Hannibal's Dynasty
Page 44
it as revenue from Lepcis plus its surroundings. See Appendix §3.
11 Roman republic’s estimated income from 200 to 157: T. Frank, An Economic His-
tory of Rome, vol. 1: The Republic (Baltimore 1933) 126–41; Nicolet (1978) 1.255–7.
Rhodian customs-duties: Pol. 30.31.7–12; Walbank, 3.458–60. Rhodian customs-
duties before 167: Pol. 30.31.7–12; Walbank, 3.458–60. Punic war-indemnities in
241, 237 and 201: chapter I §V, chapter IV §I, chapter XV §I (that of 241 was per-
haps suspended during the Mercenaries’ War, Hoyos (1998) 125). Revenues of
Athens at the start of the Peloponnesian War, reportedly 1,000 talents:
Xenophon, Anabasis 7.1.27, cf. Thucydides 1.99.3; R. Meiggs, The Athenian Empire
(Oxford 1972, repr. 1987) 258–9. Syracusan indemnity: Pol. 1.16.9–10, 17.3;
Diod. 23.4.1; Zon. 8.9.11 (Eutropius, 2.19.1, improbably claims 200 talents);
Hoyos (1998) 106–7.
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12 Population of Carthage: Appendix §4. Resident non-citizens: cf. Huss (1985)
501–2. Adult men: this follows P. A. Brunt’s calculation of them as 28–31 per
cent of total population, at any rate in third-century BC Italy ((1971) 59, 116).
Punic citizens sent out as colonists: Aristotle, Pol. 2.11.15, 1273b; 6.5.9, 1320b.
Roman citizens in 247: Livy, Epit. 19. In 225, with Roman and Italian allied man-
power together reported as 770,000 (probably too high): Pol. 2.24–5; cf. Brunt,
chapter IV. Population of the empire: Appendix §4. Slaves: Huss, 499–500.
13 Aristotle on the political system: Pol. 2.11.1–9, 1272b–1273b; 4.7.11, 1293b
(‘threefold aim’ (Penguin tr.)); Picard and Picard, LDC 141–6; Huss (1985) chap-
ter XXX. Cf. Pol. 6.43.1, Walbank, 1.724, and Huss, 458 note 1, for other
admirers. The kingship: Ameling (1993) chapter II. The sufetes: Gsell, HAAN
2.193–200; Picard (1963); Sznycer (1978) 567–76; Bacigalupo Pareo (1977); Huss
(1983) and (1991) 118–23; Scullard (1989a) 490–1. Occasionally there might be
four rather than two sufetes in a year (W. Huss, Muséon 90 (1977) 427–33). Gen-
erals: Bengtson (1952); Picard (1968) 115–23; Ameling (1993) 83–117; Hoyos
(1994) 249–56. Plurality of offices: Aristotle 2.11.13, 1,273b.
14 H’drm, Huss (1985) 462, (1991) 124–7. Senate’s powers: Gsell, HAAN 2.202–4,
215–26. Decided peace and war: cf. Hoyos (1994) 262–4; below, chapter XVI
note 21. On the term rab, see Huss (1979), (1985) 465 and (1991) 129, who sug-
gests that on its own this was the title of Carthage’s presumed magistrate for
finances; but see Appendix §14. Public scribes ( sprm): cf. Pol. 3.22.8 (first treaty
with the Romans); Sznycer (1978) 585 (also for market inspectors). Boards of
Five (pentarchies): Aristotle, Pol. 2.11.4, 1273a13–20; cf. 3.1.7, 1275b12–13. Ban
on Greek: Justin 20.5.12–13 (a date around 370). Inner council of senate: Pol.
10.18.1, 36.4.6; Livy 30.16.3 ‘sanctius consilium’; Walbank, 1.76, 2.218; Huss
(1985) 462–3 and (1991) 125.
15 Tribunal of One Hundred and Four: Aristotle, Pol. 2.11.2, 1272b (‘104’); 2.11.4,
1273a (‘100’); Justin 19.2.5 (100 judges created from among the senators). Ordo
iudicum: Livy 33.46.1–7. See, e.g., Susemihl and Hicks (1894) 341–3, 348–9; Gsell,
HAAN 2.205–8; Sznycer (1978) 579–81; Huss (1985) 464; Ameling (1993) 83–5;
and cf. below, chapter VI §III; XV §II.
16 Citizen assembly: Aristotle, Pol. 2.11.5–6, 1273a; Pol. 3.13.3–4 (election of Hanni-
bal as general), 6.51.2–7; Livy 33.46.6–7; Gsell, HAAN 2.225–31; Sznycer (1978)
581–4; Huss (1985) 463–4; Hoyos (1994) 262–4. Poorer Carthaginians excluded:
so for instance Gsell, 2.228, and Sznycer, 583, because Polybius distinguishes
between ‘citizens’ and ‘artisans’ at New Carthage in 210 (10.16.1, 10.17.6–9); but
see Walbank, 2.216; Scullard (1989a) 491–2. Evidence for formal clientships, per-
haps including freed slaves: Huss (1985) 497–9.
17 Magonids: Justin 18.7.2–19.3.12; Herodotus 7.165; Diod. 13.43.5, 14.54.5.
Fourth-century Hanno the Great: Aristotle, Pol. 5.6.2, 1307a; Justin 21.4. Bomil-
car’s attempted coup: Diod. 20.43.1–44.6. See, e.g., Gsell, HAAN 2.186–91,
245–52; Picard and Picard, LDC chapters II–III; L. J. Sanders, Historia 37 (1988)
72–89; Lancel (1992) 127–32 (= English tr. 110–15); Ameling (1993) chapter II.
I I I T H E R E V O LT O F A F R I C A
1 Outbreak of the Truceless or Mercenaries’ War: Pol. 1.66–70; Diod. 25.2; Gsell,
HAAN 2.101–5; Huss (1985) 252–5; Loreto (1995) 45–113; Hoyos (1999).
Rebel coinage (cf. Pol. 1.72.6): for instance Jenkins and Lewis (1963) 43, 51; W.
Huss, Schweizer Münzblätter 150 (1988) 30–3; E. Acquaro, in Devijver and Lipinski
(1989) 137–44; Howgego (1995) 113–14.
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2 Troops’ irritation with ‘the generals who had made the promises’: Pol. 1.67.12;
cf. Appian, Sic. 2.7. Gisco’s fate: 1.80.10–13. Prosecution of Hamilcar: Appian,
Iber. 4.16, Hann. 2.3; dating accepted for instance by Lenschau, RE 7.2356; Gsell, HAAN 2.255; Picard (1967) 74 and (1968) 120; Loreto (1995) 205–6, who
implausibly argues for different charges arising out of the war in Africa. Contra:
de Sanctis, 3.1.377 note 16; Walbank, 1.140, 151; Hoyos (1994) 261–2.
3 ‘The leading men’ or ‘the men in power’, το`υς πολιτευοµ´ενους (Appian, Iber. 4.16;
the Loeb translation is less satisfactory, ‘the chief men in the state’). The verb
basically means ‘to be in public life’, but can also mean ‘to be in government’ or
‘to administer affairs’. Since Hamilcar’s enemies must have been in public life too,
the stronger sense seems to be what Appian intends (similarly Loreto (1995)
208–9). Hasdrubal ‘the most popular’, Appian, ibid. ; his youth and the alleged
sexual relationship, Nepos, Hamil. 3.2; Livy 21.2.3 (‘uti ferunt’). Diodorus on
Hamilcar in 237: 25.8. The widespread idea that Hamilcar at this time was at odds
with the dominant faction, or with the oligarchy as a whole (de Sanctis,
3.1.376–7; Gsell, HAAN 2.253–4; Picard (1967) 60, 68; Scullard (1980) 184),
hardly squares with such evidence as we have (Hoyos (1994) 258–61, 267; Loreto,
208–9).
Appian shifts the prosecution to 237, perhaps through linking it with a sup-
posed joint appointment of Hamilcar and Hanno to subdue the Numidians,
following the Mercenaries’ War; Hamilcar uses the appointment as a clever way
to escape trial (cf. also Hann. 2.3). In reality, if any operations against the Numid-
ians occurred, they were part of the mopping-up near the end of that war when
the two generals were again co-operating. Hamilcar’s appointment immediately
following the war was to Spain.
4 Seibert defends Hanno against Polybius’ biased presentation ( FzH 96 note 52; cf.
Walbank, 1.140, and Huss (1985) 258). But it remains true that he did not shine in
his operations. Loreto (1995) 135–7 maintains that Hanno then led his surviving
troops back to Carthage, where some formed Hamilcar’s army in turn. But it is
hard to believe that Polybius—especially in his anti-Hanno mood—would have
left that out, and in fact he indicates that the
army was formed partly of later-
enrolled mercenaries (75.2). Hamilcar’s army may have included some of the
2,743 Punic prisoners of war sent home, ransom-free, by the Romans (Pol.
1.83.8; Val. Max. 5.1.1 and Eutrop. 2.27 give the number) if the restoration
occurred about this time: cf. Hoyos (1998) 124.
Multiple generalships: Gsell, HAAN 2.422–3. Adherbal in overall command
in 250–249: Pol. 1.44.1, 53.2–3; Gsell, 422 note 6; Thiel (1954) 281; Walbank,
1.109, 116; Lazenby (1996) 126. Hamilcar appointed, Pol. 1.75.1; but as com-
mander-in-chief, Picard and Picard, LDC, 206; Huss, 258; Scullard (1989a) 567;
Lancel (1992) 392; Hoyos (1994) 250–1. Carthaginians urged both generals to
avenge Gisco: Pol. 1.81.1. Hamilcar ‘called Hanno to him’: 1.82.1. Carthaginians
surprised by their quarrel: Seibert, FzH 101 note 71.
5 Punic naval strength in 241–240: Pol. 1.73.2 (triremes and the smaller 50-oar
ships). Rebel numbers: Pol. 1.67.13, 73.3; Nepos, Hamil. 2.2. De Sanctis, 3.1.375
note 11, and Walbank, 1.139, are probably right to judge the Libyan figure
(70,000) exaggerated, despite Loreto (1995) 87–9, 119–21. Battle of the
Bagradas: W. E. Thompson, Hermes 114 (1986) 111–17; Loreto, 137–48. Siege of
Utica raised: Pol. 1.75.3, explicitly; cf. Huss (1985) 259 note 59; sceptics include
Walbank, 1.143; Seibert, FzH 99 note 63; Loreto, 139, 151. Though Polybius
later writes of the defeated rebels fleeing back to their camp outside Utica
(1.76.9), he reports Hamilcar pursuing them part of the way at least (76.10) and
their leader Spendius is next found following him into the Libyan countryside
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(77.1 and 4). Hamilcar possibly had Hanno’s help in raising the siege of Utica—
Hanno and his forces were somewhere in the background (cf. previous note).
6 Relations with Hiero and the Romans: Pol. 1.83.2–11; Nepos, Hamil. 2.3; Appian,
Sic. 2.10; Zon. 8.17; Hoyos (1998) 123–6, suggesting (125) that the indemnity was
waived until war’s end. But the story that Roman envoys tried to mediate in the
struggle (Appian, Sic. 2.11, Lib. 5.19; Zon. ibid. ; accepted by Huss (1985) 257, and Loreto (1995) 198) is not to be believed; at best it misunderstands or embroiders
the rôle of their protest embassy. Spendius’ ‘Fabian’ tactics, Pol. 1.77.2.
7Naravas’ family: Appendix §5. Naravas and Hamilcar’s victory, Pol. 1.7
8.1–12;
policy of mercy to prisoners, 78.13–15, 79.8. Veith identifies the victory-site, a
plain circled by mountains, as near the hill-town of Nepheris 18 miles/30 kilo-
metres south-east of Tunis (in Kromayer and Veith, AS 3.2.539–41); de Sanctis
prefers a site north of the Bagradas (3.1.378 note 19; cf. Seibert, FzH 99 note
64); Loreto ((1995) 153) suggests the mountains 6–10 miles (10–15 kilometres)
west of Tunis but remarks that the lack of help from Tunes for the rebels would
indicate a relatively distant site, which seems contradictory. If Veith is right,
Hamilcar could have been trying to command a supply-route from the Cape Bon
region. But possibly enough the encounter was much further inland.
8 Hanno’s activities: in Kromayer and Veith, AS 532 inferred confrontation with
Mathos besieging Hippou. Loreto, supposing instead that Hanno had marched
back to Carthage even before Hamilcar left there (note 4 above), then has him
remain at or near the city until he went to join Hamilcar ((1995) 137, 160).
9 Revolt in Sardinia, Pol. 1.79.1–7; massacre of Gisco and other prisoners,
79.8–80.13; Hamilcar’s no-quarter policy, 82.2 (with Polybius’ implied approval;
cf. 81.7–11). Trampling by elephants: inflicted by the regent Perdiccas on
selected opponents in 323 after Alexander’s death (Curtius, Historia Alexandri
10.9.18; Scullard (1974) 78). Much or most of Libya submitting only after
Spendius’ and Autaritus’ débâcle, 86.2.
10 Union of armies and quarrel with Hanno, Pol. 1.82.1–5; Hamilcar became
supreme general, 82.5 and 12. Seibert and Loreto similarly infer differences over
how to wage the war, rather than an unattested ancient feud (Seibert, FzH 101
note 71; Loreto (1995) 161). Soldiers’ decision: cf. Eucken (1968) 73; Huss
(1985) 477; Hoyos (1994) 250; Loreto, 165–6.
11 The reconstruction in Picard (1968) 117–19, and Picard and Picard, LDC 207–8,
of the politics behind Hamilcar’s election to supreme command is imaginative,
circumstantial—for instance giving a substantial rôle to Hamilcar’s putative son-
in-law Bomilcar—and largely based on assumptions. They also see Hamilcar’s
election as chief general as establishing his mastery of the Punic state.
12 Fleet lost, Pol. 1.82.6. Mathos’ siege of Hippou Acra, 70.9, 73.2, 77.1, cf. 79.14;
on Utica, note 5 above. Their ‘senseless’ defection, 82.8–9 (’αλ´ογου); cf. Loreto
(1995) 160, 163–4. Pro-Carthage factions deposed: since both cities were (it
seems) treated fairly mildly after the war, this is best accounted for if loyalists
recovered control then. Hippou and Utica, to show their keenness for their new
cause, treated the Carthaginians within their walls with the usual pitilessness:
82.9–10. Carthage besieged: 82.11.
13 Hardships of the besiegers: Pol. 1.82.13, 84.1–2; Diod. 25.4.1. Recruits after
breakout, Pol. 84.3. Walbank, 1.146, suggests the rebel army totalled no more
than 20,000; Loreto ((1995) 169, 172) accepts Polybius’ figure. ‘The Saw’, Pol.
85.7 (in Salammbô, chapter 14, Flaubert more evocatively if misleadingly calls it
‘the defile of the Axe’); Veith locates it close to modern Hammamet and the sea
about 30 miles/50 kilometres south of Carthage (in Kromayer and Veith
3.2.546–54), but Polybius’ description is too brief and general for any precision.
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Hamilcar’s conduct: cf. de Sanctis’ remarks, 3.1.382 (‘certo non senza perfidia’);
Walbank, 1.147; Loreto, 176, defends it.
14 Fates of Spendius and Hannibal, Pol. 1.86. Hamilcar’s move north prevented
Mathos joining up with Hippou and Utica rebels: thus Meltzer (1896) 385;
Loreto (1995) 185. Seibert, FzH 105 note 92, scathingly but unpersuasively
judges the move ‘kopflos’. Walbank, 1.148, and Huss (1985) 265 note 100, see it
only as a move to maintain his communications; Veith, in Kromayer and Veith,
AS 3.2.556, supposes that Hannibal’s force was virtually annihilated, but that is
not Polybius’ implication (86.5, many killed, all driven from camp).
15 Reconciliation between Hamilcar and Hanno, 1.87.1–6 (Polybius, 86.5, writes as
though both generals needed persuasion, which looks like an effort to play down
Hamilcar’s reluctance); Seibert, Hann. 21–2, also sees it as a compromise; cf.
Loreto (1995) 186. Hanno already general, 86.3. A political comeback by him:
Walbank, 1.148; Picard and Picard, LDC 208–9; Scullard (1989a) 568. Troops
from Carthage reinforcing Hamilcar, 87.3 (‘arming the remaining men of mili-
tary age, as though now running the last lap [i.e. in a supreme effort], they sent
them off to Barca’). Tunes: Veith, in Kromayer and Veith, AS 3.2.557, thinks
some troops remained there until Mathos summoned them to his last stand, but
no doubt Leptis Minor on the Byzacium coast, near Hadrumetum which would
be one of the ‘other cities’ mentioned (Gsell, HAAN 2.122 note 4; Walbank,
1.148); not the bigger and more famous Lepcis ( sic) Magna hundreds of miles to
the east, despite Loreto being tempted by this ((1995) 187). Death of Mathos at
Carthage, 88.6. Utica and Hippou fearful: 88.3–4, echoed by Diod. 25.5.3. Terms
given them: 88.4; Gsell, 123; Walbank, 1.149. Punic rule extended around this
time: Diod. 25.10.1, 26.23 (‘Micatani’—maybe the Muxsitani of a district ( pagus
Muxsi) west of Utica and Hippou Acra; cf. Lancel (1992) 280); Nepos, Hamil. 2.5;
see also chapter IV. Chronology: Pol. 88.7; Diodorus’ 4 years 4 months (25.6) is
impossible to match with other chronological indicators; cf. Walbank, 1.149–50;
Loreto, 211; Hoyos (2000a). Mercenaries driven from Sardinia to Italy: Pol. 79.5,
88.8.
16 Debased coinages: Robinson (1956/1978) 9; Jenkins and Lewis (1963) 43;
Howgego (1995) 113–14, noting Punic silver 15–33 per cent pure, rebel 25–43
per cent. The rebels overstruck many older Punic coins with their own dies.
17‘Mastia Tarseiou [or Tarseion?]’: Pol. 3.24.2 and 4; Walbank, 1.347
; Huss (1985)
150–1; Barceló (1988) 134–5, doubting that its site was Cartagena; Scardigli
(1991) 107. Punic help to Gades: Justin 44.5.1–4, claiming a Punic conquest of
Iberia. Barceló, chapter IV, shows that such claims have no basis; so too
González Wagner (1989), but he assumes (156) without warrant that after 241
Carthaginians were barred from direct access to Spanish trade.
I V B A R C A S U P R E M E
1 Chronology: chapters III note 15, V note 16. Punic field forces: Veith, in Kro-
mayer and Veith, AS 567–71, estimated 40,000 (versus 30,000 rebels) in Mathos’
last battle. ‘Formed a political group’, etc.: Diod. 25.8, tr. Walton; on the textual
questions, Walton (Loeb edn, 11.152); Loreto (1995) 206 note 31; Hoyos (1998)
151 note 2.
2 Hamilcar’s appointment to Spain: Hoyos (1994) 258–9. Loreto (1995) 205–10
tries to show that it gave Hamilcar domestic political dominance, but it is much