Hannibal's Dynasty

by Dexter Hoyos

H A M I L C A R I N S PA I N

  commanding them to choose between war and peace. This tale was obviously

  concocted from the famous ultimatum on war and peace presented at

  Carthage in 218 by another Fabius, then a Roman envoy. Again, in an episode

  Zonaras dates to 230 the Romans are represented as marching to fight the

  Ligurians (of northern Italy) via Punic North Africa; a charitable excuse

  might be that somewhere along the line a copyist wrote Carthaginians where

  he should have written, for example, Boii—a Gallic people of north Italy—

  but incompetently inventive malevolence by some propagandist might be the

  explanation instead.

  Another story directly involves Hamilcar. In 231, again according to Dio,

  the Romans sent over envoys to see what he was up to in Spain. Hamilcar

  received them cordially and explained that he was seeking the means to pay

  the indemnity imposed by Lutatius’ peace. The envoys, Dio affirms, could

  not find anything to criticize in this. The tale is hardly the stuff of high drama

  (Zonaras did not think it worth including in his précis of Dio) but basically is

  another confrontation story from the same source as the others. It arouses

  suspicion. No other writer knows it, and the nub of it is one side making a

  neat response when pressured by the other—just as in the other confronta-

  tions. Dio concedes that the Romans had previously had no interest in

  Barca’s doings and implies that they left him alone again after this. In sum,

  the embassy story is no more believable than the other confrontations.

  The Romans no doubt knew about Hamilcar’s expansion. Not only did

  they trade with Spanish ports as well as North African, they were on good

  terms too with Massilia, which had its own wide-ranging trading network.

  Even if their embassy to Hamilcar had taken place it would have been the

  only recorded official contact between the two powers after 237 and before

  225—that is, in a dozen years. This does not square with sustained or anxious

  suspicion. Rather, the Romans were prepared to let their ex-enemies do as

  they wished in their quarter of the world, so long as they themselves could

  get on with doing as they wished in and around Italy.7

  Some Romans even then may have admired Hamilcar, as we know Cato

  the Censor (a younger contemporary of his son) did later. But after a time—

  maybe even within Hannibal’s lifetime, once the story of his boyhood oath

  became known—Romans and Greeks came to believe that Hamilcar’s doings

  were the start of a carefully worked-out scheme for a fresh war against Rome.

  Infuriated by the defeat of 241 and then by the rape of Sardinia, he and his

  countrymen supposedly built their new empire in Spain for this purpose,

  with the war finally being launched by Hannibal. Polybius states this as a fact

  and nearly all other ancient sources follow suit.8

  This was not the predominant view among the Romans at the time.

  Certainly the Sardinia crisis had shown that concern about Punic moves

  might flare if these looked like coming close to Italy and Sicily, and no doubt

  some members of the Roman Senate did feel a continuing antipathy for their

  ex-enemies. The same thing was to happen in 225, as we shall see. No doubt

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  too critics of Barcid activity and Roman unconcern made themselves heard

  from time to time. But the Romans’ general inattention to Barcid affairs and

  to Carthage for nearly 20 years until 220—only the brief business of the

  ‘Ebro treaty’ in 225 was to punctuate it—reveals that any such criticisms

  failed to affect Roman policy-making.

  Fabius Pictor, the Barcids’ senatorial contemporary, blamed the war in

  general terms on ambition and greed in Hasdrubal and Hannibal his protégé,

  not on a war-scheme handed on from Hamilcar. One line of thought, surfac-

  ing in Appian’s history, even limited the blame to Hannibal himself, as a

  device for turning the tables on his hereditary enemies at home—though

  how far back that idea went we cannot say.9

  Hamilcar surely had little liking for his old enemies, as the oath he adminis-

  tered to Hannibal shows. He may well have believed too that, one day,

  another war would come. But his programme was to rebuild Punic strength

  and wealth, a pragmatic and defensive aim. If the Romans should choose to

  bring on some new confrontation, a possibility no Carthaginian leader could

  dismiss, the Punic state had to be able to stand up to them as it had not been

  over Sardinia. But that was quite a different aim from a revenge-war.

  Another war would call for large resources to match those of the Romans,

  and also a set of alliances with states around Italy, either to support the war-

  effort or at least to distract the Romans. Of course Hannibal was to invade

  Italy with a small army and few allies—but no long-term planner would ra-

  tionally aim at waging war on those terms. Hamilcar made no such alliances.

  Nor did his successor Hasdrubal; and Hannibal was to seek them, with the

  Gauls of north Italy, only on the eve of war itself.

  Planning a new war would also require readying a fleet. True, neither

  Hamilcar after 244 nor his successors showed any enthusiasm for naval war-

  fare. But even negatively a fleet was a plain necessity, for the Romans could

  be counted on to launch their own powerful navy for invading North Africa

  and Spain as soon as war came. Arguably, of course, building one might

  invite as hostile a Roman reaction as preparing to retake Sardinia had done,

  and this might explain the Barcids’ avoidance of it. But if they were seriously

  bent on war it was a necessary risk.

  In any case suspicion could be disarmed by putting off the actual fleet-

  building until the war was fairly near. It had taken the Romans only a few

  months to construct their first-class war-fleet, 200 quinqueremes strong, in

  243 or 242. So we could expect Hannibal to start laying down keels at any rate

  during 220 or 219, when a clash over Saguntum became predictable. Some

  naval craft should already have been available: the warships used during the

  African war plus any built (as some surely were) for the aborted Sardinian

  expedition afterwards. Yet the Punic war-effort at the start of 218 had avail-

  able only 105 quinqueremes and a few smaller ships, with just 87 of the

  quinqueremes properly equipped. Their enemies launched 220.

  It could hardly be that the Carthaginians had defective information about

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  Roman naval strength. When the Romans warred on the Illyrians across the

  Adriatic in 229 they equipped 200 ships, and the second Illyrian war ten years

  later (again involving both consuls with fleet and army) no doubt saw a simi-

  lar armament. Anyone intending to bring on a new war against them had to

  count on a Roman navy of some such size and aim to counter it. Hamilcar

  did not. After him Hasdrubal—despite having been his father-in-law’s naval

  commander—did not; nor again did Hannibal. The only persuasive inference

  is that their plans never included a Roman war.10

  V

  Hamilcar’s next reported measure was
to found a city, a very large one

  according to Diodorus. He does not state where it was but its name was Acra

  Leuce, meaning ‘White Fort’ or ‘White Cape’. The Carthaginians had

  founded a few colonies in past times, like the one on the island of Ebusus off

  the east coast of Spain, but founding cities had not been a habit of past Punic

  leaders, not even the Magonids. On the other hand it was a notable character-

  istic of monarchs of Hamilcar’s own era, starting with Alexander the Great

  himself whose most famous creation, Alexandria in Egypt, stood on Africa’s

  Mediterranean coast like Carthage itself. The Roman republic too was a

  notable city-founder within Italy, its Latin and citizen colonies planted at

  strategic locations on the coasts and in the countryside of the peninsula.

  Hamilcar, generalissimo and chief executive of a republic, founded a

  centre with resemblances to both types. Unlike Hellenistic rulers with their

  Alexandrias and Antiochs, it did not perpetuate his own name. Like their

  foundations and Roman ones, it held a site important strategically and eco-

  nomically. Unlike Roman creations, it advertised the success and the promise

  of his political mastery of Carthage, and no doubt others would have fol-

  lowed had he lived.

  Archaeological finds starting from the later half of the third century show

  towns, especially in the upper Baetis region, improving many of their fea-

  tures—both private homes and public structures like walls and sacred

  shrines. Hamilcar and his successors quite likely encouraged these upgrades.

  Better amenities could claim to advertise the new prosperity and security

  under Punic rule. Improved urbanization in turn could help to make that rule

  more effective, at any rate so long as the dominant levels of Spanish society

  were won over. Hamilcar, who achieved much using diplomatic tactics as well

  as military, would not find that difficult to do.11

  Acra Leuce is generally identified as the south-eastern coastal city which

  the Romans called Lucentum, today’s Alicante. Rising over this is an impos-

  ing headland of bare rock, a natural (and long-used) citadel. If the

  identification is correct, Acra Leuce formed a new power-centre on the east-

  ern side of Carthage’s new province, to balance—and even outshine—old

  Gades on the western.

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  This identification has been disputed. No Punic remains have been

  unearthed at Alicante, though there was a Phoenician trading-post at nearby

  Tossal de Manises. That the Roman name Lucentum derives from the verb

  for showing light, lucere, has been questioned—and thus any connexion with

  Acra Leuce.

  These objections are not compelling. Archaeological finds at, or rather

  under, existing cities are erratic, all the more so if the Punic character of a

  place lasted three or four decades at best: and 30 years later Acra Leuce was

  in a Roman province. At New Carthage (as the Romans were to call it),

  founded later on by Barca’s son-in-law farther down the coast, Hasdrubal

  built a splendid hilltop palace for himself which Polybius saw, but of which

  no trace now survives.

  The Greek name Acra Leuce described the site, according to Diodorus—

  wherever it was. It does not suggest that a Greek colony or trading-station

  already stood there. True, Massilia in Gaul had founded three very small

  colonies on Spain’s east coast, but Strabo the geographer, who tells us so, also

  implies that they lay between Cape de la Nao and the river Sucro, today’s

  Júcar. That zone lay well north of any district Hamilcar can have reached.

  The Greek name may simply translate the Punic one, just as the Punic may

  have translated a native one. Hamilcar himself may well have encouraged

  both the Punic and Greek forms. Hippou Acra is the Greek name of a North

  African port whose Punic name may have been Hippo Zarytos. In turn

  Roman Lucentum might conceivably derive not from the Latin for light but

  from Leuce, with a Latinized ending.12

  There are more objections. Hasdrubal’s more southerly creation, the

  modern Cartagena, stands on a harbour much better than Alicante’s and had

  a rich hinterland including silver mines. That Hamilcar should ignore the

  advantages of such a site in favour of lesser ones farther north may seem too

  much to swallow. On this argument, since he did not site his city at Cartagena

  he cannot have sited it at Alicante, and we should look elsewhere for it.

  All this is close to a non-sequitur. Hamilcar may well have had reasons for

  preferring the more northerly position, even if we discount mere oversight of

  the site of Cartagena. The Alicante site has a good harbour and would give a

  shorter run to and from the island of Ebusus, a prosperous Punic colony

  with busy connexions to Carthage. Again, the Cartagena site housed or at any

  rate belonged to the people of Mastia, mentioned as long ago as 348 (in the

  second Punic treaty with Rome) as being within Punic-protected waters.

  They would contribute a contingent to the Punic war-effort in 218. Hamilcar

  may not have judged it politic to force an old Spanish ally to give up its rich

  territory and harbour to new residents (even if Hasdrubal later did). Nor of

  course need we imagine that to found New Carthage Hasdrubal would have

  had to give up Acra Leuce, were this at Alicante, and the territory in

  between—another objection offered.13

  Another alleged difficulty is linked with how Hamilcar eventually died. He

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  was besieging a city Diodorus calls Helice; with winter coming on he sent

  away the bulk of his forces, elephants included, to winter-quarters at Acra

  Leuce—a fatal move, as it turned out. Helice is generally identified with the

  Roman Ilici, today’s Elche famous for its fourth-century BC Iberian noble-

  woman’s statue and equally for its broad palm-groves, the most extensive in

  Europe, that surround the city. But Elche is only 13 miles (21 kilometres)

  south-west of Alicante. It is hard to believe that Hamilcar could safely found

  a major city in the farthest region of his new province with a powerful hostile

  centre standing so near—blocking, in fact, direct land-communication with

  the rest of Punic Spain. Elche incidentally has warmer winters than Alicante.

  These arguments might suggest that Acra Leuce really lay somewhere else

  in Hamilcar’s province—closer to the heartland or close to the inland fron-

  tier. Livy names a site, seemingly near Castulo in the eastern Sierra Morena, as

  the place where Hamilcar died, and its generally supposed name Castrum

  Album (‘White Fort’) could obviously mean much the same as Acra Leuce if

  this meant ‘White Citadel’. This might seem to clinch the matter: Hamilcar’s

  city would be not on the coast at all, but at a strategic strongpoint in silver-

  mining territory and pointing the expansionist way to the plains of La

  Mancha and central Spain.

  But Hamilcar did not die at Acra Leuce. Diodorus’ account shows him cut

  off from there as he retreated from Helice. And the argument from Livy

  turns out to be circular.
In all Livian manuscripts the name is Castrum Altum,

  ‘High Fort’. Text-editors supposed a connexion with Acra Leuce and

  changed Altum to Album—even though Acra Leuce was identified with Ali-

  cante while Livy is plainly narrating events inland. In other words ‘Castrum

  Album’ is only a mistaken inference from Acra Leuce and cannot be used as

  evidence for it. What Livy does imply is that Hamilcar’s Helice is not Elche

  but some place farther off, as we shall see.14

  Acra Leuce, then, can remain identified with Lucentum and Alicante. Its

  foundation should date to the last years of the 230s: Hamilcar would have

  taken time to come round to that region, very likely via the coast, and his next

  recorded move was into the inland mountains of the south-east.

  The settlers probably were a mixture: loyal natives, people from Gades and

  other Phoenician towns, a sprinkling of outsiders (for instance from

  Ebusus), and no doubt an element of Carthaginians in the governing élite.

  The town’s position at the eastern end of the Punic province, and its use as a

  base for further operations, suggest that Hamilcar had only recently con-

  quered the area. It protected the productive south-eastern coastlands and,

  with Gades, Malaca, Abdera, Mastia and the other Phoenician or allied

  Iberian ports, completed a semicircular chain of secure points around the

  province. And with the interior of the south-east a harsh tangle of moun-

  tains and valleys and even some deserts, Acra Leuce was an anchor for the

  vital coastal roadway that linked the south-east to the rest of Punic territory.

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  VI

  It is not certain that Hamilcar treated Acra Leuce as a new capital for Punic

  Spain, but likely enough. Gades was a very small town on an offshore island

  and the Gaditanes, though allies, were an independent state; besides, Gades

  lay inconveniently far off in Spain from Carthage itself. His new city had

  none of these drawbacks. This then was probably where he and his two

  eldest sons were based in the last years of his life, although he, his son-in-law

  and eventually the boys must have spent much of every year on the move

  around their territories, campaigning and administering.

  Hamilcar’s second son Hasdrubal came to Spain before his father’s death.