Hannibal's Dynasty

by Dexter Hoyos

  ough bibliography of Hannibal’s pass from 1820 to 1993) and Hann. 96–113.

  Seibert holds that identification of the pass is impossible and he is probably

  right. Less plausible is his theory that the Punic army went in two corps via

  two passes, thus explaining—he thinks—why some of Polybius’ and Livy’s

  details diverge ((1989) 72–3; FzH 198; Hann. 106). Now neither writer, nor

  227

  A P P E N D I X

  any later one, shows any awareness of this division, and in fact Livy’s account

  of the whole march largely draws on Polybius. Discrepancies could have

  arisen if one or more previous writers had tried to clarify the route from their

  own, sometimes faulty, geographical knowledge or guesswork, and if Livy

  reflected the guesses (he was interested in the topic himself).

  (ii) While Hannibal claimed that he had only 20,000 foot and 6,000 horse

  on reaching Italy, some scholars hold that he left another 8,000 out—light-

  armed pikemen and Balearic slingers, both mentioned at the Trebia by

  Polybius (3.72.7)—to make his victories against huge odds seem still more

  glorious: thus Delbrück (1920/1975) 1.361–2; Ridley (1987) 162; Seibert,

  FzH 181, 212; Hann. 112. Delbrück, 361, holds that the heavy infantry alone

  must have totalled 20,000 on arrival, because otherwise they would have been

  too few, after Trebia and Trasimene, to carry out the tasks they did at Cannae.

  If so Hannibal really brought 34,000 troops into Italy.

  But at the Trebia in December 218 he had about 40,000 men in all, includ-

  ing by then 10,000 horse (Pol. 3.72.8–9; Walbank 1.404–5; Lazenby (1978)

  56)—and this after ‘all the neighbouring Gauls’ had rallied to him and sup-

  plied troops (3.66.7). If he had reached Italy with 34,000 men, then these

  new allies can have numbered only about 6,000 and have been mostly cavalry

  since his cavalry total had risen by 4,000 (so Delbrück, 361). This is implausi-

  ble, and it also contradicts Polybius’ evidence for substantial Gallic infantry at

  the Trebia (3.72.8, 74.4 and 11): for one thing Hannibal’s 20,000 infantry in

  that battle consisted of Spaniards, Africans and Gauls (72.8). Much more

  likely then the general had gained 4,000 horse and 10,000 or so foot, includ-

  ing some light-armed, from his new allies.

  Even if he left the several hundred-odd Baleares out of his Lacinian

  record, he must have counted his own pikemen—themselves Africans and

  Spaniards—among the African and Spanish foot (so too Walbank 1.366; cf.

  Connolly (1981) 187). Nor did these pikemen likely total 8,000, for of that

  total at the Trebia some would be Gauls (cf. Lazenby, 81). In other words his

  African and Spanish regular infantry probably numbered more than 12,000.

  Moreover, as most of the casualties at Trebia and Trasimene were to fall on

  his Gauls, the Africans and Spaniards would not have been too many fewer at

  Cannae in 216 (cf. Goldsworthy (2000) 180, 189, 207) though admittedly

  some men had died of cold in winter 218–217.

  He of course had pikemen at Cannae too (Pol. 3.113.6) but likely enough

  many were Gallic again ( contra Goldsworthy, 207; see Lazenby, 81; Connolly,

  115, 117–18; Wise (1982) 17 suggests 6,000 were). In rearming his African

  troops after Trasimene with his plentiful haul of captured Roman weapons

  (3.87.3) he may well have armed the highly trained African pikemen at least,

  thus adding them to the regular infantry (on these pikemen’s military quality,

  cf. Lazenby, 14–15). Even if not, it is unconvincing to suppose his regular

  infantry was only 9,000–10,000 strong at Cannae.

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  A P P E N D I X

  10 ‘De dignitate atque imperio certare’

  (chapter X, note 9)

  The original source or sources for Hannibal’s statement to his Roman cap-

  tives—Silenus, Sosylus, Fabius or the like—no doubt used Greek terms like

  τιµ´η and ’αρχ´η; for a Latin version of ’αρχ´η Hannibal or his interpreter could

  have said potestas or maybe dicio. Imperium looks like Livy’s rewording or maybe a recent annalist’s, for by their time it could mean ‘empire’ as well as ‘power’

  or ‘command’—not in Hannibal’s day, though (cf. Hoyos [1998] 130). Livy

  himself probably had all these senses in mind.

  11 Independent Roman corps operating in Italy

  (chapter XI, note 3)

  Hanno’s and Hannibal’s victories over such forces in 213 and 212 are one or

  both rejected by Kahrstedt (1913) 265–6, and Briscoe (1989) 54 note 52.

  Seibert, Hann. 288, accepts the earlier but (294 note 33) rejects the later; both

  are accepted by de Sanctis, 3.2. 264, 383, by Huss (1985) 359 note 184, 365,

  by Lazenby (1978) 102, 113, and by Kukofka (1990) 76–7 with modifications.

  Appian, Hann. 9.37, 11.45–7, confuses the defeat of C. Centenius’ ‘army’

  after Trasimene in 217—in reality Centenius led the consul Servilius’ cav-

  alry—with the disaster of M. Centenius Paenula the ex-centurion (perhaps

  appointed a praefectus) in Lucania in 212; but this is hardly a warrant for disbe-

  lieving the Paenula incident which Livy reports.

  Irregulars in 209 forced to surrender: Livy 27.16.9. Some had been

  brought over from Sicily by Valerius Laevinus and combined with Bruttian

  deserters for operations in Bruttium. Livy 27.12.4–6 avoids naming any com-

  mander; cf. chapter X note 13. Note too another independently operating

  force in 208, a column of Roman troops marching on their own from Taren-

  tum towards Locri when ambushed at Petelia by Hannibal (27.26.4–6).

  12 Debated aspects of the Italian campaign of 207

  (chapter XII, notes 12–13)

  Though Livy seemingly makes Hannibal move from the territory of Larinum

  in east-central Italy to the Sallentine peninsula, ‘agri Larinatis’ in his text may

  be a copyist’s mistake for ‘agri Tarentini’ (27.40.10, where most MSS actually

  offer ‘laritanis’, ‘laritani’ or ‘lartiani’): thus Huss (1985) 392. Certainly the gen-

  eral is soon after reported departing ‘ex agro Tarentino’ (40.12). But Livy fails

  to explain why Hannibal should be marching into the heel of Italy at all—for

  forage? Or is ‘in Sallentinos’ an error for some other and more northerly des-

  tination (e.g. ‘Salapitanos’)?

  Whether the rest of the reported marching and fighting could have fitted

  between mid-March, when the consuls entered office and joined their armies,

  229

  A P P E N D I X

  and mid-June when Nero left Apulia for the north, is hard to decide but looks

  a little dubious (the battle of the Metaurus was fought on 22 June by the

  Roman calendar, according to Ovid, Fasti 6.769–70. Cf. Walbank 2.270–1,

  answering de Sanctis’ scepticism (3.2.560–1); cf. Derow (1976) 280–1; Seib-

  ert, FzH 244–5).

  Seibert ( Hann. 382–4) sees Canusium as Hannibal’s intended junction-point

  and the brothers as having conflicting views (‘Meinungsverschiedenheiten’),

  while also supposing (385) that Hasdrubal had got in touch with Hannibal as

  soon as he reached Italy. He rightly notes (383–4) that a junction in Umbria

  implied moving against Rome. But it need not follow that this meant giving up


  the Punic-held south, for Hannibal had garrisons in key cities.

  At the battle of the Metaurus, Seibert ( Hann. 389, 391) judges Nero’s deci-

  sive tactical manoeuvre as fiction from a Nero-friendly tradition—a very

  early one if so, since Polybius reports it—which copied Hannibal’s decisive

  cavalry manoeuvre at Cannae. Instead he credits the other consul Livius with

  working around Hasdrubal’s flank to strike the decisive blow. But not only is

  this an arbitrary treatment of Polybius’ evidence as well as Livy’s; it virtually

  implies that Nero’s presence was unnecessary, for until he made his manoeu-

  vre his troops played no part in the battle. (Nor, it may be added, is Nero’s

  infantry manoeuvre very similar to Hannibal’s cavalry coup at Cannae.) Why

  not infer then that his famous march and reinforcement of Livius were

  invented too? Seibert also denies Nero’s decisive rôle in urging a battle and

  assigns the decision to Livius (386–7, 391)—even though before Nero’s

  arrival the latter was avoiding combat and gave his unexpectedly arriving col-

  league a decidedly ‘frostige Begrüßung’ (386).

  Livy claims that Nero’s return to Apulia was swifter (‘citatiore agmine’)

  than the outward one—it began the night after the battle and took six days

  (27.50.1), while the battle itself was fought the day after he joined Livius

  (27.46.5 and 11). If the Metaurus was fought on 22 June, this would date

  Nero’s expedition—500 miles (800 kilometres) of marching plus a major

  battle—from about 12/13 June to 28/29 June, a clear impossibility. De Sanc-

  tis (3.2.556) suggests Nero and his cavalry took six days to return while the

  infantry took longer, for he holds (553) that Hannibal moved towards Lar-

  inum now, not at the start of the year—giving Nero only some 190 miles

  (300 kilometres) thither from Livius’ army—but on this see Lazenby (1978)

  185. Three to four weeks’ absence is a safer estimate.

  Seibert’s efforts ( Hann. 385 note 36) to shield Hannibal from blame for not

  noticing Nero’s absence (‘angesichts der kriegerischen Praxis völlig normal’)

  or, if he did notice it, for not taking advantage of it, are hardly persuasive.

  And if Nero knew that his absence would be ‘völlig ungefährlich’ for the

  Romans because Hannibal would not stir, this puts the latter’s military sag-

  acity by 207 in just as poor a light.

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  A P P E N D I X

  13 The peace talks in 203 and P. Ryl. 3. 491

  (chapter XIV, note 12)

  P. Ryl. 491, published in 1938 (Roberts (1938)) and generally seen as pro-

  Carthaginian in tone, does not mention an attack on Scipio’s envoys, but it is

  too fragmentary for disproof and its supposed bias is quite unprovable

  (Hoyos (2001a)). Just as likely if not more so, it could be a précis of a pro-

  Roman account, maybe even Fabius Pictor’s. Whatever its background, it

  does not impugn Polybius’ account.

  Plutarch meanwhile has a story of Scipio telling the Carthaginians that,

  because they had recalled Hannibal, he would not continue the armistice

  ‘even if they wished it’ unless they paid a further 5,000 talents ( Moralia

  196C–D); but this tale is not plausible. Having brought Hannibal home the

  Carthaginians would scarcely be interested in paying to continue the

  armistice; and Eutropius (3.22) has Scipio prescribe a similar penalty when

  Hannibal himself supposedly asks for peace before Zama. So at best

  Plutarch’s story is a glimmer of a more pro-Punic and anti-Scipio tradition:

  thus de Sanctis, 3.2.533 note 161, and Huss (1985) 414 note 90; while Mantel

  (1991) 121–2 sees it as a distorted annalistic item.

  14 The ‘quaestor’ at Carthage in 195

  (chapter XVI, note 3)

  That ‘quaestor’ means rb ( rab) and head of finance is argued most fully by

  Huss (1979), but the case is not completely certain. Finance officials are

  attested— mhsbm, ‘the accountables’—but, it seems, no rab of the mhsbm

  (Sznycer (1978) 585; cf. Huss (1985) 465) even though rab means simply

  ‘chief ’ and is also used with other offices, e.g. rab kohanim, ‘chief of priests’

  (Huss, 543). Livy’s Latin, of course, may mean not ‘ the quaestor’ (the usual

  supposition) but, just as likely, ‘ a quaestor’ and so may refer to one unco-

  operative member of ‘the accountables’. True, Gades in 205 had two sufetes

  and one ‘quaestor’, all of whom Mago murdered for disloyalty (Livy 28.37.2);

  but Gades, a town much smaller than Carthage, may well have had only one

  mhsb. In any case Latin writers are not consistent in naming Punic magistra-

  cies, so a ‘quaestor’ recorded at one city does not inevitably prove one at

  another; for inconsistencies compare Livy calling Hannibal in 196 ‘praetor’

  (33.46.2) but writing of ‘sufetes’ in 193 (34.61.15), while Justin terms him

  ‘consul’ at the time of his flight (31.2.6); and on Nepos’ confusions see chap-

  ter XV note 7.

  15Hannibal, Cyrene and Siwa (chapter XVII, note 4)

  Along with holding that Hannibal visited Cyrene in 193, Seibert ( Hann. 514

  and on his Map 10) supposes that he travelled inland to the oracle of Zeus

  231

  A P P E N D I X

  Amon at the oasis of Siwa, for later he believed in a prophecy of Amon

  about his place of burial (Pausanias 8.11.1; Appian, Syr. 11.44; Tzetzes, Chili-

  ades 1.801–22). Of course he would not have had leisure to go to Siwa during

  his flight in 195. But Appian and Tzetzes pretty clearly imply that Hannibal

  had been sent the prophecy, perhaps after submitting a written query. No

  actual visit to the oasis should be supposed.

  232

  T I M E - L I N E

  814/813

  Timaeus’ date for the foundation of Carthage

  753

  Traditional date of Rome’s foundation

  from 550s?

  Malchus, Mago and descendants dominant at

  Carthage

  509

  Traditional date of Roman kings’ expulsion, and of

  first Roman–Punic treaty

  348

  Likely date of second Roman–Punic treaty

  310

  Agathocles of Syracuse invades Punic Africa

  308

  Military coup by Bomilcar foiled

  307Agathocles abandons his forces in Africa and returns

  to Sicily

  279

  Roman–Punic pact against Pyrrhus

  about 275

  Hiero (later king) becomes leader of Syracuse (dies

  215)

  264

  Clash over Messana and outbreak of First Punic War

  256–255

  Romans invade Africa; victories and defeat of Regulus

  249

  Punic naval victories off Drepana and Cape Pachynus

  247Hamilcar Barca appointed general in Sicily; birth of

  Hannibal

  247–244

  Hamilcar on Mt Heircte

  244–242

  Hamilcar at Mt Eryx

  241

  Battle of the Aegates islands; peace with Romans

  Outbreak of the Mercenaries’ War

  238/237 (winter)

  End of Mercenaries’ War; Hamilcar again elected

  general and dominant in Punic affairs

  237 (March?)r />
  Romans seize Sardinia, declare war on Carthage;

  Carthaginians cede Sardinia and pay money

  (April?)

  Hamilcar’s expedition to Spain

  237–228

  Hamilcar’s expansion in Spain

  231

  Alleged Roman embassy to Hamilcar

  229 (end) or

  Death of Hamilcar at ‘Castrum Altum’; Hasdrubal

  228 (start)

  elected general

  233

  T I M E - L I N E

  228 or 227Hasdrubal visits Carthage

  227/226

  Foundation of New Carthage; Roman interest

  aroused

  225 (spring)

  Ebro-accord between Hasdrubal and the Romans; prob-

  able date of first Saguntine–Roman diplomatic links

  225–222

  Romans defeat Gallic invasion of Italy, and subdue

  Cisalpine Gaul

  221

  Hasdrubal assassinated; Hannibal elected general;

  subdues Olcades

  220

  Campaign in central and northern Spain; Vaccaei and

  Carpetani defeated

  (autumn)

  Roman envoys see Hannibal at New Carthage

  219 (prob. Apr./May– Hannibal besieges Saguntum

  Dec.)

  218

  Romans declare war at Carthage

  (June–Nov.?)

  Hannibal’s expedition to Italy

  Cn. Scipio operates in north-eastern Spain

  (Nov.–Dec.)

  Battles of the Ticinus and the Trebia

  217Hannibal enters Etruria; crossing of the Arno

  marshes

  (June)

  Battle of Lake Trasimene; Hannibal marches to

  Apulia; Fabius Maximus dictator at Rome;

  operations in Campania

  Victories of the Scipio brothers in Spain

  216 (Aug.)

  Battle of Cannae

  215

  Defections to Hannibal begin in Campania and

  southern Italy; further operations in Campania;

  treaty with Philip V of Macedon

  Hasdrubal in Spain defeated at Hibera

  Hiero of Syracuse succeeded by his grandson

  Hieronymus

  214

  Hannibal’s operations in Campania and Apulia;

  Hanno defeated at river Calor

  Hieronymus assassinated; Hippocrates and Epicydes

  ally Syracuse with Carthaginians

  213

  Arpi in Apulia defects to the Romans; Marcellus

  besieges Syracuse

  212

  Tarentum defects to Hannibal; likewise Metapontum,

  Thurii and Locri; first battle of Herdonea