by Dexter Hoyos
Hasdrubal surely found this gratifying. By sending the envoys to him in
Spain, and not to the authorities at Carthage, the Romans were plainly recog-
nizing his pre-eminence over Punic affairs. This in turn could only enhance
his pre-eminence, especially if he struck a successful agreement with his visi-
tors. Since he obviously harboured none of the schemes they seemed to fear,
an agreement was easy to make. All he had to do, in fact, was promise that
‘the Carthaginians are not to cross the river called Iber in warfare’.
Why the Ebro and not, rather, the Pyrenees which were a much more obvi-
ous barrier? Perhaps because it was precisely southern Gaul, on the other side
of those mountains, that the Romans wished him to abstain from. Moreover
they were probably already friends with the little Greek port of Emporiae in
north-eastern Spain, a potentially useful observation post, and wanted to pre-
serve it from Punic hegemony. At the same time the Ebro at its nearest was
more than 220 miles (350 kilometres) from his new city and there was plenty
of intervening Spain to occupy him. Hasdrubal had no trouble agreeing.
The envoys promptly left for home; and in due course—and the nick of
time—the consul sent to Sardinia sailed back with his legions and helped his
colleague entrap the Gauls into annihilation in Etruria.
Both sides could congratulate themselves on an accord well made. The
Romans had been relieved of their Punic worries: Hasdrubal, attractive in
personality and subtle in diplomacy, no doubt contributed greatly to this in
his talks with the envoys. He in turn had Roman acquiescence in treating the
great bulk of Spain as free range for further expansion: for the accord plainly
implied—and the envoys surely discussed this face to face with him too—
that the Romans would complain only if he were ‘to cross the river called
Iber in warfare’. Given their intermittent sensitivity to potential Punic
initiatives, it was an implication worth having. They in turn could feel
reassured that Carthage was under sensible government, with no inclination
to get involved in Rome’s regional affairs, while he could feel not only
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correspondingly reassured over Spain but also domestically strengthened
thanks to this proof of Roman recognition and respect.
Neither side paid the other diplomatic attention after this. The Romans
went on to conquer Cisalpine Gaul, Hasdrubal to consolidate the Punic
dominion in southern Spain. They had no more dealings with each other
during his lifetime.19
VI
According to Appian, Hasdrubal conquered Spain ‘up to the river Iber,
which divides Iberia more or less through the middle, five days’ journey from
the Pyrenees, and flows to the northern ocean’. This Appianic mélange of
precision and confusion suggests that he really means the Tagus but—either
by his own effort or thanks to his source—has worked in a careless recollec-
tion of the Ebro, which does lie about five days’ distance (on foot) from the
Pyrenees and, as we have just seen, did mark the limit of Hasdrubal’s poten-
tial expansion after 225. That the Tagus was the furthest north of Punic
control under the second Barcid is confirmed by Hannibal’s campaign of
220, launched into the lands beyond its middle reaches.
Just what such a frontier meant is a rather different question. Hasdrubal
left behind a reputation as both a military man and, even more emphatically, a
supple and appealing diplomat. Just as Hamilcar had done, but apparently
more often, he used persuasion and alliances in lieu of armed might to
extend Punic dominance. Such links would be most prevalent in the outer
reaches of his province, though not there alone. The Tagus then would not
be a patrolled border strictly marking off Punic from non-Punic territory, but
rather would mark the furthest zone (so far) of communities friendly with—
or in some cases firmly subjected to—the Carthaginians.
Punic dominance extended across southern Lusitania to the Atlantic coast.
Hamilcar had secured the lower reaches of the river Anas, and during the
Second Punic War we find Punic armies wintering comfortably among the
Conii in the Algarve and by the mouth of the Tagus. The gold washed down
in some Lusitanian rivers, notably again the Tagus, may also have drawn
Punic notice.20
East of the Toletum district the Tagus flows from the north-east, rising as
it does in the mountains of the Cordillera Ibérica or ancient Mons Idubeda.
In these upper Tagus lands—the nearer parts of Celtiberian Spain—
Hasdrubal may well have enjoyed friendly relations with what communities
there were, but nothing suggests Punic dominance or any need, strategic or
commercial, for it. The Carpetani, who dwelt on the plains by the Tagus with
Toletum as their strongest town, may have maintained friendly or at least cor-
rect relations, but were outside any real control, as they showed in 220 and
still later. In Polybius’ roster of subject or allied troops under Hannibal’s
command at the start of 218, the most northerly contingents (apart from the
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H A S D RU BA L’ S C O N S O L I DAT I O N
pro-Punic Ilergetes beyond the Ebro) are Oretani and Olcades, both cer-
tainly or probably dwelling south of the river. And though Hannibal
campaigned across central Spain in 220 and in theory imposed control up to
the Ebro and Duero, many Celtiberian communities switched support to the
Romans during the Second Punic War. Those who served in the Punic army
did so, it seems, for pay as professional mercenaries.
But friendly contacts and commerce did not stop in central Spain. The
accord with Rome had no bearing on these. The little Greek colony of
Emporiae on the coast well beyond the Ebro used a Punic standard for its
coins although, as noted earlier, it was very probably on good terms with
Rome too. The Ilergetes in the middle Ebro region not only had a small con-
tingent in Hannibal’s forces at the start of 218 but fought against the Romans
in most stages of the ensuing war (even after Punic Spain itself had been
overrun). They, and especially their energetic chieftains the brothers Indibilis
and Mandonius, must have formed strong bonds with Barcid Spain a good
while before Hannibal took command.21
On the east coast the Saguntines, at least, had a different view. Small but
prosperous, their town traded with the Punic province as with other regions,
but in diplomacy and policy they stayed at arm’s length. At some date—
hardly earlier than 225—they in fact struck up friendly contacts with the
Romans. This link was one-sided in practice. The Saguntines every so often
sent word to Rome about developments in Punic Spain, obviously with an
eye to their own interests, but were paid no attention apart from (presum-
ably) a polite acknowledgement. Not that they were in any danger, for
Polybius indicates that down to 220 the Carthaginians maintained peaceable
relations. Nor did Punic dominance otherwise extend as far as the Ebro
before 220, as Polybius also makes clear. On the
other hand the Saguntines
did have disputatious neighbours (as we shall see) and, on the principle that
your enemies’ enemies or potential enemies may as well be your own friends,
these very likely kept up good relations with New Carthage. When they
became Punic subjects is not clear, though Hannibal described them as such
in late 220: probably during 221 or 220 when with torrential speed he spread
his hegemony across Spain up to the Duero and Ebro.22
The northern bounds of Hasdrubal’s province, then, stretched seemingly
along the Tagus to about the centre of Spain, and from there roughly along
the ranges separating the middle Tagus and upper Anas; next eastwards
across the southern plains of La Mancha, either to the lower reaches of the
river Sucro and along this to the coast, or else turning south-eastwards to
meet the coast around Cape de la Nao. He may not have directly controlled
the eastern regions of the Tagus (the Toletum district was independent-
minded Carpetanian territory, as mentioned earlier, and beyond it the
river-line turned to the north-east), but Hasdrubal thus had a grip on the
routes from the south and south-east into the interior. Only the east coast up
to the Ebro remained outside his control.
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H A S D RU BA L’ S C O N S O L I DAT I O N
Expansion in that direction could wait, or so he might reckon. By 221 he
had charge of nearly half the Iberian peninsula: on a rough estimate, over
90,000 square miles (or 240,000 square kilometres). This was an area greater
than Punic territory at home, even including the subject Libyans. Administra-
tion, exploitation and political relations—between the inhabitants and the
Carthaginians, and no doubt among the variegated communities them-
selves—needed constant attention. Mineral exploitation continued, not only
in the area of New Carthage but in other districts like the Sierra Morena.
Hannibal pushed it forward energetically, according to Pliny the Elder. Pliny
adds that the great mine of Baebelo—its shafts running up to a Roman mile
and a half into the mountain—yielded 300 pounds of silver a day to Hanni-
bal, the one such statistic surviving from Barcid times. Despite Pliny, this
mine was probably not first opened during Hannibal’s governorship, which in
Spain lasted only two and a half years. It more likely dated from Hasdrubal’s
time, though Hannibal may well have improved it to that impressive level.23
Affairs at Carthage needed supervision too, though in detail they could be
left to Barcid kinsmen and allies to look after. Steady progress in Spain and
the successful accord with the Romans can only have enhanced Hasdrubal’s
dominant position over both these allies and the republic as a whole. Such
criticism as there was came, as usual, from Hanno the Great and his friends,
but their influence was now at a nadir. Livy tells a story of Hasdrubal sending
to Carthage in 224 for a ‘hardly yet adult’ Hannibal, and Hanno opposing it
on the moral ground that Hasdrubal had the same homosexual designs on his
brother-in-law that Hamilcar allegedly had once had on him, and the political
ground that Hannibal was being groomed for virtual monarchy. In reality
Hannibal had been in Spain since 237 and in any case was a man of 23 by
224. At some stage Hasdrubal appointed him commander of the cavalry, and
effectively his deputy: this quite likely happened in 224. The kernel of truth
in Livy’s tale then may be that Hanno objected emphatically to the promotion
and claimed that the republic was becoming a de facto monarchy. True as this
might be, it would hardly be news to his hearers. The Hannonites remained
mired in impotence.24
VII
In Spain, whatever Hasdrubal’s later reputation as a lover of peaceful solu-
tions, warfare did not fully cease. There may have been less fighting than in
Hamilcar’s time, but Hasdrubal’s military strength grew. From 50,000
infantry and 6,000 cavalry in 228, he commanded 60,000 and 8,000 respec-
tively during his later years according to Diodorus, and the 200-strong corps
of elephants continued in service at least for a time. Hannibal’s appointment
to be cavalry commander was a far from ornamental post, as Livy’s glowing
description of his military prowess shows, not to mention Appian’s remark
that ‘where force was needed he [Hasdrubal] made use of the young man’.
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Polybius confirms the picture obliquely: he mentions how Hannibal and
his friend Mago each captured cities in Spain (never together, to avoid dis-
putes over booty), and given Hannibal’s age this can only point to exploits in
Hasdrubal’s time. Again, as soon as Hannibal became general late in 221 he
launched and won a lightning war against a hostile Spanish people—showing
that Hasdrubal’s military machine was in first-class condition, perhaps too
that the Olcades had been the murdered leader’s next war-target.
Nor was Hasdrubal’s treatment of his Spanish followers always mild. He
had shown his harsh side in dealing with Hamilcar’s slayers (not to mention
the rebel Numidians years earlier). The poet Silius may not just be inventing
that he wished to be feared, even if Silius overdoes it into caricature. In 221 a
particular act of sternness rebounded fatally. He put to death a Spanish chief-
tain for some offence, only for one of the man’s loyal followers to break into
his quarters and murder him in his sleep. This may have happened in the
palace at New Carthage, or a country villa since Appian has it done on a
hunting expedition.
Hasdrubal had been general for nearly eight years. The season was autumn
221, for Hannibal on becoming general still had time for a first campaign. In
southern Spain, warfare could run until quite late in the year, as Hamilcar’s last
campaign showed; if Hannibal spent six to eight weeks on his fighting and
ended it sometime in November or even early December, we can put Has-
drubal’s death in September or October. He was probably still in his forties.25
The Carthaginian state and empire that he left behind was at least as strong
and rich as it had been in 264—in some ways stronger and richer. At home
Punic territory had been enlarged, and relations with the Numidian princes
seem to have been more peaceable than for a long while past. Overseas, for
the first time in the republic’s history it controlled sizeable continental terri-
tories, whose tribute and trade very likely outclassed the returns garnered
before 264 from Punic trading-stations and island possessions. The still
uncertain Punic predominance over southern Spain in 229 had become
firmly established by 221, while trade with other lands no doubt continued as
before, including Italy and Sicily and probably even Africa’s Atlantic coast-
lands.
Finally, the republic had large, highly trained armed forces, whose use of
cavalry and resulting mobility—tactical and strategic—were superior to virtu-
ally any other Mediterranean military establishment, a corps of officers who,
as the future would show, were probably the ablest of any army
of that age,
and leadership of the same order. In sum, what Hamilcar had aimed at, Has-
drubal achieved. The Carthaginians were again a first-class power whom no
one could browbeat or victimize, not even the Romans. The new general and
leader would put this regained strength to its utmost test.
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H A N N I BA L I N S PA I N
I
The same procedure for replacing Hasdrubal was followed as for Hamilcar.
‘The forces’ in Spain—Polybius assures us, and so do later sources—
unanimously chose Hannibal as their new general. As before, this choice was
most likely made by the Carthaginian troops and officers, under arrange-
ments equally unknown. Then, when the events in Spain were reported at
Carthage, the citizen assembly ratified the appointment. Of course there was
no question of other candidates or any competition. Thus a third Barcid took
control of the city and the empire, confirming the de facto monarchy into
which the republic had evolved. If Hanno the Great protested this time, it
went unrecorded.
Livy draws a famous and biased character portrayal of the new leader, sup-
posedly at the time he became Hasdrubal’s subordinate. Hannibal’s vividly
described warlike qualities are convincing enough, partly because they fit
many of his recorded doings. To the old soldiers (Livy writes) he recalled his
father Hamilcar in looks and energy, he showed superb qualities of leadership,
bravery and endurance, and yet—the Roman historian insists—he was a tissue
of cruelty, treachery and atheism. The alleged vices are briefly listed and gen-
eralized, nor does Livy mention a failing that Polybius later stresses, greed for
money. Even at this point to accuse Hannibal of atheism reads oddly when,
just a couple of chapters earlier, the historian has told the story of his boy-
hood oath and plainly means us to take it seriously. A few pages later he then
tells how the general went to Gades to make vows at the temple of Hercules,
meaning Melqart, in preparation for his expedition to Italy. The vices in the
portrayal obviously owe more to Roman tradition than to accurate reportage,
even though there is no reason to imagine that Hannibal was a saint.1
Hannibal in a real sense was entering on his inheritance. Having accompa-
nied his father and brother-in-law to Spain he had seen every stage in the
