by Dexter Hoyos
8 below. Bomilcar last heard of in 211: Pol. 9.9.11, cf. Livy 26.20.7. Walbank,
2.230, supposes he commanded the fleet sent to Greece in 209, but this is an
assumption. Punic effort in 205 to supply Hannibal: note 11 below.
6 The campaign of 206: Pol. 11.20–33; Livy 28.12.10–16.5; Appian, Iber.
25.96–38.155; Walbank, 2.296–312; Lazenby (1978) 145–56; Corzo Sánchez
(1975) 234–40; Millán León (1986); Seibert, Hann. 404–9.
7Carthaginians less interested in Hannibal, more so in Spain: Livy 28.12.9. Mod-
erns who see Hannibal as let down by his home government include Mommsen,
HR 2.144, 146, 201; Egelhaaf (1922) 16–17, 40; Groag (1929) 104–7; Thiel
(1946) 161; Hoffmann (1962) 92–3, 98, 113, 141–2; Caven (1980) 156, 183,
257–8; Lancel (1992) 418; Seibert, Hann. 340 note 81, 369–70, 412; Santosuosso
(1997) 181–2. ‘Hannibal’s complaint’ in 203: Livy 30.20.1–4; Silius 17.187–235;
Appian, Lib. 33.138.
8 Laelius’ raid in 205 and Punic reactions: Livy 29.3.9–5.1. Mood at Carthage in
203–202: Pol. 14.9.6–10.1, 15.1.1–3.2. Carthaginians’ reaction after destruction
of the camps: 14.6.6–13; Livy 30.7.6–8. But Appian’s picture of a bellicose, fickle
and foolish citizenry, hostile even to Hannibal for not being warlike enough ( Lib.
31.131, 34.143–35.150, 38.157–9, etc.), is an obvious distortion, whether going
back to an author like Silenus or more likely a Roman annalist. Hannibal saves
Hasdrubal, Appian, Lib. 36.151. He later silences an opponent of peace: Pol.
15.19.1–3; Livy 30.37.7–9 names the man Gisco. Hasdrubal ‘the Kid’, Livy
30.42.12–21, 44.5; Appian, Lib. 34.145, also 49.213–53.228 (an improbable ora-
tion to Scipio).
9 Appian, Hann. 40.173.
10 On the tribunal of One Hundred and Four earlier: chapter VI §III. Supremacy of
Carthage’s ‘ordo iudicum’ by 196: Livy 33.46.1.
11 The debate on invading Africa: Livy 28.40.1–45.9 (‘let there be peace in Italy’,
41.9). Legions in 205: Lazenby (1978) 195. Hannibal’s Cape Lacinium inscription:
Pol. 3.33.18, 56.4; Livy 28.46.16; cf. Seibert’s comment ( Hann. 416), ‘er sah wohl
den Krieg als beendet an’. Groag (1929) 107–8 implausibly imagines it was
accompanied by unrecorded peace-overtures to the Romans. Loss of Locri:
29.6–7; de Sanctis, 3.2.499–500. Hannibal’s camp: Pliny, NH 3.95, mentions a
Castra Hannibalis on the coast near Scylletium at the narrowest part of Italy (cf.
Seibert, 417 note 24). But he spent only part of his time there, if Pol. 15.1.11 is
correct in giving him two years at Cape Lacinium; and this was at least 85 miles
(140 kilometres) from Locri. Epidemic and food shortage: Livy 28.46.15,
29.10.1. Bruttium too small to supply Punic army: 28.11.7–8 (from 206). Punic
supply fleet in 205: Livy 28.46.14 citing Coelius; Appian, Hann. 54.226 has 100
ships. The later annalist Valerius Antias (Livy, ibid. ) had the Punic fleet transport-
ing Etruscan and other booty and captives from Mago’s expedition—but Mago
was still stagnant in 205 and never in fact invaded Etruria.
12 Scipio’s invasion and early operations: de Sanctis, 3.2.502–11, 562–7; Scullard
(1970) chapter VI. Hannibal’s doings in Italy in 204–203: Livy 29.36.4–9,
30.19.10–12; Seibert, Hann. 428–9, 435, 449. Seibert rhetorically questions the
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Romans’ alleged successes in 204 over Hannibal (e.g. ‘warum griffen sie das
Lager Hannibals nicht an und trieben ihn endlich außer Landes, wenn sie so
deutlich gesiegt hatten?’, 428) but does not ask why Hannibal was still hanging on
in Italy. Cf. Groag (1929) 107, wondering why Hannibal did not even earlier leave
a lieutenant in charge and return to Carthage (to confront his supposedly hostile
government); while Huss (1985) 400 note 244 sees the leaders at Carthage still
nursing illusory hopes. Livy depicts the general as bitter about departing in 203
(30.19.12–20.9; cf. Silius 17.184–200), but this is imagination. Roman naval
forces increased in 203: Thiel (1946) 162–3.
13 Hasdrubal’s pre-eminence at Carthage by 204: chapter XII §I. Negotiations in
winter 204–203: Pol. 14.1.9; Livy 30.3.5–7; Appian, Lib. 17.69–70; Dio frg. 57.72
= Zon. 9.12.7. Appian and Dio have Spain among the lands explicitly mentioned:
probably an inference that goes back to their ultimate sources, for Spain could
not be ignored (even if Syphax and Hasdrubal might have preferred this). Hanni-
bal and Scipio before Zama: below, chapter XIV note 19. Huss (1989) struggles
to find a theme of ‘Pan-African’ solidarity in the alliance of the Carthaginians
and Syphax.
14 Scipio and countrymen aimed to limit the Carthaginians in Africa and had
geopolitical goals too (‘il dominio del mondo’, no less): de Sanctis, 3.2.510–11.
Secure peace required Hannibal’s own defeat: Scullard (1970) 125; cf. Scullard
(1980) 234 (Rome needed compensation for sufferings). Scipio himself later
claimed—or so it was said—that he would have destroyed Carthage had he had
the time; but this smacks of postwar pride and pique (Livy 30.44.3—contrast
30.36.11; cf. Scullard (1970) 155–6). Eckstein (1987) 248–9, cf. 262–3, sees it as
his original aim, in part thanks to Livy and in part because reportedly the
Carthaginians in 203 were fearing it. Casualties at Zama: Seibert, Hann. 470 note
42. Consuls’ attempts to take command in Africa: Livy 30.24.1–3 (in 203), 27.1–5
(202), 40.7–16 (201); cf. Harris (1979) 139. Attack on the camps: Lazenby (1978)
207–8 with references.
15 Thirty days for Hasdrubal and Syphax to rendezvous with new armies at Great
Plains: Pol. 14.7.9. This looks almost too short an interval: possibly Polybius
`
`
wrote the Greek numeral Ν (‘50’) and it was later miscopied as Λ (‘30’) thanks to
the initial letter of the next word, ΠΕΡΙ. The disaster at the camps was at the start
of spring (14.2.1; late February in North Africa?) and Syphax was later defeated
and captured by Masinissa on ‘22 June’ by the Roman calendar (Ovid, Fasti
6.769–70; Walbank, 2.440). Though scholars disagree over how accurate the cal-
endar then was (Derow (1976); Seibert, FzH 306), all this fits suitably. Fifty days
would put the rendezvous at the Great Plains in late April, the battle two to three
weeks later (cf. Pol. 14.8.1–4) in May, and Syphax’s capture some while after that
(for Derow, 266–8, cf. 272–3, it was 23 May). Though Syphax’s son Vermina and
some lesser chieftains held out against Masinissa and for the Carthaginians (Pol.
15.3.5–7; Livy 30.36.8; Appian, Lib. 33.139, 141) they proved of little moment.
16 Attack on Roman fleet: Pol. 14.10.6–12; Livy 30.10; Appian, Lib. 24.100–25.103,
30.127–8, calling the admiral Hamilcar but telling of two attacks. It would be a
rather typical coda if the Hasdrubal afterwards appointed admiral was still the
son of Gisco (Livy 30.24.11, 25.5; cf. Kahrstedt (1913) 558; Lazenby (1978) 330,
in Index), though Appian has the latter become a guerrilla leader and finally
commit suicide ( Lib. 24.97–8, 29.122–30.127, 36.151, 38.169; similarly Zon.
9.12.10–11, 14.10)—none of this me
ntioned by Polybius or Livy, and very pro-
Hasdrubal in flavour. The suicide may be factual since Hasdrubal now vanishes
from the record. Hanno son of Bomilcar: note 5 above. Hannibal’s nephew: de
Sanctis, 3.2.678, in Index; Picard and Picard, LDC 264; Caven (1980) 243.
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X I V D E F E A T
1 Carthage’s countryside rebellious: Pol. 14.9.5. Carthaginians decide to seek
terms, recall Barcids and prepare for siege: Pol. 14.9.7–10.1; Livy 30.9.7; Silius
17.149–83; Appian, Hann. 58.243, Lib. 31.129; other sources cited by Seibert,
Hann. 449 note 66. Carthage divided between Barcid supporters and pro-peace
anti-Barcids: de Sanctis, 3.2.519–20, 522, 532; Hoffmann (1962) 103; Warming-
ton (1964) 230–2; Picard (1967) 203; Picard and Picard, LDC 264; Scullard
(1970) 134; Caven (1980) 246. Hanno the Great’s group excluded: chapter XIII
note 8. Inner ‘sacred council’ of senate: chapter II §IV.
2 Laelius: note 6 below. Livy’s claim (30.16.14–15) that the Carthaginians negoti-
ated only to buy time may draw on Polybius, whose account of the talks does not
survive. For Seibert, ‘hatten beiden Seiten . . . kein ehrliches Spiel gespielt . . .
Beide Verhandlungspartner wollten Zeit gewinnen’, and Scipio wished ‘den
Krieg mit einem Sieg über Hannibal zu beenden’ ( Hann. 459–60, cf. 446; cf. too
Groag (1929) 108). But it suited Scipio far better to finish the war quickly, pro-
vided he could impose the terms he wanted. Senate ordered consuls of 203 to
keep Hannibal and Mago in Italy: Livy 30.21.1; cf. Hoyos (1983) 179. The consul
Caepio in 203 eager to supplant Scipio: chapter XIII note 14 above. One of
those in 202 was similarly keen: Broughton, MRR 1.319 for references.
3 Prostrate envoys: Pol. 15.1.6–7; Livy 30.16.4 supposes it a normal Punic custom;
so too Picard (1967) 203 ‘cérémonial égyptien’; Seibert, Hann. 445 note 48. The
envoys tried it again after Zama, if we can believe Appian ( Lib. 49.214) sup-
ported by hints in Polybius (15.17.1–2) and Livy (30.36.10). Envoys blamed
Hannibal: cf. chapter VI §III.
4 Scipio’s terms: Schmitt, SVA 291–3; Mantel (1991) 105–6; Scardigli (1991)
297–313; Seibert, Hann. 445–8. Appian claims that Scipio set the future bound-
ary of Punic Africa at the ‘Phoenician Trenches’ ( Lib. 32.135), but on these see
chapter XV §I.
5 Pol. 15.1.2, 8.8, and P. Rylands no. 491 (Roberts (1938) 114–17 with Plate 5), lines
2–4, on the armistice-oaths (cf. Scardigli (1991) 315); Livy 30.17 (Laelius’ arrival
at Rome), 21.1–2 (news of Barcids’ departure), 22–3 (Punic envoys face Roman
senators); Appian, Lib. 31.131–2.136; Dio, frg. 57.74 = Zon. 9.13.8. On P. Rylands
491 see M. Treu, Aegyptus 33 (1953) 30–56, with earlier bibliography; Lippold
(1963) 64–6; Walbank, 2.441–2; Lehmann (1974) 182–6; Eckstein (1987) 251–4;
Mantel (1991) 111–17, 124–8; Seibert, FzH 307–8; Hoyos (2001a). Senate
wished to keep Hannibal and Mago in Italy: note 2 above.
Seibert, Hann. 448, accepts Dio’s report of the Senate’s refusal to negotiate
while Punic armies were still in Italy, seeing it conform to ‘allgemeinem römis-
chen Usus’ ( ibid. note 60); next (453–8) he accepts most of Livy’s account, adds
to it Appian’s senatorial commission sent to Africa, and then infers from Pol.
15.1.3 and 4.8 that the Roman citizen-Assembly prodded the Senate to agree to
terms after all—but harsher ones, thereby provoking the Carthaginians to fight
on (‘Was sie erregte, war die Tatsache, daß die Römer die Begingungen
wesentlich verschärft hatten’, 457). This reconstruction is unconvincing, and in
any case the Senate’s supposedly harsher additions ( Hann. 455) to Scipio’s terms
(446–7) include a limit on the size of the Punic navy which Livy in fact ascribes
to Scipio (30.16.11) while the other additions are minor—a ban on hiring Lig-
urian and Gallic mercenaries, and a precise figure for the indemnity the
Carthaginians already knew they would have to pay.
6 ‘Scipionem in eo positam habuisse spem pacis si Hannibal et Mago ex Italia non
revocarentur’ (said Laelius and his colleague Fulvius, Livy 30.23.6). Tränkle
(1977) 237–8 sees Livy as using not Polybius, but a later author ‘der die ganze
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Geschichte stärker in einem römisch nationalen und antikarthagischen Sinne
ausgeformt hatte’, but it is likelier, as usual, that Livy draws on both Polybius and
other sources together to produce a composite—and not always well-judged—
narrative. Seibert judges the Senate’s initial rejection of the terms as genuine,
holding that Roman annalists would not invent it as this would make it
impossible for them to describe the ensuing Carthaginian attack on the food
convoy as a breach of the terms ( Hann. 454 note 94). But annalists got round this
difficulty—in Livy, Scipio accuses the enemy of violating the armistice and the
law of nations (30.25.2, 25.9–10, 37.6), not the ‘rejected’ terms; contrast Pol.
15.1.2 and 9.
7Mantel (1991) 126–7
, 133, infers Valerius Antias as Livy’s source. Coelius’ use of
Silenus: Cicero, De Divinatione 1.49, cf. chapter VIII note 18; C. B. R. Pelling,
OCD 3 355. Dramatic invention by Coelius: notably a fearsome storm that nearly
wrecks Scipio’s crossing to Africa in 204, whereas all other sources give him a
calm sea (Livy 29.27.14–15 = Coelius, frg. 40P; cf. P. G. Walsh, Livy: His Historical
Aims and Methods (Cambridge 1963) 132; Badian (1966) 16). Silius borrows the
storm for Hannibal’s crossing in 203 (17.236–91). On Valerius Antias and other
annalists see, e.g., Badian (1966).
8 Hannibal now in Africa: Pol. 15.1.10–11, cf. 15.3.5. Leaves Italy: Livy 30.20.5;
Appian, Hann. 58.243; Lib. 31.129; Thiel (1946) 170–1; Seibert, Hann. 450–1.
Thiel thinks that the interval between summons and departure points to Hanni-
bal having to build the ships. Capture of Syphax: chapter XIII note 15. Summons
to Hannibal: note 1 above. Chronology: de Sanctis, 3.2.571–2. Scipio’s forces and
fleet in 204: Lazenby (1978) 203; Seibert, Hann. 432.
9 Massacre: Diod. 27.9; Livy 30.20.6 (but contrast 42.3.6); Appian, Hann. 59.249;
cf. chapter VIII §IV. Silius, interestingly, has no massacre (17.158–202). Kukofka
(1990) 149 is disposed to believe one did occur; Connolly (1981) blames it on the
Romans after Hannibal’s exit. Horses: Diodorus (3,000) and Appian (4,000), ibid. ;
cf. Seibert, Hann. 432 Both Diodorus (27.10) and Appian ( Lib. 33.140) then tell
an implausible tale of Hannibal in Africa massacring 4,000 Numidian cavalry
deserters from Masinissa to acquire their horses. Polybius on mutiny-free expedi-
tion, 11.19.3–5, 23.13.1–2; echoed by Diod. 29.19, Livy 28.12.3–4.
10 Mago’s death: Livy 30.19.5. Nepos reports him still alive in 195 ( Hann. 7.3–4, 8.2;
accepted by Seibert, Hann. 448 note 63, 513–14) but Polybius’ and Livy’s details
of the Zama campaign—and Livy’s account of Hannibal’s sufetate in 196—
know nothing of him, while Dio, frg. 56.77 (= Zon. 9.13.10), has the
Carthaginians before Zama send him back
to Italy! Cf. de Sanctis, 3.2.526 note
151, 604; below, chapter XV note 16.
11 Carthaginian urgings to Hannibal: Pol. 15.5.1–2. Hannibal’s niece: chapter XIII
§I. The ousted Mazaetullus fled to Punic territory with his puppet king, before
returning to Numidia under assurances from Masinissa and against Punic wishes
(Livy 29.30.10–13). Tychaeus: Pol. 15.3.5–7, cf. Appian, Lib. 33.139; Walbank,
2.444. ‘Mesotylus’: Appian, Lib. 33.141, accepted by Lazenby (1978) 217–18.
Appian imagines Syphax’s son Vermina bringing aid too—but in reality he
arrived only after Zama (Livy 30.36.7–8; Seibert, Hann. 472).
12 Fresh supplies to Scipio: Scardigli (1991) 336 note 174 sees the Carthaginians as
obliged to keep Scipio supplied, but this is not what Livy (30.16.12) reports. Pro-
vision-fleets sent in early spring 202: Thiel (1946) 174; Walbank, 2.441. In
January, i.e. winter: Kahrstedt (1913) 557–8, 560 note 1, implausibly. Roman
transports seized, Livy 30.24.5–12. It is not likely that the transports reaching
Aegimurus could be seen from Carthage 30 miles (50 kilometres) away (despite
Livy, Thiel (1946) 174, et alii), though this would be true of those driven ashore at
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Aquae Calidae on the Cape Bon coast near modern Korbous. Tribulations of
Scipio’s envoys: Pol. 15.1.3–2.15; Livy 30.25.1–10; Appian, Lib. 34.144–5. These
episodes a Roman fabrication to justify Scipio’s renewal of hostilities: Hoffmann
(1941) 279–82; M. Treu, Aegyptus 33 (1953) 48–53; Lippold (1963) 64–5; Huss
(1985) 414 note 90; Seibert, Hann. 458–9. Yet the Carthaginians had recalled
Hannibal so as to renew hostilities (thus too Seibert, 457–8) and he was now in
Africa, so Roman tradition had no need to invent a pretext for Scipio to do so (cf.
note 6). Besides, Scipio’s preliminary peace-terms after Zama included compen-
sation for Punic ‘misdeeds’ during the armistice (Pol. 15.18.3; Livy 30.37.6 more
specifically writes of compensation for the seizures; cf. Eckstein (1987) 259). See
also Appendix §13.
13 Attitudes at Carthage: Pol. 15.2.2–3; Diod. 27.11.1; Appian, Iber. 34.143–5,
35.149–50; cf. Livy 30.24.10–11. Fabius Pictor’s anti-Barcid claims: chapter VI
§III. That the return of the forces from Italy cast a supposed ‘peace party’ out of
