in February to head of a whole territorial department a few months later. It must have been both a mark of esteem on the part of most of the ayuntamiento, and a political move evidencing the divisions within the council. Miller was a centralist, thoroughly loyal to the old regime, and so despised by Travis that when he wrote of the nominations in his diary that night, he declined even to mention Miller by name.9 Reflecting Stephen Austin's hesitant stance, San Felipe was always diffident about stepping forward or backward, and the best the aggressive faction, headed by Williamson, could do was to put two of its own on the slate.10

  The next day Travis as secretary sent a copy of the nominations, as well as those for several other new positions in the Brazos Department, to political chief Músquiz in Béxar. Two weeks later he did not hesitate to send a private letter. In it he first informed Músquiz that Miller was a “foreigner,” not a colonist, and had not become a naturalized citizen of Mexico, thus disqualifying him. Having attempted to undermine his opponent, and whether or not he had a sound basis for making that claim, Travis then went on to add the line that established him then and forever as a politician: “I have no desire to be employed in the position of Chief,” he said, “but if I were named I should comply with all the laws and orders of the Government according to the best understanding thereof.” In short, he very much wanted the position.11 At the same time, when he learned that his friend David Burnet would be appointed a district judge at San Jacinto, Travis could not help crowing to Burnet about how he had been “instrumental in promoting your appointment.” A bit full of himself in his new influence he may have been, but Travis would not have been a politician if he did not also want recipients of his favors to know what he had done for them, for favors could be returned one day. He urged Burnet to accept, as they were of like mind, and Travis wanted to see as many of the hawkish Texians in office as possible.12

  Interested as he was in his possible elevation, Travis had even more important things to pass along to Músquiz. Williamson wrote a personal address to the ayuntamiento expressing his views on the question of Texian independence from Coahuila. “We still continue our unnatural connexion with Coahuila,” he said. The petition taken by Austin had been ignored, Austin arrested, and the Mexican congress apparently intended to ignore their pleas. In such a situation, they must act: “Desertion by us then, of this Our own cause, would be worse than political apostacy,” he declared. He proposed that San Felipe and the other ayuntamientos in Texas draft a “respectful memorial” on independent statehood. “Let us try it,” he pleaded. At the same time he attached a petition to the congress in Mexico City begging for Austin's release, and stating, in words borrowed rather significantly from the Declaration of Independence, that Texians would pledge “their lives, their fortunes and their sacred honor” to uphold the constitution and the laws of Mexico. He reminded Mexico that Texians had risen in support of Santa Anna, and the outbursts at Anahuac and Nacogdoches had been forced on them by necessity. Travis copied the two documents for transmission to Béxar, and may well have had some small hand in their composition, given his close alliance with Williamson.13 In the months ahead, as one or another of the other ayuntamientos followed suit with memorials, Travis forwarded them to Béxar as well. The one from Nacogdoches came, ironically enough, on Bastille Day.14 The leaders of the aggressive faction were becoming more bold, and Travis with them.

  Momentous news came on May 14, the same day that Travis tried to undercut Miller's chances for the Brazos leadership, when he received the announcement that the state congress now in Monclova had passed a law opening virtually all the public land in Texas and Coahuila for sale at auction in eleven-league tracts. It was, of course, part of Bowie's work, though Travis may have known nothing more than rumors of his involvement. Still, Travis regarded the act as “the most important law ever passed by the state govt.”15 From his point of view, in tandem with the abolition of the April 6 law, this move would allow the influx of thousands of new settlers from the United States. To buy their land they would have to become citizens, which would give them the vote, and the prospect of shifting the seesaw struggle between the centralists and the republicans decisively to the left. And should that struggle turn ugly, or even become a struggle with Mexico itself, then their arms would be needed in defense of Texas.

  Travis did not get the political chief's portfolio in the Brazos department. It went to the schoolteacher Henry Smith, but if Travis felt any disappointment he kept it to himself. More likely, he enjoyed sufficient success elsewhere that he could weather a disappointment now with a maturity that had been foreign to him in Claiborne. The daily routine of the ayuntamiento kept him busy enough translating documents, finding translators when his skills proved insufficient, preparing passports, and the like.16 When Williamson was absent, as he was for a time in July, Travis actually conducted the dealings with Béxar on his own, most of it routine transmission of documents and reports. When illness forced Músquiz to resign as political chief in San Antonio, Bowie's friend Juan Seguín replaced him, and Travis dealt with him thereafter. On occasion all of San Felipe's elected officials were absent, leaving Travis to act as alcalde, alderman, and everything else.17

  The appointment of Henry Smith was a significant event, for he was the first nortemericano to win such a high office in Mexican Texas. It showed goodwill on the part of the new governor, Augustín Viesca, and also gave promise of a greater Texian voice in Texian affairs. Travis congratulated the new appointee, expressing the “hope that you may be the means of great good to Texas.” Since the new Department of Brazos was to be headquartered in San Felipe, it would have been most efficient if political chief Smith had moved there, but he kept his home in Brazoria and seldom even visited Austin's village. That only meant the more work for Travis, for the ayuntamiento there had to work in tandem with Smith, and its secretary was his secretary. When Travis notified Smith of his appointment on July 24, he sent along a plea to come to San Felipe to preside at forthcoming elections, and to deal with correspondence awaiting him. Smith would keep to Brazoria for the most part, however, and as the summer wore on, Travis found the paperwork accumulating. It was especially frustrating when a large bundle of documents arrived in the ayuntamiento office directed specifically to Smith. Only he could open them, but Travis confessed that “we are anxious to know” the contents.18

  Their anxiety for information reflected the uncertainty of events in Mexico. By August, Travis lamented to a friend that there was still no word of the prisoner Austin's fate.19 Coahuila itself reeled in turmoil following the election of the new legislature and the removal of the capital to Monclova. Once Santa Anna took power it became painfully evident that people had been mistaken about his liberal sentiments. Faced with unsettled conditions, largely the result of his own uprising, he began concentrating more and more power in Mexico City, essentially becoming the very sort of centralist that he had rebelled against. Seeing this, the Monclova legislature in May condemned him and called for a special session to meet and address the situation. That was all the old centralists in Saltillo needed. They reconstituted themselves as a rump legislature, chose their own governor, creating a virtual state of civil war in Coahuila as each capital vied for power, as well as for the profits to be made from the anticipated boom in land speculation set off by Bowie and others the year before. In August the Monclova congress failed to gather a quorum, as many members feared to appear, and a military-led centralist coup seized power, deposed the sitting governor, and officers of the army installe
d their own governor. When the two competing capitals referred their dispute to Santa Anna, he decided in favor of Monclova but ordered the election of a new congress in December, with a postponement of the special session until the following March. Perhaps most foreboding of all, Santa Anna sent Gen. Martín Perfecto de Cós and a garrison to Saltillo to keep order. With all that happening, it was even worse for Travis and his friends in San Felipe that it could take nearly four weeks for documents from Monclova to reach San Felipe. No wonder they fussed at unopened mail when Smith stayed in Brazoria.

  Based on what they did know, Travis and the ayuntamiento were worried. The Texian delegation in the Monclova congress sent them an address early in September detailing the chaotic conditions there, warning of a military overthrow of civil government, and two rival legislatures, both of questionable legitimacy. Texas should recognize neither, they advised. In the political power vacuum then existing, they advised that Texas call a convention to create its own provisional government headquartered at Béxar. With two cities in Coahuila fighting each other to be capital, “is not Texas as much entitled to a government?” the delegates asked.20 Hearing this, the new political chief in San Antonio, Seguín, promptly agreed, condemning Santa Anna in the process. In San Felipe, Williamson condemned the rise of a military despot at Monclova “whose ignorance is alone equaled by his arrogance.”21

  By mid-September in San Felipe affairs seemed to calm, and Travis could actually tell his friend Burnet that “there is no news of much importance.” There were rumors of Austin being released, though unconfirmed, San Felipe had voted for Viesca's reinstallation as legitimate governor, and there was a movement to unseat Thomas J. Chambers, one of the Texian delegates to the Monclova congress. Travis offered to have Burnet nominated if he wished, another example either of Travis's genuine influence with the ayuntamiento by now, or else of his belief in his influence.22 But then came news of a threat that the military in Béxar might overthrow the outspoken Seguín for his declaration against Santa Anna, and once more the unrest emerged. The threat took Henry Smith by surprise, and even if Travis did not have the clout he had thought with the rulers in San Felipe, he certainly enjoyed great influence with the political chief of their department, for now Smith turned to the secretary. Frankly—and incredibly—he confessed that he did not know what to do, and begged for Travis's advice.

  “We are all at a loss,” Travis admitted, but then hammered home his repeated theme that “one thing is certain, never has there been a time when your presence was so much needed as now.” Smith must come to San Felipe and act rather than stay at home and allow events to pass around him. For his own part, however, Travis was as decisive as Smith was diffident. “Texas is forever ruined unless the citizens make a manly, energetic effort to save themselves from anarchy and confusion,” he said. The central committee, created in the wake of the Anahuac disturbance, must meet with Smith and the ayuntamiento and issue a call for a convention, and the delegates sent to the proposed meeting in Béxar must be sent with “absolute powers” to act and to “dispose of the destinies of the country.”

  “We are virtually and ipso facto without any legal government in the state or nation,” he declared. “We are subject legally and constitutionally to no power on earth, save our sovereign selves. We are actually in a situation of revolution and discord, when it becomes the duty of every individual to protect himself.” If Texians did not act for themselves now, he said, the rule of law and order would be crushed everywhere. “The fact is, something must be done to save us from our inevitable fate, and the sooner the better.” Through circumstances, Smith was now the highest ranking legal norteamericano official in all of Texas, and he should take the lead. “Let all party animosities drop. Let us march like a band of brothers to the same saving and vitally important point.” Whatever the majority in their convention decided, they must support it, and as for Smith, he could dally no longer. “Come! Come! Come!”23

  It was a remarkable statement, certainly saying more than Smith expected, and perhaps even more than Travis realized. Not only did he refuse to recognize the legality of either legislature in Coahuila, but he also maintained that there was now no legitimate government in Mexico itself. Moreover, Texians now owed allegiance to no one. They were, in the underscored word he used himself, “sovereign.” Every man must step forward, and they must all act now, for revolution was upon them. It was William B. Travis's personal declaration of independence, not just from Coahuila, but from Mexico itself. If there had ever been any lingering doubt as to his sentiments, he ended it with this clear, bold alignment with the most hawkish of the Texians, now aligning into a group whose origins traced to the original uprisings at Anahuac and Nacogdoches. Travis had been in at the beginning, if only as a passive participant in his prison cell. Now in advising the uncertain Smith, he made a bid to assume leadership.

  In evidence either of his trust in Travis or his inability to fix his own mind, Henry Smith adopted every one of Travis's suggestions. On October 25 he published a call to the ayuntamientos in the Brazos district “and the Citizens of Texas Generally,” calling for the selection of delegates to a convention to declare Texas independent from Coahuila and establish its own constitutional government. At the same time came word—probably from Travis—that in Béxar the tejano leaders under Seguín were taking the same step, proposing November 15 and Béxar as the venue.24 Meanwhile, in San Felipe, Travis distributed handbills sent by Smith conveying the same call, and their reception took him a bit by surprise. Especially troubling was the dissent from Frank Johnson and William Jack, important members of the central committee. He hoped that a spontaneous approval by the people would overrule his colleagues, especially as he had opened a package addressed to Smith—no more waiting anxiously for him to come and open his own mail—and found the plan of the people in Béxar. It looked good, and he believed the people would give their accord to the convention. “Let us meet their advances,” Travis declared. “It is all important to our success now and in future to have them with us. Now is the time to secure them & their influence in our favor.”

  Indeed, Travis regarded cooperation with Béxar as sufficiently important to justify engaging in a little political maneuvering. He found to his surprise that he was virtually alone on the central committee in favoring the convention call. Johnson and Jack, his new friend Wylie Martin, the odious Miller, and others all felt it was going too far too soon. Faced with their opposition, Travis advised Smith that he should bypass the committee. “I think it has never done any good,” Travis complained. “To succeed we must act through the legal authorities,” and that meant the ayuntamiento, where there was a safe majority in favor of a convention. He advised Smith to write to Jack and Miller only to mollify them and observe the forms of consultation, but to go around their committee entirely and communicate directly with the movement's leaders in Béxar. Indeed, in San Antonio, Travis happily saw that both the native tejanos—whom he, like others, still called Mexicans—and the immigrant Texians seemed of one accord. The Mexicans, he said, had “thrown themselves into our arms & upon our protection.” Common decency dictated that Smith “improve the golden opportunity & send commissioners to meet them.”25

  Significantly, and to his credit, Travis shared little if any of the common prejudice against Mexicans, either tejanos or their brothers in the rest of the nation. If anything, he saw them as allies in their common cause against anarchy in Coahuila, and possible dictatorship in Mexico City. He enjoyed good relations with Juan Seguín, though theirs was as yet a passing association, and he counted a fair number of tejanos among his clients and professional acquaintances. Certainly he had no reluctance to sleep with a tejana. Like Bowie, and like the tejanos themselves, he probably accepted much of the prevailing Mexican social distinction between the pobres, the landless poor, and the families like the Veramendis and the Seguíns, but as subsequent events would show, he looked on even the peon class as people entitled to respect if deserved. Hence his
anxiety to meet the bexareños halfway.26

  Unfortunately, Travis could not control events as he seemed to control Henry Smith. At the political chief's request he spoke with Johnson, Jack, and the others and found an almost unanimous resistance. “Public opinion runs so high against any change that I doubt whether anything can be done towards an organization of Texas at this time,” he wrote in disappointment on November 1. Regardless of his suggestion that it be bypassed, the central committee met formally on the proposition late in October, and over Travis's objections decided against calling for the convention. Immigrants were coming to Texas again, and they did not want to precipitate another closure of their borders. Santa Anna had made good on a few other reforms. Most of all, Austin still languished in a Mexican jail, and any precipitous act on their part might endanger his life. Severely disappointed, Travis told Smith that “I knew it was useless to oppose them.” Consequently, much as Travis may have choked on the words, he joined with the majority in issuing a broadside stating their opinion that the revolt in Coahuila did not justify Texas in violating the 1824 constitution. Conditions in Texas had improved. They enjoyed most of the advantages of being an independent state without having to bear the additional expense. For Austin's sake they must stay tranquil.27