Hannibal's Dynasty
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Livius. In fact the Romans knew or at least suspected that some Etruscan
help had already reached Hasdrubal: later on a commission was set up to
investigate how much and by whom. More Gauls would surely flock from
Cisalpina to join the Barcid standards. Hannibal had probably heard too how,
in 209, 12 of the 30 Latin colonies had declined to supply further levies
for Roman armies, claiming physical exhaustion—a refusal they were still
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persisting in. Three of the recalcitrants lay in Umbria and Etruria: a major
victory there might entice even them to change sides, and that might draw in
others as well. Everything would build pressure on the Romans to concede
peace at last. And even if that took time to happen, at Carthage meanwhile
the insecure dominance by the Barcids and their friends would be immeasur-
ably fortified.14
V
Whatever the possibilities they envisaged, the brothers’ failure to keep in
touch—or even to try very hard at keeping in touch—was a planning disaster
second only to the costly crossing from Spain to Italy 11 years before. Has-
drubal’s mistake in making only one effort at contact was outdone by
Hannibal’s failures, first to make any contact-effort at all and then, far too
early in the campaigning season, to give up trying to move nearer the north-
ern theatre of operations. Whether he thought there was still plenty of
time—or came to despair of being able to achieve a junction—he thereby
made effective nonsense of his brother’s coming to Italy.
His inactivity stands in glaring contrast to the consul Nero’s reaction once
Hasdrubal’s captured despatch was interpreted. After alerting the authorities
at Rome and ordering the urban legions to Narnia, he selected 7,000 men
from his army (1,000 of them cavalry), left a subordinate in charge of the
rest, and led the select corps by forced marches to join his colleague Livius.
Provisioned by the communities along the route and joined by many volun-
teers, his force swiftly reached Livius’ army near Sena Gallica without
Hannibal realizing where he had gone or even that he had gone.
Hasdrubal did notice that Livius was reinforced (despite the consuls’
efforts to hide it) but was brought to battle beside the river Metaurus on 22
June. As usual he displayed no great generalship; by contrast, Claudius Nero
again did. Prevented by an intervening hill from clashing with the enemy
wing opposite, he marched some of his troops round behind Livius’ heavily
engaged forces to take Hasdrubal’s Spaniards in flank and rear and roll up the
Punic army. Hasdrubal had no flanking cavalry and his elephants proved use-
less. With the battle and the whole expedition lost, he spurred into the mêlée
for an honourable death.15
This self-immolation aroused admiration in Polybius and Livy, and many
others since, but arguably was another act of ill-judgement. Not all his army
was destroyed and the surviving troops—anything between 5,000 and
15,000—managed to get away as a body, though it seems they afterwards dis-
persed. Had Hasdrubal survived to rally them in retreat he might have
maintained a resistance in Cisalpine Gaul to distract the Romans and then to
reinforce his brother Mago when the latter landed in northern Italy two years
later. He would have enjoyed much support: much of Cisalpine Gaul was
furiously anti-Roman and even after Hannibal’s war ended fighting went on
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there, some of it led by a Carthaginian officer who had been there since 205
or even 207. At the least he would have denied the Romans a grisly propa-
ganda coup. Nero bore the dead man’s head back to Apulia and flung it at the
feet of a Punic outpost, to be taken to Hannibal.16
Hannibal had sought Flaminius’ body after Trasimene to give it proper
burial, and had honourably buried the slain Aemilius Paullus after Cannae
and Marcellus the year before this. But it was not for some generations yet
that the Romans’ hatred and fear of their invader would change to a grudging
admiration. Hasdrubal was the first Carthaginian general in the war to fall in
battle against them, in contrast to three consuls and three proconsuls since
217; besides, in the Romans’ eyes he with his brothers had brought on this
whole calamitous war. Nero’s barbarism is comprehensible though not
laudable.17
Hannibal recognized the import of the gift: he saw in it (Livy makes him
say) ‘the fortune of Carthage’. He could not win the war in Italy any more.
Now it had always been obvious that defeat for his brother would mean this:
which makes it all the more extraordinary how completely he had been out-
generalled by the Romans. Not only had Nero brought him to a stop at
Canusium, but the general then let himself be cajoled into remaining there
while the consul vanished with a sizeable contingent. Nero supposedly gave
out that he was leaving to subdue a still-hostile Lucanian town and its Punic
garrison. If this item of disinformation crossed to Hannibal it at least told
him that the Romans were dividing their forces right in front of him, and that
a nearby stronghold of his was in danger. If he did not hear it, he might at
least have noticed afterwards that the enemy forces facing him were fewer
and have received some reports or rumours of Nero’s vigorous dash for the
north.
True, Livy implies that march, battle and return march all took a mere 12
or 15 days, but even that would have given time enough to take advantage of
the situation. In any case modern scholars plausibly urge that so short an
interval is hardly believable, for Livius’ army and the Metaurus were a good
300 miles (400 kilometres) from Canusium. The longer Nero really was
absent, the less can Hannibal be absolved from the error of culpable inactiv-
ity. It was his last chance to exploit Hasdrubal’s arrival in Italy: either to strike
at the remaining Roman forces in turn (the rest of Nero’s army under an
untried subordinate, Q. Catius, and the propraetor Fulvius Flaccus in Luca-
nia) or indeed to imitate Nero and lead a flying column north to join
Hasdrubal (Hanno could replace him in the south). The latter move would
have been more like the Hannibal of the early days—and would probably
have brought about a different outcome at the Metaurus.18
Instead he paid the price for waiting on events. He abandoned Lucania,
abandoned even Metapontum—forcing its citizens to follow him—and with-
drew into Bruttium, with Croton, Caulonia and Locri his seaports. Roman
armies followed, watchful as usual but uninterested in battle. Too weak to
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break out, too strong to be attacked, Hannibal and his men would spend the
last four years of the epic expedition virtually under open siege in this corner
of Italy, while the fortunes of the Carthaginian state went from one disaster
to another.
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X I I I
A F R I C A I N VA D E D
I
After t
he Metaurus Hannibal made no further military moves apart from
guarding his south Italian turf—not always successfully even there, for the
rich prize of Locri would fall to the enemy in 205. To judge from his actions,
or lack of them, he had decided to wage only a holding action with the forces
left to him. He would hold on as long as possible, to distract the enemy from
fresh thoughts of invading Africa—though it was being raided almost every
year—while hoping that Hasdrubal son of Gisco might somehow turn the
tables on young Scipio in Spain, as the dead Hasdrubal had done against
Scipio’s elders.
This was not much of a hope, for the son of Gisco had shown (and would
show) as little aptitude for defeating Romans as Hasdrubal the Barcid had.
Nor would the prospect be all that pleasing if he did. Mago was with him, but
any lustre he might win would be secondary. A successful son of Gisco
would pose nearly as great a danger to the Barcids as would defeats, for it
would mean an independent gaining victories while Hannibal could not.
This decision for holding tight was a strange one. The Carthaginians’ war-
effort was far from exhausted. A new general and new army had been sent to
Spain late in 208 or early in 207 and fresh forces were raised among the
Celtiberians—even though Livy reports Scipio’s subordinate Silanus as
swiftly defeating Mago and the new general and taking the latter prisoner. But
Hasdrubal son of Gisco once more raised a powerful army to confront him
in battle in 206, an army of colossal strength according to Polybius’ figures—
70,000 infantry and 4,000 cavalry, almost the size of the mighty Roman army
of Cannae. Whatever the right figure, the Carthaginians plainly still had
enough resources as well as energy to achieve an armament which they
hoped would finally crush the invader.
Of course Scipio put an end to that hope at Ilipa and by the end of 206
Punic rule had ended throughout Spain. Hasdrubal betook himself back to
Africa, leaving Mago to fight whatever rearguard actions he wished. The
youngest Barcid was ruthless—when Gades showed itself fickle, he seized
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and crucified its chief magistrates as a payback—and energetic, as in his
effort en route to the Balearic islands to repeat Scipio’s coup of capturing New
Carthage, but no more successful than the son of Gisco in delaying the total
loss of his father’s empire.1
Yet Punic resourcefulness was not finished. When Scipio sailed across to
Syphax’s coastal stronghold Siga to try winning over the Numidian (it would
have been a major coup if he had), he found Hasdrubal son of Gisco a
fellow-guest of the king, and Hasdrubal secured Syphax for Carthage despite
Scipio’s charm. Hasdrubal could offer a unique inducement—his daughter
Sophoniba as Syphax’s new wife—but more than romance was surely needed
to bind the Numidian’s loyalty. He must have reckoned that in Africa at least
the Carthaginians’ prospects still looked better than a Roman invader’s.
Syphax before long improved his and his new allies’ position by making
himself master of all Numidia. Originally he was lord of the Masaesyli of
western Numidia, and it was Naravas’ brother Gaia who as lord of the Mas-
syli held the east. He had been firmly loyal to the Carthaginians’ and the
Barcids’ cause, and his son Masinissa had rendered years of sterling service in
Spain. On Gaia’s death in 206 the old king’s brother and successor Oezalces
married a young niece of Hannibal’s—one of his sisters’ daughters—thus
carrying on the tradition of Barcid links to Numidian royalty.
Hannibal, as head of the family, must have approved the marriage and very
likely had initiated it, to ensure that the Massylian alliance would continue in
spite of recent Punic disasters. With Syphax on friendly terms too, thanks to
Hasdrubal son of Gisco, it meant that all Numidia should be secure against
Roman blandishments. But Oezalces’ early death, and contacts between
Masinissa and the Romans, brought trouble. Oezalces’ elder son and succes-
sor soon fell to the machinations of another ambitious lord, Mazaetullus,
who forcibly put the younger brother in place of the elder, became the power
behind the new throne and took Hannibal’s widowed niece as his own wife in
hope of Carthaginian support—another token of the Barcid group’s contin-
uing potency. Hannibal may have acquiesced in this coup (at any rate
Mazaetullus and his puppet king were afterwards allowed refuge in Punic ter-
ritory), but Masinissa now ousted the ousters to make himself master of the
Massyli. Syphax, prompted by his new father-in-law, then ousted him in turn
and united the whole of Numidia under his own rule.
Hasdrubal’s political strength at home can only have profited from the suc-
cess of his son-in-law. Nor was Masinissa’s overthrow a blow against Barcid
interests: his enemy Mazaetullus had won Punic favour by marrying Hanni-
bal’s niece, whereas his own contacts with the Romans were suspected or
known by now at Carthage. The Numidians united under a pro-Punic king
were plainly preferable to a Numidia divided and its eastern folk under a
dubious or even hostile ruler.2
Mago meanwhile was given command of a new expedition from the
Balearic islands to Italy, this time by sea with 14,000 troops, including about
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2,000 cavalry. After seizing Genua (today’s Genoa) on the Ligurian coast in
205, he received nearly 7,000 more men and even a few elephants, not to
mention substantial funds for hiring extra troops. This again points to collab-
oration between the Barcids and Hasdrubal son of Gisco: the forces and
funds committed were substantial, the military move plainly serious—in fact
it was the Carthaginians’ last overseas effort.
On the other hand, Mago’s landing in Liguria, 550 miles (900 kilometres)
or so from his brother at the opposite end of Italy, was only the latest pecu-
liarity in the war-effort. Had he tried for Bruttium and had just some of his
troops got through with or without him, they would have contributed more
to Hannibal than the whole force did when deposited in Liguria, too few in
number to dent the Romans’ north Italian array and too far away to be any
use to the general. No doubt Bruttium would have been a hazardous attempt,
with Roman fleets patrolling, but ancient fleets always had difficulties doing
this—and in any case in 206 the Roman fleet in Sicily had been cut from 100
warships to 30. In 203 Hannibal would take himself and at least some troops
over to Africa quite safely.3
Moreover the Carthaginians still had warships even if no fleet after 211
numbered as many as 100. Despite Roman naval might, in 209 and again in
207 a Punic fleet operated in western Greek waters, intending to support
Philip of Macedon’s campaigns in Greece—though it failed in this and its
absence from south Italian waters in 209 aided Fabius’ recovery of Taren-
tum. True, in 208 Valerius Laevinus won a victory (the biggest of the war)
over the 80
ships that tried to stop him raiding North Africa. But more ships
could have been built and may have been—to judge from the naval activities
in following years and seeing that, when peace was made in 201, Scipio had
large numbers of war-vessels to burn. In other words, the Carthaginians in
these years still had significant naval resources, but used them poorly.4
Now operational matters were still Hannibal’s to direct. This is shown not
just by Polybius’ insistence but by such evidence as there is. For instance the
expedition to Liguria: it is hard to imagine why an anti-Barcid faction, if it
now held power at Carthage, would choose their enemy’s brother as com-
mander. Not only was Mago chosen but he was later reinforced and supplied
with copious funds. Hannibal surely had to be consulted at least, and quite
probably he was the initiator. Again, on his own return to Africa in 203 he
continued in supreme command: Hasdrubal son of Gisco, hitherto in in-
glorious charge of home defence, had been sacked and his interim
replacement was—according to Appian—Hanno son of Bomilcar, who
sounds like Hannibal’s nephew (and, if Appian can be believed, it was Hanni-
bal who saved Hasdrubal from vengeful prosecution at Carthage).
Obviously the general did not and could not direct operations in detail in
other lands and at sea, any more than a Roman emperor did in later times.
Details were the business of the commanders in situ. In the same way he had
to leave it to the authorities at Carthage to administer Punic North Africa,
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gather and embark troops and supplies for abroad, and organize defence
against raids or invasion. But ultimate responsibility for major initiatives had
to be his. Nothing suggests that he had to impose his wishes on a reluctant
home government or was thwarted at times by one—even if later on the
Carthaginians chose to claim so. Had he opposed the fleets being sent to
Greece, it is hard to imagine they would still have gone. Had he directed the
home authorities to send him regular supplies and money, they would have
made the effort, as in fact they did in 205. And had he wished Mago’s fleet
and the later reinforcements to sail for southern Italy, that would at least have
been tried.
But on naval matters Hannibal had always been a landlubber. As was sug-