Hannibal's Dynasty

by Dexter Hoyos

they might well stand on the defensive and, worse still, raise even larger

  forces than usual in the hope of overwhelming him. Any such reactions

  would make his own task a good deal harder and slower—and, most danger-

  ous of all, Carthage itself could be strangled by a Roman expedition while he

  was still campaigning in Italy. His expedition itself, which transferred the bulk

  of Punic military strength from Punic territory into the militarily more or less

  unknown reaches of Gaul and beyond, needed to win successes both swift

  and smashing to maintain his fellow-citizens’ morale. It had to be nicely

  timed.

  A less likely suggestion is that he meant to await the consul P. Scipio in

  north-eastern Spain, crush him there and then invade Italy, but that on learn-

  ing of the Gallic revolt (to which Scipio’s original forces were diverted) he

  decided the Romans would not come after all and so began his own march. If

  that were true, he must have remained unaware of Scipio levying a fresh army

  for Spain until he himself was marching through southern Gaul. But this is

  implausible, for trade between different regions would not have dried up with

  the declaration of war and the Carthaginians had at least one spy even at

  Rome (the one detected in 217 after two years’ activity).12

  He fairly soon must have learned that Scipio was to invade Spain and Sem-

  pronius North Africa; then, not long after, that Scipio had been held up by

  the Gallic revolt in Cisalpine Gaul (prompted, ironically enough, by Hanni-

  bal’s agents earlier). Once he knew the Romans’ initial expeditionary

  destinations, he could march north from New Carthage; then he paused in

  the north-east, even after subduing it, because Scipio had been held up in

  Italy. With one and not two consuls to confront, he could afford to cut the

  size of his army—by over 20,000, or more than one quarter after its losses in

  the north-east—to improve flexibility in movement and supply. North Africa

  would be defended against Sempronius by the forces he had sent, plus any

  further levies the home authorities made.

  Finally, when he calculated or learned that Scipio’s expedition was soon to

  start he marched into Gaul, arguably to waylay the advancing consular army

  (so there was no need for an urgent advance), destroy it and so both assure

  Spain’s security and clear his road to Italy. But although his departure from

  Spain was late, he then made it as far as crossing the Rhône before the consul

  even drew near. By then autumn was drawing near too; his army’s numbers

  had fallen, the Boii and their neighbours the Insubres were successfully in

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  arms, and the Alps were still to be crossed. There was a skirmish between

  reconnoitering Numidian and Roman cavalry—which his men lost, allowing

  the Romans to ride briefly up to his camp—but he had to recalculate. If he

  waited to cross swords now with Scipio’s army he might not reach Italy until

  the following spring, even if he won. Much might happen before then,

  including in North Africa.

  Arguably, therefore, Hannibal now abandoned the plan to intercept Scipio;

  instead he swung north away from him and struck out for Italy. An echo of

  the discussion that led to this decision may survive in Livy’s report of how

  the general hesitated over the two alternatives and was persuaded to head for

  Italy by the Boian and other chieftains who had crossed the mountains to

  meet him. But he marched north for only four days more before halting in

  friendly territory for some time to rest and refit, even though Scipio’s army

  was in pursuit for all he knew. So he may have been hoping that he might still

  succeed in enticing the consul after him in search of a battle. In fact Scipio

  did march fast to reach the Carthaginians’ crossing-place over the Rhône

  three days later and only then turned away.

  Hannibal will have learned of this while resting his troops. There would be

  no battle in Gaul, but neither would he be dogged by the Romans as he

  crossed the mountains into Italy. Scipio he expected to return there too, Poly-

  bius writes, but not at any speed. He would continue to hold the military

  initiative.13

  IV

  Invading Italy was an immensely bold venture which in the 23 years of the

  previous war the Carthaginians had never tried. But they did have an old tra-

  dition of taking war to their enemies. Their earliest warlord, Malchus,

  supposedly had led expeditions to Sicily and Sardinia; and down the centuries

  Punic armies had several times moved against Syracuse and other Sicilian

  Greek cities. Hamilcar’s expedition to Spain had fitted the same vigorous tra-

  dition. Where Hannibal’s was unprecedented was in the great distance he had

  to travel and the vast resources of his foes. But he could be encouraged by

  the century-old precedent of Alexander the Great, who with fewer than

  50,000 troops had overthrown the Persian empire in three great battles and

  replaced Persian mastery over the east with Macedon’s.

  Ironically enough, in this new war the Carthaginians—hitherto renowned

  for mastery at sea—would be inferior navally to the Romans, who less than

  half a century earlier had not rated at sea at all. This Roman naval superiority

  was a drawback, but the Barcids themselves had always been land generals.

  All the same, the Carthaginians during the next few years did again build up

  their sea-going forces, so as suggested above Hannibal may now have sent

  around orders for fresh shipbuilding, as well as for properly manning all the

  ships already available. He may also have backed the scheme for building the

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  artificial ports in the southern quarter of the city, if these do date to the

  period from 218.14

  His own concern was the army he was leading to Italy. Made up of infantry

  from Africa (no doubt mostly subject Libyan conscripts with Carthaginian

  officers) and Spain, and cavalry partly Spanish and partly Numidian—

  Numidian horses and their practised riders were arguably the best light

  cavalry in the world at that time—it numbered 90,000 foot and 12,000 horse

  according to Polybius and Livy. But as often pointed out, not only are these

  figures implausibly huge in themselves but they clash with others that the

  same historians offer. Thus Hannibal reportedly crossed the Pyrenees with

  50,000 foot and 9,000 horse, then the Rhône with 38,000 and 8,000 respec-

  tively, finally arriving in Italy with 20,000 and 6,000. Polybius drew at least

  these last figures from Hannibal’s later inscriptional record in the temple of

  Hera at Cape Lacinium, just as he did his detailed breakdown of the forces

  transferred between North Africa and Spain, so it is likely that the other

  totals have the same origin.

  Therefore if the original strength is correct too, the general’s forces must

  have fallen by 43,000 men—over 40 per cent—even before he reached the

  Pyrenees, which is extraordinary. True, he suffered ‘great losses’ in subduing

  north-eastern Spain and then he left his officer Hanno with 10,000 foot and

  1,
000 horse to hold the region, while another 10,000 disillusioned Celtiberi-

  ans were allowed to go home. But that would mean his fighting losses in the

  north-east were great indeed, over 20,000 men—more than his coming losses

  at the Trebia, Lake Trasimene and Cannae. This is not very plausible.

  Polybius may have drawn, and in his inscription Hannibal may have

  chosen to give, the wrong impression about the starting total. For although

  102,000 as the grand army’s original strength is hard to account for if it actu-

  ally left Spain numbering only 59,000, such a figure fits fairly well if the

  15,000 troops entrusted to Hasdrubal to hold Spain are counted in and if the

  general lost about 7,000 men subduing the north-east. These plus the 21,000

  sent home or left with Hanno add up to 43,000, which would leave Hannibal

  his 59,000 to lead into Gaul. The only difficulty is with the cavalry, whose

  various attested figures—Hasdrubal’s 2,500, Hanno’s 1,000 and Hannibal’s

  9,000—add up to rather more than 12,000, with at least some hundreds

  more lost in the campaign beyond the Ebro. But the discrepancy is probably

  only about 1,000, and some rounding-off of totals (even by Hannibal) can

  be surmised.15

  In other words the original total more likely shows the full military strength

  that the Carthaginians had in Spain by mid-year. Hannibal himself then prob-

  ably marched from New Carthage at the head of 87,000 men, including

  about 10,000 cavalry. He may have chosen to blur this in his Cape Lacinium

  record to impress readers with both the vastness of his original resources

  and, contrastingly, the smallness of the army he actually brought into Italy

  and with which he wrought such monumental havoc on the Romans. All the

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  same, 87,000 was a massive force: bigger than his brother-in-law Hasdrubal’s

  largest reported armed strength, twice as large as two full consular armies,

  larger than either of the armies that the kings of Syria and Egypt would put

  into the field when they met in battle the year after. Together with the 20,000

  troops holding North Africa and Carthage, it means that to confront the

  Romans in this new war the Punic republic under its Barcid leadership had

  mobilized 122,000 men on land alone. The Romans with their six legions and

  allied contingents, some 71,000 all told, were in fact outnumbered in 218.16

  V

  As winter gave way to spring 218 the Punic generalissimo learned at New

  Carthage of the Roman embassy to old Carthage and its theatrical declara-

  tion of war. With Saguntum captured around the end of 219, the earliest that

  the Romans could send envoys overseas (short of risking their lives and,

  more important, their mission) was March. This helps explain why two of the

  envoys were the consuls of the previous year: they left office on 15 March.

  The embassy’s mission was to demand ‘compensation’ over Saguntum—not

  help or recompense for the Saguntines, who no longer counted, but that the

  Carthaginians hand over Hannibal and his senatorial councillors for punish-

  ment. When predictably the senate at Carthage rejected this, the leader of the

  embassy symbolically let fall war from a fold of his toga. Many senators

  shouted their acceptance: no doubt Barcid kinsmen and supporters espe-

  cially, but even senators outside the ruling faction might well be antagonized

  by the Romans’ non-negotiable stance.

  This outcome to the ultimatum was no doubt expected on both sides.

  Already Hannibal’s military preparations, and his soundings in Gaul, the Alps

  and north Italy, were well under way. He had ceremonially visited the ancient

  temple of Melqart, Carthage’s patron god, on the island where Gades stood,

  to fulfil old vows and swear new ones in hope of future success (so much for

  Roman claims of his irreligion). Already too the Romans had authorized

  Scipio and Sempronius to levy armies and fleets for Spain and Africa. But

  Hannibal had neatly got them to bring on the war in formal terms, and to do

  it so gracelessly that even wavering Carthaginian citizens must see their coun-

  try as a victim of aggression. This plus the wealth from Saguntum united his

  fellow-countrymen behind him, all at any rate save Hanno the Great and his

  thinned-out political circle.17

  All the same, for the reasons suggested above he did not launch his expedi-

  tion until almost mid-year and even then did not cross the Pyrenees for

  another two months or so. No one in his council was under illusions about

  the risks of the invasion. Polybius even tells a story of how at one meeting

  the officer Hannibal Monomachus declared that the only way they would

  make it was to live off human flesh (prisoners’, presumably), though Hanni-

  bal refused to consider this. He certainly had to face the possibility of some

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  opposition en route even though his agents had striven to conciliate the

  peoples between the Pyrenees and north Italy, and also the dangers of poor

  supply and—even worse—of desertions.

  Both Hannibal’s sense of mission and his overall confidence are shown in

  his visit to Melqart’s temple during the winter and then by his famous dream,

  recorded by his friend and historian Silenus. On the march up the east coast

  towards the Ebro, at a place Livy calls Onusa, the general dreamt he was sum-

  moned to a council of the gods, whose chief gave him a divine guide for the

  road to Italy. Bidden to follow the guide without looking back, he neverthe-

  less disobeyed and saw a monstrous serpent ravaging the land. This, he was

  told, was the fate of Italy. The chief of the gods, naturally called Jupiter in

  the Roman versions, must have been Ba’al Hammon: so Hannibal could be

  confident, and could assure his officers and men, that the expedition was

  blessed by both the supreme deities of Carthage.18

  VI

  Beyond the Ebro the peoples brought into subjection, according to Polybius,

  were the otherwise unknown Aerenosii and Andosini, the pro-Roman but

  just as obscure Bargusii, and the ‘Ilurgetes’. Of these Livy gives only the last

  two and adds the rather better-known Ausetani and Lacetani—who later on

  that year reappear as Punic allies instead. These two were probably mistaken

  guesses by a source of Livy’s, baffled by the genuine but unrecognized tribes’

  names. As for the Ilergetes, the well-known people whose chief town was

  Ilerda, modern Lleida or Lérida in Aragon, they were almost certainly on the

  Carthaginians’ side already, for their powerful leader Indibilis had ‘always’

  been strongly pro-Punic (so Polybius affirms elsewhere) and he dominated

  nearby peoples too, including the Lacetani. Hannibal’s conquest may have

  been another, smaller community of Ilergetes, perhaps a breakaway branch,

  attested on the coast between the later cities of Tarraco and Barcino.

  These may all have put up a fierce resistance and cost him men, but as was

  noted earlier they cannot be the main reason why he chose to fight them him-

  self and took so long to move into Gaul. As for the 11,000 troops he left

  behind under Hanno, t
hey were not enough to cope with a consular army

  but—again as argued earlier—Hannibal himself was expecting to meet and

  destroy Scipio somewhere in Gaul. In any case it was open to the comman-

  ders left behind (Hasdrubal included) to call on allied Spanish communities

  for auxiliary corps and, of course, to levy further forces from Carthage’s

  Spanish subjects. The 10,000 disgruntled Carpetani and others whom he

  released from service may well have found conscription-agents looking for

  them after a year or two.19

  To Hanno he also entrusted all the heavy baggage that the grand army had

  brought along from New Carthage. With it now more streamlined though

  smaller, and reckoning that the Roman consul was close to setting out for

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  Spain, the general marched in three columns through the Pyrenees and into

  Gaul on the true start of his epic venture.

  Not everything was or could be planned for a certainty. The Gauls along

  the route had not agreed in advance to let the army pass, so he had to placate

  an armed and suspicious warrior assembly gathered at Ruscino (today’s Per-

  pignan) with reassurances sweetened by gifts to their chieftains. Why he had

  not done this earlier, when he was sending agents to Cisalpine Gaul, is hard

  to understand. According to Livy he had, though it still needed to be fol-

  lowed up with gold; but if he did seek their agreement earlier he cannot have

  been very successful, and Polybius in fact mentions him forcing some of

  them en route to concede it.

  Rather than a mere oversight, the failure to conciliate the Gauls in advance

  may have been due to his strategic plan as suggested above. Fighting the

  Romans in Gallic territory, even if he won the Gauls as allies or kept them

  neutral, was not a scheme likely to please people whose lands would bear the

  brunt. Even if he had claimed that he meant to march directly to Italy, they

  could not be sure the Romans would let him. Only the fresh reassurances,

  and gifts, at Ruscino won him passage.20

  The same suspicions explain why the Volcae on the lower Rhône opposed

  him crossing their river though they were no more inclined to the Roman side

  than to his. Hannibal had to disperse them by skilful use of a detached cav-

  alry column under his nephew Hanno, which crossed higher up and struck