Hannibal's Dynasty

by Dexter Hoyos

  coast.5

  There is other evidence too for financial straits at Carthage. In or not long

  after 247 another general, Hanno, captured the wealthy inland town of

  ‘Hecatompylus’, a Greek name for Theveste, today’s Tebessa 160 miles (260

  kilometres) south-west of Carthage, with frankly imperialist aims according

  to the historian Diodorus. Why a war in Africa when the one for Sicily was

  still unfinished? Strategic and political reasons may have contributed—Regu-

  lus’ invasion had encouraged Carthage’s Numidian neighbours to attack

  Punic lands—but Diodorus implies the importance of booty and extra rev-

  enues in the Carthaginians’ thinking around 247. In these same years their

  own native Libyan subjects were charged taxes so oppressive that in the end

  they were ready to revolt. The Carthaginians, ‘thinking that they had rational

  grounds, governed the Libyans very harshly’, comments the historian Poly-

  bius drily. Hanno again was a noted practitioner of such revenue-raising.6

  Much if not most of Carthage’s wealth and revenues flowed from trade—

  or had flowed before the war. Some of it was exotic: men told stories of

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  barter with tribes on the West African coast, journeys to the Tin Isles north

  of Spain, far-western sea routes jealously guarded and intruding ships sunk.

  But the bulk of Punic commerce was with other Mediterranean lands, west

  and east, and it is very likely that this suffered from the interminable war.

  The occasional Roman fleet raiding on the coast would have had only pass-

  ing effects on trade, but privateers could pose a bigger deterrent if they

  plundered widely and repeatedly. The biggest blow, though, would have been

  the closure of Sicily and Italy to Carthaginian merchants. Not only were these

  lands commercially important themselves, but ancient merchant-ships also

  needed to put in to land regularly on long trips, for fresh stores or to avoid

  rough weather. Now no Punic merchant could safely use landing-places

  under Roman control. Trade especially with the eastern Mediterranean and

  beyond must have suffered, though it was still possible to get to and from

  such places by sailing eastward along the Libyan and Egyptian coasts—a

  longer route. When the Romans finally built a new fleet in 242, the

  Carthaginians seem to have learned this not from merchants or intermedi-

  aries but on its arrival outside Drepana. All this would damage revenues,

  credit and war-making; and nothing suggests that doubling the Libyans’ taxes

  and annexing new territory made up for all the damage.

  Hamilcar, taking over from Carthalo in Sicily, thus had an unenviable mis-

  sion. He had limited money, limited forces and only two surviving

  strongpoints. The enemy controlled the rest of the island and every year still

  sent two consular armies there, some 40,000 Roman and allied Italian troops.

  Realistically then his task was not so much to win the war as to avoid losing it.

  Big battles and large-scale campaigns were out of the question. At best he

  might wear the Romans down to a point where they were finally willing to

  make peace. At the least, he must keep the fight going one way or other until

  the Carthaginians had the means for a major new effort, or till something else

  turned up: for instance problems for Rome from some other quarter—

  restiveness among the hard-pressed Italian allies, or moves by their old foes

  the Gauls in Italy north of the peninsula.

  To old, experienced Carthaginian generals this may have looked like a poi-

  soned cup. Hamilcar was young and confident, and had his own ideas of how

  to carry out his mission.

  First he quelled the still-restive soldiers, with methods much harsher than

  Carthalo’s. He ‘cut down many of them one night and had many others

  thrown into the sea’, writes Zonaras in his résumé of the historian Cassius

  Dio. But Hamilcar then, according to Zonaras, failed to recapture one of the

  islets just outside the harbour of Drepana after the besieging consul seized it.

  When he tried to retake it, the Romans drew him off by launching an assault

  on the town. The story looks a little suspicious: Zonaras claims that capturing

  the islet helped the Romans’ siege-efforts against the town, but in fact

  Drepana remained firmly in Punic hands for years to come. If the islet was

  lost, the blow was not so damaging after all. Still the episode, if true, illustrates

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  Hamilcar’s problems with manpower and could help explain his coming

  change in strategy.

  Now he led a new naval raid on Italy, moving along the toe of the penin-

  sula through the lands of Locri and the Bruttians, meeting it seems little

  resistance. There was no Roman navy to worry about and Hiero of Syra-

  cuse—despite becoming a permanent friend, amicus, of the Romans the year

  before—no doubt thought it rash to challenge Hamilcar’s warships with any

  of his own. It was on the return trip to Sicily that the new general pounced

  on the heights of Heircte.7

  III

  Just where Hamilcar’s mountain stronghold was is still debated. Not, as origi-

  nally thought, Monte Pellegrino, the mountain on the shore just north of

  Panormus: it is too small for Polybius’ specification of a 100 stadia rim, not

  to mention too close to the city, too sheer nearly everywhere, and without

  access to a proper haven.

  More recent candidates lie some 12 miles (16 kilometres) across the moun-

  tains to Panormus’ west, overlooking the gulf of Castellammare—steep and

  narrow Monte Pecoraro rising to nearly 1,000 metres above Terrasini or lower

  Monte Palmita to its south. But again, both are too small, Pecoraro too steep.

  Since Hamilcar could not have stationed all his army on the heights them-

  selves as Polybius states, some (or most) of it must have camped on the coastal

  lowlands beside them, and the 100 stadia would then have to include these.

  Polybius’ emphasis on the nearness of Panormus becomes incomprehensible.

  The heights of Heircte were most probably the broad and lofty mountain

  mass bounding the plain of Panormus 5 miles (8 kilometres) west of the city,

  its highest point being the 809-metre Monte Castellaccio. Much of it is steep-

  sided but paths, one of them starting from the shore below, lead up to the

  undulating plateau on the crest. To the south lie even higher mountains.

  Below its eastern flank a pass separates it from the smaller but even steeper

  cape of Monte Gallo. The pass may be where the fort of Heircte stood; the

  small bay and sheltering island at the foot of the two headlands will have

  been where Hamilcar’s fleet moored. Water is available at the harbour, as

  Polybius states. The heights are about 100 stadia in circumference, with pas-

  tures and with a suitable lookout on Monte Castellaccio.8

  Hamilcar’s move was unexpected and debatable. Polybius stresses his isola-

  tion from Lilybaeum and Drepana. He could not defend them from assault

  where he now was; pressure on the enemy could only be indirect. But with

  the forces available, that was
going to be true wherever he was. Carthage’s

  Sicilian field army, which in battle outside Panormus only three years before

  had numbered about 30,000, now probably amounted to some 10,000

  infantry, mostly professional mercenaries from all over the western

  Mediterranean (including at least 3,000 Gauls, we learn later), and a few

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  hundred cavalry. For at war’s end 20,000 mercenaries left Sicily for North

  Africa and these included the unbeaten garrisons of Lilybaeum and Drepana,

  who must have numbered 10,000 or more. Losses over the years must be

  allowed for, but given this total Hamilcar’s force too cannot have been sub-

  stantially bigger. Besides, if it had been, he would have enjoyed much greater

  flexibility. He could have pounced on Panormus or tried more aggressively to

  raise the siege of Drepana.

  The Romans reacted by camping a force close to his, it seems on a lower

  hill to the south. Only 5 stadia, or about a kilometre, separated the camps, but

  not much aggressive Roman élan was shown. Assaulting the Punic eyrie was

  clearly an option with little appeal even when Hamilcar was away on one of

  his raids. The Roman force was about the same size as the Punic and served

  chiefly to protect Panormus, although constant skirmishing occurred. After

  all, the bulk of the two consular armies sent yearly to Sicily, four legions plus

  Italian allied contingents, was tied down outside Drepana (where the Romans

  were also occupying the nearby heights of Eryx) and Lilybaeum. Hamilcar

  felt secure enough to sail out, no doubt with only part of his force, on a new

  sweep of the Italian coast, this time as far north as Cumae on the bay of

  Naples. The resulting booty and prisoners it seems cheered his mercenaries

  substantially: we hear of no more grumbles.9

  Further Italian raids may have been made over the next three years, though

  we are not told of any. The Romans founded new defensive centres on their

  coasts in these years: citizen colonies, Alsium and Fregenae, on the Etruscan

  coast near the Tiber in 247 and 245 or 244, and a colony of Latin status at

  Brundisium on the Adriatic in 244. The first was probably a response to

  Carthalo’s raid, but Fregenae even nearer to the Tiber suggests that still more

  security was found necessary for the coast close to Rome. Does the colony at

  Brundisium imply that Hamilcar had made descents in that area in 246–245?

  Quite possibly: after his visitations to the Tyrrhenian side of Italy it might

  have been a good idea to try a coast where he was less expected.

  At Heircte itself Hamilcar handily held off the enemy troops over the way.

  Polybius limits himself to generalizing about the two sides’ ambushes,

  stratagems, sorties and counterattacks. The Carthaginians may have operated

  more widely too. Diodorus, in another opaque and short excerpt, reports

  ‘Barca’ attacking ‘Italium, a fort of Catana’s near Longon’ (the outcome is not

  known). Catana lay on the other side of Sicily, a long way from Heircte

  though not impossible for a general accustomed to hitting at Italy. But no

  Longon is known in that area, whereas a town Longane existed by a similarly

  named river close to Mylae and Messana—the historic river where Hiero of

  Syracuse had once shattered the Mamertines of Messana in battle and led

  them to call in the Romans. Diodorus’ later copyist may have mistakenly

  replaced Messana with Catana. Likely enough the Mamertines held the area

  for their Roman allies to guard the coast-route to the west. The fort’s name

  would fit Mamertine occupiers, as they originally hailed from Italy.10

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  From time to time he may also have sailed over to the besieged towns on

  the coast to keep up the defence; and occasionally too to Carthage itself. His

  eldest son had been born in 247 but another arrived during the 240s (both

  were to be with him on campaign in Spain in late 229 or early 228), and it is

  not at all plausible that his wife was with him in his mountain camps. The

  children—there were daughters as well—may have found him something of

  a stranger, if an affectionate one, but their father must have welcomed the

  brief respites from warfare, especially the piecemeal kind of warfare he was

  waging.

  Hamilcar may have aimed to obstruct Roman forces and supplies moving

  to the sieges at Drepana and Lilybaeum, a reasonable strategy as we have

  seen, given the resources he had. Already his presence near Panormus made

  the coast road beyond there impossible for the enemy. Inland, the roads

  zigzagged around one mountain ridge after another (and maybe with Punic

  attackers lurking round the other side) or else a time-consuming detour was

  required via Agrigentum and the south coast (the Romans had built a road

  linking Panormus and Agrigentum some years earlier for other purposes).

  The sea was a much easier way of travel and transport, but Hamilcar could

  hit at ships too. Besides, ships had to put in regularly to land, and the sea itself

  was perilous between autumn and spring of every year. Hamilcar’s guerrilla

  methods thus had promise.

  These methods probably earned him his famous nickname. A Carthaginian

  had only one proper name but nicknames were often used—partly to sort

  out different bearers of the few names common among leading men. Hamil-

  car went down in history as ‘Barcas’ to the Greeks and ‘Barca’ in Latin. This

  reflected most likely the Punic word for lightning, like the Semitic brq (with

  vowels added, baraq) . Hamilcar’s swift and scorching sorties by sea and land

  would fit it well. He had less scope for these, as we shall see, from Eryx later,

  and so his countrymen probably attached it to him during his Heircte years.

  Scintillating stories of his exploits circulated at Carthage. Beyond the city too,

  for a few years later a Numidian prince was keen to ally himself—at some

  risk—with a leader who had so roused his admiration.11

  Yet all he achieved was a stalemate. The Romans could not take Drepana

  and Lilybaeum, but neither could he force them to lift the sieges. Coastal

  defences in Italy, as mentioned, were being improved. His forces were thin-

  ning through military action and because, with funds short and pay already

  falling into arrears, few recruits came his way. The besieged strongholds on

  the west coast may have been in worsening straits too. One spring or summer

  morning in 244 the Roman troops opposite his position awoke to find it

  empty and no Punic ships in the bay. A fast rider would be sent off at once to

  inform the consuls besieging Drepana and Lilybaeum, but they knew already:

  the lightning had struck near Drepana.

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  IV

  Mount Eryx or Monte San Giuliano rises isolated to over 2,000 feet (750

  metres), just inland from Drepana: a broad ridge with a vast view over both

  coastal plain and sea—which may explain Polybius’ notion that it was the

  second highest mountain in Sicily. On its crest stood a renowned temple of

  the goddess known to
Phoenicians as Astarte, Greeks as Aphrodite and

  Romans as Venus, whose servitors included priestess-prostitutes. On a shoul-

  der below stood a little town also named Eryx, while a low spur jutting in

  Drepana’s direction was called Aegithallus. The Romans had captured the

  position in 249, their only success amid the disasters of that year (what their

  view of the priestesses was we do not know).

  Hamilcar sailed in at night to another small bay north of the mountain, took

  his men up the zigzag road to the town and slaughtered the garrison. Captured

  townsfolk were marched down to the ships and taken over to Drepana—for

  some of them a second forced removal, as another Hamilcar had shifted the

  entire citizenry of Eryx to the port 16 years earlier. If he had planned on

  retaking the summit as well, he failed; Roman troops still held it, and Aegithal-

  lus too. But the town of Eryx now became Hamilcar’s stronghold.

  This was a far more ticklish, and puzzling, position than the heights above

  Heircte. He was wedged halfway up a mountain, between two tenacious

  enemy garrisons, with one twisting path down to his anchorage. On the plain

  below him a Roman consular army was encamped, though facing it were his

  forces in Drepana. Even if he had captured the summit as well, it would not

  have added greatly to his flexibility of manoeuvre. Yet Hamilcar both chose

  this position as his new base and maintained it for more than two years.

  The change suggests that Heircte had become too remote and Drepana, at

  least, too heavily pressed. If his losses were not being replaced then the range

  and impact of his actions would be narrowing. The alternatives were unap-

  pealing: either shut his field forces up in one of the two ports with the

  garrison there or move around the open country harassing the besiegers and

  their lines of supply. With his current strength the second option would

  court disaster: even if the enemy detached only part of their armies against

  him, one pitched battle could mean the end of his army. The other option

  would concede all initiative to the Romans and leave the besieged ports with

  even gloomier prospects.

  But the problem at Eryx, which Hamilcar never really solved, was how to

  use the position to make a real impact. He was supplied by sea, like the