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In his analysis of the significance of the Delaney Hearings in the development of pesticides policy, Christopher Bosso has argued that industry initially resisted the hearings on the deeply entrenched view that any publicity constituted negative publicity. In the case of the Delaney Hearings, Bosso recognized that industry fears were justified, given Delaney’s stated intent for the committee: assess possible dangers to public health and decide whether the threat warranted federal regulatory reform.16 In revisiting the Delaney Hearings, I point to how scientists and those charged with the responsibility to evaluate scientific evidence evaluated risks associated with exposure to pesticides, particularly chlorinated hydrocarbons and organic phosphates, which had proliferated since the passage of FIFRA in 1947. To a certain degree, the views of witnesses correlated to their primary association. To the surprise of no one, industry and USDA representatives defended the value and safety of new insecticides, but there were notable exceptions: scientists from academia, the PHS and the NIH conveyed considerable uncertainty regarding risks in the face of the committee’s pointed questioning.
One of the first witnesses proclaimed the importance of new insecticides to the food supply. K. T. Hutchinson, who was assistant secretary of agriculture, quantified losses due to pests: “Notwithstanding the large losses caused by pests, which for insects alone are estimated to approximate $4,000,000,000 annually, without the use of pesticides it would be impossible to produce needed food. The importance of controlling pests is being recognized, and more farmers and livestock producers are using the essential aids to protect the investments they make to produce crops and domestic animals. That the control of pests is one of the most effective ways to increase yields and supply high-quality products is becoming generally accepted.”17
Numerous state health officials submitted statements to the hearing. Most focused their concern on additives and substitutes that were being introduced to food products deliberately, but some also cited the potential risks of chemicals that entered the food supply inadvertently, such as insecticides. R. L. Cleere, executive director of the Colorado Department of Health, articulated worries about the pesticides: “Our department is in accord with any legislation to control the use of harmful chemicals which may find their way to the consuming public in foods. Today many new insecticides, rodenticides, and fungicides are being used which are definitely toxic and their toxicity levels on the end products have not been ascertained.”18 In addition to uncertainty regarding the new insecticides, Cleere noted the lack of legislation in Colorado: “Colorado has no definite legislation as yet on this matter. There has been no organized work of a State nature on toxicities. Our food and drug laws do prohibit poisonous, adulterated foods, knowingly marketed as contaminated by poisonous or harmful substances and resulting in sickness or death from eating such articles of food or drink. This would apply to known poisons; but what about some of our present day insecticides, etc.?”19 Another state health official, Carl E. Weigele of New Jersey, recommended extensive testing before market release.20 Interestingly, Weigele used the New Drug section of the FFDCA (§ 201 (p)) to support the practicability of such toxicity testing without burdening private industry. George A. Spendlove of the Utah Department of Health expressed similar sentiments in this statement: “Our department feels very strongly that Federal legislation should be enacted providing, as in the case of new drugs, that chemicals introduced in foods shipped in interstate commerce should first be demonstrated to be safe to the satisfaction of the FDA.”21
One of the clearest (and most alarming) presentations on DDT came from a Connecticut physician named Morton S. Biskind. Before receiving his M.D. at Case Western Reserve University in 1930, Biskind earned a master’s degree in pharmacology in 1928. Though he served as a research fellow at Case Western Reserve University, as a member of the headquarters staff of the council on pharmacy and chemistry in the AMA, and as head of the endocrine laboratory and the endocrine clinic at Beth Israel Hospital in New York, Biskind restricted his statement to his direct clinical experiences with patients over the course of two and a half years. He argued:
The introduction for uncontrolled general use by the public of the insecticide DDT, or chlorophenothane, and the series of even more deadly substances that followed has no previous counterpart in history. Beyond question, no other substance known to man was ever before developed so rapidly and spread indiscriminately over so large a portion of the earth in so short a time. This is the more surprising as, at the time DDT was released for public use, a large amount of data was already available in the medical literature showing that this agent was extremely toxic for many different species of animals, that it was cumulatively stored in the body fat and that it appeared in the milk. At this time a few cases of DDT poisoning in human beings had also been reported. These observations were almost completely ignored or misinterpreted.22
Biskind proceeded to describe what he called “Virus X,” a syndrome comprising many symptoms—acute gastroenteritis, nausea, vomiting, abdominal pain, diarrhea, running nose, cough, sore throat, pain in the joints, muscle weakness, insomnia, headache, hypersensitivity, numbness, twitching of voluntary muscles, loss of weight, and psychological effects, among others.23 Several of Biskind’s patients had complained of these symptoms in association with encounters with DDT and other pesticides. Biskind had described these cases in a series of articles published in 1949.24
In the midst of Biskind’s statement, Congressman A. I. Miller, who was also a doctor, interrupted to ask if Biskind had published these findings in scientific medical journals. Biskind responded that he had, but Miller countered by citing the findings of the AMA: “Generally the theory that DDT is highly toxic in concentrated doses is accepted, of course. But the American Medical Association, a group that goes through these poisons with a fine-toothed comb, has not reached the conclusions that you are now giving to the committee. Is that true?”25 When Biskind replied that he was aware of the findings, Miller asked if he could identify any large group of scientific men who accepted Biskind’s conclusions. After admitting that he could not, Biskind cited three scientists who agreed with him. Miller then queried the chairman whether the record should be encumbered with something of doubtful standing as far as scientific men were concerned. Delaney countered that Biskind should read his statement. Miller noted his reservations once again: “It is true that what he says has not been accepted by a majority of the scientific men. I maintain that there is only a very small segment that accepts this viewpoint; and if there were a large segment that accepted the viewpoint, then the Government would have no right to permit DDT to be used any place. It is their fault, if they accept this man’s viewpoint and findings. I am inclined to be sympathetic with him, because I think there is something to it, but if what he says it true, then it goes counter to the other large group of scientific men that says that it is safe to use, and has been given the green light by Government agencies.”26 Before Biskind could resume, Congressman E. M. Hedrick, another physician, questioned Biskind: “As a matter of fact, lots of people have been exposed to DDT with apparently no injurious effects; is that not correct?”27 Biskind answered it was true. Hedrick wondered whether the people Biskind had described had been hypersensitive to DDT. Biskind replied: “I do not think that there is any question that they are. But I think that the number that are, is far larger than ordinarily supposed.”28
Biskind resumed his statement by describing several additional patients who had experienced a variety of symptoms in association with exposure to DDT through various pathways. Patients had encountered DDT in their foods, as dusts in aerosol sprays, and even from wallpaper and clothing impregnated with the chemical. Biskind based his original research on more than two hundred cases, but he had learned of many additional cases. He argued that exposure to DDT was virtually universal and that it was impossible to separate the effects of direct exposure and those that occurred following ingestion of contaminated food. Even specimens of mother’s milk from pati
ents with a history of exposure showed DDT. Cow’s milk offered no alternative, Biskind argued, since USDA reports indicated that samples contained 0.5 to 25 ppm of DDT.
Biskind worried about other chemicals, including chlordane, BHC, and parathion. He acknowledged that these chemicals posed a dilemma: “We are dealing with double-edged swords, for the very substances now promoted to increase the size of our crops in the long run turn out to be detrimental to agriculture itself. All these substances and the fantastically toxic parathion, too, inhibit the growth of certain plants, and compounds of the DDT group also persistently poison the soil, so far as present evidence goes, for 5 or 6 years and possibly indefinitely.”29 The dire threat of parathion, in particular, extended beyond the risk to humans: “Parathion is everywhere admitted to be deadly for man and all other animals. One manufacturer warns that sprayed areas may not even be entered with out a mask and protective clothing for 30 days after application. Failure to heed this precaution has already resulted in numerous serious accidents to men. What happens to the birds and other wildlife who cannot read?”30
In his conclusion, Biskind exhorted Congress to take action against the use of certain pesticides on crops: “It is my opinion that the use on crops or in food establishments of any sort, of the chlorinated cyclic hydrocarbons—which include the DDT group of compounds and the organic phosphates of the parathion group—should be, and, if we want to survive, must be—specifically forbidden by law.”31 In response, the chief counsel, Kleinfeld, asked a few questions beginning with, “Doctor, I think you testified that the views, which you have here expressed are not generally recognized by the medical or scientific profession; is that correct?”32 Biskind admitted that this was true. Kleinfeld then asked Biskind to cite his publications regarding DDT and to indicate any other scientists who had conducted experimental work on the insecticides he discussed. Finally, Kleinfeld requested that Biskind read aloud the text of a press release issued on April 1, 1949, by the Federal Security Agency and the USDA after a meeting that included representatives from appropriate divisions of the U.S. Army and Navy as well as the FDA, the PHS, the Office of the Surgeon General, and the Pan American Sanitary Bureau. The statement dismissed concerns regarding DDT: “It is well recognized that DDT, like other insecticides, is a poison. This fact has been given full consideration in making recommendations for its use. There is no evidence that the use of DDT in accordance with the recommendations of the various Federal agencies has ever caused human sickness due to the DDT itself. This is despite the fact that thousands of tons have been used annually for the past 4 or 5 years in the home and for crop and animal protection.”33 After a few more questions of a general nature, the committee dismissed Biskind.
For information regarding the toxicity of DDT to humans, the Delaney Committee called on Wayland Hayes and Paul Neal of PHS. In their statement, Hayes and Neal acknowledged that DDT was a highly toxic in large amounts and noted the symptoms of acute toxicity.34 Having clearly established the acute toxicity of DDT to animals, Hayes reviewed the medical literature regarding its toxicity to humans, including his inhalation and ingestion experiments (see chapter 2). From this research, Hayes noted: “No objective or subjective symptoms were found in spite of thorough physical examinations, including neurological, biochemical, hematological, psychophysiological, electroencephalographic and electrocardiographic studies.”35
Despite the extensive testing with animals, Hayes and Neal stated, there was no evidence of harmful effects of the ingestion of DDT: “We have found that although a great deal of animal experimentation has been carried out with DDT there are no bona fide scientific reports of human cases following the ingestion of small amounts of DDT, although, as just noted, acute poisoning following large doses has been encountered.”36 With this statement and many others, the PHS scientists directly challenged Biskind’s testimony. To contradict Biskind, Hayes and Neal deployed several strategies. First, they undermined the scientific validity of two British studies on which Biskind based his symptomology for DDT by questioning the methodology, the reproducibility, and the general environment (postwar England). But Biskind’s anecdotal evidence of DDT poisoning in his patients struck Hayes and Neal as particularly problematic. For example, if more than a third of Biskind’s patients exhibited symptoms associated with DDT poisoning, as he testified, Hayes and Neal rhetorically wondered why other doctors were not reporting similar numbers of poisonings in their patients. To counter Biskind’s claims, they reported on a surveillance program that began in 1945, when DDT was released for public use, and continued until November 1947. Of forty reported cases, none yielded a diagnosis of DDT poisoning after toxicological investigation and hospitalization, in some cases. Moreover, they reported, “To the best of our knowledge, there have been no substantial cases of DDT poisoning in this country resulting from the ingestion of food containing DDT as a residue.”37 While acknowledging DDT’s significant toxicity, Hayes and Neal reiterated and expanded this point in their conclusion: “In summary, it must be emphasized that DDT is a toxic substance and can cause injury if not properly handled. Undisputed cases of acute illness have been reported. It is also true that there are accurate reports of the presence of DDT in the body fat and milk of human beings. There is, however, no authentic report of liver injury or other chronic poisoning in man resulting from DDT.”38
Hayes and Neal, who fielded many of the questions over the course of the hearing, yielded little ground from their initial assertion of the safety of DDT as a residue in food in low quantities. Even in the case of the USDA’s recommendation in 1949 to limit use of DDT in dairy barns, Neal pointed to the lag between experimental work and publication as one reason the PHS did not have information on the storage of DDT in fats. But Kleinfeld pressed the point:
KLEINFELD: “And I suppose that is why no objection was taken to the use of DDT in dairy barns and on dairy cattle; is that correct?
NEAL: “I think that is a question for the Department of Agriculture, but from my memory I can tell you, sir, what I remember of it. It was that if you used DDT in the barns in dairies and you kept it off the cow’s food it was thought that very little absorption would occur.”39
There were other instances wherein Neal or Hayes directed Kleinfeld to another branch of government or dismissed a question as falling outside the realm of science. For example, Kleinfeld questioned Hayes about a recent paper in the Journal of the American Medical Association that suggested the possibility that DDT and other chlorinated hydrocarbons had adverse effects on the functions of adipose tissue. Kleinfeld quoted from the paper and asked Hayes if he agreed with the statement. Hayes replied: “I agree with the statement, but you notice he says they may have.”
KLEINFELD: “Yes. I asked if you would agree with that statement—that it may have.
DR. HAYES: Yes; it may have
MR. KLEINFELD: Pardon me?
DR. HAYES: I say it may have. But there is no proof in the literature that it does.
KLEINFELD: Is there any proof that shows that it does not?
HAYES: No. It is just that we are quoting from a scientific journal and they are discussing the possibilities.
KLEINFELD: That is correct.
HAYES: And that is one of the possibilities which must be considered.
KLEINFELD: Which should be considered before a chemical is used on a food product?
HAYES: I believe that is a legal question, not a medical one.
KLEINFELD: I would think the ordinary person would answer that question, sir; but if you do not want to, let me ask you another question.40
Having raised scientific uncertainty to qualify the findings of a paper that could have important implications for the food supply, Hayes dismissed the important questions of what should be considered before a chemical is used on a food product as a legal question (and implied that such questions fell outside his purview).
At other times, Hayes deflected questions by referring to existing federal legislation or recommend
ations. After again referencing the J.A.M.A. article, Kleinfeld asked Hayes if he believed that DDT should be used in dairy barns. Hayes responded, “That has already been prohibited after a decision made jointly by the Food and Drug Administration, Department of Agriculture, the Public Health Service, and perhaps others.”41 Similarly, Hayes deflected a question regarding the development of resistance to DDT in houseflies, noting that he was no entomologist, after he acknowledged that researchers in the U.S. and abroad had revealed that houseflies did develop DDT resistance.
Wayland Hayes’s testimony before the Delaney Hearings was vitally important in part due to his position as the chief of toxicology for the PHS. Few government scientists had better access to the full range of data regarding the potential health effects of DDT and other chemical insecticides. No one was better placed to provide Congress with a clear sense of potential human health effects of exposure to DDT. Hayes made it clear that DDT was a highly toxic chemical that in large doses could sicken humans. He acknowledged acute effects, but he knew of no definitive studies that had shown chronic effects in humans as a result of small exposures. Although he conceded that the USDA, FDA, and the PHS had recommended against the use of DDT in dairy barns, Hayes offered no indication of his view of this action though surely concern regarding chronic effects of exposure to DDT in cow’s milk inspired the recommendation. By parsing questions as scientific or legal, concerned with other scientific specialties, or covered by existing legislation, Hayes characterized (in one individual) exactly the fissures that delayed a coordinated response to the risks of chemical insecticides, let alone legislation. As the hearings proceeded, other scientists would present potential DDT residues as a real threat to public health leaving Congress no clear path toward reasonable legislation.