by Dexter Hoyos
development of Punic power there and had contributed to much of it. What
his long-range aims were at this point, if he had any, is not reliably recorded.
Fabius Pictor, then Polybius, and afterwards other writers, stressed how
87
H A N N I BA L I N S PA I N
deeply the new general had been conditioned by his predecessors: to equal
either Hasdrubal’s supposed level of arrogance and acquisitiveness (as Pictor
claimed) or, as Polybius and later writers saw it, Hamilcar’s determination to
revenge on the Romans all the wrongs they had done to Carthage. But these
notions were formed in hindsight and prompted by the war of 218.
Hannibal’s expectations in 221 were probably different. By now he had a
Spanish wife, a girl from Castulo, the silver-mining town in the Sierra
Morena. Silius the later epic poet names her Imilce, claims noble birth for
her, and avers that during 220 she bore him a son—items that may all be true
though Imilce is actually a Carthaginian name; but where Silius got them
from is unknown. Like Hasdrubal’s marriage in 228, this would strengthen
Barcid ties with their Spanish subjects and allies. It might even suggest that
Hannibal expected to continue a mainly Spanish rôle, like his predecessors.
For when his plans changed and he marched for Italy, neither his wife nor his
son (if the child existed) went with him.
With him in Spain he had both his brothers, Hasdrubal the younger and
Mago, and (if Appian is right) an already adult nephew named Hanno—all of
them holding high rank in the army. This concentration of family strength is
striking, all the more as we know of no kinsmen at Carthage apart from
another Mago, who does not seem all that prominent. But the Barcid generals
had built up a broad network of political alliances at home, as the impotence
of Hanno the Great’s group shows, and Hannibal very likely had other rela-
tives or relatives-in-law there helping to keep the family’s grip firm: Bomilcar
his brother-in-law for instance. Among political allies we might guess at Him-
ilco, the father of his cavalry officer Maharbal, if he still lived. His close
friend and lieutenant Mago the Samnite surely had family connexions at
home too that were important to Barcid dominance, and so too a tough offi-
cer and friend also named Hannibal with the sobriquet Monomachus, or
Gladiator. Gisco, a senior officer mentioned only at Cannae, Plutarch terms
‘equal in status’ to the general—an unexplained but striking description that
again suggests more than just military importance.2
Hannibal probably had a particular need for vigorous political aides and
allies at Carthage. Like his brother-in-law and father, he had never held a civil
magistracy there. But unlike them he had spent no time there as an adult, so
his knowledge of and dealings with his fellow-countrymen were at long
range and at second hand. This was not a crippling disadvantage. Barcid
dominance rested on military success and imperial profits, and was institu-
tionalized in the office of general and the military posts subordinate to this,
all of them in safe hands. So long as success and its profits continued, so
would the dominance. Again, Hannibal may well have meant to visit his
home city after a while—as Hasdrubal had done early in his command—to
strengthen his ties with important individuals, the institutions of state, and
his fellow-citizens overall. Meanwhile, though, he would be very reliant on
the Barcids’ leading supporters there.
88
H A N N I BA L I N S PA I N
As a result, on some matters he may have been readier than either pre-
decessor to follow their advice: for instance about constructing the city’s
famous artificial ports. These, the rectangular outer one for merchant ship-
ping and the circular inner one for warships very possibly date to the period
from 218. Though Appian (probably following Polybius) describes them in
the context of the Third Punic War, and archaeological remains earlier than
200 are very scarce, after 201 the Carthaginians neither needed nor were
allowed to have a navy. Nor did they have a significant one between 241 and
218 as we have seen—in 218 Punic naval strength in Spain and Africa
together amounted to fewer than 100 ships ready for service. By contrast,
once they had to wage the new war with the Romans they needed and did
develop large naval forces (not that these ever performed impressively). But
Hannibal by 218 was busy with land campaigning and anyway, like his pre-
decessors, rarely showed much commitment to sea-power. A project like the
double port was more likely the brainchild of supporters at Carthage, who
saw the need both to strengthen Punic naval efforts and also to protect Punic
commercial shipping against Roman raids.
Hannibal never in fact got to Carthage while the war lasted, and keeping in
touch with Africa from Italy must have posed as much of a problem as with
Spain. Inevitably he would have to leave a good deal of local decision-making
to the city authorities, even though the overall direction of the war remained
with him. Now and then bigger responsibilities too may have been taken on by
the authorities there: in 215 the Mighty Ones sent orders to his brother in
Spain to march with reinforcements to him in Italy, while later that year the
new king of Syracuse, with the general’s obvious encouragement, sent envoys
to Carthage for an alliance. This might be convenient enough—as long as the
home authorities continued to be Barcid supporters. But as more years passed
and both victories and benefits receded, this crucial aspect might well
weaken.3
II
Hannibal’s first move as general was a new campaign. Polybius records this
after giving details of how the citizen body at Carthage ratified his election
in Spain, but that may be simply for neatness’ sake. If Hannibal waited until
he learned of the ratification he would lose anything up to a month
(depending on winds and waves) of what was left of the campaigning year.
As Hasdrubal’s deputy, and at all events general-designate, he was surely free
to act.
He attacked and stormed the Olcades’ strongest centre, Althia, which was
enough to prompt the rest of them to surrender. His swift and sharp offen-
sive suggests advance preparation: as was noted earlier, the Olcades may
already have been in Hasdrubal’s sights. They were relatively affluent, for he
was able to garner booty and funds, but they are unknown after Barcid times.
89
H A N N I BA L I N S PA I N
Their territory probably lay not on the coastlands just beyond Acra Leuce—
that would have made them far too vulnerable to be independent as late as
221—but in the interior, for when in the next year he campaigned towards
the Duero, the Carpetani by the Tagus let him go by but then were persuaded
by Olcades fugitives (among others) to attack him on his return. This points
to the Olcades being not too far from the Carpetani, and to their south since
the Vaccaei lived to the north. So it is plausible that the Olcades dwelt on the
northern La
Mancha plains, between the Oretani and the Carpetani: they may
have been related to these latter and lost their separate identity later. It is at
least interesting that a town named Alce, or Alces, stood in that area in
Roman times.4
Subduing the Olcades brought Punic power close to or up to the middle
Tagus. It may also have brought the nearby region up to the Cordillera Ibérica
under Hannibal’s influence, which reached the Ebro by the end of 220
though his campaign that year was against the Vaccaei in the west.
This second campaign was not a mere outgrowth of the first. Not only
were the Olcades and Carpetani warlike and therefore better within his mili-
tary establishment than outside, but the mountains beyond them were rich in
iron and the Celtiberians there skilled ironworkers. Even if conceivably the
Olcades had provoked attack in some way, the move against the Vaccaei was
simple aggression and, as with the Olcades, produced booty and glory—both
of which he needed.5
Aged 25, a virtual stranger to Carthaginians at home, and appointed to his
post arguably for no reason but family ties, Hannibal had to prove himself to
everyone: to his fellow citizens, his soldiers, Carthage’s Spanish allies and sub-
jects—many of them led by warrior princes—and even the Spaniards outside
his province. The one way to do so fast and effectively was by warfare, and
this was also where his best talents lay.
The Vaccaei were masters of cornlands and livestock on the broad plains
spreading up to the middle Duero. Whatever their past relations with Punic
Spain, war had not featured. Between them and the Tagus dwelt the Car-
petani and, further west, the Vettones, neither of whom were ruled from
New Carthage though they may have passed for its friends. So if Hannibal
used a pretext, it might be that the Vaccaei had been intimidating these peo-
ples. The Carpetani, who did not bother him on his outward march, were
hardly sorry to see him going to teach their neighbours a lesson.6
He stormed two Vaccaean strongholds, Helmantice—in Livy, Hermandica
(the later Salamanca)—and Arbucala, which has been identified as the town of
Toro on the river Duero. A dubious later tale, not in Polybius or even Livy, has
him tricked by the women of Hermandica when the town surrendered: they
walked out with weapons under their clothes to rearm their menfolk, who
then fell on Hannibal’s plundering troops. So impressed was he by their
courage that he gave them back their town and goods. This does not square
with him taking both towns by force, as Polybius and Livy record, amassing
90
H A N N I BA L I N S PA I N
booty as Livy affirms, or prompting a flood of aggrieved fugitives from
Hermandica to join those from the Olcades in pressing the Carpetani to turn
against him.7
These successes were enough for him: he then set out homewards. Yet
Hermandica and Arbucala were not the only important Vaccaean centres—
so too were Pallantia and Intercatia, both north of the Duero, which in the
next century were to give the Romans much trouble. Maybe these two
avoided trouble now by a timely submission, though nothing like it is men-
tioned. More likely the general decided he had done enough for one year’s
campaigning. Though Hermandica had been captured in one go, Arbucala
had held out and cost him time and no doubt lives. He may have decided that
it was time to declare victory and go home, or that further efforts against the
Vaccaei must wait until next season.
The Carpetani, ‘and likewise the neighbouring peoples gathered together
with these’, now turned on him. The arguments used by the fugitive Olcades
and Hermandicans to instigate them to do this are not mentioned, but the
most obvious one would be the danger to Carpetanian freedom from a too-
successful Punic expansion. The allied forces pursued the Punic army to a
crossing of the Tagus, presumably near Toledo—but were crushingly beaten.
Hannibal in this his first major battle showed his tactical skills. Having
crossed the river southwards, he turned and marched back to its banks so as
to tempt his pursuers to cross for battle; then once they began crossing—
thus dividing their strength—he fell on them. Exploiting similar tactics, the
Greek leader Timoleon with inferior forces had smashed an army of
Carthage in Sicily 120 years before. But Timoleon’s opportunity had come
almost by accident. Hannibal made his own. Now he could march untroubled
back to New Carthage for the winter.8
Up to a point the successes of his first two campaigns were striking: towns
stormed, booty and captives gathered, and now ‘none of the peoples south
of the Ebro ventured lightly to confront the Carthaginians, except the Sagun-
tines’. Closer study might modify the picture a little. The town-captures in
both campaigns relied on direct assault, single or repeated—for in contrast to
his genius with armies, Hannibal’s siege-skills would always be limited. The
Vaccaei had not been annexed, indeed may not even have been forced into
dependence. The Carpetani and their allies were no doubt taught a lesson;
but they had not been hostile before 220 so, in effect, Hannibal had simply
restored the status quo with them. And the operations in 220—two towns
stormed and one battle won—are surprisingly few for a whole campaign
year: a hint that they were not the blitzkrieg that Polybius’ and Livy’s brief
reports might suggest. It looks as though the Vaccaei, even apart from Her-
mandica and Arbucala, put up some serious resistance, and may even have
foiled a completer success.
The booty and fame, though, and the intimidation of northern central Spain
were valuable for reinforcing his authority as new Punic leader. Hannibal may
91
H A N N I BA L I N S PA I N
have intended to return in 219 in greater strength to impose more thorough
control. But his exploits had other and fateful repercussions.
The antagonistic neighbours of the Saguntines, probably the Turitani at
the town of Turis, a few miles down the east coast, now if not earlier entered
under Punic tutelage along with the rest of ‘the peoples south of the Ebro’.
And the Saguntines themselves, who for some time had been informing the
Romans of Barcid activities, were finally rewarded with a pair of Roman
ambassadors being sent to look over the situation and meet the new general.
When he returned to spend the winter at New Carthage, he found the two
waiting for him.9
III
Probably deliberately, Roman historical tradition afterwards distorted the
facts about this embassy. This was to give the impression that during the next
year’s long siege of Saguntum the Romans did not leave their Spanish pro-
tégés entirely in the lurch. Supposedly (so Livy tells it) they voted the
embassy in 220, but Hannibal launched the siege too quickly and the envoys
had to travel to his camp outside the town—only to be turned away. This
story gathered increasingly implausible features as it went on, including a
band of Saguntine envoys able to get out of and back into
their town at will.
The versifier Silius economically then blends this ‘siege-embassy’ with the
war-embassy of 218. Only Polybius has the persuasive version: envoys arriv-
ing in late 220 to interview the new Punic leader. But Roman tradition is
probably right about their names: P. Valerius Flaccus, very likely the one who
had been consul in 227, and Q. Baebius Tamphilus who may have been an
ex-praetor.10
These were weighty envoys, and the first from Rome in five and a half
years. Hannibal must have heard of their arrival before he reached New
Carthage. He probably had no trouble working out why they had come. He
surely knew of the Saguntines’ various earlier messages to Rome and he now
also had their fractious neighbours under a Punic wing. With the Romans
aware that his influence—either firm or fluctuating—now reached to the
river Ebro, they might well want to discuss the future of Hasdrubal’s five-
year-old agreement. Maybe the future of Saguntum too, small, independent
and now surrounded by Punic subjects or dependants. The Romans wanted,
he might reckon, to establish a working relationship on these and other mat-
ters with the clearly energetic successor to their old negotiating partner.
Now from Hannibal’s point of view the Ebro and Saguntum were ticklish
topics. Once he finished nailing down Punic dominance over Spain beyond
the Tagus, and that would take only another campaign or two, the obvious
ground for further conquests lay over the Ebro and up to the Pyrenees. After
all, the only alternatives were the harsh mountain-lands of Spain’s north-west
or the North African hinterland of Carthage—or for Hannibal, less than two
92
H A N N I BA L I N S PA I N
years after assuming command, to give up warfare and turn his leadership
into purely peaceful and civilian paths, something not even Hasdrubal had
done. None of these choices, it is clear, appealed to him, least of all the third,
which would have brought to a stop the momentum and charisma fuelling
Barcid supremacy at home and in Spain. So the Ebro line would have to be
reviewed.
As for the Saguntines, they had never come up in Punic–Roman relations
before. But plainly they had a friendly link with the Romans. Not only were
